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ABSTRACT 
David Llewelyn Parry 
Behavioural Reactions of Managers Towards Airline Operations Performance In 
Times of Crisis and Growth 
This research was undertaken in the United States within two different regional airlines 
and examines the attitudes and behaviours of managers to operations performance 
measurement and review (PMR) systems during separate periods of crisis and growth.  
The aim and objectives were to examine whether managers would consciously adopt 
the necessary attitudes and behaviours that are required to positively interact with a 
PMR system and to further examine what these behaviours should be. A secondary 
aim was to understand whether the prevailing business state of crisis or growth 
affected the attitudes and behaviours of managers as they used the PMR system.  
The research spanned seven years and was conducted over four iterative cycles within 
an Action Research paradigm and used semi-structured interviews and repertory grids 
to examine individual personal construct systems. The research is essentially 
qualitative but draws on quantitative techniques where appropriate.   
The research has shown that people do not automatically adopt the behaviours 
necessary to achieve performance goals. Unless there is structure, support and an 
inherent commitment to training managers on how to, correctly, interpret operations 
performance data then there is likely to be an uncommitted and uninformed response 
to the PMR system. The research has confirmed that both business states of crisis and 
growth can have a positive impact on some people and encourage them to adopt 
performance-driven behaviour.  
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Chapter One 
1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research project and a 
discussion behind the motivation and background to the work reported with additional 
detail that is relevant to setting the scene for the overall research. Additionally, it 
provides an introduction to the design of the research, its justification, the boundaries of 
the project and its aims and objectives. It concludes with an outline of the structure of 
the dissertation. 
The central theme of this research was to examine the behavioural reactions of 
managers to the implementation and use of performance measurement and review 
(PMR) systems in times of crisis and growth. 
I decided to write this thesis in the first person because it details my experiences as a 
practitioner and researcher while I was actively, and intimately, involved in several 
change initiatives as the research cycles unfolded. This provides enhanced context to 
the storytelling to use a first person perspective, especially as the research was 
conducted using a participant methodology. 
1.1 Background 
The research presented in this thesis takes place against the backdrop of the regional 
airline industry in the United States during the period 2003-2010. It was initially 
undertaken in an attempt to make a positive contribution to the flight operations 
performance of the regional airline for which I was working, after our survival was 
threatened by our parent company following a major crisis in the airline industry that 
resulted from the acts of terrorism in September 2001. The research was later 
expanded to another regional airline. 
In order to better understand the term “regional airline”, and to set the stage for the 
research project, it is important to make a distinction here that there are essentially 
three specific business models for mass air transportation in the United States: 
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1. Major legacy carriers such as Northwest Airlines, Delta Airlines, American 
Airlines, United Airlines and US Airways 
2. Low Cost Carriers (LCC) such as Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, AirTran 
Airways, Spirit Airlines, and more recently, Virgin America 
3. Regional airlines such as Allegheny Airlines, Pinnacle Airlines, Mesa Airlines, 
Chautauqua Airlines, Mesaba Airlines, Atlantic Southeast Airlines  and SkyWest 
Airlines 
The regional airline industry is a very lean and low cost operation that focuses on 
providing short-haul feeder service to the mainline hubs on behalf of the major airlines 
and accounts for approximately 50% of the nation’s commercial airline flights. This 
amounts to more than 15,000 regional airline flights per day operated by a fleet of more 
than 2,700 regional aircraft, which is almost one-third of the US commercial passenger 
fleet. Regional airlines carry in excess of 150 million passengers per year, which 
represents more than one in every five domestic airline passenger (Regional Airline 
Association 2005).  
For example, Pinnacle Airlines provided a service of approximately 800 flights per day 
throughout the eastern half of the United States and Canada that fed passengers into 
the major hub airports for Northwest Airlines. These flights were operated with a fleet of 
50-seat regional jets and were flown under the brand Northwest Airlink, which was the 
name given to flights operated on behalf of Northwest Airlines. This offered a seamless 
service for the passenger between the mainline carrier and the regional airline. In this 
example, Pinnacle Airlines provided service into the hubs of Minneapolis, Detroit and 
Memphis, which is representative of a ‘hub and spoke’ system whereby the airline 
provides passengers with service to most cities within the country by connecting them 
through a central point. Rather than having an overabundance of direct flights to small 
markets, an airline can achieve far greater synergies by delivering passengers into a 
major hub and then connecting them to their destination. As an example, a passenger 
flying from a small community in the south, say, Fort Walton Beach in Florida, who 
wished to travel to San Francisco on the west coast, could take a flight on Northwest 
Airlines to its hub in Memphis and then connect to another larger aircraft for the onward 
journey to San Francisco. Additionally, having a large hub means that passengers can 
be more effectively fed to services with much larger aircraft travelling overseas. This 
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hub and spoke system also allows the ability to easily re-route passengers when the 
airline’s operating schedule is disrupted.  
The service that a regional airline provides is, by its nature, a rather intense operation. 
Most flights are relatively short in length, typically between thirty minutes to two hours, 
and each aircraft may operate as many as 10 flights per day. This rapid succession of 
flights does not leave much margin for errors or delays. Passengers connecting to 
long-haul flights can be significantly inconvenienced if their flight to the hub airport is 
delayed and they miss their connection. It is therefore of the utmost importance that 
these flights operate according to the published schedule. As we will see later, the 
notion of measuring performance is critical for an airline to maintain this kind of 
reliability and consistency and this provides a tremendous challenge requiring a host of 
resources to manage the daily operation effectively. 
One thing that is undeniably true about the airline industry is that it is full of challenge, 
diversity, crisis and growth. Indeed, during my career to date I have not experienced 
anything quite like this before. I began my career in England during the 1980’s working 
in an unrelated industry before embarking on a dramatic path change that led me to 
settle in the United States and to immerse myself in the airline industry. What has been 
so startlingly different is the “living for the day” approach to airline operations. Anything 
that took place yesterday rapidly becomes ancient history by the following day simply 
because the focus, of all those employed within the logistics side of the business, is on 
the day of operation to ensure that the schedule remains intact during the inevitable 
and numerous disruptions that occur. It is fair to say that no two days are the same and 
that we often propel ourselves from one crisis to another, either within the context of 
isolated problems related to a single flight, or indeed in much broader terms to that of 
the airline, or even the industry as a whole.  
In addition, economic and political variables have a profound impact on the aviation 
community. The industry is truly global, not just by the very nature that the reach and 
influence of air transportation is obviously worldwide, but by the fact that the same 
principles and processes apply; that is, the fundamental requirement for safety and 
operational excellence. This must be maintained despite highly competitive, and at 
times cutthroat, conditions.  
At the time that I commenced this research, the World in general was singularly 
focused on terrorism. This was in the recent aftermath of September 11th (2001) and 
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the ‘shoe bomber’ incident (December 2001). Economically, the industry had been on a 
slow decline for an extended period, but this was exacerbated by this unique event and 
threw the industry into chaos, and a significant slump, that saw the eventual demise of 
some long-established airlines. Competition and the energetic struggle for market 
share took on new heights as airlines rapidly struggled for survival. 
My research has spanned a seven year time period from 2003 to 2010 and comprised 
two studies within the Flight Operations department of two prominent regional airlines 
whose fortunes followed opposite paths after the events of 9/11. The primary vehicle 
for my research centred around the implementation and use of performance 
measurement and review systems (PMR). It further explored how managers behaved 
when presented with a formal measurement and review process that required them to 
understand operations performance metrics while simultaneously dealing with their 
company being either in turmoil or in a period of prolonged growth. 
A PMR system in this context is a structured process that identifies and measures the 
key aspects of performance that are considered important or decisive to the success of 
the airline and then presents the performance results in a visual and interpretive way to 
allow critical review, discussion and development of action plans. The foundation of the 
system is the identification of critical success factors (CSFs), which are the 
performance outcomes that are essential to the survival of the airline. These CSFs are 
then developed into a series of key performance indicators (KPIs) that are used as the 
primary metrics of the system. This in turn provides insight to how effectively and 
efficiently the CSFs are being met. 
The first two cycles of research, were conducted at Allegheny Airlines, a mature 
regional airline that was a wholly owned subsidiary of US Airways. Allegheny suffered 
negatively after the terrorism attacks in 2001, and the continued threats of terrorism, 
largely because the parent airline, US Airways, had fallen victim to unfavourable 
economic conditions. The second two cycles of research were conducted at Pinnacle 
Airlines, an independent regional airline that was able to prosper during the very 
difficult phase that followed 9/11.  
Each of these cycles involved gathering and analysing data that examined the 
response, reaction and thoughts of managers and directors to the implementation of a 
performance measurement and review system, and then their use of, and engagement 
18 
 
with the system, with the examination of their attitudes and behaviours forming the 
backbone of the research.  
The approach that I adopted provided a unique perspective and an interesting 
opportunity for me, because as a new director I was eager to gain an in-depth 
understanding of how my colleagues understood and responded to operations 
performance, and to be able to share this insight and experience with my direct reports 
who were not well-versed in operations performance measurement.  
It was apparent from the beginning of my tenure at Allegheny Airlines that my role as 
the Director of the Operations Control Centre (OCC) would not only allow me a great 
deal of latitude in running the daily operations of the airline, but that I would also be 
accountable for the results. Therefore, it was of critical importance to make the best 
and most informed decisions possible. This can only be achieved with consistency 
when those who are charged with making operational decisions universally understand 
the relationships between the performance variables. It was at this point that my 
interest took sharper focus and I decided to pursue a line of inquiry into the nature of 
performance measurement at Allegheny to see what my colleagues thought about it, 
and how they perceived that their roles influenced operational performance. This began 
a long and winding journey of research that has been condensed and captured into this 
thesis. By attempting to understand the behaviours of others and to gain an insight into 
the deeply rooted mechanics of operational logistics, I hoped that it would allow me to 
become a better manager and also provide the opportunity to enlighten others on the 
cause and effect relationships between various flight operations events and their 
associated metrics. 
1.1.1 Airline Operations Performance 
Measuring operational performance is a vital component of a formal performance 
measurement system in most companies, but it becomes even more pronounced for 
airlines because they live and die by the reliability of their flight operation, which in turn 
has a direct impact on financial performance. 
The United States Department of Transportation (DOT), publishes a monthly Air 
Transport Report, which measures such items as on-time arrivals and lost baggage, 
and in turn holds the industry to high standards of output quality, and especially safety. 
These external standards serve to benchmark each airline’s operational performance 
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against its competitors, but the internal factors behind each airline’s operational output 
are not generally known to the other airlines, or detailed in the report. More insightful 
information, and finely detailed performance data in particular, remain closely guarded 
by airlines, but these DOT statistics do effectively rate airlines against one another and 
allows the General Public to evaluate the relative performance of each airline. 
However, the reports can only show the end-results of each airline’s efforts during a 
given month. In order to understand the true determinants of operational performance it 
is necessary to examine processes embedded deep within the organisation that are in 
many cases far removed from the final service offered to the customer. 
On the day of operation, all efforts at planning and preparation naturally reach their 
fruition and it is then left to the actions and efforts of the front line personnel, such as 
pilots, flight attendants, airport staff and the central operations management centre to 
run the airline as smoothly as possible. All of this, of course, involves human 
interaction, which can stumble as frequently and dramatically as any other human 
endeavour. By relying in very large part on human involvement, the attitudes and 
behaviours adopted by employees can have a very significant and profound impact on 
the end-result. These attitudes and behaviours, therefore, seem to be critical to the 
survival of any airline because it is this resultant effort, brought about by its employees, 
that produces its reputation with the public, be it good or bad, and that reputation can 
be indelible, as many now defunct airlines have discovered. 
1.1.2 The Human Factor: Behaviours and Attitudes 
During my career, and in particular my formative years in aviation it struck me that the 
effectiveness of individual departments, divisions or indeed companies seemed to be 
far more dependent on the attitudes and behaviours adopted by its personnel than to 
the views espoused by senior management. It became apparent to me that the 
inherent culture within the company dictated whether people would adopt the attitude of 
just simply working to receive their paycheque, or the attitude of striving to go ‘above 
and beyond’ on a consistent, basis. The second of these two attitudes, implying some 
level of constant improvement, relies very heavily on individuals feeling appreciated 
and knowing that their work is of value. I have experienced company cultures where 
pressure was exerted by senior management in the form of veiled, or even outright, 
threats, and consequently attitudes change dramatically for the worse and behaviours 
decline. There are of course times when people need to feel pressured to work harder, 
but this should be used constructively and wisely. 
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I have seen, and been on the receiving end of, different approaches to the objective of 
trying to obtain good performance. It has been my experience that when desired 
behaviours are nurtured and fostered, people tend to respond positively, but when they 
are forced, the result can be a decline in morale and an erosion of performance. 
Maintaining a reasonably high level of motivation allows individuals to engage 
positively and constructively with problems when they arise.  
These differing personal experiences and opinions, and the psychological reaction of 
how individuals respond to various motivational stimuli, became an interesting personal 
study for me and I wanted to know if my views remained valid in other situations. These 
personal beliefs grew from 10 years of experience (at that time, 2003) of working in 
America. Being British and spending the first part of my career in Britain I was used to 
a rather different culture. The American way of doing things was initially at odds with 
my approach; a great deal of big talk and lofty goals, but with an undeniably effective 
“can do” attitude. However, this big talk did not always tally with reality and sometimes 
yielded results that were far less than expected, often at the expense of the people 
involved. 
This interest in the attitudes and behaviour of employees also led me to adopt a 
psychological slant (see repertory grid technique in chapter three) to the research 
project that in turn provided intriguing insight into human nature and the way in which 
we make sense of things.  
1.2 Research Overview 
The motivation for the research stemmed directly from my involvement in a weekly 
‘airline performance review meeting’, which was imposed on the managers and 
directors at Allegheny Airlines, my employer at the time. Our parent company’s 
management oversight body, known as US Airways Express Division, conducted the 
review and they expected that the key operations managers and directors from each 
Express Division carrier would participate in it. This was a new concept for many of the 
directors I was working with and there was an apparent, and at times very obvious, lack 
of understanding of performance measurement in general. At this realisation, I began 
to question how we could actually be effective as managers without having an in-depth 
knowledge and understanding of the measurement of operations performance. This led 
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me to embark on a professional doctorate (DBA) at Bournemouth University to learn 
how to conduct research, and develop my understanding of the subject matter. 
Performance measurement is very important in the service chain because all actions 
leading up to delivery of the service incrementally affect the intrinsic value and quality 
of the final product. It is from this reasoning that the research focussed on performance 
measurement during the preparation and initial delivery of the service process, rather 
than purely on service quality as determined by the customer after the event had taken 
place. I have not considered financial performance because it is outside of the scope of 
this project, but obviously financial performance is a very important element in overall 
company performance. In fact at British Airways during the 1990’s “financial and 
service performance were measured side by side to keep the quality and cost ratio in 
balance” (Street 1994, p.16). It is certainly recognised, that the airline industry places a 
great deal of emphasis on financial performance, especially following 9/11, but for this 
study, I have concentrated on the execution of the flight schedule, and the events that 
take place during the operating day, which are, collectively referred to here as 
‘operations performance’. 
This study was worth undertaking because at the time of its commencement, the airline 
in question was facing a major crisis that required it to improve operational 
performance in order to survive.  
The value of this research lies in the knowledge, skills and individual learning acquired 
by the people who participated in the project. The knowledge and insight gained during 
this project may help inform similar organisations that need to address operations 
performance by providing a basis from which they can consider the attitudes and 
behaviours of management staff in order to approach or modify their performance 
measurement processes. 
The research was undertaken using the methodology of Action Research because of 
its suitability for practitioner research. It involved four iterative cycles of data-gathering 
and analysis across two separate and distinctly different regional airlines in the United 
States.  
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1.2.1 Cycles 1 and 2: Allegheny Airlines (Crisis) 
During 9/11, when an unprecedented act of terrorism on American soil shook the 
World, I was working in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania for Allegheny Airlines a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of US Airways. This parent company, US Airways, was in turn one of the 
United States major legacy carriers. Allegheny’s fortunes were tied to the performance 
of US Airways, and as such, the airline had little financial latitude. Allegheny’s role was 
to provide regional airline service within the Northeast region of the United States from 
spoke airports into the major hub airports of Philadelphia, New York’s LaGuardia 
airport, and Pittsburgh. US Airways provided the route structure and operating 
schedules and Allegheny’s job was to ensure that it maintained schedule integrity and 
reliability. 
Allegheny had been operating under increasingly difficult conditions even prior to the 
acts of terrorism on September 11th 2001. The economic downturn in the aviation 
industry following the events of 9/11 ultimately forced the parent company (US 
Airways) into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in August 2002. The United States 
Constitution and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 permits bankruptcy in the United 
States. Chapter 11 of this code allows a company to receive bankruptcy protection by 
allowing the debtor to keep some or all of their property and to use future earnings to 
pay off creditors.  
During this time it became evident that there had been mismanagement of the parent 
airline for a number of years, but 9/11 served as the catalyst to force the company to 
re-examine its deficiencies and embark on a course of significant restructuring. By filing 
for protection under the U.S. bankruptcy laws, it allowed the airline to formally address 
its need to restructure, while receiving protection from its creditors. The objective was 
to enable it to downsize to a level that could sustain profitability in the longer term. This 
change effort resulted in numerous furloughs (redundancies), station closings, a 
reduced flight schedule and the return of aircraft to their leasing companies. However, 
an aggressive restructuring plan was devised and implemented by a newly appointed 
CEO, and the airline successfully emerged from bankruptcy after a mere seven months 
at the end of March 2003. This was a record in the United States for a major 
corporation to restructure under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code and emerge as a 
viable concern. However, its haste would also prove to be its undoing. Shortly after it 
emerged from bankruptcy, the war with Iraq began in earnest and once again, the 
airline was forced to enter Chapter 11 in September 2004. This made it vitally important 
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for US Airways to more effectively address the economic and operational performance 
of its subsidiaries.  
My research project began in 2003, following US Airways’ first bankruptcy and became 
important in understanding the determinants of operational success. This would allow 
the subsidiary to examine its performance relative to the goals set by the parent airline 
by implementing an operations PMR system. It would be imperative to improve 
operational performance in order to survive.  
1.2.2 Cycles 3 and 4: Pinnacle Airlines (Growth) 
The second two cycles of research took place at a larger regional airline that was not a 
wholly owned subsidiary of a major carrier. Pinnacle Airlines was an independent 
airline that provided regional jet service to two customers: Northwest Airlines (NWA) 
and Delta Airlines (DAL) and had therefore much greater latitude in deciding how to 
conduct business. 
When I began my tenure with the airline in November 2004, Pinnacle was already in a 
state of growth and was continuing to take deliveries of new aircraft to place into 
service for Northwest Airlines. At this time, they had a fleet of 99 CRJ200 regional jets. 
This fleet would continue to increase over the course of the following year to reach 145 
jets.  
In December 2007, Pinnacle began service for a second customer, Delta Airlines, by 
beginning the deployment of 16 CRJ900 aircraft. The addition of the Delta business 
was a new phase of growth for Pinnacle and stemmed from a deal that was negotiated 
after Northwest Airlines was forced to enter bankruptcy protection in 2006: a common 
theme amongst US airlines. One specific result from the bankruptcy was that Pinnacle 
Airlines was due a considerable sum of money, $120 million, which Northwest was 
granted relief from paying as part of the terms of its bankruptcy protection. Additionally, 
the Airline Service Agreement (ASA) that Pinnacle had been operating under, which 
was the contract for the provision of air service that it had with NWA, was put on the 
table for renegotiation. This allowed the negotiators at Pinnacle some advantage and 
they were able to release the restriction previously placed upon Pinnacle that required 
it to serve just one customer, namely Northwest Airlines. In so doing, Pinnacle was 
then able to bid on additional business. This occurred at a time when many of the 
major carriers were offering requests for proposals (RFPs) to the regional airlines in the 
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hope of reducing costs by sub-contracting some of their flight schedule. Pinnacle was 
successful in winning the Delta business and began a further round of growth.  
When I arrived at Pinnacle, it was clear that operational performance was at the 
forefront of the airline’s culture. Indeed Pinnacle had a reputation for being one of the 
best performing airlines in North America in terms of on-time departures, arrivals and 
completion factor; three metrics that are considered as the cornerstones of operational 
performance. However, although the airline was indeed successful at delivering good 
performance results, the performance review process was limited to the senior 
management group and not divulged or disseminated to a larger group of employees. 
This presented a good opportunity for me to introduce a similar system to the one I 
implemented at Allegheny; namely to formalise our review of performance statistics 
weekly with the managers that had direct control or influence over them. This became 
the Weekly SOC (System Operations Centre) Managers Meeting and gave me an ideal 
opportunity to continue my research by refining the performance process and 
observing the behaviours and attitudes of those who had to engage with it.  
The data gathering at Pinnacle followed the same approach that I adopted at 
Allegheny, and both pursued the overall aim of better understanding the structure of 
the performance measurement process and the behaviours and attitudes of managers 
and directors.  
The results of these various implementations across both carriers form the conclusions 
to this thesis. 
1.3 Justification 
The justification for this research can be separated into three areas.  
Firstly, the business justification was an attempt to assist with the survival of Allegheny 
Airlines, the airline at the centre of the first two cycles of enquiry, and further to engage 
the flight operations management team in understanding the determinants of 
operations performance results. During the third and fourth cycles, it was to apply the 
previously gained knowledge to a different setting and management team and provide 
them with the opportunity to materially improve their ability to measure, understand and 
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interpret performance results. These were all expected to have benefits to professional 
practice. 
Secondly, the academic justification was to provide deeper understanding of the 
human behavioural reactions to PMR systems, which is a subject that has only been 
lightly covered in previous research and literature. 
Finally, my personal justification was an inherent interest in the subject of human 
behaviours and the desire to provide a structured way to advance my own knowledge 
and education. 
My position within each airline gave me access to the employees and processes that 
were involved in the daily operation and allowed a unique perspective into their 
thoughts and actions over several years.  
1.4 Scope 
The research examined a specific area of performance measurement that relates to the 
individuals charged with managing flight operations performance. In particular, it 
focused on attitudes and behaviours towards imposed performance measurement 
systems and collaboratively designed performance measurement systems. It then 
linked this to how the external environment of crisis and growth affected the ability and 
motivation of managers, either to engage with such a system for survival of the airline, 
or to facilitate efficient growth. 
To better frame the scope of this research, I have listed below explanations of the main 
areas of concentration during the research project:  
• Operations performance directly concerns the daily flight operations of each 
airline, and encompasses the results of the activities produced by all employees 
engaged within the operational side of the business. This includes all functions 
performed by staff within the centralised operations control centre (OCC) and all 
employees in the field: pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and airport workers. 
Operations performance in this context does not cover the performance results 
of such functions as Finance, Information Technology (IT), Human Resources 
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(HR) or any other support function that is not directly involved in operating the 
daily flight schedule.  
However, it is acknowledged, that these functions do have an influence on 
operations performance if they are unable to effectively accomplish their own 
objectives. For example, if HR is unable to attract and recruit sufficient new 
pilots then there is a significant risk that the airline will not be able to fly its 
published schedule. Likewise, if IT is unable to provide responsive and expert 
technical assistance then critical operations systems may be in jeopardy of 
failure, or a partial outage, that would prevent the airline from operating. 
Additionally, if Finance is unable to secure investment capital for future 
expansion, or replacement of aging aircraft and support equipment, then airline 
performance and the level of service provided could be restricted. Similarly, a 
failure to maintain an efficient and timely Accounts Payable function could lead 
to a suspension of critical services provided by vendors, such as aircraft 
fuelling, ground equipment and ad-hoc maintenance. This could not only affect 
operations performance but could put the entire airline at risk. Collectively all 
departments within a service industry, even if they are far removed from the 
final product, have an influential and important role to play.   
• The introduction and use of the PMR systems was limited to the Flight 
Operations departments (cycles one, two and three) or other departments that 
were responsible for operations performance (cycle four), rather than the 
support functions mentioned above 
• ‘Attitude’ refers to the voiced and/or demonstrated opinions and feelings that 
the interviewees exhibited to their working life and specifically the measurement 
of operations performance, rather than their much broader attitudes and beliefs 
to life and work in general 
• ‘Behaviour’ refers to the actions and conduct displayed by the interviewees to 
the PMR systems and other external factors, such as the states of crisis and 
growth 
• Crisis and growth refers to the prevailing climate state that each business was 
experiencing and represents the larger overall influences being exerted upon 
the airline by either internal or external factors 
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The primary aim was to gain a clear picture of how attitudes and behaviours can affect 
the effective use of a PMR system in a flight operations department, and to identify 
which attitudes and behaviours are fundamentally necessary for the performance 
measurement system to be successful. The research does not focus on a specific 
problem but rather seeks to identify and explain how managers work with PMR 
systems during separate periods of crisis and growth. 
A series of objectives was designed to achieve this aim, which are detailed in the next 
section. They involved introducing formal operations PMR systems at both airlines and 
gathering data to identify the behaviours exhibited as the managers responded to their 
role in the measurement of operations performance. 
The research has been designed around a practitioner (insider management) 
perspective and thus allowed me the unique prospect to explore these changes from 
inside the organisations and to gather both formal and informal reactions over time.  
1.5 Aims and Objectives 
When I initially set out to conduct this research it was with the goal of examining the 
involvement of my colleagues at Allegheny Airlines in a performance measurement and 
review process that I designed and implemented and to understand their consequent 
behaviours.  However as time went by, I was presented with an opportunity to continue 
this research into another airline, Pinnacle Airlines, and to build upon the outcomes of 
the first study. This eventually led to four separate research cycles of data gathering 
and analyses across the two airlines. 
The primary aims of the research project were to examine how measuring operations 
performance was actually practiced, and understood, by the managers and directors 
who had responsibility for the daily flight operation following the introduction of a 
performance measurement system. In particular, I wanted to concentrate on what 
impact their prevailing attitudes and behaviours had on the overall success and 
acceptance of the system. To do so required seeking an understanding of how these 
managers and directors initially responded to an imposed PMR system, which was 
then hoped to result in a clear picture of the attitudes and behaviours that can affect the 
effective use of a PMR system.  
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The following overall objectives were identified in an attempt to achieve these aims and 
were all designed to take place during the design, implementation, use, and refinement 
of operations performance measurement and review (PMR) systems. They were 
further magnified in each separate cycle of research to provide a specific structure for 
that cycle. Therefore, the following chapters that cover each research cycle contain a 
sub-set of these objectives that were specifically relevant to that cycle. 
1. Design and introduce a formal operations performance measurement and 
review (PMR) process 
2. Examine how individual managers view and understand the measurement of 
operations performance and how it relates to their everyday job following the 
implementation of the PMR system by conducting semi-structured interviews 
3. Investigate how each manager assessed the behavioural reactions of their 
colleagues in response to, and engagement with, a PMR system by conducting 
rep grid interviews 
4. Identify the displayed attitudes and behaviours of the managers who are 
required to engage with a PMR system by conducting repertory grid interviews  
5. Discover what effect the underlying business state of crisis or growth had on the 
managers’ attitudes and behaviours to a PMR system 
6. Draw conclusions on the value of the employee, as a stakeholder having 
responsibility for operations performance, to the success of a PMR system 
Achieving these objectives would require close contact with the people involved, and 
continual access over a considerable period of time, to allow time to design, implement and 
use a PMR system and then to gather data from the subject group for analysis. It would 
also require a qualitative methodology that would allow an inductive and interpretive 
approach. 
1.5.1 Achieving the Objectives 
The introduction of the PMR systems was to focus attention on the critical processes 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992), and the determinants of success (Fitzgerald et al. 1991) 
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that have the greatest impact on service output, and hence overall operational 
performance. To do this required capturing the results of the primary activities of 
operating an airline. A performance measurement system loosely modelled on a 
balanced scorecard framework (Kaplan and Norton 1996a) was chosen as an 
appropriate structure to use because it promotes measures across a broad range of 
activities that represent the leading and lagging indicators of performance. The notion 
of developing measures in four distinct categories (financial, customer satisfaction, 
internal processes and learning and growth) had direct relevance to the need of the 
airline to address measurement at all levels throughout the Flight Operations 
department. 
My personal objective, which became a very significant part of the research project for 
me, was to improve practice and to provide guidance by actively coaching the 
managers and directors who are responsible for performance metrics, or who are 
required to attend formal performance review meetings. Performance management 
systems seek to substantially improve and optimise company performance by 
developing metrics that measure key processes and inform decision making (Kaplan 
and Norton 1996b). However, the methods can be complex and do not provide 
guidance on the human elements necessary for understanding and engaging with 
these systems. It was therefore important for me to disseminate knowledge and assist 
people in becoming more familiar with performance measurement and to provide 
guidance on how to understand the underlying drivers behind individual metrics.  
1.6 Thesis Structure 
Following this chapter, a literature review of performance measurement, is presented in 
Chapter Two, which examines the previous research in the field and why I have used it 
to inform this research and as a framework for analysis. 
Chapter Three details the design of the research. Action Research is justified as an 
appropriate methodology from which to conduct the research, and the methods used 
for data coding and analysis are presented. Philosophical, ethical and other 
considerations, such as bias, are also discussed. 
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Chapter Four contains the initial and fundamental first cycle of research which then 
informed, and shaped, subsequent cycles. It is presented in-depth and provides a rich 
and detailed overview of the research situation, problems and outcomes. 
Chapter Five outlines the events of the second cycle and illustrates the Repertory Grid 
method of personal construct elicitation and analysis. 
Chapter Six and Seven cover the third and fourth cycles of research and moves the 
research setting to another airline. 
Chapter Eight contains a discussion of the findings from all four research cycles and 
examines these findings from an academic and practitioner standpoint.  
Chapter Nine discusses the contribution to knowledge and in particular the contribution 
to professional practice along with insight to the individual learning that was 
experienced during this research process. 
Chapter Ten concludes the research project, makes recommendations for further 
research, and contains my personal reflections on the entire research process. 
 Additional information is contained in the appendices to substantiate and expand upon 
the data presented. 
1.7 Footnote 
Allegheny Airlines, the airline at the centre of the first two cycles of research, became a 
victim of the second Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing at US Airways and was successfully 
merged with its sister company, Piedmont Airlines, in 2005. Thus, all efforts at 
improving performance at Allegheny were ultimately in vain. Most of the personnel 
dispersed within the industry and, unfortunately, all that remains from the performance 
measurement intervention is this underlying research study and the knowledge and 
experience that the various individuals gained during a very difficult period of turmoil for 
them. 
Pinnacle Airlines continues to operate well and successfully and performance 
measurement initiatives are continually being refined. Additionally, I am trying to build 
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upon this knowledge to further the application and understanding of human 
engagement with performance measurement.  
1.8 Summary 
This chapter introduced the reader to the research and briefly summarised the main 
content of the thesis and its structure. It has established that the primary focus is on 
understanding the attitudes and behaviours of managers when they are required to 
engage with PMR systems, and therefore to contribute to professional practice and a 
seeming gap in the literature. 
32 
 
Chapter Two 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter introduces the field of performance measurement and discusses the 
literature applicable to the research project and why it has been used as a framework 
for inquiry and analysis. 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature consulted throughout this project falls squarely within the field of 
performance measurement, and more specifically the behavioural reactions to the 
implementation and use of PMR systems. 
In my initial evaluation of the field of performance measurement and management, I 
discovered that there was a vast body of literature covering so many other related and 
sometimes cross-over aspects of performance that it was not possible to give adequate 
attention to them without being unwieldy and overly complex. In order for it to make 
sense, and to make it manageable, my review of the literature is concise and has been 
confined to providing an overview of the most applicable areas that comprise the 
following subjects in a logical sequence: 
• Defining performance measurement 
• Discussing performance measurement 
• Design of performance measurement systems 
• Communicating strategy through performance measurement systems 
• Implementation of performance measurement systems 
• Service quality as it relates to airlines 
• People management, culture and management style as they are exhibited in 
the attitudes and behaviours displayed by managers and employees.  
This last aspect of the performance literature was the most relevant to the topic under 
research. I have also limited my exploration of business performance measurement to 
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the last two decades because that is where the most advances in the subject have 
been made. The chapter concludes with a section that ties all of this together and 
presents a framework around which the research took place. 
2.2 Defining and Positioning Performance Measurement 
What is performance measurement? In order to bring perspective to this subject it is 
worth examining the bare bones of what performance measurement actually means.  
On the face of it, it sounds straightforward enough and suggests that it is a method by 
which to gauge how something has been carried out, or performed. But, how does one 
accomplish this and how does it relate to running a business? If we take a brief 
moment to consider the immensely broad and open-ended subject of how a business 
operates, it is not a very big leap to conclude that all businesses, by default, must 
measure things. They have to do this in order to actually make sense of what they are 
doing as an entity and to remain solvent.  Whether this measurement is a cash flow, a 
return on investment, or an inventory count, it requires some form of monitoring. When 
we then take this a logical step further, we find that in order to make further sense of 
things a business needs to calculate and appraise the variance, or performance, 
between two measurements to see how a dimension has changed over a period of 
time. In simple form, this could be the difference between an opening and closing 
balance, the time taken to make a product, or the fluctuation in the price of stocks and 
shares. We now have a concept, performance measurement (PM), that seems to be 
fundamental to the operation of a business; but what do our two keys words of 
‘measurement’ and ‘performance’ actually mean. On consulting The Oxford English 
Dictionary we can find useful definitions to put these words into context: 
Performance: “The accomplishment or carrying out of something commanded 
or undertaken; the doing of an action or operation”, or 
“The quality of execution of such an action, operation, or process; the 
competence or effectiveness of a person or thing in performing an action; spec, 
the capabilities productivity, or success of a machine, product, or person when 
measured against a standard (Definition 1989b) 
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Measurement: “the action or an act of measuring or calculating a length, 
quantity, value, etc” or  
“a dimension ascertained by measuring” (Definition 1989a) 
This now leads us into the combination of these two words; the measurement of 
performance, which is, quantifying how an action, operation or process changes over 
time. This act of measuring performance has become intrinsic and fundamental to what 
we do as individuals and it is therefore easy to accept that all businesses must 
measure things. Indeed, it is an elementary aspect of running a company and can 
range from the most simple financial book-keeping and accounting processes, to 
complex performance management programmes, such as the balanced scorecard 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992) that are deployed corporate-wide. However, the shape, form 
and complexity that a measurement process takes can be an entirely different matter, 
but we can safely say that business performance measurement is seemingly native to 
every going-concern and can occur subconsciously, or be a highly visible endeavour. 
After all, measuring performance is the only way to determine if any kind of business is 
actually being transacted.  The act of gauging performance is therefore ubiquitous and 
exists in virtually all going concerns across public and private sectors, and was 
undoubtedly occurring long before these words were officially defined in the year 1607, 
as indicated in the Oxford English Dictionary. 
In further clarifying this definition it should be noted that performance measurement is 
the critical process that helps to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of a business:  
“Effectiveness refers to the extent to which customer requirements are met, 
while efficiency is a measure of how economically the firm’s resources are 
utilised” (Neely et al. 1995, p.80).  
It should also be noted that there is a clear distinction to be made between 
performance measurement and performance management. Performance measurement 
is the act of gauging, measuring and assessing the change in some aspect of 
performance, whereas performance management is the act of determining what to do 
with the data once it has been collected (Bititci et al. 1997; Neely 2002). I feel that this 
is best described by the following quote:  
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 “The performance measurement system is seen as the information system 
which enables the performance management process to function effectively and 
efficiently” (Bititci et al. 1997, p.524) 
Measuring performance, and thereby the efficiency and effectiveness with which a 
company operates its business is an absolutely necessary and integral activity for all 
firms. Any improvement initiative, or indeed anything that seeks insight, cannot be 
assessed unless the performance measurement system provides the objectives, 
measures, results and a means to interpret the data (Neely et al. 1995; Simons 2000). 
But, what exactly is a performance measurement system?   
Neely, Gregory and Platts (1995) aptly defined this as:  
“The set of metrics used to quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
actions” 
“A performance measure can be defined as a metric used to quantify the 
efficiency and/or effectiveness of an action” 
Therefore, in its simplest form a performance measurement system is comprised of a 
series of individual measures that when combined as an entity, represent a complete 
system. This system in turn should provide the insight and knowledge that is needed to 
understand variances in performance and to strive for improvement. 
The above explanations suggest that the common underlying theme of performance 
measurement is that it is a fundamental and foundational aspect of running a business. 
It does not necessarily mean that it is actively practised. Indeed when it is practised it 
can be the subject of much debate, frustration and complexity that one wonders why it 
can be so difficult to do something that is accepted as essential to running a business. 
The problem lies in the fact that there are no universally applicable instructions on how 
to measure performance. In more recent times, there has been much work and 
research carried out within this broad field, but no “one size fits all” solution to 
measuring performance is available, and indeed the core facet that has received the 
least attention in the academic and practitioner literature is the element of human 
interaction. Each and every firm is quite distinct from one another, being that they are 
comprised of human beings, who by our very nature are unique individuals and the 
product of our cultures, upbringings, and continuous experience. This level of 
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uniqueness means that a PMR system must be adapted to each firm, and this creates 
a problem.  
It is only within the last few years that there has been slightly more emphasis placed 
upon the behaviours and attitudes of employees when they are faced with interacting 
with a PMR system (De Waal 2002; Edwards and Sohal 2003a; Elzinga et al. 2009; 
Van Riel et al. 2009).  It is perhaps not surprising that the consideration of human 
feelings, emotions, behaviours and reactions, was not afforded much attention when 
PM systems were evolving; they might have been considered ‘soft’ and not taken as 
seriously as the more rugged, and easier to define, tangible aspects of managing 
performance (Bourne et al. 2000; Crandall 2002; Neely 2005). But, it is this human 
element that caught my attention early on and prompted this research study in 
attempting to better understand the impact of human behaviour on PMR systems. It 
struck me that it was an essential component that, in my experience, had been 
overlooked. However, it is important to remember that my observations of human 
behaviour have taken place within the aviation industry in the United States. I mention 
this primarily because aviation is a very fast-paced, inherently stressful, and 
overwhelmingly over-measured operational practice (Belobaba et al. 2009). Indeed the 
industry is defined by performance metrics that are imposed both internally and 
externally, by federal agencies, the public, the stock market, union organisations, and 
the airlines themselves, which all have an inordinate amount of measures from which 
to gauge recent and historical performance (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2006). 
It can therefore, be reasonably accepted that within the aviation industry performance 
measurement takes on a very pronounced role, to the point of being the core method 
by which all airlines gauge themselves (Doganis 2002). Financial performance is 
acutely critical to an airline but it is its’ operational performance, measured through a 
PMR system, that becomes its cornerstone. It is within this context of airline operational 
performance that I am interested to learn if, how, and why, employees respond and 
engage with a PMR system and the impact that their behaviours have.  
2.3 Performance Measurement in the Present Context 
When reviewing the performance literature it was evident that the field had been 
dominated by financial accounting measures of company performance until more 
recent times when the focus began to shift (Cross and Lynch 1988; De Waal 2002; 
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Fitzgerald et al. 1991; Kaplan and Norton 1992; Keegan et al. 1989; Neely 1999; 
Simons 2000). But, these traditional measures of financial performance do not 
necessarily provide insight to the internal processes that take place in other aspects of 
how a business performs. The growth in importance of performance measurement has 
developed rapidly over the last two decades and has seen a strong movement away 
from these traditional, financial-based measures to a better-rounded and balanced 
approach that encompasses other factors that are critical to success (Bititci et al. 2006; 
De Waal and Gerritsen-Medema 2006; Kaplan and Norton 1992; Neely et al. 2002). 
This move away from financial measures began in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s 
when these measures began to be criticised for their backward looking, or lagging, 
nature (Eccles 1991; Ghalayini and Noble 1996; Johnson and Kaplan 1987). Balanced 
performance measures began to emerge in the 1990's as companies realised the need 
to gauge performance on other more relevant and predicting factors and to focus on 
the underlying drivers of performance (Bourne et al. 2003a). Eccles suggested that the 
results of quality and customer satisfaction programmes such as the Total Quality 
Movement and the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award focused performance 
measurement on non-financial factors.  “Quality measures represent the most positive 
step taken to date in broadening the basis of business performance measurement”  
(Eccles 1991, p.132). This was echoed by others who held the view that total quality 
management (TQM) represented a shift in emphasis towards customer satisfaction 
(Letza 1996; Neely et al. 1995). 
“Most companies’ operational and management control systems are built 
around financial measures and targets, which bear little relation to the 
company’s progress in achieving long-term strategic objectives. Thus the 
emphasis most companies place on short-term financial measures leaves a gap 
between the development of a strategy and its implementation.” (Kaplan and 
Norton 1996b, p.75). 
Professor Andy Neely (1999) examined the performance measurement revolution and 
concluded that there was a significant move away from traditional accounting systems 
and financial measures of performance to a more ‘balanced business scorecard’ 
approach such as the Performance Pyramid (Lynch and Cross 1991), the Results-
Determinants Framework (Fitzgerald et al. 1991), the performance measurement 
matrix (Keegan et al. 1989), and of course the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 
1992). All of which offer frameworks from which to build a PM system. Neely also 
stated that “it is widely accepted that performance measures influence behaviour”. This 
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indeed could be true but he did not substantiate this and his work did not ask how 
behaviours influence performance.  
The development of the Balanced Scorecard in the 1990’s aimed to bring structure to 
the measurement of performance by introducing non-financial measures and ensuring 
a more balanced approach to how firms managed their PM systems. This was taken up 
in a multitude of works that further expanded upon the core theory and its applications 
(Banker et al. 2004; Bourne et al. 2003b; Kaplan and Norton 1996b; Lee and Sai on Ko 
2000; Libby et al. 2004; Lipe and Salterio 2000; Simons 2000) and even spawned other 
‘balanced’ methods such as the Performance Prism (Neely et al. 2001; Neely et al. 
2002). The one thing that these have in common is that the system does not put 
employees first (De Waal 2002). The employees are considered the instruments that 
must embrace change and engage with the system. Indeed the systems aim to modify 
employees’ behaviours. However, my own personal experience caused me to question 
this very early on. The underlying culture and praise and reward system in place within 
a company can have a very profound effect upon the attitudes and behaviours that are 
displayed. If morale is low there can be a consequent lack of motivation to embrace a 
PM system if it does not consider the employees own wellbeing and motivational 
factors. 
At about the same time that Eccles and Kaplan were voicing concerns about traditional 
financial measures Fitzgerald et al developed their framework of Results and 
Determinants (1991). In their model, there are two basic types of performance 
measure, namely results and determinants, which are measured across six 
dimensions. Results focus on aspects of competitiveness and financial performance, 
whereas the determinants that drive these results, focus on quality, flexibility, resource 
utilisation and innovation. The results are the lagging indicators, while the determinants 
comprise the leading indicators. There appeared to be a great deal of merit to their 
approach and it clearly illustrated that in order to obtain desirable results a company 
must critically evaluate its internal processes, which are the drivers of future 
performance. However, there was an inherent lack of method in the model to guide 
translating company vision into strategy, which is a necessary component.  
More recently the Performance Prism has been put forward as a “stakeholder centric 
view of performance measurement” (Neely et al. 2002, p.151). The prism is a five-
faceted model that has stakeholders at its heart. The reason for this is that in most 
organisations shareholders are the most important stakeholder. Within the stakeholder 
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group in the performance prism consideration is also given to investors, customers, 
employees, and suppliers. There is also recognition of other stakeholders such as 
regulators and pressure groups. In relation to the airline industry in the United States, 
the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) has a rigid set of regulations that must be 
adhered to, and union groups have restrictive collective bargaining agreements that 
must also be complied with. These facets serve to explain, much as Fitzgerald et al 
(1991) did, that the results of stakeholder satisfaction are a function of the determinants 
that comprise the other facets of the prism. 
In recent decades, balanced performance measurement, as a conscious business 
initiative, has come to the forefront of strategic thinking as firms seek ever-increasing 
opportunities for competitive advantage and continuous improvement (Neely 2005). In 
order to improve something a company must know where current performance falls 
short. This obviously relies upon some form of measurement to provide the necessary 
insight (Neely 1999). Indeed, “it is now accepted that businesses perform better if they 
are managed through formalized, balanced and integrated performance measures” 
(Bititci et al. 2004) that evolve over time to a refined process that can encapsulate the 
core operations of the business. It is not surprising that performance measurement 
systems in use today are now recognised as essential tools that shape how a company 
puts its strategy into action (Feurer and Chaharbaghi 1995; Kaplan and Norton 1996a). 
The measurement of performance is crucial in determining strengths and weakness 
and is the critical process that helps to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of a 
business and provide insight to gaining competitive advantage (Neely et al. 1995).  
From the traditional financial based measures to the more recent holistic approach to 
PM systems there has been an ever growing breadth of literature. The subject of 
business performance is vast and much of the development of this has taken place in 
the last 30 years. An influential article in 1991 (Eccles) predicted a PM revolution and 
that every company would have to reconsider how it measured business performance. 
This emerged from the realisation that financial measures could no longer be the 
primary gauge of business performance as they had been. 
Not surprisingly the subject area of performance measurement, and its application, is 
by its very nature vast and spans a multitude of different business disciplines including: 
accounting, operations management, organisational behaviour, information systems, 
and organisational strategy, to name but a few (Neely 2005). As a research subject, 
performance measurement remains a relatively young field of study, with some of the 
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most influential works dating back to only the 1980’s and 1990’s (Banker et al. 1984; 
Cross and Lynch 1988; Dixon et al. 1990; Eccles 1991; Fitzgerald et al. 1991; Johnson 
and Kaplan 1987; Kaplan and Norton 1992; Keegan et al. 1989; Lynch and Cross 
1991). This can make it a rather difficult field from which to adequately draw any firm 
conclusions. There are still many unanswered questions and further areas to explore. 
Indeed many studies either expose new areas for research, or tend to criticise previous 
approaches, as new dimensions are brought into play. 
In a discussion on the evolution of performance measurement Professor Andy Neely 
proffers that “performance measurement is not and never can be a field of academic 
study because of its diversity” (Neely 2005, p.1268). This view holds that the breadth of 
the field is enormous and plays into practically all aspects of business and personal life. 
He also points out that researchers from these differing fields employ different 
methodological approaches, research questions, and theories, therefore making it 
difficult to nail down such a vast field (Banker et al. 1984; Charnes et al. 1978; Dixon et 
al. 1990; Eccles 1991; Kaplan and Norton 1992,  1996a; Lynch and Cross 1991; Neely 
et al. 1995). This interwoven complexity conjures up a minefield of potential 
applications that can further discolour the already murky waters. 
It is no surprise that as the field of study evolved, many other criteria to a successful 
PM system began to emerge. This is the case with human involvement. Until the early 
2000’s human behaviours were not given sufficient credibility when discussing PM 
systems (De Waal 2002). It was assumed that the system itself was a means to create 
motivation for the employee (Kaplan and Norton 1992). It was not until much later that 
more focus was put on the question of individual attitudes thereby further defining the 
“balance” of PM systems, that is, the balance between the system helping managers to 
understand their business and the managers themselves embracing such a system so 
that business can be made more efficient and effective. After all, the success of any 
implementation is largely dependent on the people involved, and relies upon their 
commitment and willingness to engage with new systems (De Waal 2003a; Simons 
2000). 
My initial exploration of the literature provided very little performance management 
literature relating directly to research that has been carried out within the flight 
operations field (Bhat 1995, p.54). In fact, the majority of literature available within 
aviation is predominantly concerned with service quality as measured by customer 
satisfaction with the service encounter (Ekdahl et al. 1999; Gustafsson et al. 1999; 
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Laszlo 1999; Rhoades et al. 1998; Street 1994). However, performance management 
and performance measurement are very broad topics and there is a considerable body 
of literature available. It is assumed that there are research studies that focus 
specifically on flight operations but that they are likely to be of a proprietary nature and 
not available for public consumption. 
2.3.1 Business Climate 
The business environment in which organisations operate and compete is ever 
changing. Senior management needs to maintain a constant vigilance to ensure that 
existing strategies and methods are in tune with these changing circumstances, and to 
ensure that new, more effective strategies and methods are developed (Kennerley et 
al. 2003). This is especially true of the airline industry where the external environment 
has a profound impact on the bottom line.  The economic climate largely dictates the 
demand for air service and consequently the prices charged. Staying one step ahead 
and remaining competitive is paramount to survival (Doganis 2002). 
Airlines in general have developed sophisticated measurement systems. Their whole 
output is measured internally by the airline itself and externally by government 
agencies and the general public. Naturally, key performance indicators that rise to the 
fore are those of safety, service quality, on-time performance, customer satisfaction 
and finance. These measurement systems must be honed to produce leading 
indicators that can influence and encourage management to seek continuous 
improvement. Performance measurement systems must be maintained and managed 
in order that a company can recognise quickly when a trend must be addressed, or to 
benchmark itself against the competition. Therefore management systems must 
change and develop over time as the business climate changes, and an organisation 
must be ready to adapt (De Waal and Mollema 2010). In order to be agile and maintain 
profitability within the airline industry it therefore follows that a company must also have 
employees that recognise the need for change and are also willing to implement new 
strategies (Parast and Fini 2010; Rhoades et al. 1998). 
2.4 Communicating Strategy through PMR Systems 
In considering the impact of performance measurement systems on business it is 
argued that the most effective way to communicate company strategy and to allow it to 
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permeate the organisation is through a structured performance measurement system 
that has formal, balanced, and integrated performance measures at its heart (Bourne et 
al. 2000; Kaplan and Norton 1992; Neely 2002; Simons 2000). The balanced scorecard 
takes strategy as its central theme and promotes it as the method by which to 
effectively communicate a company’s strategic objectives. This is reinforced by Kaplan 
who cites the “huge gap in vision and strategy developed at the top and the things 
people down in the organization, at the frontline, are doing” as being one of the most 
important factors contributing to the success of BSCs (in De Waal 2003b, p.31). This is 
especially true for large corporations where traditional methods of communication can 
founder in their ability to motivate and inspire employees to seek continuous 
improvement. Memos, updates from the president, and other types of corporate 
communications can fall short in inspiring the workforce to greater levels of 
performance. However, a well-structured and implemented PMR system can bring into 
sharper focus the underlying corporate goals that employees need to relate to in order 
to be effective (Simons 2000). Once a sense of belonging and ownership is stimulated, 
it is expected to result in a commitment and drive that surpasses previous performance 
levels (Kaplan and Norton 1996b). The predominant stance within the literature is that 
performance measures designed to support strategy provide information on whether a 
specific strategy is being successfully implemented and followed, and that it is 
expected that the measures will also promote behaviour consistent with the strategy 
(Neely 1999).  
The Balanced Scorecard is probably the most popular and widely used means of 
deploying and implementing corporate strategy but one other such initiative was the 
SMART system developed at Wang Laboratories in the late 80’s (Cross and Lynch 
1988), which was in response to dissatisfaction with traditional performance measures. 
This model took the form of a pyramid with strategy and vision at the pinnacle and then 
four levels of building blocks in the main body of the pyramid that represented different 
measures. All of this was underpinned by ‘operations’ as the foundation of the pyramid. 
These systems also served to clarify, communicate and manage strategy and intended 
to become the core management system. Kaplan and Norton were able to point out 
that the shortcomings of more traditional measurement systems is “their inability to link 
a company’s long-term strategy with its short-term actions” (Kaplan and Norton 1996b). 
Indeed the BSC was, and still is, considered, to be an effective means of more clearly 
defining and communicating a company’s strategy to its employees. It has the ability, if 
implemented correctly, to convey the core principles that a company must follow to be 
successful. If the BSC is depicted in a visual sense with charts and graphs then 
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employees can more readily relate to it and understand why the company might be 
pursuing a particular direction.  
There are however two sides to the strategy coin: the system that measures the results 
of the company’s strategy, and the system that promotes strategic change, which 
prompts the question: Does strategy emanate from the PM system or does strategy 
form the core of the PM system? There are convincing arguments that PM systems are 
successfully used to implement strategy. The flip side is that PM systems also drive 
strategic change with measures that are able to highlight the ineffectiveness of a 
strategy and thereby provide evidence and impetus for a strategic change. A good 
performance measurement system can drive strategic change by providing a feedback-
loop to the strategic initiatives that have been implemented (Feurer and Chaharbaghi 
1995). This also supports the assertion that the PMR system should be a continuous 
process and not simply the design and implementation of a set of measures. The 
business environment is dynamic and therefore the PM system must itself be 
continually refined and new measures selected that best support the company’s 
strategy, or promote strategic change. 
Even a well directed strategy may provide bad results if the behaviours and attitudes of 
employees charged with achieving this objective are not conducive to it. It is equally 
important to understand the employee groups motivation levels before embarking on a 
strategy that will be at odds with them. If morale has suffered, or there is inherent 
resentment within the organisation, then achieving any lofty target may not be 
successfully accomplished simply by implementing a PM system. A culture of 
performance-driven behaviour is sought (De Waal 2004). This behaviour is manifested 
in employees who naturally go above and beyond in their attempts to meet targets, 
follow strategies, and seek continuous improvement.  
2.4.1 Strategically Aligned Behaviour 
New research (Van Riel et al. 2009) has begun to emerge in the strategy literature on a 
concept termed strategically aligned behaviour (SAB). This focuses on “the influence of 
employee perceptions of different managerial efforts on the degree to which employees 
take initiatives to implement the company’s strategic goals” (Van Riel et al. 2009 
,p.1198). Although this work is largely concerned with strategy implementation it does 
play a role in PMR systems because of the very large influence that strategy has on a 
PMR system implementation, which is the core aim of implementing strategic goals. 
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This work supports the belief that you must carefully consider the human element when 
deploying strategy. Van Riel et al discovered that by providing organisational support, 
and managerial efforts to help employees, it was likely to lead to SAB. They found that 
there were essentially three types of perceived managerial effort that had a 
complimentary effect on SAB: 
1. efforts to motivate 
2. efforts to stimulate capability development 
3. efforts to inform about the strategy in general 
However, the researchers also point out that their findings show that for these efforts to 
succeed in SAB they should not occur in isolation. There appears to be a continuous 
need by the employee to feel involved and supported in order to modify behaviour to be 
consistent with the strategic goals. This once again only raises the importance of 
concentrating on the human element of a PM system in concert with all other factors. If 
the employee group is not integrally involved then there seems to be a higher likelihood 
of failure, or to successfully realise company goals (De Waal 2004). 
2.5 Performance Measurement System Design 
A core objective of a performance measurement system is to provide a means by 
which to gauge success and pursue continuous improvement. To meet this objective it 
must be carefully designed to properly and fully examine the important internal 
processes that a business must be aware of, and any external aspects such as 
industry benchmarks, that influence what the business does (Simons 2000). This 
should then in turn provide a balance between financial, non-financial, internal and 
external measures and have a systematic review process (Najmi et al. 2005). A PM 
system should provide more than just insight, it should be a change initiative, or an 
instrument that facilitates change initiatives, and be a sustainable system that can 
provide performance results over a period of time. But, it is also recognised that simply 
having a PMR system is no guarantee that performance will actually improve (Bourne 
et al. 2005).  
Introducing performance measurement systems can present various hurdles but there 
is guidance proposing that PM systems should be developed in three main phases 
(Bourne et al. 2000): 
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1. The design of the performance measures 
2. The implementation of the performance measures 
3. The use of the performance measures 
In large part these suggestions were driven by the fact that while there were many 
theories on what types of measures a company should use, and the management 
processes by which to identify them, there was little guidance on the actual 
implementation of the system and the “importance of designing measures in a way 
which encourages behaviour which will support the strategy” ((Bourne et al. 2000). This 
is further supported by Neely who acknowledged that measures should be established 
and communicated so that “people do not feel threatened, but actually see the data as 
a way of understanding what is working” (Powell 2004, p.1023). There is also the view 
that a performance measurement system should be designed by a newly created 
process, and led by a project manager who reports to the highest levels of the 
organisation so that performance criteria are linked to the company’s strategic 
objectives (Kuwaiti 2004). As discussed in the previous section, strategy is widely 
regarded as the core facet from which measures should be derived. It is also important 
to ensure that there is a careful assessment of performance measures so that they do 
not encourage inappropriate action and ‘false alarms’ (Schmenner and Vollman 1994).  
In most design and implementation phases the length of time from commencement to 
actually using the system is considerable, with studies suggesting that it can range 
from 6 months to several years (Lawton 2002). This underlines that a useful PM 
system cannot be created overnight and that considerable thought must be put into its 
design. 
In this research project, I have used PMR systems that were loosely modelled on the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) because it provided a structured and relatively 
straightforward way to rapidly implement a PMR system into the Flight Operations 
department. The system needed to be introduced very quickly and the BSC also had 
the benefit of being a reasonably well-known system that the managers and directors 
might accept because of its perceived credibility. 
 
 
46 
 
2.5.1 Balanced Scorecard 
The modern evolution of PM systems towards something that provides a more 
balanced set of measures began in the early 1990’s with Kaplan and Norton’s 
Balanced Scorecard. This has become the most well known of all PM systems and has 
been cited prodigiously across the performance literature. 
However, the notion of strategic performance management systems and balanced 
measures was not new. In the early part of the 20th century, French process engineers 
created the Tableau de Bord, literally a ‘dashboard’ of performance measures, which 
has become a corporate best practice in France, but unfortunately little known or 
practised outside of its borders (Bourguignon et al. 2004; Epstein and Manzoni 1997). 
In a  similar fashion to the Tableau de Bord, the framework of the balanced scorecard 
was designed to act as a dashboard of indicators providing a range of measures that 
would allow managers to view performance across four separate perspectives and 
answer four key questions (Kaplan and Norton 1992, p.72): 
Customer Perspective: how do customers see us? 
Internal Perspective: what must we excel at? 
Innovation and Learning Perspective: can we improve and create value? 
Financial Perspective: how do we look to shareholders? 
These separate perspectives are what separate the BSC from other integrated 
performance measurement systems and is the fundamental basis to allow managers to 
see all of the important measures together (Andersen et al. 2006; Cheng et al. 2007; 
Chia et al. 2009; De Waal and Mollema 2010; Mendibil and Macbryde 2006). The links 
between the performance measures should give insight to inter-relationships and be 
used to test theories about cause and effect. “A strategic feedback system should be 
able to test, validate and modify the hypotheses embedded in a business unit’s 
strategy” (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b, p.84) 
A central component to the organisation of this framework is to limit the amount of 
measures used in order to avoid complicating and overwhelming managers with too 
much information. The principle tenet is to introduce a fundamental shift away from the 
reliance on traditional financial measures, and to encourage a focus on the balance 
between inter-related operational measures (Bourne et al. 2005; Powell 2004; Verweire 
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and Van Den Berghe 2003). Financial perspectives typically contain the traditional 
measures used to assess the wellbeing and prosperity of the business, but they are 
lagging indicators reporting past outcomes. Financial measures should serve as the 
focus for the other objectives in the scorecard (Chia et al. 2009).  The Customer 
perspective includes measures of the value proposition that the company will deliver to 
its customers. The Internal perspective includes the critical internal processes in which 
the organisation must excel, and the Learning and Growth perspective “identifies the 
infrastructure that the organisation must build to create long-term growth and 
improvement” (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, p.28). Team objectives are then linked to 
the company's strategic goals, vision and mission. Good communication is required to 
promote buy-in and give everyone a “line of sight” to company goals. Kaplan and 
Norton provided a nice analogy for visualising the need for a balanced set of measures 
by explaining that a pilot needs the full array of data from all his instruments to ensure 
that his aircraft is performing correctly, or to take action if an irregularity occurs. 
“Reliance on one instrument can be fatal” (p.71). This underlines the need for 
managers in organisations today to simultaneously monitor many different aspects of 
their company to ensure that correct and appropriate action is being taken. 
It is interesting to note that in this highly influential article the authors recognise in their 
opening statement that a firm’s PM system “strongly affects the behavior of managers 
and employees” (Kaplan and Norton 1992). However, this theme is presented as a 
one-way flow, from the PM system to the individual, without acknowledging that it is 
perhaps a two-way street. This is again exemplified in their conclusion, with the 
assertion that “people will adopt whatever behaviours and take whatever actions are 
necessary to arrive at those goals” (p.79). 
The BSC has evolved a great deal since 1992 and has spawned a small industry of 
people proclaiming its benefits and advantages (Atkinson 2006; Basu et al. 2009; Marr 
and Schiuma 2003; Schneider and Vierira 2010; Self 2004). The implementation of 
BSC’s has been fairly widespread and as they have been introduced it has led to 
further refinements and developments. The balanced scorecard took on a new 
importance to many companies during the 1990’s as they developed it into a strategic 
management system by which they could achieve long-term strategic objectives (De 
Waal 2010; Paranjape et al. 2006; Simons 2000). The central principle of a balanced 
set of measures has been the ‘gold nugget’ in this framework. Realising the need to 
focus on measures that are not simply tied to financial performance has broadened the 
view of a firm’s performance and allowed the structured measurement of performance 
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to be adopted at operational levels, and then communicated in a way that workers can 
understand (Chan 2004; Chavan 2009). 
In advancing their work on the BSC Kaplan and Norton took their framework a step 
further by introducing four management processes that would provide additional help in 
linking the relationships between strategic objectives and short-term actions, and show 
how the BSC can be used as a strategic management system (Kaplan and Norton 
1996b): 
1. Translating the vision – helps build a consensus around the organisation’s 
vision and strategy. 
2. Communicating and linking – lets managers communicate their strategy up 
and down the organisation and link it to departmental and individual objectives. 
3. Business planning – enables companies to integrate their business and 
financial plans. 
4. Feedback and learning – gives companies the capacity for strategic learning 
These four new processes claimed to enable senior managers to better understand 
and implement a BSC that could be the heart of a strategic management system. 
These processes provide the method to develop, integrate and communicate plans and 
objectives that complement existing financial measures and targets. Their work also 
attempted to allay the fears that many BSC implementations are prone to failure (Neely 
and Bourne 2000; Othman 2008; Schneiderman 1999). This development of overlaying 
four new processes aimed to influence managers to more acutely reflect upon their 
business, devise thought-out strategy statements and create a scorecard that 
accurately portrays how to operationalise these broad strategy statements.   
Despite the widespread acceptance of the BSC it does of course draw its critics. There 
is much talk of BSC implementation failures (Bourne et al. 2003b; Bourne et al. 2002; 
Paranjape et al. 2006; Schneiderman 1999), of system design faults (De Waal 2005; 
Ghalayini and Noble 1996; Marr and Adams 2004), and a complexity that can slow its 
introduction (Gautreau and Kleiner 2001; Johanson et al. 2006 ). By 2000 it was 
estimated that as many as 50% of large US firms would be using a balanced scorecard 
but that “70% of balanced scorecard implementations fail” (Neely and Bourne 2000, 
p.3). There are several reasons for this including the difficulty of designing relevant and 
linked measures and an inability to fully and correctly implement the programme (Neely 
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et al. 1997). The factors leading to the failure of balanced scorecards are concerned 
primarily with the design of performance measures and an unsupported implementation 
programme. A study In 1998 (Lipe and Salterio 2000) challenged the effectiveness of 
the BSC by showing that it was only the measures that were common to all business 
units, as opposed to measures that were unique to the respective business unit, that 
were used by superiors when evaluating a managers performance. This suggested that 
insufficient emphasis can be placed on the unique measures that may only be 
applicable to one business unit, but may also be the key to its success. They further 
proclaimed that we “know very little about the human information processing demands 
of the BSC” (Lipe and Salterio 2000 ,p.296) suggesting that there needs to be far more 
emphasis placed upon the human component of using BSC’s. 
Neely (2000) suggested that PM systems such as the BSC, are limited by the fact that 
they are just frameworks and lack the insight on how to develop, select and introduce 
appropriate measures that can be used to manage a business. He argued that there 
was a lack of specific guidance in the literature concerning the performance measures 
that managers should adopt. In his research on specifically designing measurement 
systems, he concluded that the lapse of guidance in the literature is because it “ignores 
the complexity involved in the actual design of measurement systems.” (p.1142). This 
obviously points out that undertaking the design and implementation of a PM system is 
not to be taken lightly and that insufficient thought and preparation is likely to result in 
failure.  
2.6 PMR System Implementation Within the Scope of the BSC 
Implementation is where the performance measurement system must interact with the 
wider environment. Will it be the source of individual goal setting and rewards, or be 
seen as a management control system? (Letza 1996). 
At each of the two airlines in this research study the introduction of a PMR review 
system was necessary to bring about greater awareness of airline operational 
measures and to encourage engagement with operational performance. The 
implementation of a system must therefore capture the employees’ interest and create 
a sense of attachment to the operating performance that the individual manager is 
deemed to have some influence or control over. The inherent expectation is that by 
creating awareness of the key determinants of performance excellence, and assigning 
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ownership and accountability for designated measures, improvement will naturally 
follow. However, the relationship between performance measures must be linked in 
order for it to be systematic. But how do managers and employees react to these 
measures and what satisfaction do they gain by being held accountable for 
performance? Empirical evidence from a German study showed that if there is a high 
degree of balance, or systematic linkage of performance measures, then managers’ 
satisfaction with a performance management system implementation is higher than if 
the linkage is weak (Sandt et al. 2001). Additionally, the conceptual use of measures 
provides a higher degree of satisfaction compared to managers who do not perceive 
that they have a performance management system. (p.13). This in turn gives the 
manager understanding and insight to the strategy and underlying business model.  
An alternative view to developing a set of strategies associated with the introduction of 
a balanced scorecard is to utilise SWOT analysis (Lee and Sai On Ko, 2000). By 
determining a company’s strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats, it can serve 
as a stepping-stone to implementing a balanced scorecard. It is imperative that senior 
management communicates strategy to employees at all levels if the scorecard is to be 
successful. It is also vital when implementing a performance measurement system to 
guard against the phenomenon where “people modify their behaviours in an attempt to 
ensure a positive performance outcome even if this means pursuing inappropriate 
courses of action” (Neely Andy et al.  1997, p.1132). This was further illustrated by 
Neely and Bourne when discussing implementation failure that if there is a culture of 
blame, people will begin to seek ways to deliver the measure rather than pursue real 
performance (Neely and Bourne, 2000). Indeed inappropriate behaviour can occur all 
too often (Bourne and Neely, 2002). 
Even a well-defined balanced scorecard can run into difficulties. Lawton (2002) 
explains that scorecards are sometimes called “dashboards” if the focus of the system 
tends to be on the measures themselves and not the objectives. This can lead to the 
situation where “studying the dashboard without also looking out of the windshield can 
cause accidents” (Lawton, 2002, p.67). 
It is not just BSC’s that have been subjected to criticism. Virtually all integrated 
measurement systems have received ongoing criticism over the years by highlighting 
their limitations. Among these limitations include the fact that they are predominantly 
monitoring and controlling tools, rather than directly promoting continuous improvement 
and that they only report performance results rather than being able to predict future 
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performance (Ghalayini and Noble 1996). It is obviously necessary to keep clear sight 
on the overall strategic objectives when implementing a PM system. 
2.7 Impact of Service Quality on Airline Operations Performance 
“Service quality is a matter of controlling details in the service delivery. Thus 
quality development means improving all the parts of the service chain and 
seeing the whole. Far too many companies work on the detail “the encounter with 
the customer” but really they should be studying critical incidents in the whole 
production chain. From the customer’s perspective it is essential that the whole 
service process functions properly” (Edvardsson 1992)  
The above statement serves as a foundation for linking service quality to performance 
measures within an airline and highlights the necessity to examine the entire supply 
chain and not just the encounter with the customer. Within the airline industry the 
service quality literature tends to focus on those activities that the customer has direct 
contact with: reservations, check-in, airport facilities, the in-flight experience etc. In 
other words it is the customer’s experience with the service encounter and whether it 
matched, exceeded or fell short of perceived expectations. But, service quality really 
begins many months earlier when the airline is building its flight schedule and crew 
lines. Aircraft flows and routings, crew schedules, how and where to change crews, 
aircraft utilisation, airport connection time, make-up time to provide for irregular 
operations, training, staffing, placement of reserve crews etc, all contribute in one way 
or another to how the final product is delivered. Indeed “the product cannot be judged 
in isolation from those who deliver it” (Street 1994, p.13). 
It is from this belief that to provide exemplary service performance all critical processes 
must be measured and analysed at all points in the service production chain. If there is 
insufficient understanding and awareness of process flows, inter-relationships and 
causes and effects then there are flaws in how the product is brought to market. It is 
therefore necessary to use a PMR system to monitor and control the results, but it is 
equally important to have regular reporting and to ensure clarity in communication 
(Fitzgerald and Moon 1996).  
Macdonald (1995) relates a very interesting story in which he was involved in two quite 
different airline experiences. One was travelling on British Airways, the other on Virgin 
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Atlantic. He prefixed the story with his assessment of the two as British Airways being 
"an efficient, quality-conscious airline, interested in customer care", and Virgin as "a 
customer-focused airline" (p.6). The story told how British Airways would break bad 
news in a series of "digestible driblets" (p.7) but always in a friendly and sympathetic 
manner. Conversely, Virgin went above and beyond by notifying the customer ahead of 
time of a delay and making all further arrangements that minimised his inconvenience.  
The end result was a series of extremely frustrating but friendly experiences with British 
Airways, but a story of superb customer concern and care with Virgin, which resulted in 
the customer being 'delighted' with a delayed flight! (Macdonald 1995). However, in 
today’s environment with reduced service frequency, higher security, more hassles, 
and less in-flight service it is becoming increasingly difficult to delight customers and 
remain solvent.  
Vandermerwe and Gilbert (1991) in their study on internal services contend that 
"corporate performance increasingly depends on internal services" (p.50). They 
examined the perceived gap between service users' needs and service providers’ 
performance:  
“Reliability, responsiveness and on-time delivery are equally important internally 
as they are externally…both internal and external service providers tend to 
deliver 'satisficing' service packages which fall short of user requirements” 
(Vandermerwe and Gilbert 1991) 
The cost to provide the service can be affected by the level of failures in the entire 
service delivery process. A failure to provide the promised service can occur at any 
point in the chain. This may manifest itself in costly and inconvenient delays and 
cancellations. They can be broken down into three areas: 
Pre-delivery – poorly planned aircraft flows, crew swaps, crew resources and 
turn times 
At-delivery – poor decision making during irregular events such as weather, 
mechanical difficulties, lack of attention to detail, failure to act to prevent 
cascading delays 
Post-delivery – customer complaints not handled quickly or professionally 
According to Edvardsson (1992) “in service companies it is estimated that as much as 
35 percent of the staff are employed in correcting the mistakes made by the others” 
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(p.17). It therefore becomes critical to ensure that performance measures and their 
objectives are clearly communicated to all employees such that mistakes can be 
avoided. Neely et al  (1995) citing Crosby’s (1972) assertion that “quality is free” is an 
assumption that “for most firms, an increase in prevention costs will be more than offset 
by a decrease in failure costs” (p.84). 
In the United States and perhaps at the pinnacle of success in providing service quality 
is Southwest Airlines who have maintained a solid and responsive business model for 
three decades that has enabled them to pursue considerable and continuous growth 
even in the face of losses sustained by the major airlines (Bunz and Maes 1998). The 
case of Southwest is truly remarkable and there have not been many successful 
imitators. It would appear that the key to their success lies in their culture where 
“employees see themselves not as an airline with great customer service, but as a 
great customer service organisation that happens to be an airline” (Laszlo 1999, p.95). 
There are other stories of a few progressive airlines that have attempted to explain the 
significance of service quality to performance, most notably at Scandinavian Air 
Systems (SAS) where they tried to set new standards of customer services (Ekdahl et 
al. 1999; Gustafsson et al. 1999), at Continental Airlines where they had to transform 
the airline from the worst in the country to the best (Bethune and Huler 1998), and at 
JetBlue who set new standards for customer service and loyalty (Peterson 2004). 
Additionally, within the field of operations research there has also been some excellent 
insight (Yu 1998) on the various aspects of airline operations, and in particular how 
they come together to provide the service encounter, or “moment of truth” as it is often 
referred to. However, these studies have focused primarily on the contact the customer 
has with the service provider and no mention was made of the internal processes that 
constitute the entire service delivery chain.  
Other research has focused on the service performance gap where the service offered 
falls short of expected standards.  It emphasises the need for a firm to ensure it fosters 
lasting relationships with its customers, suppliers and employees in an attempt to close 
the gap between service performance and service quality (Chenet et al. 2000). An 
additional note on service quality concerns a study undertaken by Frost and Kumar 
(2001) which investigated internal customers and internal suppliers. They developed a 
measure of service quality known as INTSERVQUAL, which was able to “identify the 
critical factors influencing internal service quality amongst employees in a large service 
organisation” (Frost and Kumar 2001, p.383). But, the internal service providers in the 
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study were baggage handlers, cabin cleaners and cabin caterers. While all play a 
crucial role there is again no mention of the support staff further away in the service 
chain, those who plan, schedule, monitor and ultimately control the airlines’ aircraft 
activity. It is likely that a service performance gap can exist that can be traced back to 
these staff and their activities.    
2.8 The Human Factor 
The aspect of the literature dealing with human behaviour as it pertains to performance 
measurement was the element that had received the least attention in the literature 
when I first began my research study. Indeed, it still remains an area with many open 
questions of how the behaviours and attitudes of the employees affect the 
implementation and use of a PMR system. A key characteristic of management 
research is that it is about people and how they interact with their environment. Yet 
within the performance literature we have tended to see a concentration on a system 
approach rather a people approach (Kaplan and Norton 1992; Neely 2005). Attitudes 
and behaviours can be influenced by the existing company culture and the business 
environment that the company finds itself in (De Waal 2004; De Waal 2010; Edwards 
and Sohal 2003b; Van Riel et al. 2009). During crisis there is a tendency for people to 
experience anxiety and stress about their own future and wellbeing, and during growth 
there is a higher likelihood of embracing change and fostering performance driven 
behaviour. 
As we have seen, the majority of research into performance measurement lays out the 
tangible facets of strategy, system design and implementation of PMR systems, while 
there is a distinct lack of information regarding how individuals behave and react to 
these systems. It is assumed that individuals will adapt their behaviour to the PMR 
system. However, recent research (De Waal 2003a) has taken this a step further by 
identifying individual behaviours that are deemed to be important to a successful PM 
system implementation. However, there is little tying this to business climate and 
personal motivation, and how much of this interaction and behaviour is driven simply by 
job duty rather than willing participation? Indeed, how is willing participation 
encouraged?  These are areas that we need to better understand. 
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2.8.1 Culture, People and Management style 
Over the last two decades, a variety of approaches and methods have been developed 
to help businesses better understand their operations, to stave off competition and to 
develop improvement initiatives. Central to the success of these methods is 
acceptance by the employees because they are the resource to attain the desired 
better performance (Simons 2000). Further evolvement of research into performance 
measurement has begun to place more emphasis on company culture and 
management style, suggesting that they seem to be interdependent and have a 
profound effect upon a performance measurement system (Bititci et al. 2004). It can be 
expected that the PMR system will have a distinct effect upon the behaviour of the 
employee, but here we can see that the inherent culture and management style impart 
themselves on the employees and thus influence whether the PMR system will indeed 
be successful or not. If the management style and culture are in harmony then the 
outcome may well be performance driven behaviour, which is surely the desired result 
of any PMR system.  
Of particular interest here are the lessons and conclusions drawn by Bititci et al (Bititci 
et al. 2006) which found that there was a strong connection between organisational 
culture, management style and performance measurement. They further determined 
that performance measurement is a cross-functional issue that requires collaborative 
thinking at all levels of the organisation. These are particularly relevant to my study 
because the deployment of PMR systems at both Allegheny Airlines and Pinnacle 
Airlines are expected to be influenced by the business climate, prevailing culture and 
management styles. The element of attitudes and behaviours displayed by the people 
expected to engage with a PMR system has received little attention in the literature 
until more recently. 
2.8.2 Attitudes and Behaviours (performance driven behaviour) 
Over the last few years there has been a slowly growing focus on the behavioural 
aspects and human side of performance management and in particular how this can 
have a profound effect upon, not only the implementation of the PMR system, but on 
performance output itself. It has long been recognised that a successful organisation is 
comprised of successful people but this has not necessarily been a nucleus within the 
performance measurement literature. 
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At this juncture, it is worth putting some meaning to the terms ‘attitudes’ and 
‘behaviours’ as they relate to this study, and to understand the relationship between 
them. In this context I have used the following definitions: an attitude is “an opinion 
that includes an evaluative and emotional component” (Aronson 2004, p.90), whereas 
a behaviour is our manner of acting and controlling ourselves. Ordinarily we might 
expect that our attitudes would predict our behaviour, for example if someone disliked 
cabbage then they would not eat it. But, Aronson points out that there is “no consistent 
relationship between attitudes and behavior” (p.127). He proposes that the notion that 
attitudes predict behaviour is all in our minds and that “we just imagine that people act 
consistently with their beliefs and attitudes” (p.127). For example, if I was a law abiding 
citizen and it was my advocated belief that the speed limit on a motorway had been 
correctly established at 70mph, would that predict that I would constantly adhere to this 
speed limit when driving on motorways? I doubt it. If I was in a hurry, or the traffic was 
fast-moving, then there is a high likelihood that I would drive faster and consequently 
my behaviour would not be aligned with my attitudes and beliefs. 
How does this all relate to the subject under research? It is important to understand this 
distinction between what people say and what they do, because the two are not always 
the same. In this research, I have conducted interviews during which the interviewees 
have given me their attitudes about various subjects, but this does not necessarily 
mean that they will behave in a similar manner. Sometimes it is all too easy to criticise 
something, let’s say a PMR system, yet still use it positively to accomplish your 
objectives. We need to carefully bear this in mind when conducting qualitative research 
and examining interview data. 
De Waal (De Waal 2002) initially identified from a review of the scientific and 
professional literature 40 behavioural factors that were considered important to the 
implementation and use of a PM system. However, it seems that these identified 
behavioural factors are those considered to be ‘expected’ or observed from the 
“controlled system”, which in this particular context is described to be the manager who 
has responsibility for some form of performance. Superior to him would be the 
“controlling system” e.g. directors and executives, who receive performance 
information from the established performance management system about the 
controlled system (manager). Rather convoluted in its description but it conveys an 
approach to PM that relies on the notion of control, as opposed to say, initiative and 
active participation.    
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These 40 behavioural factors were subsequently tested in three Dutch companies in 
the ‘starting’, ‘development’, and ‘use’, stages of a PM system by converting them into 
questions and categorising whether the behaviours were satisfied, partially satisfied, or 
not satisfied. Central to this was the notion of “regular use”, which stems from the belief 
that “a performance management system is regarded successful if managers use the 
system on a regular basis” (De Waal 2003a, p.689). Following an analysis of these 
behaviours by a method of pattern matching DeWaal was able to narrow his results to 
18 individual behavioural factors that are important to the successful implementation 
and use of a PM system. This was a very important contribution to the beginnings of 
understanding the impact of human behaviour on an imposed PM system. These 18 
factors are recreated in table 2-2 below. 
Table 2-1 Important Behavioural Factors 
Classification 
scheme part 
Areas of attention  Behavioural factors  
Performance 
management 
system  
Managers' understanding - a good 
understanding by managers of the 
nature of performance 
management  
D4. Managers understand the meaning of KPIs 
D7. Managers have insight into the relationship 
between business processes and CSFs/KPIs 
U7. Managers' frames of reference contain similar 
KPIs 
U21. Managers agree on changes in the CSF/KPI 
set 
Controlled 
system  
Managers' attitude - a positive 
attitude of managers toward 
performance management, toward 
a performance management 
system and toward the project  
S2. Managers agree on the starting time 
S4. Managers have earlier (positive) experiences 
with performance management 
U13. Managers realize the importance of 
CSFs/KPIs/BSC to their performance 
U14. Managers do not experience CSFs/KPIs/BSC 
as threatening 
Controlling 
system  
Performance management system 
alignment - a good match between 
managers' responsibilities and the 
performance management system  
D9. Managers' KPI sets are aligned with their 
responsibility areas 
D13. Managers can influence the KPIs assigned to 
them 
U9. Managers are involved in making analyses 
U15. Managers can use their CSFs/KPIs/BSC for 
managing their employees  
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Internal 
environment  
Organizational culture - an 
organizational culture focused on 
using the performance 
management system to improve  
U23. Managers' results on CSFs/KPIs/BSC are 
openly communicated 
U22. Managers are stimulated to improve their 
performance 
U8. Managers trust the performance information 
U17. Managers clearly see the promoter using the 
performance management system 
External 
environment  
Performance management system 
focus - a clear focus of the 
performance management system 
on internal management and 
control  
D16. Managers find the performance management 
system relevant because it has a clear internal 
control purpose 
D17. Managers find the performance management 
system relevant because only those stakeholders' 
interests that are important to the organization's 
success are incorporated 
Source: de Waal (2003a) 
These factors have been further categorised into areas of attention to provide a more 
general overview of what an organisation must pay attention to when implementing and 
using a performance measurement system. Evidence from De Waal’s research within 
four Dutch companies shows that even if there is sufficient attention applied during the 
starting and development stages it does not therefore mean that it will lead to a 
successful regular-use stage (De Waal 2003a). The use stage is in many ways the 
most important aspect of a performance measurement system. It is here that 
continuous attention and evaluation of the behavioural factors is especially important 
because the system must be ongoing and provide some longevity. This is the stage 
where it becomes clearer whether the attitudes and behaviours of managers and 
employees change in response to the results of the performance system. As Kaplan 
and Norton (1992) stated, this is where the performance measurement system will 
affect the behaviour of employees and the expectation that people will adopt the 
behaviours and actions necessary to meet performance goals.  In a very useful sense 
this has added some illumination to the problems that firms encounter when jumping on 
the BSC bandwagon.  
This evidence suggests that performance measurement systems can only succeed if 
the appropriate tools, methods and techniques are used to properly design, structure 
and implement the system (Bourne et al. 2000; Bourne et al. 2003b; Paranjape et al. 
2006; Simons 2000). However, in order for the system to be used effectively there must 
be a corresponding training programme that enables the users to attain sufficient 
knowledge and insight to not only understand the measures, but more importantly to 
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make decisions that can lead to an improvement in performance. This training should 
focus on developing the necessary behavioural qualities that are required for the 
continued use of the system (De Waal 2010; Van Riel et al. 2009). 
Now that we have some insight to the behaviours that are desirable, how do we now go 
about encouraging and eliciting them from our managers and employees? De Waal’s 
research has served to underline that human behaviour is just as important to a PM 
project as is the design and implementation of the programme. Subsequent research 
has taken this further with the development of a Performance Management Analysis 
tool (De Waal 2004) that attempts to measure and evaluate performance-driven 
behaviour. This tool took a more in-depth look at two distinct but interdependent 
aspects; that of the ‘structural’ and ‘behavioural’ side of performance management. The 
structural side refers to the performance measurement system currently in use and the 
measures that have been identified, whereas the behavioural side refers to the human 
factors that naturally guide how an individual relates to the system.  
Table 2-2 The nine aspects of the performance management analysis.  
Aspect Type Short description 
Responsibility 
structure 
Structural A clear parenting style and tasks and responsibilities have been 
defined and these are applied consistently at all management levels 
Content Structural Organisational members use a set of financial and non-financial 
performance information, which has a strategic focus through the 
use of critical success factors and key performance indicators 
Integrity Structural The performance information is reliable, timely and consistent 
Manageability Structural Management reports and performance management systems are 
user friendly and more detailed performance information is easily 
accessible through information and communication technology 
systems 
Accountability Behavioural Organisational members feel responsible for the results of the key 
performance indicators of both their own responsibility areas and 
the whole organisation 
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Management 
style 
Behavioural Senior management is visibly involved and interested in the 
performance of organisational members and stimulates an 
improvement culture and proactive behaviour. At the same time it 
consistently confronts organisational members with lagging results 
Action 
orientation 
Behavioural The performance information is integrated in the daily activities of 
organisational members in such a way that problems are 
immediately addressed and (corrective or preventive) actions are 
taken 
Communication Behavioural Communication about the results (top-down and bottom-up) takes 
place at regular intervals as well as the sharing of knowledge and 
performance information between organisational units 
Alignment  -  Other management systems in the organisation such as the human 
resource management system, are well aligned with performance 
management, so what is important to the organisation is regularly 
evaluated and rewarded 
Source: de Waal (2004)  
The ultimate objective of a successful PMR system is to inspire performance driven 
behaviour that if directed correctly will result in continuous improvement. This goal, 
although appearing straightforward, is a very hard to achieve, and if a company is 
unsuccessful in its quest it can be the downfall of a PMR system implementation. It is 
therefore very important that senior management have considerable and insightful 
understanding of the psychological barriers that can thwart a PMR initiative. It is the 
employees who must make the system a success and without their buy-in and support 
any PMR system will ultimately be doomed to failure. 
A much more recent study (Elzinga et al. 2009) has sought to substantiate De Waal’s 
research and to rank the relative importance of the previously identified behavioural 
factors to make it generally easier for a company to know which factors on which to 
place emphasis and focus when implementing a PMR system. The results from this 
work not only confirm De Waals’ findings but also help to sharpen the focus. They have 
been able to identify “that the ten most important factors come from all three stages 
(design, implementation and use)…and thus there does not seem to be a  reason to 
assume that one phase is more important than another” (Elzinga et al. 2009, p.518). 
This once again adds significant support to the assertion that employees’ attitudes and 
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behaviours should be considered at each stage of the PMR system, and not that the 
expected behaviours will naturally emerge when the system is introduced.   
It is curious that caring for and understanding employee behaviour has not come to the 
forefront of PMR research before. Everyone has spent much time and energy 
researching and practicing the tangible aspects of PM, such as strategy, the design of 
measures, implementation, etc, that the employee has been relegated to the back seat 
and left to simply engage with the system whether or not they truly understand it or 
want to become part of it. Of relevance here are also the findings of Van Riel et al 
(2009) who determined that managerial efforts to motivate, stimulate and inform had a 
significant and positive impact on aligning employee behaviours with strategic goals. 
This section has established that the commonly accepted approach to performance 
measurement systems has been to focus on financial and operational indicators of 
performance (Neely 2005), rather than to pay attention to the individuals who work 
within these systems, and in particular how they perceive and react to the various 
measures that are imposed upon them (De Waal 2003a). The missing component is 
research that can identify and understand behavioural reactions and attitudes, and how 
in turn these reactions are influenced by the business climate, which also influences 
the design, implementation and use of a PMR system, with the desired end-result 
being to foster performance driven behaviour. 
2.9 Tying It All Together 
We have seen in the preceding sections that there has been a wealth of academic and 
practitioner literature and research into the various facets of performance 
measurement. Additionally, the subject has been discussed from two distinct angles: 
the view from above that suggests that employee behaviour is changed by the PMR 
system, and then the lesser supported view from below that employee behaviour 
impacts the ultimate success of a PMR system.  
The various systems and frameworks that enable a company to have a central and 
structured performance management system, such as the BSC, Performance Prism, or 
SMART pyramid, have a significant part to play. However, it is argued that in order for 
these to be successful a company must take an introspective look within itself and 
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examine its employees, the culture, and the motivation and rewards systems that are 
available.  
So how do the topics of system design, implementation, strategy, and business climate 
influence individual attitudes and behaviours. Do they influence employees to seek 
continuous improvement, or do they act as threat to the employee? The following 
framework, which has been derived from the preceding literature review, depicts that 
the development of a performance measurement system tends to follow a linear path 
with strategy informing system design, which is then followed by implementation and 
use, which is where the desired behaviours and attitudes are expected to be displayed. 
The flow expects that the behavioural reactions will be consistent with the chosen 
strategy and are the result of a systemic development of a PM system. In addition, it is 
expected that strategic goals will be influenced or dictated by the overlying business 
climate.  
The framework below (Figure 2-1) presents a general model hypothesising that desired 
behavioural reactions will result from the linkages between performance strategy, 
system design and system  implementation. The box depicted in dashes is the area of 
my research. 
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Expected Behavioural
Reactions
Performance 
Strategy
System Design 
System 
Implementation
PMR System 
Outcomes
 
Figure 2-1 Framework from Literature Review 
Even though this process flow is supported in the core literature we know that from the 
early applications of performance measurement as a financial measurement system to 
its evolution as a strategic management system, the one key theme that has been 
largely taken for granted is the action of the employees charged with trying to attain the 
established goals. We do not know with sufficient detail how and why employees might 
engage with a system such as the BSC and make it work. Indeed, we know that many 
fail. How do employees react and behave when faced with a system that has been 
forced upon them? The following research looks at this perspective and asks what 
impact employee attitudes and behaviours have on the ultimate success of a PMR 
system.  
Table 2-4 below summarises the literature from the aforementioned review that is 
central to this project. 
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Table 2-3  Table of Literature Informing the Research 
Aspect Description Literature Informing the 
Research 
Performance Strategy The drive for ever-increasing 
levels of performance both 
operationally and financially 
to achieve strategic 
objectives 
(Bititci et al. 2004; Bourne et al. 
2000; Bourne et al. 2003b; 
Feurer and Chaharbaghi 1995; 
Kaplan and Norton 1992,  
1996a,  1996b,  2000; Neely 
2002; Simons 2000) 
System Design The framework through 
which the performance 
metrics are devised 
 (Bourne et al. 2003a; Bourne et 
al. 2005; Bourne et al. 2000; 
Bourne et al. 2002; Ghalayini 
and Noble 1996; Kaplan and 
Norton 1992,  1996a,  1996b; 
Lipe and Salterio 2000; Neely et 
al. 2000; Neely et al. 2002; 
Paranjape et al. 2006; 
Schneiderman 1999) 
System Implementation The deployment and use of 
the performance 
measurement system 
 (Bourne et al. 2002; Kaplan and 
Norton 1993; Lawton 2002; Lee 
and Sai on Ko 2000; Neely et al. 
1997; Sandt et al. 2001) 
Expected Behavioural 
Reactions 
The expected alignment of 
employees to the PM system 
and thus the attainment of 
company strategy 
(Bititci et al. 2006; Bititci et al. 
2004; De Waal 2002; De Waal 
2003a; De Waal 2004; De Waal 
and Gerritsen-Medema 2006; 
Elzinga et al. 2009; Neely 2005; 
Simons 2000; Van Riel et al. 
2009) 
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My research is not intended to validate, or even advocate, any particular performance 
measurement system, but rather to assess and gain a better understanding of their 
effect on human behaviour and what behaviours and attitudes that a PMR system 
stimulates in individuals. 
2.10 Summary 
This review has positioned, and discussed the nature of performance measurement 
and framed how PMR systems can be designed, implemented and used. It has also 
affirmed how the critical aspects of human attitudes and behaviours have been largely 
neglected in the literature, why these aspects might be of prime importance to the 
successful implementation of a PMR system, and how the formational aspects of 
strategy, design, and implementation can be influenced by behaviours. While other 
aspects of performance measurement have been examined and researched multiple 
times it is this aspect of human engagement that warrants further attention. This is 
driven primarily by what became fundamental to this research: the assertion 
exemplified in Kaplan and Norton’s milestone paper introducing the Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1992). It portrayed a view of PM that suggests that the 
PM system itself “strongly affects the behaviour of managers and employees”, and 
concludes that by establishing goals the PM system “assumes” that people will adopt 
whatever behaviours and take whatever actions are necessary to arrive at these goals. 
These broad assumptions struck me as being little more than derived suppositions and 
I began to focus my attention on whether it was actually quite the opposite effect, that 
is whether the behaviour of managers themselves actually had more influence on the 
PM system, and therefore performance, than the system itself.  
This review has therefore stated that a systems approach to measuring operations 
performance does not properly account for the behavioural reactions of managers and 
that more emphasis and understanding of this aspect is needed.  
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Chapter Three 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter introduces the choice of methodology and its justification as an 
appropriate approach, along with a large section that is devoted to the methods used to 
gather and analyse the data. It concludes with a diagram of the overall research 
design.  
3.1 Selecting a Methodology 
As a practitioner setting out to discover knowledge I had to ask some probing questions 
of myself and others concerning why we did things in a certain way. It became 
apparent that in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon (crisis at 
Allegheny Airlines) that a rigorous approach should be taken to examine the attitudes 
and behaviours that were being exhibited by the managers, against the backdrop of 
measuring flight operations performance.  
At the initiation stage of the idea for a research study it can be difficult for a practitioner 
to know how to logically and methodically go about the research. Although I did not 
really know the best method by which to approach it my intention was to better 
understand the situation and then take some action in an attempt to improve it. In this 
instance, the project was not just about researching a situation but also interacting with 
it. Putting together a piece of good research seemed rather daunting without being able 
to, at least follow some basic rules or a framework. It soon became apparent that there 
was not a ‘one size fits all’ option, and that advantages and disadvantages had to be 
weighed against one another before choosing the most appropriate research strategy 
for a specific type of investigation. Each choice carries with it a set of assumptions 
about how we make sense of the world in which we live, and ranges from the 
underlying philosophy, to the methodology, and the methods employed to elicit and 
analyse data, and whether these are predominantly qualitative or quantitative in nature 
(Denscombe 2007). 
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In the social sciences the type of research techniques used have particular ontological 
and epistemological foundations. Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of 
existence and reality, and in a very simple form can be whether we approach things 
from an objective or subjective standpoint. Coupled with this is epistemology, or the 
theory of knowledge, which is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and 
scope of knowledge and considers what knowledge is and how it is acquired 
(Denscombe 2007; Dick 2000). These philosophical underpinnings determine the type 
of research approach. 
If approaching research from an objective ontological standpoint then this will involve a 
positivist, external, or critical realist epistemology and will lead to a hypothetico-
deductive methodology that will rely on the techniques of statistical testing, 
experimentation and secondary data analysis. Conversely, a subjective approach will 
involve a phenomenological philosophy resulting in an interpretivist, or action research 
epistemology conducted from within the research setting as an inductive or cooperative 
inquiry methodology that relies on techniques such as participation, interviews and 
observation. Results from research following a positivistic and deductive approach can 
be generalisable and applied to a wider context than the research setting, whereas 
results from a phenomenological and inductive approach, tend not to be generalisable 
and are specific to the research setting (De Vaus 2001; Denscombe 2007; Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003; Schwandt 2001). 
The aim of my research was to be an integral part of a change action designed to 
improve a situation and therefore the research paradigm needed to be built around 
action and research outcomes that enrich each other. This requirement naturally 
demanded a cooperative and interpretive approach that would not be restricted by 
testing a hypothesis but allow knowledge to be uncovered so that it could be used to 
inform further action (Dick 1993). My research is therefore based on the principles of 
phenomenology, which emphasises subjectivity, description and interpretation. This 
was quite apt in a business setting when we wished to understand the behaviours and 
thoughts of others.  
In both airlines, I saw many people around me who were confused or disengaged from 
operations performance and I wanted to understand why. But, in order to do this 
properly I really needed to establish a formal and organised research project. At the 
outset it was important to answer some basic questions about whether the problem to 
be examined was relevant to my role and responsibilities, and if it would be feasible to 
68 
 
conduct it in terms of time, resource availability, access, and finance. It was additionally 
important to decide whether the targeted research group was sufficiently diverse, 
whether the data could be precise and detailed, would the research subjects be open 
and honest, could the investigation focus on the vital issues, could I avoid bias and 
remain objective, and could I avoid misrepresentation, and protect confidentiality? This 
was a long and daunting list and it was obviously very important to be able to answer 
these questions in the affirmative before the research could begin. Because I was an 
integral part of the workforce responsible for daily operations performance and I had to 
interact with everyone else who shared these responsibilities it fortunately did not take 
too long to confirm that the above referenced foundational questions could be 
answered in the affirmative. 
The fundamental starting point for this research was to determine what was going on, 
and to describe it, and then to determine why it was going on, and to explain it. So the 
two methods of description and explanation needed to be fundamental to the research 
approach decision. I was not concerned about testing a pre-conceived theory but rather 
more interested in determining what was happening within the Flight Operations 
department and why. It was this fundamental approach of examining and seeking out 
the theory, which ultimately drove me towards an emergent methodology. 
Initially, my research was intended to be data-driven, rather than literature driven. In 
other words rather than turning to a body of extant literature on the subject as my initial 
starting point, and conducting the project as theory-driven, I preferred to take the path 
of making some sense of the research situation first and the people within it. The 
objective being to put aside any preconceptions so that I would be more open to fully 
experience the research situation and derive an initial understanding that would not be 
overtly influenced by the literature. This approach was necessary because until I fully 
understood the primary research issue it was not logical to review the literature. “In 
many studies you don’t know the relevant literature until data collection and 
interpretation are under way” (Dick 1993). This approach naturally ruled out the more 
traditional and scientific methodologies of hypothesis testing. It also required that the 
research methodology allow for practitioner involvement from the inside, rather than 
observation as an outsider. I therefore conducted the first round of data gathering 
before truly engaging with the literature, which proved to be beneficial because it 
solidified for me the focus of the research for the remainder of the project without being 
swayed in a direction that the literature may have suggested. 
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As a consequence, in the beginning my research questions remained quite indistinct 
until I could satisfactorily evaluate the situation and assess the needs of my colleagues 
as they related to performance measurement so that any planned ‘action’ would be of 
use to them. Additionally, until understanding the true nature of the problem the 
methodology was also hazy, because it derived from a situation that was partly 
unknown and research questions that were initially fuzzy. This approach to the 
research problem created some anxiety and frustration for me because there was not a 
precisely defined problem to be addressed and thereby a tailored method by which to 
address it. 
A theory-driven approach is most common to conventional research and works well 
when a problem is clearly identified and defined, and you start with precise research 
questions. The majority of quantitative research and much qualitative research is 
theory-driven, with some obvious exceptions being Grounded-Theory, Ethnography 
and Action Research, which by definition can readily adopt an emergent-theory 
approach. In my particular situation, using a theory-driven approach did not seem at all 
suitable because I did not have a clearly defined problem until much later in the 
research project. My approach needed to be rapid, responsive and flexible, and 
additionally needed to afford me the ability to study and improve upon my own work 
practice by taking action within the research situation that would eventually improve 
upon it. The action outcomes would hopefully benefit myself, my colleagues, and the 
airline as a whole. I had no prior experience or training in theory-driven research and 
so this helped me to adopt the data-driven approach without bringing any pre-
conceived ideas or expectations to the research study. 
This fundamental approach also allowed both the content and process of the research 
to develop as the study proceeded. This became very important because I had initially 
expected to undertake just one case study at Allegheny Airlines. However, this was 
eventually expanded to four cycles of research across two organisations because my 
research study and this eventual thesis came about from a decision to understand the 
chosen phenomena in a particular and official way by embarking on a formal research 
programme at Bournemouth University. I was faced with a situation that I believed fell 
squarely within my own area of responsibility, but also a situation that I did not know a 
lot about, or how to adequately tackle. The idea of pursuing a professional doctorate 
(DBA), as opposed to a more academically based PhD, was to allow for a more 
experiential and practitioner approach. To that end, I have dedicated a chapter to the 
contribution that this research makes, especially the contribution to professional 
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practice, which I feel has been the greatest, and certainly the most personal, learning 
experience from the whole process. Therefore, the real starting point of the research 
journey began with the decision to pursue a formal qualification that would provide the 
structure and learning opportunity to facilitate a conscientious intervention in my direct 
work setting and to examine and report upon it. Once that decision was made it 
became a matter of familiarising myself with research methodologies and choosing a 
suitable approach.  
As my research followed the design, implementation and use of modified balanced 
scorecards, it began to unfold into a story that could be told as an integral part of the 
research. Siv Friis, writing about a practical application of action research (Greenwood 
1999), relates how she used storytelling to describe "the context in which events take 
place" (p.101). By her justification, "every development in a change situation is unique 
and only the people within the work situation are in a position to tell the true (i.e. 
relevant) story of that workplace" (p.101). This is a compelling argument to employ 
storytelling as the research unfolds as it provides a rich detail of events as they 
happen. I have endeavoured to utilise this approach in describing the research 
situations and in particular my interpretation of how individual experiences unfolded 
from the data. 
3.1.1 Practitioner Research 
Conducting business research projects as part of our everyday job responsibilities has 
become more prevalent and valuable over time, and the people conducting them are 
often expected to be company employees with relevant commercial experience. 
Because of this, it is important to have a basic grounding in the techniques that will 
allow the business manager researcher to produce a report that is structured, well-
founded and with coherent and supportable recommendations. In the commercial world 
it is far more likely that a research undertaking is conducted by a practitioner who will 
himself interact with the subject matter under study and either test a theory or look for 
explanations on a phenomenon or behaviour. Practitioner research is therefore 
embedded in the organisation. A research methodology that has the researcher as an 
integral part of the research study is consequently more appropriate for a study in this 
context. It is less likely that the researcher will be able to examine the research 
situation from an external perspective as a consultant or academic might. This insider 
approach is well suited to action research, grounded theory and ethnographic studies. 
The underlying premises of each these methodological approaches differ of course but 
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all require some form of participation or integration of the researcher. In a business 
setting, a department manager can then examine a particular problem by being 
involved with the research participants, and understand the dynamics of how the 
company operates, with insight to its culture and method of operation. 
There are also disadvantages that arise from being an insider that must be addressed 
for the research project to have acceptance and trust. Being a practitioner researcher 
removes some of the barriers that can exist when seeking access to an organisation 
but it does bring with it other problems such as role duality, role conflict and the need to 
manage organisational politics carefully. The role of the researcher must be 
distinguished from the role that the researcher plays as an employee of the 
organisation. The objective is to maintain harmony and remain an ‘accepted’ colleague 
and department leader while still being able to question the actions of those being 
researched. It is possible to do both in concert and this is indeed how I conducted my 
research. It was hoped that those involved would be ready and willing to accept the 
challenge because both companies were in urgent need to unfreeze their current 
thinking and develop a critically competitive approach to change. 
3.1.2 Emergent Theory Methodologies 
Having determined that my interest lay in examining the behaviours and attitudes of the 
people I worked with to the PMR process it was not a big leap to settle upon an 
approach that was geared towards improving practice while at the same time letting a 
theory emerge, before testing any further theories. In other words an emergent-theory 
approach, as opposed to a theory testing approach. I was more concerned with 
wanting to shed light on a situation that appeared to be dysfunctional and 
unenlightened. However, my intention was to first examine the situation and then to go 
about trying to influence or correct it. Therefore, it was plainly evident from the 
beginning that the emergent part of the research would be important but was not the 
underlying foundation for the whole project.  
At this point Action Research was put forward as suitable approach because it offered 
a means of conducting research while at the same time being actively involved in a 
change effort. However, in considering its suitability I reviewed several methodological 
approaches that might otherwise provide an acceptable approach. Each brings with it a 
set of assumptions about the social world and how reality is perceived, and it was 
apparent that there is not one ‘right’ way to conduct research. Having set a requirement 
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that an approach should provide a mechanism for theory generation and for the 
researcher to be an active participant in the research process, this narrowed the field to 
a few primary methodologies. Of tantalising interest was Grounded Theory, which has 
a very large following and is intuitively appealing to a researcher who does not have 
preconceived ideas about the research problem, Grounded Theory offered an 
appealing slant because it encourages only referencing the literature when fitting the 
emerged theories into existing research findings (Strauss and Corbin 1997). 
Case Study methodology also offered an opportunity to take an in-depth look at the 
instance of what is to be investigated (Yin 2003). The basic premise of a Case Study 
approach is that insights can be gained by looking at an individual case that can have 
wider implications. “The aim is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular” 
(Denscombe 2007, p.36). I decided against this approach because I knew that at 
Allegheny the intervention would be linear and needed to build upon itself as lessons 
were learned and that these lessons needed to be an integral part of the continuing 
research rather than be reported as a separate instance. 
Another option was Ethnography, which is traditionally concerned with the study of 
cultures and groups. There is some logic to applying it within a business context 
because of its tendency to “emphasize the importance of understanding things from the 
point of view of those involved” (Denscombe 2007, p.63). It has to be, by its very 
nature, a method to see things from the perspective of how those involved see things, 
rather than from an outsider’s point of view. Ethnography can provide very detailed 
descriptions of things that are observed and witnessed by the researcher and can be 
used to both develop and test theories. Although appealing, this was deemed not to be 
a suitable approach to my situation because it is limited by the fact that it is ‘stand-
alone’ and isolated, and the results from an in-depth ethnographic study can not readily 
contribute to wider theories. It can be used to provide detailed descriptive accounts but 
without necessarily providing analytical insight. The emphasis is on acute observation 
rather than the researcher directly participating in the research situation. It does not 
present a suitable opportunity to enact an intervention to solve a research problem or 
improve a situation.  
Following a review of the aforementioned methodologies I made a strategic decision to 
adopt Action Research as the most suitable and practicable approach. This is a style 
that advocates participation in order to provide learning and improvement, and to 
critically reflect upon the action taken and the events experienced in order to inform 
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further action. It was appropriate for my research situation because it required an 
insider approach and was conducive to getting the best outcome from the research. 
“The great advantage of action science is that it provides the researcher with 
substantially improved access” (Gummesson 2000). Additionally it would allow me to 
fully participate in the research situation and plan, act, reflect and modify the research 
intervention. 
3.2 Introduction to Action Research 
Action Research (AR) has its roots in the pioneering work of Kurt Lewin in the USA 
during the 1950’s (Lewin 1946). Over the past 60 years, the design and practice of 
action research has evolved into a diverse range of approaches that include Action 
Science (Argyris et al. 1985), Action Learning (Revans 1982), Experiential Learning 
(Kolb 1983); Reflective Practice (Schon 1991) and Soft Systems Methodology 
(Checkland and Scholes 1990) to name just a few. It is particularly well suited to 
practitioner research because it involves cycles of diagnosing problems, planning 
action, taking action and then critically reflecting upon that action. 
Action Research is an approach, rather than a method. A method implies a step-by-
step systematic process that runs in a planned and linear manner, whereas AR is much 
more of a winding road, akin to a philosophy, and not a set of proven rules to be 
followed. AR is also concerned with social practice and is aimed towards 
understanding and improvement. It is reflective, participative and dynamic, whereas 
conventional approaches tend to be static (Denscombe 2007).  
The fundamental concept of Action Research is that it builds upon itself in iterative 
cycles, meaning that actions need to take place so that we can reflect upon them and 
make sense of what we are doing so that subsequent actions can then benefit from the 
knowledge gained in the first. This supports the principle that Weick defines as "people 
act in order to think" (Weick 1995). An action takes place initially with unknown results. 
Further action is then based on the contemplation of these results. This process is 
depicted visually in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 Action Research Iterative Cycle  
Source: (Muir 2007) 
My appreciation of action research  as the most effective approach evolved during the 
course of the study and was guided by the works of Ellis and Kiely (2000), Remenyi 
(1998), Gill and Johnson (2002), Greenwood (1999), Greenwood and Levin (1998), 
Coghlan and Brannick (2001), Coughlan and Coghlan (2001 & 2002), Coghlan (2001), 
Dick (1993,  2000). All of these authors acknowledge that AR is a cyclical process 
involving taking action and then critically reflecting upon that action. AR constitutes 
interpretative research where the "emphasis is on a social rather than an economic 
view of organisational activities" (Alvesson and Deetz 2000), and by its nature it is 
participative and collaborative. 
3.3 Justification for Selecting Action research 
This qualitative methodology is particularly well suited to practitioner research as it 
involves iterative cycles of diagnosing problems, planning action, taking action and 
then critically reflecting upon that action. In order to study a particular problem within an 
organisational context, research can be effectively conducted if the researcher is an 
active participant in the change process. This is fundamental to an action research 
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approach and provides the benefit of seeing the story unfold from the viewpoint of the 
participants. The phenomenon being researched is a "real event that must be managed 
in real time" (Coghlan 2001, p.39), therefore action research “focuses on research in 
action, rather than research about action” (Coughlan and Coghlan 2002, p.222). My 
research experience to date has served to solidify this concept because I was a direct 
participant and initiator of change processes. Action research and its variants offer the 
benefit of being a practical approach that aids the researcher to effect change with the 
aim of improving practice. The research itself “involves a feedback loop in which initial 
findings generate possibilities for change which are then implemented and evaluated 
as a prelude to further investigation” (Denscombe 2007, p.123). It therefore lends itself 
to business problems where a manager wishes to better understand and then improve 
a certain problem, or process. It is involved with practical issues, problems and 
concerns that are encountered in the everyday world. It is used to gain a  better 
understanding of the problems which arise and to actually set out to alter and improve 
them as an integral part of the research process, rather than to just enact 
recommendations that come at the end of a research study, which may at that point in 
time be irrelevant in a dynamic and changing environment that many firms operate 
within. Action research weaves its findings and evaluations into further action as a 
cycle of research, which in turn leads to another iteration and a cyclical process. Action 
research can be seen as relevant, inter-active and effective in addressing problems. 
This research was conducted under the methodology of action research approach as a 
way of "carrying out research which is truly 'fit for purpose' in the sense of being 
appropriate to the business context and those working within it" (Kiely and Ellis 1999, 
p.32). An action research approach within an action inquiry ideology is underpinned by 
a philosophy of enhanced efficiency and effectiveness (Ellis and Kiely 2000). From my 
own personal perspective I became fully engaged with the action inquiry approach 
because it provided a great opportunity for individual learning while at the same time 
contributing something of value to my organisation. This dual benefit to the researcher 
and the company provided opportunities for increased improvement during all cycles of 
research.  
Action Research as a study contrasts with traditional positivistic research, which aims 
to provide universal knowledge. Knowledge created through AR is embedded in the 
organisation being studied and does not produce theories that can be universally 
applied (Coughlan and Coghlan 2002, p.224). AR is conducted from the inside looking 
out with members of the organisation participating in change, whereas positivist 
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research is undertaken from the outside looking in where the employees are the 
objects of the study.  
However, it is important to point out that there is nothing wrong with more traditional 
research methods. Indeed, there are situations in which they are the most appropriate. 
This is especially true when doing research that needs to replicable. However, in this 
particular setting the choice of action research was more fitting because it was far 
better suited to the situation of being a practitioner researcher and it values 
responsiveness over work that can be replicated in order to allow action to be taken as 
part of the research. “Good research is designed to fit the interests and skill of those 
involved” (Dick 2000). It was also important to achieve a level of personal and 
professional growth and development, which action research facilitates by requiring 
active involvement. 
This study was been conducted using the philosophical underpinnings of 
phenomenology and the methodology of action research with myself as the researcher 
being a full participant in the intervention. It has adopted an interpretive approach and 
involved the collection and analysis of data and the subsequent sense making of the 
attitudes and behavioural effects of those engaging with it. The collection of data has 
been primarily qualitative and includes the use of interviews, repertory grids, 
observations and informal conversations. Quantitative methods were also used to 
analyse statistical data where appropriate. 
The research described here is deeply imbedded in the actions that took place around 
me. I do not believe that this research could have been conducted with sufficient insight 
had it been approached from a more positivistic and external standpoint. 
 “Each turn of the spiral is an opportunity for learning and change” (Dick 2000) 
3.4 Research Design 
Having selected AR as the methodology it was now time to plan the intended research. 
As I discussed earlier the use of AR begins in a fuzzy sort of way and takes a sharper 
focus as the research progresses. I experienced this very same sequence during the 
development of the project. I initially set out to make some sense of how my colleagues 
understood their work situation and the company culture at Allegheny Airlines. This led 
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me to narrow the focus of the research study and to begin imagining how to take some 
action and then reflect upon what happened. Afterwards I built a plan to focus on the 
introduction of a performance measurement system, then to monitor how it was being 
used, and the reactions to it of my colleagues. 
3.4.1 The Research Situations 
Allegheny Airlines at this time in its life (2003/2004) was in a state of decline and 
impending peril. It was readily apparent that survival meant concentrating on some 
core aspects of the business that would enhance its strengths. The primary problems 
that were in existence when I began this research stemmed from lacklustre operations 
performance and no formal operations measurement or review process. This was 
further hindered by a lack of senior management involvement and support and the 
managers not having a real notion of how to explain the performance results. 
Additionally, there was an apparent unequal accountability to our parent company, US 
Airways Express Division, when Allegheny’s performance was being compared to other 
US Airways Express carriers because they were operating in more favourable 
geographic regions. 
As time went by and the fortunes of Allegheny Airlines began to dwindle it became 
obvious that I would need to take another job. Allegheny was slowly being wound-down 
and its assets transferred to its’ sister airline, Piedmont Airlines. I was able to continue 
my research and conclude two cycles of taking action, data gathering and reflection 
before I was forced to move on. Very soon after my departure the airline was 
completely wound-up and Allegheny is now another sad victim of the ever-volatile 
airline industry, where such long-standing, and at one time, prestigious names such as 
Eastern, Pan Am and TWA have been relegated to just memories.  
When I joined Pinnacle Airlines in late 2004 it was enjoying a long period of growth and 
prosperity. The airline had been replacing its fleet of aging turboprop aircraft with 50 
seat regional jets. It once again became apparent to me that Pinnacle also did not have 
a very good operations performance reporting and review process and this provided 
me with the opportunity to continue my research work. 
These diverse experiences of crisis and growth ultimately provided a good opportunity 
to compare and contrast the respective attitudes and behaviours of the employees who 
were responsible for operations performance at both airlines. 
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Each AR cycle followed the same series of events. These were: 
1. Determining the problem 
2. Planning action 
3. Taking action 
4. Analysing and evaluating  
5. Reflecting on the action taken 
These are further depicted in the following chapters, which detail each cycle of 
research along with the actions that were appropriate to each cycle. 
3.4.2 My Role as Researcher and Practitioner 
At Allegheny Airlines I held the position of Director, System Planning and Control and 
worked closely with a small group of directors who were mostly engaged in running the 
daily operation. I also had several managers who reported to me. It was this position of 
involvement that enabled me to have access and influence over how we approached 
performance measurement. It allowed me to implement a system, further refine it, and 
then to observe how others reacted to it and to formally elicit their views and opinions.  
At Pinnacle Airlines I was the Director of the SOC (System Operations Control Centre). 
This was a similar position to the one I held at Allegheny and it again allowed me the 
same level of access and influence over how we approached performance 
measurement. 
3.4.3 Ethical Considerations and Bias 
Entering into the research there were some ethical considerations that I had to be 
cognizant of mostly concerned with informed consent. Prior to conducting any of the 
interviews I explained to the interviewee that any information they provided would be 
held in confidence and only used as part of the intended research thesis.  
All interview candidates were selected objectively and without prejudice. 
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My research was self-funded and there were not any conflicts of interest with either of 
my employers. All reported research was carried out by myself, was not part of a group or 
collaborative effort and was not sponsored or directly supported by either airline. 
3.5 Data Collection Process 
Research data was gathered by way of semi-structured individual interviews and 
repertory grid interviews and was further informed by observations and informal 
conversations. The data was categorised and analysed using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to seek out the important behavioural attitudes evident in both 
business states: crisis at Allegheny, and growth at Pinnacle. 
3.5.1 Interviews 
The initial approach to understanding what was going on at Allegheny Airlines required 
some method of eliciting thoughts and opinions from the research participants. It was 
logical and appropriate to do this in person. Semi-structured interviews were used 
because they are flexible and allowed me to explore relevant themes by asking 
additional questions depending on the interviewee’s response. This enabled each 
participant to privately, and confidentially, explain their thoughts about the company, 
the culture, and more relevantly the performance review process. This was done to 
build an initial picture of the situation and to provide insight to help build a better 
performance review process. 
These interviews were conducted with key managers and directors drawn from the 
Flight Operations department of both airlines. The objective of the interviews was to 
comprehend how these managers viewed the concept of performance measurement 
and to gain an understanding of the prevailing culture, support network and in essence 
the different realities they perceived of the environment they were working in. 
3.5.1.1 Transcripts 
Each of the interviews was transcribed by myself. I felt it would be important for me to 
remain close to the data, rather than have it completed by a third party. The act of 
transcribing the interviews also gave me close connection to the data and enabled me 
to fully understand their context, which was invaluable when making sense of them and 
drawing conclusions. 
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3.5.2 Repertory Grids 
Following the use of interviews during the first cycle, I wanted to take this a step further 
for the second and third cycles and so I began to search for a method that would not 
only elicit useful insight, but at the same time provide some additional structure to the 
data generation process.  
I began to explore the possibility of using repertory grids. My initial foray into the realm 
of repertory grids led me to the works of Devi Jankowicz (Jankowicz 2004) and Fay 
Fransella (Fransella et al. 2004). Both of whom have been supporting this technique for 
many years. The repertory grid technique itself, known as a role construct repertory 
test, was originally conceived and developed by psychologist George Kelly (1905-
1967) in the United States during 1950’s and was used as a diagnostic and research 
tool to build a picture of a client’s view of reality in a clinical psychology setting (Kelly 
1955).  
He developed a philosophy known as Constructive Alternativism, which postulates that 
there is only one true reality, but that it is experienced from one or another perspective 
by each and every one of us who have alternative constructions of that reality. 
Everyone has their own perspective on reality and a construction of what reality means 
to them, ”a person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which 
he anticipates events” (Kelly 1955, p.46). This is a complex quote but it succinctly 
states that our understanding and sense making of reality are informed from past 
experiences that are then used to interpret future events. Kelly matured his theory and 
wrote his seminal work The Psychology of Personal Constructs (Kelly 1955). The 
fundamentals of his philosophy, and in particular the repertory grid technique, have 
been developed over the years and have become much more widespread in use. It 
was this peripheral, yet enticing, aspect of repertory grids that initially caught my 
attention. The technique itself is relatively straightforward, but takes quite some time to 
learn, and adds a different dimension to an interview that provides for structure and 
focus. I decided to adopt this approach as a means of identifying the behaviours 
resulting from the PMR system implementations and to compare how the respondents 
viewed their colleagues. 
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The main components of a repertory grid are: 
Topic – what the interview is about 
Elements – these are examples that illustrate the topic. In this case, they were 
the managers and directors involved in the PMR systems 
Constructs – this is the most important component and is where the elements 
are compared with one another to produce statements (constructs) of what the 
interviewee thinks about the topic 
Ratings – the interviewee rates each element on each construct against a 
rating scale, in this case 1-5 
A construct is a bipolar statement of how someone interprets their experiences, and is 
expressed by saying what something is, and is not. For example, by saying that 
someone is happy as opposed to sad is to construe, or make sense of, how we 
interpret someone’s mood. A construct always has an opposite meaning. “It is this 
bipolarity of a construct that distinguishes it totally from a concept” (Fransella et al. 
2004, p.16).  
When trying to understand another person it is important to do so in their own terms 
“which means finding out what their personal constructs are [or] we run the risk of 
simply laying our own thinking on to them” (Jankowicz 2004, p.11) 
I used repertory grids to examine the relationships between a diverse group of 
managers who worked together in a department that was responsible for airline 
operations performance.  This performance is measured in the way the airline is able to 
meet the promises it makes to its customers, the passengers, which is implicit in the 
schedule that it publishes. This operating schedule in simple terms states that flight 1 
will travel between city A and city B at a certain frequency and at specific times. The 
customer has an expectation that he/she will be transported exactly as detailed in the 
schedule. Indeed it is implied that the customer must arrive at the departure airport 
within a specific time in order to be transported, therefore the expectation is that the 
airline the passenger is paying money to will fulfil its end of the bargain. The managers 
identified in this study were employed to ensure that this service was provided. While 
their jobs are multi-faceted they are also responsible for measuring and managing 
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operating performance. As outlined in chapter four of this thesis a balanced scorecard 
approach was used to provide the necessary interaction with a set of performance 
measures.  
3.5.2.1 The Repertory Grid Interview Technique 
The interviews followed a standard elicitation approach of presenting a triad of 
elements and a qualifying phrase for the interviewee to then shape a construct around. 
This was accomplished by asking the interviewee what two of the elements had in 
common as opposed to the third. A blank grid template was produced using an Excel 
spreadsheet and was based on a design that was depicted in The Easy Guide To 
Repertory Grids (Jankowicz 2004). The spreadsheet was divided into columns 
representing the ‘Emergent’ pole, the list of elements and the ‘Implicit’ pole. Each row 
was used to record a different construct and the ratings that the interviewee applied to 
them (Figures 3-2). The template was printed and used during the interview to write 
down the responses from the interviewee. Prior to the analysis stage, the written 
responses were typed into the spreadsheet. 
 
Figure 3-2 A Completed Repertory Grid 
When all of the individual grids were complete they were transferred into Rep IV, a 
specialist software programme that can graphically depict the grids and allow additional 
analysis to take place. 
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Each interviewee was briefed on the purpose of the inquiry. The concept of personal 
constructs was discussed with them and a high level description of the technique was 
provided along with how I was going to use the results. The objective that was 
expressed to the interviewees was to build a picture of the most influential aspects of 
human interaction that become necessary to effectively engage with a structured and 
purposeful performance management system. The overall aim was to better 
understand how involved each individual manager responded to the measurement 
system, and try to distinguish how they saw themselves in relation to their colleagues 
who were also charged with accountability for operational performance over the period 
under study.  
The interviewee on each occasion was offered a triad of three elements (managers 
from within the department) and asked to say why two were similar in some way, yet 
different from the third, while considering them in the context of the PMR system that 
all were engaged with. Once a construct had been supplied and noted down under the 
Emergent pole I attempted to clarify its meaning by using a straight forward method of 
laddering down to examine the underlying concept at the foundation of the construct 
offered. Once a degree of clarity was obtained, I asked the interviewee to provide the 
opposite meaning of the emergent construct. This became the implicit pole. Once the 
full construct was elicited, the interviewee was asked to rate each of the elements on a 
scale, which depicted how close to each end of the scale the interviewee thought they 
belonged. The rating scale used was a simple 1 to 5 with 1 representing the emergent 
pole and 5 representing the implicit pole, or the polar opposite of the theme suggested 
in the emergent pole during elicitation. After the initial rating of the construct, a 
verification was made to ensure that each pole had been rated correctly by selecting 
two or more of the elements that shared similar ratings and asking the interviewee if 
the elements selected were indeed considered to be similar in context and rated at the 
appropriate end of the rating scale.  
This process continued until the interviewee had exhausted all useful constructs, with 
each time a different triad offered for the interviewee to select two that shared 
something in common. Upon completion of the elicitation process the interviewee was 
asked if they had gained anything meaningful through the process and what they 
thought it meant. Each interview had its own feel and each interviewee took something 
different away from the experience. All of them seemed to have a more insightful 
understanding of how their colleagues construed things and what the individual really 
thought of them, and for some this was enlightening. This is the truly intriguing part of 
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repertory grids. The technique can be used very effectively to encourage someone to 
consider a relationship, or aspect of another person, in a specific context and learn 
something of how they really see that person. By simply showing the interviewee which 
elements had similar percentage similarity scores it was interesting to note whether 
they had already made that distinction prior to the repertory grid interview or whether it 
began to surface during the process. A fascinating discovery. 
3.5.3 Observations 
As the research progressed I also used personal observations to further inform the 
feedback given by the research participants. The research journey was a long one with 
much of it filled with critical reflection and refinement to the performance measurement 
processes and reviews. By using my personal observations to inform the analysis and 
conclusions I was able to gain deeper insight to the thoughts and comments of the 
participants. 
3.6 Process for Data Analysis 
Several methods of data analysis were used to achieve the intended aims of this 
research. Each of them is explained below. 
3.6.1 Content Analysis of Interview Transcripts 
Interview analysis was initially conducted using AnnoTape, a programme that allows 
direct coding and indexing of audio material in order to build a coherent interpretation 
of the data and to class responses into themes, categories and patterns that linked 
current practice to theory. Direct coding of the audio data was initially chosen over the 
more traditional method of transcription into text as “the direct listening to and 
structuring of the original oral speech allows an empathic listening to what was said in 
the interview interaction” (Kvale, 1996 p.174). I found that I was better able to relive in 
my mind the actual interview situation and recall the demeanour and body language of 
the interviewee. This was invaluable when it came to deciphering meaning from the 
interviews and in drawing conclusions. 
In order to further validate the results of the audio coding the interviews were then fully 
transcribed and analysed in NVivo8, a qualitative data analysis software. 
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3.6.1.1 Coding 
The interview transcripts were coded in NVivo8 using a process whereby relevant 
words and sections of the transcript were coded to themes that made sense to me as I 
conducted the analysis. These were further refined and narrowed to a set of 
categories. This art of coding is a process of bringing together passages in the data 
that seemed to represent or illustrate a particular theme or concept. By so doing, it built 
a greater understanding of the issues contained within the transcripts and illuminated 
patterns and generated ideas. 
3.6.2 Repertory Grid Analysis Techniques 
Several analysis techniques were employed to make sense of the repertory grid data. 
They comprised descriptive, relationship and multiple grid analysis. Each of these then 
contained several steps which are followed in a logical sequence. The techniques are 
listed below and are described in detail in the following section. 
A. Descriptive analysis techniques: 
Step 1 Process analysis 
Step 2 Eyeball analysis 
Step 3 Construct characterisation 
B. Relationship analysis techniques: 
Step 4 Cluster analysis – elements 
C. Multiple grid content analysis: 
Step 5 Bootstrapping 
 
In Chapter Five, I have included a fully worked illustration of how I used these 
techniques to make sense of the grid for one of the interviewees. Hopefully, this will 
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help the reader to follow through with the various steps of the analysis, and it also lays 
the foundation for the same techniques used in Chapter Six, which was the third cycle 
of research.  
A discussion of each technique now follows. 
3.6.2.1 Descriptive Analysis Techniques 
During the preliminary analysis of each grid three steps were taken to ensure familiarity 
with the grid content. They are qualitative in nature and are descriptive of the grid 
process and elicitation methods enabling the interviewer to get to grips with the content 
of each grid.  
The first step was a “process” analysis, by which I thought back to the interview itself 
and how it was conducted. I considered the topic and the interviewee’s reaction to it 
was noted. Similarly, I considered whether the interviewee had any difficulty 
understanding the requirements of the interview or difficulty in developing constructs 
and rating the elements. The elements and constructs were then examined. For 
example, did the interviewee agree with the list of elements? During this round of grid 
elicitation I supplied the list of elements. Each element was an individual manager 
within the Flight Operations department who had a direct connection with the 
performance measurement system. The constructs were similarly examined to assess 
whether the interviewee might have had difficulty in expressing themselves. During this 
process I had to ask myself several questions such as: was the qualifying question 
useful enough to allow the interviewee to begin discussing behavioural reactions? Was 
it followed, or avoided? Which constructs came easily and which were difficult? What 
did the constructs say about the topic? Was that significant? Was the rating scale 
intuitive? Did it make sense to the interviewee? At the end of the process analysis I had 
formed a clear picture of what the interviewee had said and how they were able to 
relate to the subject being discussed.  
The results of the grid were not complete at this stage and indeed the grid “does not 
have to have results to be useful. The process by which the information is obtained is 
informative in itself…when counsellors use the repertory grid for counselling and 
guidance purposes, they frequently give greater priority to what goes on during 
elicitation, and far less to what’s in the grid when the elicitation process has been 
completed.” (Jankowicz 2004, p.77). 
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Step Two was an “eyeball” analysis which involved reading the grid as a whole and 
gaining a familiarity with what is there and how it is represented. In other words a 
general examination of the grid to understand what is being said about the topic, the 
composition of elements and constructs, the ratings used and to begin to form some 
preliminary conclusions about what the grid represents and to gain a feel for what the 
interviewee is saying about the topic in question. This step involved a more thorough 
examination of the grid and the constructs. At the end of this first round of basic 
analysis I was able to make some conclusions about the grids. These interpretations 
were somewhat subjective because I was also using my own system of construction to 
draw these conclusions but they were done so in light of the previous process analysis 
that had taken place to ensure that they accurately represented what the interviewee 
was saying.  
Step Three was a construct characterisation. This is a process whereby I sought to 
identify the types of constructs used and their significance. Table 3-1 below depicts the 
most common types of constructs and their definitions: 
Table 3-1 Common Construct Types and Their Definitions.  
Type of Construct Definition 
Core Has a deep and personal significance to the interviewee 
Propositional Offers a simple description of basic and, at first glance, superficial element characteristics, e.g. male - female, right-handed - left-handed 
Affective Expresses a feeling or concern 
Behavioural Describes what the elements do, or the part they play in some process to which they belong 
Evaluative An opinion or an assessment 
Attributional Incorporates perceived reasons for behaviour 
Unremarkable No great implications can be drawn 
Source: Jankowicz (2004) 
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The objective of this was to discover meaning, and identify what mattered to the 
interviewee. This was accomplished by looking at the proportion of constructs that were 
considered to be ‘core’ and thereby of personal importance and significance to the 
interviewee, versus those that were peripheral or of lesser importance. This helped to 
broaden the picture of how the interviewee had approached the topic and what was 
intrinsically important to them. 
3.6.2.2 Relationship Analysis Techniques 
The primary methods of relationship analyses involved examining the relationships 
between the constructs and the elements within a single grid using cluster analysis. 
This led to Step Four, which was an examination of the relationships between the 
various elements. RepGrid IV presents these in a pictorial format known as a 
dendrogram (see Figure 3-3 below).  
A dendrogram (from the Greek dendron "tree" and gramma "drawing") is a tree 
structure diagram that is used to show how, or whether, the elements within a repertory 
grid cluster into groups. In the context of this research, the elements were the flight 
operations managers and directors who were interviewed using the repertory grid 
method. It does this by graphically showing the percentage similarities between the 
different elements. These percentage similarities were in turn derived from the ratings 
given by the interviewees during the construct elicitation interview by mathematically 
determining the difference between the aggregated ratings for each element across all 
constructs within a particular grid. The percentages show how each element is related 
to one another. If the percentage similarity is high, say greater than 80%, then the 
elements are considered to be closely related. Consequently, if the percentage 
similarity is low, say less than 50%, then, the elements are more opposed to one 
another and will represent a significant difference in how they are rated on each 
construct. In this research the dendrogram shows whether there are similarities or 
dissimilarities in relative attitudes and behaviours and can be used to draw conclusions 
about which elements are more, or less, aligned with the others.  
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Figure 3-3 Example of Dendrogram Depicting Cluster Analysis of Elements 
In the example in Figure 3-3 there is a distinct cluster of elements made up of MD, ACP1 
and ACP2, who form a cluster whose lowest similarity score is 85%. This suggests that 
they are closely aligned on the set of constructs within this particular grid. 
Conducting similar examinations of all grids paints a picture of how the group views 
themselves, and each other. This can lead to very interesting insight, not only for the 
researcher but also for the interviewee when they begin to see the relationships between 
elements. 
3.6.2.3 Multiple Grid Content Analysis 
Step Five was a content analysis, which was accomplished by using a technique called 
Bootstrapping. Bootstrapping is a method by which you can analyse a series of 
repertory grids to find combined results. Ordinarily a repertory grid is a single process 
conducted with one person, but in the case where multiple people have been 
interviewed about the same topic it is valuable to further analyse the grids together. In 
this case, it was particularly important because the aim of the research was to 
understand how the managers and directors collectively behaved towards the 
performance review process.  
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The process was carried out in an iterative series of categorising the constructs. For 
this I produced an index card for each of the 88 constructs that had been elicited during 
the interviews in the second cycle, and 74 in the third cycle. Each card contained a 
construct showing both of its poles and an index number so that I knew from which grid 
it came and which construct it was. I then viewed each card in turn and placed them 
into categories. The categories were determined on the fly by using terms, or themes, 
that the constructs themselves invoked. If a card did not fit into an already determined 
category then it was placed into a new category. This process took some time and was 
organic in that it required reviewing and re-reviewing the previously decided categories 
to ensure that each construct was placed properly.  
Once this process was complete, I compiled the results into a table, which showed the 
categories into which each construct was placed. Table 3-2 below displays my first cut 
at categorising the constructs during cycle three. 
Table 3-2  Example of Multiple Grid Construct Categorisation 
Category Definition Sum %
Conscientiousness
Demonstrates commitment to 
company and works to improve 
performance versus ready to move on, 
or not willing to help and does not care 
about performance
1.4 1.8 2.8 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.12 4.5 4.13 5.6 5.12 6.7 6.13 6.14 7.2 7.6 6.3 17 19.32%
Accountability for 
performance
Holds people accountable, or is held 
accountable themsleves versus not 
holding people accountable or 
accepting accountability
2.9 3.13 4.3 4.14 5.13 6.8 7.1 7.8 8 9.09%
Motivation
Concerned about making 
improvements and determined to get 
work accomplished versus makes 
excuses, lacking drive and 
independent thought
1.2 3.2 3.6 6.4 6.6 6.11 7.4 7 7.95%
Creativity and flexibility
Tendency to be creative and flexible to 
adapt versus being rigid, obstructionist 
and inflexible
1.11 2.3 6.9 3.9 6.5 4.2 6 6.82%
Big picture versus individual 
view
Demonstrates larger picture 
perspective versus analytical 
perspective
1.6 2.4 2.6 6.2 7.3 5 5.68%
Compassion and relation to 
employees
Empathetic and understanting towards 
employees versus isolated from 
workforce and more involved with 
numbers
4.10 7.7 5.2 6.10 5.7 5 5.68%
Action orientated and using 
authority
Takes action and implements change 
versus not using authority to make 
changes
2.1 2.2 5.9 5.10 5.11 5 5.68%
Miscellaneous
Constructs that do not naturally fall 
within the specified categories and for 
which a separate category is not 
appropriate because it would be a 
category of one
1.10 5.8 5.5 5.4 4 4.55%
Communication and sharing 
information
Being cooperative and realising others 
may need information versus don't 
care that information should be shared 
1.7 4.11 5.1 3.4 4 4.55%
Demeanour Calm and organised versus anxious 
and aggressive
2.7 4.12 6.1 6.12 4 4.55%
Alignment and differences 
between management and 
crew
"Us vs. Them": management should 
run the airline versus the union/crews 
should have greater influence
1.5 7.5 7.10 3.10 4 4.55%
Operatonal excellence
Understands and has background 
knowledge of line crews versus no 
flight experience and/or divorced from 
line operations
1.12 2.5 3.5 5.3 4 4.55%
Concern about future of 
airline
Career versus just a job: optimistic 
about post-merger airline versus the 
future is bleak
1.9 4.6 7.11 3 3.41%
Conformity Fits into established system versus 
bucks the system
4.1 4.4 4.9 3 3.41%
Work ethic Good attitude versus poor attitude 1.1 1.3 2.10 3 3.41%
Responsibility Accepting responsibility versus 
passing the blame
3.11 7.9 2 2.27%
Delegation and territory Delegates versus remains territorial 
and keeps work to themselves
4.7 4.8 2 2.27%
Outlook Positive versus negative 1.13 3.1 2 2.27%
Totals 88 100%
Constructs
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This was a start at combining the data from all of the grids, which then requires testing 
for reliability.  
3.6.3 Reliability Analysis of Data 
In order for the multi-grid content analysis to have reliability another person is enrolled 
to conduct the exact same categorisation procedure, but this time creating their very 
own categories and deciding into which the constructs should go. For this, I enrolled 
the assistance of a colleague who had some familiarity with my research but who did 
not work within the aviation industry, so that this person could be totally objective and 
impartial about how they categorised the constructs. 
The two resulting spreadsheets are then combined into one table that shows all 
categories and constructs (Table 3-3).  
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Table 3-3  Example of Multiple Grid Category Comparison 
Collaborator It's just a 
paycheck
Creative, or 
business as 
usual
Tight control over 
my own little 
corner
Responsibility Miscellaneous
Plays well with 
others
Interviewer
Conscientiousness
7.6, 6.3, 1.4, 
1.8, 2.8, 3.3, 
3.7, 3.8, 3.12, 
4.5, 4.13, 5.6, 
5.12, 6.7, 6.14, 
7.2
6.13
Creativity and flexibility 6.11 1.11, 2.3, 3.9, 
6.5, 4.2
6.9
Delegation and territory 4.7, 4.8
Accountability for 
performance
3.9, 3.13, 4.3, 
4.14, 5.13, 6.8, 
7.1, 7.8
Miscellaneous 5.5 5.4 1.10, 5.8
Motivation 1.2, 3.2, 6.4 6.6, 7.4 3.6
Big picture versus 
individual view
2.6, 6.2 1.6, 2.4, 7.3
Compassion and 
relation to employees
6.10 4.10, 5.2, 7.7, 
5.7
Action orientated and 
using authority
2.1, 5.10, 5.9 2.2, 5.11
Communication and 
sharing information
5.1 1.7, 4.11, 3.4
Demeanour 6.1 2.7 4.12, 6.12
Alignment and 
differences between 
t d 
7.10 1.5, 7.5, 3.10
Operatonal excellence 5.3 1.12, 2.5, 3.5
Concern about future of 
airline
1.9, 7.11, 4.6
Conformity 4.1, 4.4 4.9
Work ethic 1.1, 2.10 1.3
Responsibility 3.11, 7.9
Outlook 1.13 3.1
 
A reliability calculation can then be applied to see how closely they match. This 
calculation is made by adding all the constructs that are in the categories that we 
agreed upon and dividing by the total number of constructs. In this instance for the first 
pass we only achieved a 36.4% reliability score.  
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Table 3-4 Example of Reliability Testing 
Collaborator It's just a 
paycheck
Creative, or 
business as 
usual
Tight control over 
my own little 
corner
Responsibility Miscellaneous
Plays well with 
others
Interviewer Total %
Conscientiousness 16 1 17 19.32%
Creativity and flexibility 1 5 1 7 7.95%
Delegation and territory 2 2 2.27%
Accountability for 
performance
8 8 9.09%
Miscellaneous 1 1 2 4 4.55%
Motivation 3 2 1 6 6.82%
Concern about future of 
airline
3 3 3.41%
Conformity 2 1 3 3.41%
Work ethic 2 1 3 3.41%
Responsibility 2 2 2.27%
Outlook 1 1 2 2.27%
Action orientated and 
using authority
3 2 5 5.68%
Big picture versus 
individual view
2 3 5 5.68%
Compassion and 
relation to employees
1 4 5 5.68%
Communication and 
sharing information
1 3 4 4.55%
Demeanour 1 1 2 4 4.55%
Alignment and 
differences between 
management and crew
1 3 4 4.55%
Operatonal excellence 1 3 4 4.55%
Total 26 16 4 16 5 21
Totals 88 100%
Index A 36.4%
(number of constructs along the diagonal for the categories agreed upon, as a percentage of all of the constructs in the table )
16+5+2+8+1 = 32
88 constructs in total:
100 x 32/88 = 36.4%  
In order to improve upon this, both myself and the other analyst reviewed each 
construct that we did not agree upon and negotiated its meaning and therefore into 
which combined category that it should fall. This process continued until all of the 
constructs were exhausted. Another summary spreadsheet was produced and a further 
reliability check was made. This is repeated until we achieved an acceptable reliability 
score. For the analysis to be considered “reliable’ it is common practice for the 
reliability score to be greater than 90% (Jankowicz 2004). When the reliability process 
is complete there is a mutually agreed upon set of categories that represents the 
collective constructs of all of the interviewees.  
This completes the review of the research design and analysis methods. The final 
section encapsulates the research design into a diagram. 
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3.7 Diagram of the Research Process 
The diagram below (Figure 3-4) summarises and illustrates the iterative loops depicting 
the four cycles of the overall research lifespan. Each intervention is labelled to show at 
what point a further round of action was taken. 
 
 
95 
 
Understanding how 
managers relate to 
operations 
performance 
measurement
Evaluation and 
analysis
Reflection
Implementation of PM 
system and interviews 
with managers
Design of PM 
system
What attitudes and 
behaviours do the 
managers display 
and what influence 
does the state of 
crisis have?
Evaluation and 
analysis
Repertory grid 
interviews with Flight 
Ops department 
managers
Refining PM system 
and holding the 
managers accountable 
What attitudes and 
behaviours do the 
managers display 
and what influence  
does the state of 
growth have?
Evaluation and 
analysis
Reflection
Repertory grid 
interviews with SOC 
managers
Introduction of Weekly 
SOC Operations 
Performance Review
How do managers 
react to a daily cross-
department 
operations 
performance review? 
Evaluation and 
analysis
Reflection
Interviews with 
managers of all 
operations-related 
departments
Introduction of 0930 
Daily Ops Briefing and 
Performance Review
Conclusion
Reflection
Cycle 2: Allegheny Airlines – Deepening Crisis
Cycle 2 shifted the frame of reference to 
examine the attitudes and behaviours of 
managers as they tried to engage with an 
imposed PM system. This research occurred 
while the prevailing crisis deepened, 
threatening the very survival of the airline. 
Cycle 3: Pinnacle Airlines – Growth
This cycle examined the attitudes and 
behaviours of managers who were 
expected to engage with a weekly 
performance review system and whether 
the state of growth had a different 
influence on them. This research built 
upon the lessons learned in the first two 
cycles and involved the managers in the 
design of the system.
Cycle 4: Pinnacle Airlines – Decline In Operations 
Performance Following Aggressive Growth
The final cycle examined the structure and behaviours 
underlying a newly introduced daily operations performance 
review that involved all operations-related departments.
The design, introduction, and conduct of the Daily Operations 
Briefing and Performance Review had its foundations in the 
knowledge gained during the first three cycles of research. 
These iterative stages of learning, change, and growth 
provided the insight to frame operations performance in a 
manner that should be understood, and responded to, by the 
managers who had responsibility for the airline’s output.
Cycle 1: Allegheny Airlines - Crisis Following Bankruptcy 
of Parent Company
This was the first exploratory cycle aimed at understanding 
how operations performance was measured and 
understood by the managers of the Flight Operations 
department. This research took place during a time when 
the company was experiencing a significant crisis.
Action Research Learning Cycles 
and Stages of Change
Project: Attitudes and behaviours of managers to 
operations performance measurement during 
periods of crisis and growth
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
 
Figure 3-4 Research Process and Design Diagram 
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3.8 Summary 
In this chapter I have outlined and justified the selection of Action Research as an 
appropriate methodology for this project because of its participant and collaborative 
nature and that knowledge builds upon itself in an iterative process. This has important 
applicability to practitioner research. I have also described the use of the research 
methods employed including semi-structured interviews and the repertory grid 
technique, along with how the data was coded and analysed. Additionally, concerns 
with ethics and bias have been discussed. 
The next four chapters are devoted to the four cycles of research and are contained as 
separate entities, including their respective data analysis and findings, because each 
one had to conclude before the next could begin. 
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Chapter Four 
4. CYCLE 1: CRISIS AT ALLEGHENY AIRLINES 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a detailed review of the first cycle of 
research. It follows in a specific order the prescribed Action Research approach of 
defining a problem, planning action, taking action and then subsequently reflecting 
upon the action taken.  
It further describes the context of the research and provides an in depth analysis of the 
interview data, concluding with a summary of the findings and my personal reflections 
on the research process and the results produced. 
4.1 Introduction 
This study began in early 2003 as an attempt to bring some meaning and 
understanding to the measurement of operations performance at Allegheny Airlines, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of US Airways Inc., which itself, was a major airline in North 
America. The motivation for the study stemmed from a very real need to increase 
operational performance in the face of a major crisis that had taken hold at US Airways, 
which was also threatening the very survival of Allegheny Airlines.  
The study had particular relevance at the time because our parent company (US 
Airways) had recently emerged from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection after making 
large-scale redundancies and securing pay concessions from organised labour groups. 
It now needed to continue improving efficiency and reducing costs in order to remain 
solvent. On emerging from bankruptcy, US Airways made it abundantly clear to 
Allegheny that our survival depended on excellent operational performance, which in 
turn thrust us into turmoil because our performance had not previously been on par 
with their expectations. 
During this period of time, the management from the operations side of our airline was 
required to become involved in a weekly operations performance conference call, 
hosted by US Airways, which sought to compare the relative performance of the 11 
airlines that comprised the US Airways Express Division.  
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My initial exposure to this meeting immediately convinced me that we simply had to 
know more about the internal and external processes of how our airline operated and 
be fully prepared to discuss these at the weekly operations performance conference 
call. During these conference calls, we were frequently caught off-guard by probing 
questions that left us with little, or nothing, to say by way of explanation for our poor 
performance. This experience was eye- opening and more than a little humbling.  
I quickly began to appraise how I could introduce a more informative, insightful and 
effective performance measurement and review process within the Flight Operations 
department that would allow us to have sufficient information and knowledge to speak 
more precisely, and certainly more intelligently, in front of US Airways and the other 
Express Division carriers. I then set about gathering the data that would hopefully lead 
to a better understanding of how my colleagues viewed and understood operations 
performance. 
This initial action enquiry cycle explored the events, responses and attitudes 
surrounding the design, implementation and consequent use of this operations 
performance review system, and painted a picture of how the concept of performance 
measurement was actually understood, and practised by the managers and directors in 
the Flight Operations department. 
During this cycle of research, the introduction of performance measurement and review 
systems was restricted to the Flight Operations department because it had direct 
control over the flight schedule, crew assignments, crew costs, flight planning, flight 
control and recovery from irregular operations. Additionally, it was the department that I 
was employed in and allowed me access to the managers and directors that ran the 
operation. The project was not conducted or supported as a corporate-wide endeavour.  
In order to frame the research properly it is necessary to have detailed insight into the 
background at Allegheny. The following section therefore describes the research 
situation and in so doing diagnoses the problem.  
4.2 The Research Situation  
Allegheny Airlines was a regional airline operating in the eastern half of the United 
States, and was one of three wholly owned subsidiaries of US Airways, the other two 
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subsidiaries being Piedmont Airlines and PSA. These three wholly owned carriers plus 
eight other regional airlines comprised US Airways Express Division, which was an arm 
of the business dedicated to providing regional passenger feed to the major hub 
airports served by US Airways (see table 4-1 below).  
Table 4-1 US Airways Express Division Carriers 
 Air Midwest 
 Allegheny Airlines * 
 Chautauqua Airlines  
 Colgan Airlines 
 Mesa Airlines 
 Midway Airlines  
 Piedmont Airlines * 
 PSA Airline * 
 Shuttle America 
 TranStates Airlines - Jet 
 TranStates Airlines – Turboprop 
* wholly owned subsidiary of US Airways 
In 2003, US Airways and its wholly-owned subsidiaries were operating under 
bankruptcy protection after experiencing difficult economic conditions following the 
terrorist attacks in New York on September 11th 2001. In 2002, the US Airways Group 
Inc. reported a net loss of $1.65 billion on operating revenues of $6.98 billion. Similar 
poor results were also being experienced at other major airlines and this underlined the 
serious financial difficulties that the industry in North America was facing. However, this 
was not the case for many of the ‘low cost’ airlines that had forged a niche for 
themselves. A comparison from both sides of the Atlantic showed that in the USA 
JetBlue, Airtran and Southwest Airlines were all making money, while in Europe 
EasyJet and Ryanair were producing better results than their competitors. They had 
managed to maintain profitability and continued to grow in spite of the huge losses 
incurred by the major airlines. This was due in very large part to the fact that over the 
years they had managed to keep their operating costs much lower and hence their 
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revenues per passenger were higher (Anonymous 2002). This focus on an airline’s 
cost base eventually began a period of consolidation within the industry and a move 
towards deploying additional regional jets as a more economic venture. 
US Airways successfully emerged from bankruptcy in March 2003 as a smaller and 
leaner company but with the very real need to continue reducing costs, and as time 
moved on US Airways began to make some headway and realise the benefits of its 
painful restructuring. For the first quarter of 2003 a pre-tax loss of $282 million was 
reported, compared to $435 million for the first quarter of 2002, and for the second 
quarter of 2003 a pre-tax loss of $154 million, compared to $250 million in the second 
quarter of the previous year. This suggested that progress was being made. 
4.2.1 Small Jets and Forced Competition 
At the outset of the post-bankruptcy restructuring, Allegheny and the other two wholly-
owned carriers had a fleet of aging turboprop aircraft that was already planned to 
decrease in size as the leases on their aircraft expired. US Airways had made it very 
clear on many occasions that the future of regional service throughout its system would 
be with these smaller jets and that the turboprops would be phased out entirely over 
the following few years. So, Allegheny was operating under the assumption that it 
would soon be in a position to begin replacing its fleet of 37-seat Dehavilland DHC-8 
twin turboprop aircraft with new 50-seat regional jets (RJ’s). These regional jets had 
already been deployed very successfully by other major airlines throughout the world 
but US Airways was lagging behind its competitors with only four of its affiliated carriers 
flying these small jets. In fact, JetBlue and Southwest had both publicly announced 
their intentions to deploy small jets within the next couple of years. This would be a 
further blow to US Airways, posing a serious threat to its market share.  
In order to be considered as an attractive company to invest in, the senior executives of 
US Airways directed that the wholly owned carriers all needed to provide an 
economical and efficient cost structure from which to operate these new aircraft. It was 
also implied that the company who was first to present, and implement, an acceptable 
plan would likely be the first subsidiary to receive the new aircraft. There was now a 
huge incentive to be that first carrier, which immediately threw these three wholly-
owned carriers into serious competition with one another.  
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Part of the overall restructuring required each subsidiary to negotiate pay concessions 
from its labour unions and impose pay cuts on all other non-union personnel, including 
all levels of management. However, at Allegheny, this message to provide a 
competitive economic structure, was not communicated to the workforce very well, and 
although the message itself seemed simple and straightforward, it was not embraced 
or truly appreciated by the labour unions who believed that management was 
conspiring to force them into taking pay cuts and concessions with no corresponding 
promise of any future growth. For the pilots, this was further complicated by the need to 
negotiate terms whereby US Airways pilots who had been furloughed during the 
bankruptcy would fill 50% of the pilot seats for any new jets awarded to a subsidiary. 
This now meant that some jobs at each carrier would be surrendered to US Airways 
pilots, with their pilots taking jobs from ours. This programme, infamously known as: 
‘Jets for Jobs’, was a very bitter pill for our pilots to swallow, and it was many months 
before a concessionary agreement was finally reached.  
After much wrangling at each carrier, PSA presented an acceptable plan to the senior 
management of US Airways before either Allegheny or Piedmont. When the 
announcement was eventually forthcoming not surprisingly the new aircraft fell to PSA 
– all 60 of them!  
In a press release dated 12th May 2003 David Siegel, President and CEO of US 
Airways stated that  
“these new regional jets will enable US Airways to generate additional revenue 
by growing our route network and competing more vigorously in short-to-
medium-length haul markets…(and) also will enable us to increase hub feed by 
adding new markets that were too distant for turboprop aircraft, and replace 
current turboprop flying”.  
This news, which was only communicated to our employees by way of the very same 
press release, came as a major disappointment to us. Although Allegheny was not the 
first to present an acceptable deal, we were actually the first carrier to implement the 
cost saving measures and we felt that we would, at the very least, be able to share in 
the distribution of the new jets. That was unfortunately not the case.  
During his quarterly visit to our company on 14th July 2003 the President of US Airways 
Express Division, Bruce Ashby, explained to management and selected members of 
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the pilot and flight attendant unions, the rationale behind the decision and further broke 
the bad news that we would not be considered for RJ’s until the next round of 
introductions, which would be several years away. He further went on to say that “now 
is a good time to revise your resumes (CV’s)”. This was a rather callous comment that 
invoked much worry amongst the staff. 
Considering that our fleet was expected to shrink to as little as 18 aircraft, from the 
original 45, by the end of 2004, the future began to look decidedly grim and there was 
rampant speculation of further redundancies as the airline contracted. This had 
naturally taken a great toll on the people working at Allegheny, which was made all the 
worse by the fact that there were simply no opportunities to seek alternative 
employment at other carriers because of the very depressed state of the industry, 
which still had not recovered to pre-September 11th levels. Further threats of terrorism 
and poor weather cost the airlines, including US Airways, tens of millions of dollars. 
This was lost revenue that became harder and harder, and eventually impossible, to 
retrieve. 
4.2.2 Performance Measurement at Allegheny 
As discussed in the literature review, performance measurement in business today is 
recognised as an essential tool that shapes how a company’s strategy is put into action 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996a; Simons 2000). The measurement of performance is the key 
to determining areas of strength and weakness and providing insight on how to gain 
competitive advantage. The airline industry is no exception. Operating performance of 
all airlines is measured externally and publicly by the US Department of Transportation 
in its monthly Air Transport Report and details amongst other things each airlines on-
time performance and ability to complete its published schedule. However, it can only 
show the end-results of each airline’s efforts during a given month. In order to 
understand the true determinants of operational performance it is necessary to 
examine processes embedded deep within the organisation that are in many cases far 
removed from the final service offered to the customer. All of these processes are 
generally measured in one form or another by every airline. 
At the time that I began my research the only performance measurement reviews that 
took place were the weekly conference call between the US Airways Express carriers 
to compare each carrier’s relative performance, and an internal operations meeting 
each work day to review how the previous day had gone. There was nothing in-depth 
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at Allegheny that drilled down to the determinants of performance, or that tracked data 
over time to enable trends to be discerned.  
In theory, if there are no external forces at play, the flight schedule operates as 
published. In reality however, there are never any days when this occurs and multiple 
internal and external forces negatively affect the end result. It is therefore important to 
identify what these factors are and how to minimise them. This responsibility falls on 
the Operations Control Centre (OCC), which is a centralised function charged with 
ensuring that the published flight schedule is operated to its optimum. This involves 
delaying or cancelling flights, and swapping aircraft and crewmembers to reduce 
delays.  
The personnel working in the Operations Control Centre attempt to identify and 
minimise all of these impacts to ensure schedule integrity. Additionally, they are tasked 
with coordinating the provisioning of the product to the customer in terms of 
uninterrupted flights and efficient service. 
While the processes were in place to create an optimum operation there was no real 
insight to the causes of performance deficiencies. 
4.2.3 My Position 
The previous section has hopefully provided the reader with insight to the predicament 
that Allegheny was in and why there was a need to intervene in the measurement and 
review of operations performance.  
My role when embarking on this research project was that of Director of System 
Control. This provided me with the management oversight of our daily flight schedule 
and several operations management functions: Flight Dispatch, Crew Scheduling, 
Crew Planning, Crew Pay, Crew Accommodations and Crew Meal Catering. During my 
career in aviation, I had built an in-depth knowledge of and experience with many 
aspects of airline flight operations, through the management of flight operations at two 
distinctly different air carriers. In particular, I was well acquainted with the internal 
processes and the logistics involved in ensuring that a flight schedule is operated to the 
published timetable.   
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Having now decided that I needed to take a very active role in improving how we 
measured and reviewed operations performance it was important to build a framework 
around this in order to conduct it as a formal research project. The first step was to 
identify the purpose and objectives of the initial research cycle.  
4.3 Purpose and Objectives of the First Cycle of Research 
The methodology of Action Research prescribes that research should be conducted in 
a logical sequence that requires determining the problem, planning action, taking 
action, evaluating results, and then reflecting upon the action taken. This first research 
cycle, and each subsequent cycle, has therefore followed this approach and is 
represented in summary format below: 
AR Procedural Steps  Action for Cycle One 
1. Determine the problem: Managers and directors need to better understand 
operations performance in order to help Allegheny 
survive as a viable entity 
2. Plan action: Set objectives. Design PMR system 
3. Take action: Introduction of the PMR system and interviews with 
Flight Operations department managers and 
directors 
4. Evaluate and analyse: Making sense of the findings 
5. Reflect on action taken: Personal reflection on the how the first cycle took 
place 
 
Additionally, this process is depicted visually below, which is an excerpt from the 
overall depiction of the entire AR research plan contained in Chapter Three. 
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Understanding how 
managers relate to 
operations 
performance 
measurement
Evaluation and 
analysis
Reflection
Implementation of PM 
system and interviews with 
managers
Design of PM 
system
Cycle 1: Allegheny Airlines - Crisis Following Bankruptcy 
of Parent Company
This was the first exploratory cycle aimed at understanding 
how operations performance was measured and 
understood by the managers of the Flight Operations 
department. This research took place during a time when 
the company was experiencing a significant crisis.
 
Figure 4-1 Diagram of 1st Cycle Events 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the most pressing problem can be 
defined as the need to better understand operations performance and thereby improve 
our ability to influence results. Because of the situation that our company found itself in, 
there was a need to, fundamentally, readdress the way we measured and reviewed 
operations performance internally. At the heart of this needed to be a new mechanism 
for presenting and reviewing performance data, along with clear communication of the 
company’s goals and the strategies to be employed to achieve them. Flying 
passengers from A to B at the lowest cost seemed to be the prevailing objective and, in 
the cut-throat market of intense price competition on heavily travelled routes, this left as 
the only obvious means for differentiation the ability to fly passengers on-time every 
time. Hence, operations performance became a top priority for everyone.  
4.3.1 Objectives 
To achieve the aim of understanding how performance measurement was being 
practised and understood the following objectives were developed to provide structure 
and direction for the first cycle: 
1. Design and introduce a performance measurement and review (PMR) system 
2. Understand how my colleagues viewed and understood the measurement of 
operations performance 
3. Evaluate how they engaged with the new PMR process 
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4. Evaluate the prevailing culture at Allegheny 
5. Develop ideas for further work and improvement based on the research 
outcomes 
When embarking upon this project it was my personal goal to try to promote an 
awareness of how everyone’s individual role influenced the final product, and also to 
gain a thorough understanding of the true determinants of a successful operation.   
The research study ran in parallel to the implementation of the PMR system and sought 
to explore how my colleagues reacted to this change effort. I was concerned that 
enforcing change in a culture that is mature and likely to resist efforts to change would 
be a difficult accomplishment. An excerpt from my research journal at the time provides 
some insight to my own thought process when entering into the first cycle. It was not 
without some trepidation: 
“I hope that my role as a director will enable me to facilitate a change in how we 
manage performance, certainly within our Flight Operations department. We 
must do this to survive and be better than PSA and Piedmont. I am presently 
more than a little worried and anxious about whether my colleagues will be 
willing to embrace these changes. It also remains to be seen whether Michael 
and Keith (my superiors) share my view of what needs to be accomplished at 
Allegheny...” 
Would refocusing priorities and responsibilities instil a drive towards a philosophy of 
efficiency and effectiveness, or would it meet with resistance and fail to fulfil its 
objectives? This first step along the path was to design a PMR system that could be 
used as a mechanism to frame operations performance and provide a vehicle from 
which to make sense of the results.  
4.4 Design of the PMR System (Planning Action) 
When I decided that we needed a mechanism to measure and review operations 
performance it was my initial intention to first interview the managers who are 
responsible for daily flight operations to gain an understanding of how they would like 
this to be developed and to seek assistance in designing relevant performance 
measures. However, the pace of change at Allegheny and the pressing need to 
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address performance and reduce costs raced ahead of the planned research. This 
resulted in the performance measurement and review programme being devised and 
implemented prior to the interviews taking place. However, an interesting opportunity 
was presented to now observe how these managers would react and adapt to a system 
that imposed measures and a level of accountability on them.  
The design of the measurement system was hastily put together as a means by which 
to gauge Allegheny’s performance on a regular basis, and to begin formulation of plans 
for corrective action. I selected certain recognisable outcome measures that depicted 
our daily performance and which also helped build a picture of the results of these daily 
efforts. These measures are standard airline operating metrics and while they were 
used at our airline, there was insufficient emphasis placed upon them and only 
elementary discussions when performance fell short of the prescribed goals.  
The aim of the PMR system was to measure the internal processes, from the inception 
of the flight schedule months before to its execution on the day of operation, and 
identify areas for improvement and potential cost cutting. Therefore, my driving focus 
was to understand how to optimise output by identifying cause and effect linkages and 
applying this knowledge at each point in the production process. This process was 
expected to produce an increase in efficiency, an overall reduction in costs, and a 
greater ability to effectively manage operations. However, evidence from past practice 
within the US airline industry (Rhoades et al. 1998) shows that cost cutting alone 
typically results in a decrease in service quality. Service quality is the key outcome of 
the production process and so it was important to ensure that the metrics we devised, 
as part of the review process, drew attention to deficiencies in the system 
The system was modelled loosely around the balanced scorecard format as proposed 
by Kaplan and Norton (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The literature regarding balanced 
scorecards concentrates primarily on its application as a tool to manage the 
organisation as a whole but this type of application was beyond the scope and authority 
of this research project and hence it was modified for use in just one departmental. The 
structure of our business was such that the daily operation of the airline was in the 
control of the Operations Control Centre personnel, our pilots, flight attendants, and 
station agents. With the exception of station agents these groups all fell within the 
control of the Flight Operations Department and it is the actions of its members that 
were examined under this study. Therefore, the introduction of the performance 
measurement and review system was restricted to the Flight Operations department, 
108 
 
which had direct control over crew costs, the flight schedule, crew assignments, flight 
planning, flight control and recovery from irregular operations. 
The initial lofty premise for the PMR system was to assist in Allegheny’s future survival 
and the need to be competitive with our sister companies. Allegheny needed to seek all 
opportunities to reduce costs and increase its operating performance. Therefore, the 
introduction of a balanced scorecard, and the identification of performance drivers, was 
intended to address two specific areas:  
1. An increase in operational effectiveness defined as the quantifiable output of 
the airline; e.g. our ability to complete the schedule as published (completion 
factor and on-time performance).  
2. A reduction in flight crew labour costs by eliminating, as far as possible, the 
unproductive time that is built into a crewmember’s schedule, or what is termed 
as ‘soft time’.  This comprised time that a crewmember was either deadheading, 
flying less hours than the monthly pay guarantee, spending time in company 
provided rest facilities, overtime, and rescheduling premium which is used as an 
enticement to cover segments that remain unmanned due to irregularities e.g. 
sick calls. Flight crew costs are only one component of total operating cost but 
represent the highest labour cost group for most airlines (Doganis, 2002). 
At the heart of this system would be a weekly performance review meeting to allow us 
to assess recent performance and discuss ways to correct the deficiencies. I gathered 
the performance data daily by using a multitude of reports from our operations systems 
that I combined into tables and graphs for presentation at the meeting. The data was 
initially in a raw format and took time to collate. 
The research does not intend to dwell on the mechanics of this data collection or to 
focus particularly on the back office work of how the system worked but rather to focus 
on the management teams’ behavioural reactions to it. 
By introducing a performance management system that brought accountability and 
responsibility to the review process, it was hoped that true and lasting change would 
ensue. The supposition was that by heightening awareness and creating ownership of 
performance measures, significant gain could be achieved in streamlining the internal 
processes that are key contributing factors to the execution of the airlines published 
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schedule. Additionally, by deconstructing current practices it was expected that key 
cost drivers would be identified, measured, and deliberately manipulated so that there 
would be less unproductive time unnecessarily built into a crewmember's work 
schedule.  
4.4.1 Department Structure 
The Flight Department is one of five departments that comprised the hierarchy of the 
company along with Human Resources, Safety, Customer Service, Maintenance and 
Finance (Figure 4-2).  
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Figure 4-2 Organisation Structure of Flight Department at Allegheny 
My role was that of the Director of System Control, which involved managing the 
departments having responsibility for the daily flight schedule. All of the directors in the 
Flight Department worked very closely together because of the inter-related nature and 
complexities of running an airline. My area of responsibility and its role in the service 
production chain is depicted in Figure 4-3 below. 
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Figure 4-3 Model of Department Relationships at Allegheny 
This diagram outlines the inter-related nature of the many different facets of the 
operation that the PMR system would need to encompass and measure. It was 
ultimately intended that measures would be developed to capture data during all 
phases of this process. 
4.4.2 Adopting the Balanced Scorecard 
When I was evaluating how to accomplish this, it was apparent that there was not an 
off-the-shelf method that could be easily applied. After researching various different 
methods of establishing a performance measurement system, I settled on the balanced 
scorecard as a framework by which I could design a PMR system in a short period of 
time and put it to good use. I anticipated that it would provide a balanced presentation 
of financial (crew cost) and non-financial (operations management) measures that in 
turn comprised the lagging and leading indicators of performance. By focusing attention 
on the determinants of results (Fitzgerald et al.  1991) I tried to devise realistic 
measures that would provide insight and knowledge that could hopefully, be used to 
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formulate ways to improve performance in the future. The intent was to limit the 
measures used to a short list of critical indicators of current and future performance 
which would force the managers to focus on only the most important measures (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1992). This viewpoint essentially provides an avenue for companies to 
translate their mission statements into a coherent set of performance measures and in 
turn transcend functional and departmental barriers and help managers to see the 
whole picture. The scorecard advocates putting strategy and vision, not control, at the 
centre, and by establishing goals assumes that people will adopt whatever behaviours, 
and take whatever actions, are necessary to arrive at those goals. 
The PMR system that was introduced initially attempted to incorporate three of the four 
performance dimensions of the balanced scorecard: financial measures, customer 
service measures and internal process measures. All are specific to the Flight 
Operations Department and under the direct control of the management of the 
department. At the initial stage of development the learning and growth category was 
deferred until the system could be fully reviewed by those interacting with it and 
appropriate measures identified and targets set. The environment that Allegheny was 
operating in had been in a constant state of flux for some time, which made the 
incorporation of this dimension very difficult. Learning and growth measures revolved 
around developing resources and personnel with the organisation. Morale was a 
significant factor and had a negative impact on the enthusiasm and commitment of 
many, if not all, employees in the company.  
It was anticipated that the scorecard would let us see whether improvement in one area 
may have been achieved at the expense of another. Cause and effect relationships 
between performance drivers and objectives could then be understood and detailed. 
This can then help to transcend functional barriers and ultimately lead to improved 
decision making and problem solving. By developing a scorecard of measures it was 
hoped that we could identify just the measures that are used to determine good 
performance and do away with those that muddy the waters. But for success we would 
need commitment, co-operation and acceptance from all involved.  
4.4.3 The Measures 
At Allegheny there were essentially three primary outcome measures to gauge overall 
flight operations performance. The first was completion factor, which is a measure of 
how many flights are completed on the published schedule. The second and third 
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measures were concerned with on-time performance, which was measured by on-time 
departures and on-time arrivals, and gauged our ability to fly the timetable as 
published. These three outcome measures were grouped into the customer satisfaction 
dimension because the more reliable we were, the more likely the customer was to be 
satisfied with our ability to get them successfully to their destinations. Alongside these 
were internal financial measures, but only those that we had direct control over. In 
particular was the level of expenditure involved in providing hotel and transportation to 
crewmembers who were forced to deviate from their published schedules. Of greater 
significance was a factor called ‘rescheduling premium’, which was a premium pay 
element that a pilot could earn for accepting deviations to his/her trip that either 
required him/her to report a day or more early, or terminate beyond their original trip 
hour period. This could be very costly. Crew meals provided during irregular operations 
were an additional expense that also warranted careful measurement. 
Alongside the standard measures of airline performance, I also tried to balance this 
with measures that were relevant at our department level. For example we were able to 
track delays individually that were attributable to pilots and flight attendants or the 
human failing on the part of crew schedulers. I also included the number of sick calls 
received, operational decision delays, amount of rescheduling premium paid out, pay 
adjustments received, crewmember resignations, letters of commendation, and 
procedural violations. 
After making a personal determination of the most important factors, I developed a 
spreadsheet to track our daily performance over any given week and accumulate the 
statistics on an ongoing basis for comparison in the future. These were then used to 
build a PowerPoint slideshow that was the main communication vehicle used for the 
weekly review. Figure 4.4 below illustrates the spreadsheet and some of the categories 
that were being tracked. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show how the measures were displayed 
as graphs in the weekly presentation. 
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Week in Review
Source KPI Goal Jul
04-Jul 05-Jul 06-Jul 07-Jul 08-Jul 09-Jul 10-Jul WTD MTD
Flights Scheduled 214 187 290 347 347 347 348 2080 3126
(CUSTOMER SERVICE - HEADSTART)
HS flights scheduled 42 41 44 44 44 44 45 304 439
All HS delays S:00 93.00% 85.71% 97.56% 93.18% 88.10% 52.38% 95.35% 90.24% 86.08% 87.56%
Total 6 1 3 5 20 2 4 41 53
MT 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 10
FC 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 6
OP 0 1 0 0 13 0 0 14 15
CS 2 0 2 5 1 0 2 12 13
WX 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 6
AT 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 3
Downline delays 2 1 1 8 13 0 4 29 36
All HS cancellations 99.0% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 95.45% 95.45% 97.73% 91.11% 97.11% 97.75%
Total 0 0 0 2 2 1 4 9 10
XM 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 5 6
XC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
XW 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 3
XA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(CUSTOMER SERVICE OVERALL)
All Completion Factor 97.5% 100.0% 100.0% 98.6% 95.7% 95.4% 98.6% 95.1% 97.3% 97.8%
Total 0 0 3 15 16 5 17 56 68
XM 0 0 1 1 5 0 11 18 30
XC 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 3
XW 0 0 1 8 0 3 0 12 12
XA 0 0 0 4 11 2 6 23 23
OT Departures S:05 85.0% 90.2% 89.8% 85.4% 67.5% 76.1% 86.5% 76.7% 81.7% 83.8%
OT Arrivals S:14 85.0% 90.7% 92.5% 83.3% 69.0% 81.0% 89.5% 75.8% 83.1% 85.1%
Days above goal in OT & Compl. 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 5
(CUSTOMER SERVICE - FLIGHT DEPT)
Deb HS crew delays % 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 0.6% 1.34%
Pike / HS crew delays 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 6
Deb HS crew cancellations % 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.3% 0.23%
Pike / HS crew cancellations 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Pike/Deb Crew cancellations              (XC) 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 3
Crew delays S:00 1.2% 0.47% 0.53% 4.14% 3.17% 2.88% 2.02% 3.45% 2.4% 2.21%
Deb / (FC) 1 1 7 9 8 7 12 45 62
Pike (FA) 0 0 5 2 2 0 0 9 11
Mike OP delays S:00 0.5% 0.47% 1.60% 1.72% 1.44% 0.29% 0.29% 2.01% 1.1% 1.07%
1 3 5 5 1 1 7 23 34
David Sick calls - CA 4 3 2 0 3 0 6 18 25
 
Figure 4-4 Performance Measurement Spreadsheet 
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Figure 4-5 Weekly Review Slide: Completion Factor 
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4.5 Implementation of the PMR System (Taking Action) 
Due to the pressing need to understand and improve operational performance the PMR 
system had to be introduced rapidly. I therefore decided to introduce the system and 
then interview the managers afterwards taking the view that the system could always 
be changed and improved depending on how they engaged with it. 
The performance management (PMR) system was rolled out in May 2003 and 
presented to the director level at an informational meeting. It was proposed that we 
would all meet on Monday afternoons to review the performance from the previous 
week of operations and examine the data to make forecasts for the following week and 
remainder of the month. It predictably met with a mixed response. Present at the 
meeting were the directors responsible for our pilots, flight attendants, System Control 
(myself) and the VP of Flight Operations. The concept was presented as a means to 
proactively intercede and identify action required to control some dimensions of 
performance that were recognised as lacking. During this first meeting it was apparent 
that the other parties were largely unaware of the determinants of acceptable 
performance and puzzled by what was presented.  
Figure 4-6 Weekly Review Slide: Cancellations 
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This weekly operations performance review meeting was intended to prepare us for the 
weekly conference call an hour later hosted by US Airways Express division and 
involving all 11 US Airways Express carriers (see Table 4-1). Our review allowed us the 
opportunity to assess and discuss our responses to the expected questions. The US 
Airways call focused on performance results from the previous week with comments 
and questions directed to, and sometimes solicited from, the carriers that had 
performed poorly for the week. This was a valuable opportunity to see how we 
performed in relation to our sister companies and the other affiliated, but independent 
carriers.  
4.5.1 Expanding to Flight Crews 
On 24th June 2003 the Flight Department management team held an employee 
meeting with invited members of the pilot and flight attendant workforce. The aim was 
to introduce them to the way we now measured and reviewed performance to assess 
whether it might be worthwhile involving crewmembers also regularly at our weekly 
reviews, and to solicit input from them on what they believed to be the current 
problems. Our weekly performance review was presented and explained by myself. 
This proved to be an interesting and eye-opening exercise because many 
crewmembers were simply unaware of the level of detail that went into measuring 
delays and cancellations, down to the names of the crewmembers involved. This also 
drew some resentment from others who claimed it was no more than a “blame game” 
from management to the pilots. This adversarial relationship between management and 
pilots had been in existence for a long time and consequently there was a great deal of 
mistrust of management. One of the reasons for the lack of communication I noticed 
within the airline is that when the company does communicate it can meet with criticism 
and, all too often, a negative spin was put on it by union officials. Our pilot union, ALPA 
(Airline Pilots Association), was well-established, had a strong membership and could 
be somewhat militant at times and would take every opportunity to slate the company. 
In late July 2003 a modified version of the weekly performance review was made 
available to all crewmembers via a secure link on our company website. It was 
prefaced with an introduction to the performance measurement process and a 
description of the relevant measures. It was specifically stated that the data format 
could be modified and changed based on any feedback they wanted to give. I included 
the data showing a direct comparison with other US Airways carriers so that everyone 
could get a feel of where we fit in. 
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4.5.2 Interviews with the Managers and Directors in the Flight Department 
Following the introduction of the PMR system it was now important to learn how my 
colleagues had responded to this effort and whether it had changed their approach to 
operations performance at all. To accomplish this I conducted interviews in July 2003 
that were intended to build a picture of how my colleagues understood and engaged 
with performance management at our airline. The interviews spanned a period of two 
months and followed a semi-structured format that allowed the interviewee to express 
their views relating to their encounters with the PMR system and their experience at the 
airline. I consciously asked the same core questions but allowed the respondents to 
migrate away from the topic in order to delve deeper into what really constitutes the 
prevailing culture and deeply held beliefs. The interview questions are contained in 
Appendix A. 
This interview process proved to be a valuable and rewarding experience that 
highlighted some important issues, and clarified others that had appeared vague to me 
at the outset, or at least unrelated to performance measurement. There were nine 
interviews in total. All were recorded, transcribed, indexed and coded, so that summary 
interpretations could be made. The interviews took place at work, mostly in the offices 
of those interviewed, with their full consent and with a reassurance of confidentiality. 
Because the interviewees were all known to me, gaining cooperation was relatively 
easy. However, it must be acknowledged that some differences of opinion openly 
existed between myself and some of the interviewees that may have inhibited them 
from truly opening up and saying what they really believed. Since two of the interviews 
were with my direct reports, there may have been a reluctance for them to focus on 
anything that might have been perceived as negative in the presence of their boss. 
Also, I tried to remain objective in a manner consistent with that of an outsider so that 
the findings would have more relevance and understanding to the layman. An interview 
conducted by a true outsider may possibly have been more objective, but is unlikely to 
have reached to the core of the issue, or known how and where to lead the 
conversation when exploring particular peculiarities.  
The interviewees comprised the directors and managers who had responsibility for 
flight operations. The table below lists their position, department, and the abbreviations 
that are used in the analysis that follows. Actual names have been omitted from this 
table in order to protect anonymity. 
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Table 4-2 List of Interviewees - Cycle 1 
Position    Abbreviation  Department 
Asst Chief Pilot 1   ACP 1   Flight Operations 
Asst Chief Pilot 2   ACP2   Flight Operations 
Director of Operations  DO   Flight Operations 
Director of In-Flight   DIF   In-Flight 
Director of Training   DT   Training (crew) 
Director of Maintenance  DOM   Maintenance 
Manager of Crew Scheduling  MCS   OCC 
Manager of In-Flight   MIF   OCC 
 
The majority of these people were members of the Flight Department and were directly 
involved in managing our day-to-day operations. One exception was the Director of 
Maintenance who headed-up the Maintenance department but who also played a vital 
role in the daily operation. The Director of Operations, both Assistant Chief Pilots and 
the Director of Training were also Operations Duty Managers (ODM’s) who were on-
call on a rotating basis once every four weeks to talk directly to crewmembers about 
operational or technical matters that affected the successful and on-time completion of 
a flight. This typically involved clarification of standard operations procedures (SOPs) 
and the intervention when an irregularity occurred, for example, an in-flight emergency 
or a non-standard mechanical issue. The same on-call requirement applied to the 
director and manager of In-flight who intervened directly with flight attendants when an 
out of the ordinary issue arose.  
Scheduling and crew legality issues (regulated amount of time a pilot can spend behind 
the controls) are handled in a similar manner by the manager of Crew Scheduling and 
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myself. Therefore, all of us were intricately and continuously involved in the complex 
operation of the airline and had direct impact upon our ultimate operations 
performance. The reason I labour this point is to impress upon the reader the complex 
and interwoven nature of conducting flight operations.  
Following this initial round of coding and analysis, the interview data was then 
transcribed and imported into NVivo as separate cases. Each case was then 
categorised during an initial round of coding. Subsequent rounds of coding narrowed 
the initially very broad group to the larger themes that began to emerge as I became 
more immersed in the data. Once the coding of the data had been completed I was 
able to begin interpreting the results.  
The following section represents the content analysis of the interview data, and 
discusses the significant themes that emerged from the analysis of the interview 
transcripts. This provided unique insight into how the managers and directors in the 
Flight Department understood and interacted with flight operations performance results, 
and where they saw their role in the whole process. It also painted a good picture of 
how performance measurement was practised at Allegheny. Not surprisingly, there 
were some very different opinions on how and why we did things the way we did.  
4.6 Understanding Performance Measurement at Allegheny 
This section comprises the evaluation and analysis of the interview data. I have 
approached this from the perspective of ascribing significance to the interviewees’ 
comments, discussing the various topics that emerged and drawing conclusions for 
each theme. In so doing, I have endeavoured to let the interviewees’ words speak for 
themselves in order to preserve context and meaning, and to add colour to what might 
perhaps otherwise be a dull discourse. 
The interviews were all very interesting and people genuinely opened up to me 
because I was a trusted colleague, and in some instances a friend. The interview data 
was immensely rich and provided a wealth of information on how the Flight Operations 
department worked, how the PMR system was viewed and received, and gave an 
insight to the attitudes and behaviours of those involved. It was interesting to note how 
close I became to the data. Very much influencing that was the fact that I continued to 
work closely with these people throughout the whole time. This enabled me to ascribe 
120 
 
significance to their comments more readily because I was intimately aware of their 
surroundings and shared many of their experiences. 
The following sections capture the central meanings of the discussions that took place 
during the interviews. They have been separated into the nine significant themes that 
emerged during the coding of the interview transcripts, and an additional two sections 
that are specific to the discussions of the PMR system. Table 4-3 below lists these 
themes: 
Table 4-3 Significant Themes  - Cycle 1 
Goals 
Guidance and Support 
Accountability 
Teamwork 
Blame 
Resources 
Communication 
Attitudes and Behaviours 
Service Quality and Customer Service 
 
Reaction to the PMR System 
Desired Outcomes of the PMR System 
The evaluation and analysis section begins with an overview of the state of 
performance measurement at Allegheny as articulated by the interviewees, and then 
proceeds into a discussion of each of the main themes listed above. 
4.6.1 The Described Context of Measuring Performance at Allegheny 
Prior to the introduction of the weekly performance measurement and review system, 
the outcomes of the daily flight operation were measured in detail but were not used to 
manage the day-to-day operations, or to gauge performance against an operating 
strategy. Indeed, there was no strategy. Nor was there the notion to properly develop 
one. This stands in stark contrast to the intentions of most PMR systems, which 
advocate the implementation and communication of strategy as its core (Kaplan and 
Norton 1996b; Simons 2000). 
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There was already a lot of measurement taking place automatically by the computer 
applications that were used to run the operation, but without a corresponding and 
organised examination and review process it was generally an overwhelming 
endeavour to make any sense of the performance data. The measurements were taken 
after the event had taken place and were merely reflective of what had already 
happened, that is, they were outcome or lagging measures. 
Already in existence at Allegheny was a daily “Launch Meeting” which was held at 9 
a.m. each weekday to review the previous days’ operation. All controllable delays and 
cancellations were discussed by the participants, but only in general terms, and there 
was very little discussion about whether we were on target or falling behind pre-
established goals, and what needed to be achieved in order to meet the targets. The 
main reason for this was that the targets, which themselves had been predetermined 
by US Airways, were universally regarded as being unattainable   
The interview results indicated that the majority of the interviewees had a broad idea of 
what the concept of performance measurement meant to them. All were able to talk in 
terms of the concept of measuring operations performance, but there was a lack of 
clarity on how it should be practised: 
“It’s a measurement against a clearly defined target that the corporation is trying 
to meet…I‘m not aware of how we measure all of that” (DT) 
“How the day to day operation is monitored and measured to ensure that we 
maintain as high a level of quality as we can, either in people or procedures - 
really all aspects of the airline, both internal and external” (MIF) 
 “Analysis of everyday details” (MCS) 
“To gauge what kind of operation we ran...and allow us to use that data to make 
changes” (GMM). 
The internal changes that took place with the introduction of the PMR system led to 
these comments:  
“In recent weeks I have a better understanding of performance management 
than I ever did before…but to be honest prior to that if you were to have said 
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what is performance management, I’m not sure I could give you an intelligent 
answer” (DIF) 
“You’ve got to have some measure of how well a company does…the statistics 
that we now go over every week” (ACP1) 
 “I use the numbers we run through on a weekly basis. It's the statistics on how 
we fall with the rest of the group” (ACP2) 
“I would say it's been beneficial and an education for myself” (MCS) 
This was an indicator of the emphasis it had placed upon performance, coupled with 
the need to be competitive, and it was encouraging to hear that perhaps there was 
some immediate benefit being realised by the focus that the PMR system had placed 
on operations performance, especially in terms of providing an education on operating 
metrics.  
For one person, however, there was a particular difficulty distinguishing between 
company performance and employee performance, which seemed to point to a 
fundamental lack of understanding of the PMR process: 
“It’s a very difficult thing due to the remoteness of, at least in my department, 
the people [pilots] who are working for me. I never see them. So when we look 
at performance, it's almost to the point of what you don't hear, you know what I 
mean? If there’s problems they show up in delays and so on and so forth, they 
all show up” (DO) 
During the interviews, I discussed the purpose of measuring performance as a means 
to further sharpen the thoughts of the interviewees; what did they see as the reason for 
why performance was now being measured and reviewed? Again, there was a variety 
of answers that ranged from the seemingly well-informed, to those unable to clearly 
articulate a purpose. 
“Disseminate to the lowest levels of the company certain amounts of 
information” (DT). 
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“Ensure that we maintain the highest level of quality as we possibly can, either 
in people or procedures, really all aspects of the airline, internal and external” 
(MIF). 
“So that we can improve our performance, so we know which areas in which we 
lack and those that maybe we excel in” (MCS) 
“To get our crews not to fuck-up, and do stupid stuff. If we can reduce the 
amount of stupid things that they do, not just flight crew delays, but the dumb 
stuff, then we’ll be doing our job” (ACP2) 
“I think it’s to gain knowledge and make improvements” (DO) 
“I absolutely think it's necessary to have something to work towards and if you 
don't you just go through each day doing whatever comes up and you have no 
target” (DIF) 
This dialogue suggests that the interviewees were able to explain what measuring 
performance meant to them, along with its general purpose. However, my 
observations, outside of these theoretical discussions, were that these same people 
would not engage with the performance data in their actions and daily routines and 
thereby would not place a specific focus on performance deficiencies in order to make 
improvements. The weekly performance reviews brought everyone together to review 
and discuss the results, but the action seemed to end there. Why was that? 
4.6.1.1 Should Performance be Measured? 
In light of an answer I received from my first interviewee, which described how the 
measurement or management of operations performance was not understood, I asked 
whether performance should be measured at all, and continued to ask this of all my 
interviewees. It seemed to me to be a rather basic and predictably answered question 
and it was therefore not at all surprising to learn that every respondent echoed a 
resounding yes to this question. This may seem to be a quite obvious response but, the 
curious and perhaps understandable issue, given the culture at Allegheny, was that 
nobody could give a lucid explanation of what to do with the data once collected and 
who should be responsible for effecting change. One of the more disturbing aspects 
was that although most agreed that we needed to more effectively manage how we 
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performed nobody was prepared to take the lead and use the data constructively to 
hold themselves and their staff accountable for achieving a goal.  
Of the nine responses to this question of whether to measure performance, six replied 
with a resounding “yes”, two replied “absolutely”, three “definitely” and one “of course”. 
The other three seemed a little uncertain and although they all replied with the same 
phrase, “yeah”, there was no real conviction in their voices. One of the respondents 
went on to say: 
“But I’m not sure, in our particular case, how much good it does for us” (ACP1)  
These three “Yeahs” came from the Director of Operations, and the two Assistant Chief 
Pilots, all of whom are pilots. This highlighted a problem, previously recognised by 
others, that those responsible for pilot management were less than certain about how 
to manage performance, and were unclear on what direction to take. This seemed to 
stem from a lack of leadership and direction at the top of the organisation.  
“I think if it was important enough for him to do (CEO), we’d be doing it!” (GMM) 
“As a director in the company I should be keenly aware of how the company is 
doing. But if we do not measure performance, and somehow or another publish 
that information, it’s just all too easy to get wrapped up in my own little world 
and think that I'm doing fine, when really the company as a whole is not” (DT) 
4.6.1.2 What to Measure 
All interviewees were asked the question ‘if they had free reign to measure only what 
they thought was important what would that be?’ The most frequent answer was “on-
time arrivals”. This was supported by the fact that the majority of flights that we 
operated were into hub airports where our passengers connected to other US Airways 
flights to reach their final destination. The assumption made by everyone was that any 
departure delay is easily forgotten by the passenger as long as the aircraft arrives at 
the hub on-time to make their connecting flight. However, this does not directly link to 
the performance measures that Allegheny was held accountable to by US Airways, 
which comprised several metrics requiring a balance in operations and not a specific 
weight given to on-time arrivals. However, these metrics were intended to be 
composite measures of performance, but their relevance to Allegheny was not readily 
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apparent to most of the interviewees. One interviewee however, was able to recognise 
that the recent weekly performance reviews were specifically geared towards the 
overall objectives that US Airways set:  
“But I think what we're measuring now is probably coming from US Air to say, 
this is what we want to see from each carrier, so we can compare you. Now 
what are we going to do when we compare you. I don't know. But I think it's 
maybe US Air's way of saying, and making, you compete against each other” 
(GMM) 
There was no tie-in to these objectives by the others. Although they were gaining a 
better understanding of operations performance and how and why we were measured 
against other Express Division carriers, there was yet to be an acceptance of the US 
Airways method. 
One respondent proposed “a composite measurement of the service we provide” (MIF), 
but was unable to explain how to go about this. Other responses pointed to a link with 
the company’s finances and the financial budget for knowing what was important to 
measure: 
 “I guess one other aspect of what we measure is what we have the resources 
to measure” (MIF) 
“That is definitely a deficiency in my department. And that deficiency is a direct 
result of money. We do not have enough override in the budget to give even 
one line-check to the veteran flight attendants once a year” (DIF) 
This speaks directly to the need within an airline to provide annual recurrent training 
and checking for flight crews. In this instance, the Director of In-Flight does not have a 
sufficient budget allocation to pay the extra wages required by the flight attendant 
contract to a specially trained assessor who conducts an on-the-job evaluation of flight 
attendants, which is called a line check. This is designed to ensure that the airline is 
providing good customer service and a seamless product to that provided by US 
Airways, and then more importantly to ensure that the flight attendant is fully compliant 
with company policies and procedures and the federal aviation regulations (FARs).  
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“I think you’ve got to look at what you are yielding as a profit from these 
numbers, or how much more are you going to yield out of another 5% and how 
much you’re going spend to get there. And that's why I think maybe they're 
happy where they’re at, and the 99% you can make two or three months a year 
is a plus, but I think they're happy with anything above 98.7” (DOM) 
There was and had been a very tight control over the company’s finances. All 
departments were being held to strict budgets and any variance had to be explained. 
This lack of funds did not allow much room for developing new approaches or 
implementing initiatives, and most people carried out their jobs with the limited 
resources available to them. There was little creativity and people saw the lack of 
resources as a significant barrier. Challenging the CEO, or campaigning for additional 
funds or resources was simply not done.  
4.6.1.3 Value of Performance Measurement 
An underlying and largely unspoken goal was always to perform well every day, but 
whether the act of measuring it was valued drew mixed responses, indicating a 
difference between whether the company valued performance, as defined by how well 
the operation did on a given day, or, whether the company valued the measurement of 
performance.  
“We would make time to do it if someone at the top thought it was important 
enough to do” (DOM).  
“I think they value it. I'm conscious of them having to make choices about how 
much they can evaluate, and I think they try to do as much as they possibly can 
with the available resources” (MIF) 
This was linked closely to a lack of communication within the organisation that 
emerged very forcefully as the interviews progressed. The notion of performance 
management not being considered important at the highest levels provided an 
explanation as to why the employees were not able to motivate themselves to take an 
active interest in it and to further communicate and discuss performance results. 
 “They don’t place a big enough emphasis on it” (DO) 
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This apparent lack of value that was placed on the process of measuring performance 
brought into question what the managers did with the performance results. 
4.6.1.4 Performance Results 
“One thing we don't do here with these goals and numbers is sit down as 
department heads and go over them and say, what's driving these?” (DOM) 
This yet again underlined the overwhelming flaw that there was a lack of evaluation of 
operations performance. There simply was not the direction, or guidance, given by 
senior management for this to be a priority for any of the department heads. 
Performance results were not used to make substantive changes to the way the 
company operated or how it was compared with the other US Airways Express airlines. 
A great drawback for Allegheny was that it operated solely within the northeast of the 
United States, a region that can be prone to bad weather during all seasons: frequent 
thunderstorms in the summer and snow and low ceilings in the winter. Allegheny 
connected to four major hub airports in the US Airways network: Pittsburgh, New York, 
Philadelphia and Boston. Each of these major cities are in close proximity to one 
another and all are likely to be affected simultaneously when a storm rolls through the 
Northeast. The greatest concentration of our operations were focused on connecting 
outlying cities to Philadelphia, and New York’s La Guardia airport, which even on good 
weather days are close to capacity. During inclement weather, Allegheny is impacted 
disproportionately harder than its sister companies whose flight schedules are 
concentrated in the south and southeast of the country, which is much less frequently 
affected by poor weather.  
“There are various handicaps. One of them is weather, and just because 
Allegheny experienced this weather doesn't necessarily mean that comparing it 
with Piedmont that you’re getting the same results, because we’re working in 
different areas and where they may not be affected to the same degree that the 
weather impacts us” (DO) 
“I'm not sure that the other people in the Express Division are playing the same 
game that we're playing...how they’re accounting for things. Personally, I think 
we’re looking at apples and oranges, but even like with Mesa Jet and the other 
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operators, their focus is completion and ours is on-time. I think we’ve got two 
different priorities” (DIF) 
“As much as I hate to agree with the crews I think it is very different where we're 
constantly in LaGuardia operating with it’s associated problems. And comparing 
it, Piedmont isn’t there, they are down in Charlotte. They don't have those 
problems, so you’re not making an honest comparison” (DO) 
This theme of inconsistency of measurement between the US Airways Express carriers 
generated much frustration at each weekly conference call with US Airways. Allegheny 
was invariably toward the bottom of the Express Division performance comparison list, 
and the overwhelming feeling amongst the managers was that it was an unfair method 
by which to compare our performance because of the geographical area in which we 
operated. This ultimately led to a feeling of ‘why bother!’ causing the directors and 
managers to disengage with the process. 
On one occasion, we held a performance review meeting with some selected pilots and 
flight attendants in an attempt to discuss the need to improve our operation, but this 
was not very successful, largely because the directors running the meeting were not 
themselves very aware of performance measurement and what to do with the 
performance results. 
“It didn’t talk about why performance was of interest. We really were just talking 
about performance so I don’t think we answered any questions. I think people 
who were there may have gotten some insight into how we measure 
performance, but we didn't talk about why it was important to us” (ACP2) 
This attempt at communicating to the crew force and trying to inspire a need for better 
performance turned out to be mostly an exercise in frustration. The intentions were 
very good but the execution left a lot to be desired. The directors and managers 
conducting the meeting led it as a presentation of performance data, just showing 
results, and not drilling down to any of the reasons for poor performance, or even how 
and why certain aspects of the operation were measured. An explanation for this 
underlying lack of knowledge was provided up by the Director of Training: 
I‘m not aware of how we measure all of that. I think we measure completion….I 
think we measure large things like, Yep, we completed so many flights – we got 
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them there. We had on-time performance of such and such, but what I don't 
know is how many airplanes were late, and how many passengers were 
impacted by our performance?” (DT) 
As the pressure mounted from US Airways for Allegheny to have better performance 
results, the weekly conference calls began to slip into a situation where each 
department started to blame the other for delays and cancellations. This became quite 
territorial and unconstructive, and arguments started to surface. 
“All they have to do if they have a problem of any sort is just swap airplanes, 
and now it becomes a flight crew delay. Well, that’s not helping us figure out 
that its Maintenance. One of the reasons our maintenance numbers are so 
stellar is that they're bright. [Name] is a smart guy, all he needs to do is swap an 
aircraft and he's off the hook, but not the flight crew” (ACP2) 
“I’ve been out there flying, and these guys, they feel the pressure, they 
(Maintenance) pencil-whip a lot of shit. They push a lot of stuff out of the 
[hangar] door that has no business being pushed out” (ACP2) 
This represents a classic failure of a performance measurement system (Bourne et al. 
2002): a situation where people begin chasing the numbers rather than understanding 
the true reasons for failure. Indeed, in this situation ACP2 is implying that aircraft are 
being brought to the line with maintenance problems that should have been fixed 
during the night. However, it is commonplace for an aircraft to have maintenance 
‘deferrals’. These are not critical problems and can safely remain inoperative for a 
period of time until the aircraft can be routed into a maintenance base for repair. There 
is not a safety risk associated with legal deferrals.  
“I think sometimes we put Band-Aids (plasters) on problems instead of fixing 
problems” (ACP1) 
This notion of ‘Band Aids’ is a term that was used a lot and referred to making a visible, 
but very short-term fix for a particular problem. 
“I would take the accounting system we use and actually have it meaningful. I 
want to know: is it a flight crew operational delay? Is the flight attendant delayed 
because of weather last night? Is it an operational reason? Or did the flight crew 
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screw up? I need to know. We get a lot of cases were it looks like the flight crew 
screwed up, or they’re somehow negligent and when we make a phone call and 
they go “is that what they told you? God damn that’s not what happened, I 
called that fueler seven times, seven times!”. And you know, the guy’s telling 
the truth, but somehow it got twisted around, the gate agent got mad at them or 
something. It's meaningless” (ACP2) 
“The longer I do it, the more I see that if I can gather information from every 
source it's really important to get a whole picture” (ACP1) 
The preceding section has provided an overview of the state of operations performance 
measurement at Allegheny. The findings strongly suggest that a more rigorous 
approach be applied to measuring performance and then using the results to correct 
problems. Additionally, there appeared to be a distinct lack of understanding and 
knowledge of the determinants of the performance results and more work is required to 
enhance the managers’ level of comprehension.  
The following sections now focus on the nine specific themes that emerged from 
coding the data and help to characterise and add colour to the overall picture.  
4.6.2 Goals 
In order for a PMR system to be meaningful there must be goals by which to measure 
the performance results. But, who should set these goals and how do you ensure that 
they are realistic and achievable, and consistent and purposeful?  
In discussing who should set the goals at Allegheny a range of answers were given but 
not a consensus: 
“A collective effort...Before imposing a goal, get the managers input...solicit my 
input! (DIF) 
“The CEO” (DT) 
“A department head” (DOM) 
“Express Division” (DO) 
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“At a high enough level where the person who has to answer for the 
performance is comfortable with exactly what the goal is” (MIF) 
General agreement within the literature states that realistic and achievable goals must 
be the cornerstone of a successful performance measurement system, but at 
Allegheny this seemed to be missing. 
 “I certainly think if that gets pushed too far down, there may be a temptation to 
set goals that may be more easily achieved, rather than may be achieved in the 
name of running a good airline” (MIF) 
This exemplifies the dilemma of striking a balance between realistic and achievable 
goals. It can be very difficult for people to relate to a PMR system if the goals are 
considered to be unachievable: 
“I think it should be a collective effort of Allegheny management as well as U.S. 
Airways management because I'm not convinced that U.S. Airways mainline 
management fully understands the Express operation and I think they have to 
allow input from the likes of you, [Name (CEO)], and [Name (VP)], who know 
how our system operates and what the barriers are” (DIF) 
In this instance, US Airways had set the performance goals for Allegheny and there 
was a great deal of frustration that we were being held to standards that were 
unachievable. In trying to better understand how the goals should be set there were 
two interesting and insightful responses 
 “I think it works better if before imposing a goal that you get that managers 
input to develop a goal. I think you get a whole lot more cooperation and much 
more incentive to work towards that goal if you have some input to it” (DIF) 
“To a degree I think there should be two sets, one that we answer to Express 
Division and one that we answer to ourselves...we have a better view on what 
we should be doing, I think we’re better qualified to place a goal number out 
there, because we have a better handle on what our operation is. You still have 
to answer to the entire division...but I think internally we need to set our own 
goals, so that one is related to the other” (DO) 
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These comments point to the situation that in many cases the goals are set by people 
who do not really know how the operation is organised, nor the barriers that can exist 
to prevent excellent performance. It is also interesting to learn that one of the 
respondents had considered developing two different sets of goals. This seemed to be 
a classic case of needing ownership for a particular metric in order to ‘buy-in’ to its’ 
efficacy. A goal that is not suitable or realistic can put you in a situation where there is 
a sense of constant and uncontrollable failure: 
“We’re so damn far behind now, how will we ever catch up? You just need three 
or four bad days of weather then there goes the month!” (DO) 
In this case, the goals that stipulate on-time performance and completion factor do not 
adequately allow for acts of nature that negatively impact an airline’s ability to perform. 
When the goal is set too tight it can lead to a situation where achieving it becomes 
impossible.  
In a slightly different vein, improperly thought-out performance goals can also lead to 
hardship and a loss of trust: 
“But right now guys point at something like we had trips that start in the morning 
and end at night. That is just maximising a pilot’s time away from home. You 
end up with lines that have over 400 hours away from base, which is over half 
the month, and so guys look at that kind of stuff and say, ‘well, any company 
that would write this kind of stuff just doesn't care’” (ACP1) 
The inference here is that the company is trying to maximise pilot productivity at the 
expense of a pilots’ quality of life. While this may be efficient and perhaps financially 
beneficial to the company in the short-term, it soon becomes tiresome and irritating for 
the pilot, and can lead to an increase in sick calls and therefore pilots being unavailable 
for duty, ultimately resulting in cancellations and a great deal of inefficiency. 
There was also a major disparity between how the goals were not clearly aligned with 
incentives, or consequences. In the case of incentives a pilot at Allegheny was paid 
based on the amount of time he spent behind the controls. 
“When guys get paid more to get there (complete the flight) early than to get 
there late, they’ll get there early…This business is very upside down with stuff 
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like that. I don't know of any place else where you get paid more to do a worse 
job” (ACP1) 
“The compensation elements of the contract, clearly state that the longer it 
takes you to a fly from A to B, the more you're going to get paid for doing so” 
(ACP2) 
This situation clearly encourages the pilot to taxi and fly slowly in order to maximise his 
paycheque. Conversely, there was also a lack of clearly defined consequences: 
 “You need to tell me black and white. If the goal is 12 delays in a quarter or 
something like that, and if I go over that by a certain percentage I’m going to be 
fired. I need to know that now. Don't make me guess. So I need to know what 
the expectation is” (DIF) 
The foregoing discussion has affirmed that goals are a fundamental aspect of a PMR 
system but in order to meet these goals the people charged with this responsibility 
inevitably require support and guidance that in turn will provide incentives and 
consequences. 
4.6.3 Guidance and Support 
In discussing the subject of support during the interviews most people felt that they 
were supported in their endeavours to measure performance. However, aside from the 
PMR system there was so little actual measurement taking place by each manager that 
support was not really needed. After the weekly performance review was introduced all 
the departments that were directly involved in the flight operation increased their 
activity to ensure that they had some knowledge and explanations of what occurred 
during the previous week. But, at this stage it still remained an uncommitted reaction to 
an imposed system, and there was not much enthusiasm to fully embrace the concept. 
This was undoubtedly due in part to the absence of the department leader (VP) to 
promote it and hold each individual accountable. During this period of time, the Vice 
President (VP) of the Flight Department had been seconded to work within another 
branch of the airline and consequently the Flight Department was left leaderless. 
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When investigating what guidance each director or manager had received over the 
years on performance management, the Director of Training likened it to a situation 
where:  
“There’s 15 people in a dark room with 20 TV’s and when the lights come on we 
are all looking at TV’s but not the right TV at the same time. There needs to be 
specific guidance on what data everyone should look at, and that data should 
be readily available so that time is not wasted trying to find information” (DT) 
The others echoed a similar theme. There was no single clear direction of what was 
expected of people, which in turn made holding people accountable a little nonsensical. 
But, there were also some differences expressed by the interviewees between what 
guidance had been provided and what people should be focusing on: 
“I would say I'm given guidelines but I go beyond the guidelines to measure 
what I feel is necessary, or what I want to take a look at for a certain time 
period” (DOM) 
“Management should make their expectations clear” (DT) 
“I think from above I do receive support, fortunately. But again the workload‘s 
just too heavy to focus on what we should” (DO) 
 “I don't personally know of any guidance being given to me” (DIF) 
“I would have to say that there has not been sufficient guidance from the top as 
to where this data is and how it should be used” (DT) 
“I don't think upper management has ever been to Dispatch and said:  “Okay, 
remember it's always, let’s get the people there, as many people as we can, 
every day, and let's make sure that if we have to cut something out, we cut out 
the Albany to Buffalo flight and always make sure that Albany to Philly flight 
always goes”” (DT) 
My own observations supported this and this apparent lack of guidance caused the 
managers and directors to view performance measurement with some disdain. It was 
not made clear to them that it should be a high priority and there were no real 
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consequences for not engaging with the PMR process. This in addition to their sense of 
isolation and detachment from senior management consequently showed in their 
approach to the PMR system. 
4.6.4 Accountability 
The term ‘accountability’ was used to describe the level of liability that an individual felt 
they had for the performance outcomes under their control. Virtually everyone thought 
that they were held accountable for performance: 
“I certainly think I’m held accountable by my supervisor and I’m certainly given 
an amount of leeway to deal with certain situations as I see fit, but for me 
personally I need the feedback to understand what works and what doesn't. 
Certain issues are obviously easier to get feedback from than others. I certainly 
am held accountable” (MIF) 
“I think ultimately everybody's accountable until you hit Dave Seigal (CEO, US 
Airways) in this organisation. I think everybody has a degree of accountability” 
(DO) 
“I think the intent is good. I think the intent is to actually hold people 
accountable” (ACP2) 
The one exception was ACP2 who remained unclear on what accountability meant to 
him:  
Should I be personally? I don't know. That's an interesting question” (ACP2) 
The Director of In-Flight, commenting about the performance management system now 
in place, stated that:  
“I believe we are held much more accountable. I believe that I should show up 
at that 4 o’clock Monday afternoon meeting with an explanation of what my four 
delays are” (DIF).  
This was a view that was also echoed by her direct report:  
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“I certainly think I am held accountable by my supervisor” (MIF).  
But, there was an issue about what is directly within the control of the manager and 
what is not. It was identified by DIF that accountability should only be enforced when: 
“I feel as though I have some control over the ability to make a change” (DIF)  
 “I don't necessarily like being held accountable for some of the areas of 
catering because I can't control it...but if they ever really hold me accountable 
for that, I would have to speak up and say ‘it's not fair’ because I don't do the 
ordering. I don't board it on the airplane. I’m just the budget manager who sees 
the dollars show up into my account” (DIF) 
This response refutes the directive given by US Airways Express Division that the 
airline was to be judged upon its complete performance, even if some of that 
performance was uncontrollable by the manager or the airline in general, such as 
delays and cancellations due to weather and air traffic control. However, when 
Allegheny was compared side by side with the other Express carriers there was no 
leeway given if our performance had suffered because of weather. This caused much 
exasperation amongst the interviewees and was especially evident in the 
conversations that followed the weekly conference calls. They universally felt that we 
were being held to a standard that was unattainable. 
There were also some express concerns with the perceived level of apathy in the flight 
department to hold pilots accountable, and an interesting viewpoint was put forward by 
the Manager of Crew Scheduling who explained that: 
“They [ACP’s] don’t want to be enemies of those pilots. Those who don’t have 
any discipline, or aren’t held accountable for anything are usually miserable 
because, for the most part, even though a person doesn’t like to admit it too 
much, they like to realise they have boundaries and that somebody is there 
noticing what it is they do, and what it is they don’t do”. (MCS)  
This has actually proven to be the case on many occasions because we heard from the 
same pilots regularly about some problem or another that they were unable to deal with 
without getting someone in the company involved. This situation however, was allowed 
to perpetuate because pilot management wanted to maintain a level of popularity.  
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“In order to be manager in that type of position you have to be able to 
understand that there is going to be a separation between you and the people 
you work with…if that boundary is not there then a person is not going to hold 
someone accountable” (MCS).  
Perhaps one of the reasons for this was that there was a conscious decision made by 
the assistant chief pilots to maintain harmony. One explained that:  
“There is a tremendous cut off those guys (pilots) feel from this office (Chief 
Pilots) and it fosters contempt” (ACP2) 
When asked whether he was held accountable for their performance he replied “no” 
and when pushed on whether he should be held accountable his reply was a little at 
odds with the majority of other managers  
“I don’t know…I have very little control over what my guys actually do” (ACP2) 
This was supported by his understanding of how he saw his role as a representative of 
the pilots and a liaison between management and the pilot group, which was in 
apparent contrast to the other assistant chief pilot who did feel that he was held 
accountable  
“I feel I should be held responsible to know why…in my area the main thing is 
communication” (ACP1) 
“You tell people the truth. You hold people accountable where they should be 
accountable. If they're not accountable you say “you know what, that's not your 
fault, forget about it”. You cut them slack where they should be cut slack. You're 
honest and fair with people. You tell them the truth. Keep them informed. I think 
there's a lot of what we're trying to do is we’re trying to be as straight as a flight 
department as we possibly can be” (ACP2) 
This apparent disparity in approaches between Assistant Chief Pilots perhaps points 
again to the lack of direction and support that the managers and directors had. 
There was also a perceived contrast in the level of accountability between 
crewmembers and other employees: 
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“I would say that employees in this building here are held to higher standards. 
They are more accountable for their actions than the crew members” (MCS) 
In concert for a degree of accountability there was also the distinction made about a 
desire for independence: 
“First, guys want to have the airplane leave on time because they know in all 
likelihood if there wasn't another cause, outside of the cockpit, that could be 
pointed to, then they get a phone call. And pilots hate getting that kind of stuff. 
Most of us work well on our own and we like this job because there is nobody 
looking over our shoulder” (ACP1) 
While accountability was generally regarded as being a necessity, there were some 
comments stressing the negative effects of practising accountability and imposing 
discipline to address shortfalls: 
“The flight attendants feel as though they're being targeted…so when [name] 
and I call them about the delay we try to be very careful and preface our 
comments by saying there was a delay yesterday that was attributed to the In-
Flight department, rather than attributed to your flight of which you were a flight 
attendant. But, even when we say the In-Flight department many times the flight 
attendant will come back and say “well they shouldn’t be blaming that on me”. 
So they take it personally” (DIF) 
 “We have not reached the point when we say we’re going to start disciplining 
for the late flights. Up to this point we’ve kind of taken the attitude that, well 
okay as long as we understand why the airplane was late and it was justifiable, 
to a certain extent, we will, even if it is a flight crew delay, we will just say, okay 
well, try not to let that happen again. Giving them fair warning and the 
impression that “Big Brother is looking over their shoulders” (ACP1) 
In contrast is the view that feedback is needed: 
“I need the feedback to really gauge how what I do on a day-to-day basis 
ultimately affects the quality of what happens in my department” (MIF) 
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A view was put forward explaining that having consequences for not meeting 
performance goals was important: 
“I think consequences for lack of meeting certain goals have to be there I think 
there has to be consequences for the negative actions, or for not improving 
performance” (MIF) 
One of the benefits of the weekly PMR system was that it increased the level of 
accountability that people felt. But, this also brought with it some confusion about what 
people should be held accountable for and how and when the pilots and flight 
attendants should be addressed about performance shortfalls. It was obviously a topic 
that was still in its infancy and the managers and directors were finding it difficult to 
balance being held accountable themselves, and also holding their direct reports 
accountable. The overriding reason for this conflict seemed to stem from the expressed 
view that you should only be accountable for what you can control. 
Now that the PMR system had begun to assert a degree of accountability on the 
managers there was also a significant negative side effect, which manifested itself in a 
greater degree of blame being placed on others, and a distinct lack of teamwork, as the 
managers sought to avoid their department being seen as the reason for a delay or 
cancellation. 
4.6.5 Teamwork 
Teamwork, or more specifically in this context, the lack of teamwork, was a 
predominant theme in the responses. It was stated several times that teamwork was an 
essential element for good performance but it was also described as being non-existent 
at times: 
“I get tunnel vision when I focus on the Flight Department, and when I look 
down through the list of delays and it doesn't say FC (flight crew) behind it, it 
doesn't bother me, you know, because that’s somebody else's problem to deal 
with” (ACP1) 
The pressure applied by US Airways for better performance had led to instances were 
departments sought to blame others when something went wrong, rather than trying to 
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cooperatively resolve the problem. This theme was articulated with the most fervour by 
the Assistant Chief Pilots: 
 “We should be a little bit more of a team, rather than trying to push things back 
and forth” (ACP1) 
“At some point or another we need to have Maintenance and Customer Service 
people attend performance meetings because we push delays their way too, 
and they try and push them ours. Since that's the case they really should be 
part of the team, and they may have some ideas for reducing some of what we 
don't see” (ACP1) 
There were also specific concerns expressed with a lack of teamwork and a division 
between the Flight Department and Maintenance. The actions of the personnel in these 
two departments were fundamentally intertwined: 
 “I think we are separate departments to a certain extent, especially us and 
Maintenance. They only measure their own statistics. They don't concern 
themselves at all with the airline as an overall. At least I don’t believe they do, 
and we don't really concern ourselves with the maintenance side of things 
either” (ACP1) 
 “We're not a team spirit” (ACP2) 
 “You don’t really get a feeling on the line that it's all for one: it’s kind of every 
man for himself. You get in your airplane with your crew and you go where 
you're supposed to go, and then you go to the hotel and you've done your part. 
You don't really get the feeling of we’re a group headed towards a goal” (ACP1) 
“You forget about the 2200 people that are out there in the field. This becomes 
the airline to us…this building here, and when I get a phone call from a pilot it’s 
usually a pain in the ass because it’s a disruption of what I'm doing. It's easy to 
forget that they’re the company” (ACP2) 
There was also a concern about information being deliberately withheld and a lack of 
teamwork within the same department: 
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“Additionally there’s certain things, just about, how to run a flight department 
that we've never been told, and I think part of it is because that once we’re told 
how to do it we’re more of a threat” (ACP2) 
However, even with the apparent lack of teamwork there was some recognition of the 
skill of others and an expressed sense of being supported by other departments: 
“...particularly with swaps, I know they are built into the system for a reason, 
you’re trying to get an airplane into position or something. All you have to do is 
talk to [Name] for five minutes and you realise there’s people down there [OCC] 
that know what the fuck they’re doing, some bright, bright, people that are 
actually running some incredibly complex processes” (ACP2) 
“Yes I think so. Yeah I would say. I could not give you an example where I didn't 
feel supported” (DIF) 
But in sharp contrast to all of that, was the gulf in perception between how the director 
responsible for the pilots, and the director responsible for the flight attendants fit into 
the overall structure of the Flight Department; both of whom theoretically reported to 
the same VP: 
“There should be a clearly defined chain of command and an enforced chain of 
command. They should understand who the hell they work for. And poor [DIF], 
she’s swinging in the breeze. She doesn't know who to report to” (ACP2) 
The lack of teamwork was portrayed as an important issue and it was evident that a 
greater effort towards mutual support was needed. But, as higher accountability was 
being sought and pursued and with the apparent lack of teamwork it was leading to 
instances of blame. 
4.6.6 Blame 
It was interesting to learn that everyone was able to speak in terms of the standard 
outcome measures that were commonly used, but they were not able to give examples 
of processes further down the production chain that could be measured. Their 
overwhelming focus was on the inconsistency of how the coding of delays and 
cancellations was applied. This caused some grief and anguish amongst the various 
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departments who would often fight about who should take the blame. The fact that any 
delay, no matter who was at fault, was already a failing on the part of the company to 
provide a service, was frequently overlooked:  
“Our concentration in the flight department is to find anybody else to lay that 
delay on, and that’s where you run into problems because you're not getting to 
the core issue, you’re actually laying blame” (ACP2) 
“One thing we don't do here with these goals and numbers is sit down as 
department heads and go over them and say, what's driving these? But what 
we do is, and it’s a difficult job that you have to do, is to try and decide who's 
fault these things are. I think if you're going to measure these things you should 
sit down as department heads and discuss them, and see where weaknesses 
are, and see what you can do to fix them” (GMM) 
There was also a marked lack of understanding of how other departments worked and 
the feeling of operating within silos: 
“All that stuff is a mystery to me: that all this stuff integrates and works and they 
don't lose airplanes routinely, like where’s (aircraft number) 808, we haven't 
seen aircraft 808 in days!” (ACP2) 
“When guys call me and complain that somebody didn’t use night-wands to 
marshal them in, in Philadelphia. Well, I can send that on, but there's no real 
response I can give to that other than the next time they go to Philadelphia 
somebody should be using night-wands and if they don’t well eventually guys 
quit calling because I'm not making a difference” (ACP2) 
“I think when you are dealing with targets in your own department, a lot of times 
it's predicated on other departments…It's like a pilot who shows up five minutes 
before departure and all of a sudden there's a (maintenance) write-up” (DOM) 
This speaks directly to the interwoven nature of flight operations. Everybody is 
depending on someone else. In this case, if a pilot reports late to his aeroplane and 
discovers a mechanical irregularity then the burden for the delay is shifted to 
Maintenance. Had he shown up on time it is possible that a delay could have been 
avoided. These issues can only be effectively addressed is there is a very real sense of 
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collaboration and a team spirit, so that when an issue arises it is not presented as a 
vehicle for assigning blame, but viewed as an opportunity for the company as a whole 
to do better.  
The assistant chief pilots enthusiastically offered further examples of what was 
obviously being described as a blame culture:  
 “We do spend a lot of time pushing problems back and forth between one 
department and another, and crews I know from talking to them, kind of wonder 
whether we’re actually getting anything done. They say you’re just trying to put 
the blame on somebody else, and to a certain extent they’re right” (ACP1) 
“The first problem you run into is it that it becomes a question of finger-pointing 
and blame laying, rather than solving problems” (ACP2) 
It was amazing to learn how much time was actually spent apportioning blame even 
though the delays negatively impacted the company as a whole, However, ACP2 did 
recognise that apportioning blame does not solve the problem. 
“He (ACP1) spends probably half of his day, or a third of his day, every day, 
tracking down delays from the previous day, and trying get them put on 
someone else. Really, trying to get them assigned to any other department 
other than FC (flight crew), and that isn’t necessarily solving the problems, 
because a delay is a delay” (ACP2) 
“A guy has a problem in an airplane, he starts up the airplane and the AEI 
doesn’t come up, he calls up Maintenance and they say “did you shut down the 
airplane? No.” So he shuts down the airplane, let’s it reboot, waits three 
seconds, you know all the relays close, starts it up, now it’s a flight crew delay. 
So I as a manager go “ well, hell, I'm not taking that shit any longer, I’m going to 
put out to my guys don't ever shut that thing down again, just write it up”. Well, 
that’s counter-productive now. I get so upset about taking FC delays that I’m 
willing to go to war to take delays, which actually exacerbates the problem, so 
that I don’t take a hit” (ACP2) 
This attitude of ACP2 resulted from his frustration in the belief that crewmembers were 
being incorrectly penalised for delays when the fault lay elsewhere: 
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“We have maintenance issues that because of statistical anomalies are being 
coded as flight crew delays. Maintenance loves that” (ACP2) 
“ACP1 and I find some that are clearly bullshit, and we have to get the station to 
agree. Well, the station’s the one that‘s culpable. They’re not going to agree. 
There’s no neutral arbitrator that I can go to get some of these overturned” 
(ACP2) 
A negative result from trying to apportion blame or responsibility to the correct 
department is that it can take a lot of time and resources to research each delay or 
cancellation, which in this context represents a performance failure. This was aptly 
described once again by ACP2 who pointed out that his colleague spent quite a lot of 
his time correcting the coding of delays:  
 “[$70,000]...That's how much money we’re spending a year literally, on trying to 
correct these codes to make the statistical analysis more meaningful. That’s a 
lot of money and I’m not sure it’s even doing anything, it’s maybe making the 
Flight Department look a little better. Our objective in the Flight Department is to 
pass it off” (ACP2) 
A reason for the demonstrated lack of teamwork and blame can perhaps be explained 
by the company’s resources and the expressed lack of them. All of the interviewees 
stated that they were heavily tasked and unable to spend the time necessary to forge 
relationships with other departments and truly try to understand how they operated and 
their perspective on running the operation. 
4.6.7 Resources 
“I don't feel that any of us have all of the resources that we need, the personnel 
resources, that we need to keep up with the work that we have” (DIF) 
The question of resources was a sore subject for most of the interviewees and the 
consensus was that Allegheny was resource deprived, which they saw as leading to 
many of the performance issues that the airline experienced. 
“I think that when you operate with minimal personnel you get a minimal 
product” (DOM) 
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“We were hard pressed on a couple of occasions, and we had to pull some of 
those check attendants to fly the line to avoid a flight cancellation, which is the 
primary priority. And right now even though we may be able to pull somebody 
off-line periodically, I don't have enough money in the budget to pay override to 
a ground school instructor, plus do line-checks, and if we had a new-hire class, 
to do IOE (initial operating experience) and in-flight training. I had to clearly 
point out that I have no quality assurance and quality control program out there, 
so that is what we are living with” (DIF) 
“I think performance does suffer, and maybe we don't see it all, but I know from 
a customer standpoint if you go down there (Harrisburg airport) on a morning 
and you've got one gate agent working six flights, yeah that suffers. They don't 
have enough people to get the people on the airplane: get the paperwork to the 
crews. It causes problems” (DOM) 
“There's other things that we’d like to look at and do with the systems we have 
in place that we just don't have the manpower to get it done” (DOM) 
 “But again the workload‘s just too heavy to focus on what we should be” (DO) 
Although the discussions surrounding resources largely centred on the number of 
personnel available, there was also recognition that some people did not have 
sufficient access to other resources that they felt they needed: 
 “The paint jobs look like they're bad. They need to be repainted, and that's a 
money issue obviously” (GMM) 
 “We need a spare all the time. You cannot run an airline and hope to have any 
completion factor without a spare airplane” (ACP2) 
“I'd like to have a bigger supply of certain parts. I would  like to have more 
resources as far as personnel, and I think we’re operating on a shoestring, bare 
minimum level right now” (GMM) 
ACP1 complained that he had to research all of the delays but did not have access to 
the one most important operations system: 
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“The one thing that I really wish I had, that I don't, is FliteTrac” (ACP1) 
This lack of resources led to a sense of exasperation for some: 
“I submit the money in the budget every year. Here is our baseline for line-
checks: one line check per flight attendant per year, with new hires two line 
checks per year in the first year. David, there are flight attendants who have 
been here 2 or 3 years who've never had a line check, have never seen by their 
supervisor out on line, or by check attendant. So this is how bad habits develop 
and then one day we give them a line check and they don't do something right, 
and then we slap their hands “you should know this, it’s in the manual”. It is 
unfair!” (DIF) 
The level of resources naturally has a financial impact, which is not always at the 
forefront of the minds of those who must manage the operation. Their focus is 
generally on making things run, which led to some frustration, particularly from the 
General Manager of Maintenance about the cost of performance and how performance 
goals are also tied to financial goals 
 “We gauge ourselves as we keep trying to get better but there’s changes you 
can make to get better that I see we don't do for financial reasons. If you try to 
make a performance goal of 99 and you’re making 98.5 every month are we 
really happy with 98.5 or do we want to spend another 20 grand a month to get 
to 99?” (GMM) 
 “Airlines work on such a small margin that money is a constant battle” (CP) 
“I submitted the monies but U.S. Airways comes back and says cut the budget 
and where is it cut, in my area” (DIF) 
Despite the overwhelming opinion that the company was under-resourced there was 
still a small hint of objectivity from one of the interviewees.  
“I understand that in a pool of limited resources you have to pick your battles” 
(MIF) 
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4.6.8 Communication 
The most frequently talked about subject was communication, and the very apparent 
lack of it: 
 “I think that some important things should be communicated, but they aren't” 
(MCS) 
“No! I don't think this company communicates well in general about anything” 
(GMM) 
“I know certain companies for instance, in employee break rooms or in meeting 
rooms will actually have mission statement up on the wall. I think it's a good 
idea. I don't see much of it at Allegheny here” (MIF) 
“I think the company communicates very poorly” (DO) 
“If they're not communicating with me, maybe they're not communicating with 
anybody” (DOM) 
 “Aramini (previous CEO) would communicate to our employees regularly 
through some written communication. He had employee meetings in the 
hangar. It was just better. He walked through the halls” (DIF) 
Many blamed this directly on the culture and the example set by the current CEO who 
was reluctant to communicate to his employees. Even at the director level there was a 
feeling of being in the dark with regards to what was going on within the company: what 
the current priorities were, and where we should have been directing our efforts. This 
culture was characterised by a cloak of secrecy; there was no open communication 
and the ability to provide upward feedback was stifled, which had led to a marked 
decrease in morale at all levels. The management style perpetuated at Allegheny was 
a micro-management style where our efforts and short-term objectives were strongly 
related to what the CEO was concentrating on, on any given day. This could swing 
wildly from one point of focus to another. In defence of the CEO, this was likely a 
response on his part to the demands placed upon him by his superiors at the US 
Airways Express Division level. One of the major drawbacks of being a wholly-owned 
subsidiary is that you have very little autonomy and the general feeling was that we 
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were dancing at the end of strings that were being pulled by the executives in 
Washington DC. The CEO, who was repeatedly referred to as personable and likeable, 
“but not a leader”, did not take the time to visit with his employees very often and 
tended to restrict much of his dealings to his direct reports at the vice presidential level. 
In the current situation within Flight Operations, of an absentee VP, this became even 
more difficult to deal with because we found ourselves in the dark with respect to 
direction and guidance. 
In a discussion regarding communication between the company and its pilots a 
common theme emerged that suggested a serious lack of communication and trust 
between management and crewmembers.  
“The problem is most of the pilot employees see us as middle management, 
which we are, and when something catastrophic happens like the RJ 
announcement they don’t want to hear from us…they want to hear from the 
president of the company…in fact that hasn’t happened and it’s been two 
months” (ACP1) 
This referred to the regional jets being awarded to PSA and not Allegheny. It was a 
major blow for us, but was not communicated or discussed at all by the CEO. 
An illuminating comment was offered by the General Manager of Maintenance in 
describing his exasperation with the lack of communication: 
“No I don’t think this company communicates well in general about anything…it 
seems like they keep a lot of secrets, but its like when major stuff happens and 
you’re finding out from somebody else and not the company…Are they that 
busy they can’t communicate? I don’t know why they don’t communicate well, 
and that is from an acting VP standpoint. I’m part of the staff and I don’t get 
communicated with very well” (GMM). 
The company’s culture undoubtedly had a lot to do with the lack of communication. The 
micro-management style of the CEO meant that managers did not have the authority to 
make decisions and had to seek approval first. This tended to promote the 
unwillingness to act independently and not communicate with employees in case it was 
not approved by the CEO.  
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“I think [Name (CEO)] is an extremely poor communicator – he does not 
communicate with the rank and file very well” (DO) 
“Everything we do has to be approved. We are theoretically given the authority. 
We theoretically run the flight department, but we run shit” (ACP2) 
In my experience I attended many meetings where a discussion took place about 
something and the remarks “keep that to yourself” or “its confidential” were attached, 
which removed the opportunity to relay information to subordinates. All too often this 
information was not worthy of being kept quiet. This was summed up as “a culture of 
secrecy for security” (ACP2), whereby only certain information was passed down to 
subordinates perhaps in the fear that, once the subordinate is knowledgeable about his 
manager’s role and responsibility, he may prove to be a threat to his superior’s job.  
“I don’t know if it’s insecurity or whatever, but there’s a lot that goes on in here 
that is withheld from us that I need to know in order to do my job” (ACP2) 
It was clear that communication was a major problem that needed to be addressed, but 
it was also deeply imbedded in the culture of the airline and it was apparent that 
improving communication would not be an easy endeavour.  
4.6.8.1 On Communicating Performance: 
Not surprisingly, given that ordinary communication was so poor, there was very little 
communication or guidance given on performance.  
“I don't know that upper management has set up a programme that says: by the 
way I want every manager to convey some stats in any way you want to your 
people, a meeting, a bulletin board, but we want each person to have it” (DT) 
“Over the years I think the company thinks that it has communicated that 
information reasonably well but, I think the company presumes that the 
employees are interested in those kind of things, but I don’t think they read the 
charts” (DIF) 
This last sentence alludes to the fact that on rare occasions when operations 
performance was communicated, it was done so in a form that was not readily 
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understood by everyone, such as charts and graphs that required prior knowledge to 
properly interpret.  
A rather thought provoking insight to the lack of communication was offered by the 
Director of Training by way of an explanation to why this occurs:  
“This company has had so much bad news that no-one quite knows how to 
communicate effectively because it just seems like there is no good news, there 
is only bad news…but if you wanted to find some good news you could find it in 
performance” (DT).  
I took this suggestion and researched our recent records and was able to find a 
number of areas where emphasis could have been placed on performance that was 
better than the established goals. If the company had wanted to communicate with the 
employees it could have highlighted selected measures to convey a positive message.  
 “I certainly think there are ways of communicating performance information that 
can be made real and not be destructive in nature” (MIF) 
Nevertheless, the initiative to communicate to the field was not being taken: 
 “No. I have always left that up to the [Name] (CEO) or the [Name] (VP of Flight 
Ops) to do that because I thought that that was appropriate. Actually it never 
occurred to me to put it in there” (DIF)  
“I think maybe post it on the website, or post it somewhere where everybody 
can see how we're doing” (GMM) 
“If it's like, our completion factor was up significantly in June, and whatever we 
did in June, even though the weather was good, was better than we did in May 
you ought to be congratulated and let's continue to make these efforts” (DT) 
“Why would a person in Philadelphia not be entitled to know how many 
passengers came through there without bags (lost bags) this month versus the 
previous month” (DT) 
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“I think that if you tell the crews we inconvenienced 1800 passengers out of the 
51,000 we tried to move this month, those are different numbers than 1% or 
2%. We measure in different units then they show you the real picture from the 
passenger perspective versus a 2%. What is that really? (DT) 
“One of the problems we have as a corporation is that our communications with 
our field people are terrible. We have no monthly newsletters, we have no 
company publications. Until I came on board there was no regular 
dissemination of routine information to the pilots. I think it's a cultural thing. Part 
of it is US Air. I think US Air has had a history of non-communication” (ACP2) 
These comments illustrate that there should be efforts made to communicate performance 
results, and that this communication can be used to send a positive message even when 
performance results fall short of prescribed goals. Of particular note was the apparent 
situation where the managers and directors were not using their own initiative to 
communicate with their people. They seemed to be stifled in this and the reason appeared 
to be a firm clasp that the CEO put on information being shared externally to the rank and 
file. This was seen as short-sighted and contributed in a real way to a feeling of isolation 
that people felt.  
4.6.8.2 Communication Between Departments 
Allegheny Airlines operated from two buildings located one mile apart. The main offices 
occupied a large building on a street called Rosedale Avenue, which was referred to as 
simply ‘Rosedale’. The other facility, know as ‘Building 601’, was a hangar at the airport 
that also housed System Control and Maintenance. Communication between the two 
buildings was not particularly good and those at 601 tended to be forgotten by their 
colleagues at Rosedale. This was emphasised by the fact that the CEO had visited 
building 601 only six times in the previous nine months.  
Even within Rosedale, where the majority of people worked, there were psychological 
barriers that existed between departments. Flight attendant management and pilot 
management had offices next door to each other and, even though they were in the 
same department, communication often broke down to the point that one group had no 
idea what the other was doing. For instance, pilot management produced a periodic 
memo to the pilots but failed to discuss the contents with the flight attendant 
management group even though it was of specific relevance to them.  
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“Flight attendants are just not perceived as important as pilots or other people in 
the company” (DIF) 
A further example of how poorly people interacted and communicated was 
demonstrated in a meeting attended by many of the directors and the CEO. The 
Director of Customer Service, a newcomer to the airline, who some of us had met 
previously, was unknown to the Director of In-Flight who had to introduce herself to him 
because the CEO had not made any introductions. She was less than impressed by 
this and it was used by her as an example to sum up the state of internal 
communication:  
“It’s kind of like [Name (Director of Customer Service)] today, I guess he was 
introduced to a few people, I heard he was here, been here for weeks I guess – 
never met him!” (DIF) 
As there were only ten directors in the company, it seemed inexcusable that a situation 
like that was allowed to occur. 
There was also confusion regarding departmental boundaries: 
“The upper level management of the entire department comes from one side 
(Flight)” (DIF) 
“If you asked me now I’d be very hard pressed to tell you who's in the Flight 
Department. Who is the Flight Department? Is that me and [Name (ACP1)]  and 
[Name (DO)]? Is that me and ACP1 and DO and Scott Seders? Is he part of the 
flight department? Probably. How about the flight attendants? Are they in the 
Flight department? No, I think they're in the In-Flight department. Well, is the In-
Flight department part of the Flight department or is there anything such thing 
as an In-Flight department? Is In-Flight different from Flight? Is Training part of 
Flight? Nobody really knows” (ACP2) 
That there should be such confusion at the management level was disappointing. 
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4.6.8.3 Sharing Data with Employees 
One of the proposals to improve the PMR system was to share our performance data 
with our crewmembers. This was discussed with each of the interviewees and a 
number of useful suggestions emerged. Of paramount importance would be the need 
to make the data easily understood by not relying too heavily on charts and 
percentages and to only share data that the crewmembers have direct impact on. For 
example sharing the frequency of maintenance delays might only cause an adversarial 
relationship between crewmembers and Maintenance. However, it was roundly 
acknowledged that any data being shared is better than none at all. In the past, our 
crewmembers were left to gauge for themselves how well the company was doing. 
Because they are so close to the customer, it is easy for the crews to falsely conclude 
that we are doing well simply by judging how full their aircraft are, and not by knowing 
whether we are carrying the passengers on-time.  
“If we are not getting them there on-time we will not keep carrying them” (ACP1) 
Of universal interest was the ability to share our performance in terms of the number of 
passengers inconvenienced. This was felt to be the most fruitful way to encourage our 
crewmembers to take an interest in performance. The number of passengers 
inconvenienced by our actions or inactions is something that everyone can easily 
identify with.  
“Any way that we can actually bring more focus on what our passengers go 
through everyday is wonderful information for our crewmembers” (MIF)  
There are, of course, some conflicting opinions. If performance data is made available 
will everyone actually take an interest in it? The DOM and DIF did not believe so.  
“If you put something out you will have a certain amount that it will inspire. I 
would say it would be a small percentage…but those are the people who are 
already coming to work everyday and busting their hump…they are not the 
people who are going through the motions and don’t care anyway  - they’re 
here to do a job and get paid” (DOM) 
“I think over the years the company thinks that it has communicated that 
information reasonably well. But I think the company presumes...that the 
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employees are interested in these kind of things, which I don't think they are…I 
know they want the company to survive, but I don't think they read the charts on 
the board, I think it's too broad, too general” (DIF) 
However, the opposite seemed to be true of the pilot group: 
“The pilots will take a far larger interest in it than you might have thought that 
they would. There is some pride in what they do and there is an air of 
competition” (ACP2) 
“Enough would look at it that it would make a difference and it would be a topic 
of conversation: word would get around. “Hey did you see what we did this 
week and did you see how good we did this week, and did you see how bad 
that storm impacted us last week”? Our livelihoods depend on us doing a good 
job and so I think giving guys a way to measure how good of a job we are doing 
would be beneficial” (ACP1) 
A most enlightening comment was made by MCS who stated that it was the medium 
and method of sharing data that is perhaps more important. This was supported by 
others who were able to discern that performance information needs to be relevant and 
understandable to the flight crews: 
“We spend our time talking about statistics and living them day-to-day because 
they make sense to us. Completion factor at 97% is a number that means 
something to us, but if you tell a crew member “Hey we had a 97% day” do you 
think they would think wow that's great, that's an ‘A’, or do you think they would 
think well that's not really good enough. Would it have meaning?” (MCS) 
“I think if we were just to communicate to our flight attendant group that the goal 
is 89.2% in a particular area, and that Allegheny came in at 87%, I think several 
flight attendants would think, like I have all along, well that's pretty darn good, 
that's close to 89%, when really that's not good” (DIF) 
 “I think maybe if there was some way to really bring it down to a level where 
they can understand the consequences of not only what happened but also 
understand it from how our passengers perceive it. I think that would certainly 
be more powerful” (MIF) 
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The overwhelming lack of communication and ability to effectively share information 
prompted comments about secrecy: 
“Part of it is [Name]. [Name] is incredibly secretive. The pilots have no idea. 
That’s another one of the major problems we have historically as an airline is 
we tend to keep things a secret far, far longer than they need to be” (ACP2) 
“Part of that’s [Name (CEO)]. I’ve actually sat down in [Name (CEO’s] office a 
couple of times when I need to put something out on a weekly update and said 
“look {Name], if they find out from us our credibility goes up. If they find out on 
Tuesday what they’re going to find out because it’s already on the internet from 
another source, our credibility goes down. We’re better off us putting this out 
publicly” (ACP2) 
One particularly interesting aspect that emerged from several of the interviews was the 
discussion of how other prominent airline CEO’s might have handled the problems that 
Allegheny was facing with how to share information. Several of the interviewees were 
highly disappointed with what had been taking place at Allegheny with the cloak of 
secrecy and very little information being communicated. Discussions centred around 
Herb Kelleher at Southwest, Fred Smith at FedEx, David Neeleman at JetBlue, and 
Gordon Bethune at Continental, all of whom are well known in the US aviation industry: 
“I think he (Neeleman) would have come out and said “okay this is 
disappointing news and here’s why it happened, but here's where we see our 
company going, and here's why it is, or is not, the end. Here's how we're trying 
to position ourselves” (ACP1) 
“The first thing he'd probably do is walk up and down the halls and go “what the 
fuck? You people need to lighten up.”...I think the place would actually go into 
shock for a week. They just wouldn't know what to do” (ACP2) 
“The same way that Kelleher did at Southwest:  there's no secrets here, I want 
you people to know that good news is easy to share” (DT) 
“I remember going to FedEx years ago, back in the mid-80s. Every month Fred 
Smith (CEO) put a video out that was made available throughout the company. 
There was a TV in this building and there was Fred Smith on it, and it was a 
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five-minute thing on how the company did that month, and it was Fred Smith 
saying it was a bad month -- packages were down, a couple of things we are 
trying next month. But everyone, even the wives and husbands, could actually 
see how this company is doing. I was so impressed with that, that someone 
would literally be willing to take five-minutes once a month and distribute out to 
anyone” (DT) 
However, our CEO was not adopting any of these approaches and it was looked upon 
very poorly:  
“[Name (CEO)] has mentioned it in the morning meetings after a good month 
recently a couple of times, but it would be nice if he put a formal letter out to 
each department that we could hang up and your people could see it. That 
means a lot coming from the CEO of the company, or should mean a lot. No, 
that's not happening” (DOM) 
“It’s been, what, two months now? And there hasn't been a communication. I 
understand what the reservations are for sending out that kind of 
communication. You know you set yourself up for people taking potshots” 
(ACP1) 
I do my best when I'm online to try and tell the guys that management is 
working hard to make sure that they have a career here if they want it. But it’s 
not the same hearing it from me as it would be hearing it from [Name (CEO)] 
himself saying “here is what I am doing” (ACP1) 
“There is a tremendous cut-off those guys feel from this office and it fosters 
contempt. They feel pissed-off that we’re neglecting them: we’re not bothering 
to talk to them or we don't consult with them” (ACP2) 
Communication is a vast and varied subject and at Allegheny it was obviously a major 
problem that was preventing the company from operating at its optimum. Many of the 
reasons for poor communication seemed to suggest that it was cultural and imbedded 
in the organisation not to openly share information. This company culture of locking 
away information seemed to not only affect performance but also the employees’ 
general outlook and level of motivation and commitment, which was seen in the 
behaviours they displayed and the attitudes that they adopted. 
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4.6.9 Attitudes and Behaviours 
A very forceful aspect during the interviews was that the interviewees voiced their 
opinions and concerns on the behaviours of others, and also the attitudes that either 
they themselves adopted or were being displayed by other people. The frustration and 
concern over Allegheny’s situation was also manifesting itself in the crewmembers 
flying the line.  
“Right now it looks like we're working towards an end, not long-term 
employment. And so I think the attitude contributes to that. Guys just don't take 
the job as seriously, in that regard, as they should. They’re supposed to be at 
the airplane 35 minutes prior to departure on an originator (first flight of the 
day). They know that if they really hustle they can get there 20 minutes before, 
or even 15 minutes before, and they can still get it out on time, and even if it’s 
not out on time, “well, it's within 5 or 10 minutes, I’ll call it out on time and 
nobody will be any the wiser”. And so, to their way of thinking, it doesn't 
damage anything. But, it does damage something, because any time 
passengers see crewmembers hustling like that, it doesn't create a professional 
image. And I think some things would be caught sooner, maintenance problems 
and things like that, would be caught sooner if everybody was as religious about 
getting to the airplane” (ACP1) 
This speaks to the fact that employees need to feel that they are valued and that the 
company cares about them in order to keep motivation at an acceptable level. 
 “I remember talking to different pilots who have been here for years, much 
longer than I have, and they remember when we did simple things for 
recognition, such as birthday cards, or whenever somebody gets married. It is 
not a monetary gift, it’s just something that’s sent in the mail as a recognition. 
When those people realise that they work for a company that cares about them 
as individuals it makes a difference. It makes them want to perform better but 
with a lack of that, and I've heard others say that they missed that, because 
now they feel that they are a number and just a resource and therefore they are 
not willing to do more” (MCS) 
“I don't know yet all the things you do to change attitudes. I think there needs to 
be a major attitude change on the part of employees. Right now employees 
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have an attitude that the company doesn't care, or doesn't care as much they 
had hoped it would. They don't see a light at the end of the tunnel, so to speak, 
that they’re working towards something” (ACP1) 
4.6.9.1 Demonstrated Attitudes 
During the interviews certain attitudes emerged that seemed to characterise the culture 
at Allegheny during this difficult period. I have listed some of these particular examples 
below and the comments that they brought forth: 
Apathy:  
“Up to this point we’ve kind of taken the attitude that, well okay as long as we 
understand why the airplane was late” (ACP1) 
Denial of performance results: 
“I have to believe that somehow that it’s a statistical anomaly, it's so much 
worse than anybody else. I can’t imagine that our guys are that bad” (ACP2) 
Resentment of other departments: 
 “That seems to be the attitude...we just cow-tow to these pilots in pay, and lack 
of discipline, in trying to do everything with harmony, and to a certain extent we 
do that with the flight attendant union too. But there is just this perception that 
you've got to work everything out with the pilot group, then the rest will fall in 
line, and flight attendants are a dime-a-dozen, but not the pilot group” (DIF) 
Frustration: 
“I made a comment in Human Resources one time that I felt the Maintenance 
department was the redheaded stepchild of the company because we're 
constantly being beat up verbally. And I was told that they beat up everybody 
like that” (DOM) 
Inspiration: 
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“I would have to think the more that you put something out, you gonna have a 
certain amount that it will inspire. I don’t know what that percentage that would 
be. I would say it would probably be a small percentage” (GMM) 
Pride: 
 “For our flight attendant group there is no room for merit increases that's why I 
say: it's come to work, do the minimum job or the best job possible it's got to 
come from pride because it's not coming from maybe I'll get a raise” (DIF) 
“When you're a supervisor you are judged on getting the planes out of the 
hangar and different other events. Well, their pay got predicated on a union 
scale, which meant their competitiveness goes away because they know that 
they're going to get a raise at a certain time, and so I don't think there's a real 
incentive except self pride” (GMM) 
Professionalism 
“The guys that slow airplanes down are in the minority. Most of our guys here 
do a really good job” (ACP1) 
Lack of professionalism: 
“Unfortunately, I had a seat right next to the rear galley of the aircraft and there 
was a lot of fiery discussions, a lot of profanity, a lot of unprofessionalism, and it 
was really pretty shocking because I'd never been exposed to anything like that 
by someone who was in a uniform as a very definite visible representative of 
the company behaving that way” (MIF) 
Lack of incentive to do better: 
“When you're dealing with the union, these guys know they're getting a raise 
two times a year, what dates they're getting a raise, and as long as they keep 
getting a pay check they think everything is just fine” (GMM) 
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“The compensation elements of the contract, clearly state that the longer it 
takes you to a fly from A to B, the more you're going to get paid for doing so” 
(ACP1) 
4.6.9.2 Displayed Behaviours 
The behaviours that people displayed were influenced not only by the ongoing crisis at 
Allegheny but also by aspects of their personal lives that inevitably played a role in how 
they conducted themselves. A very insightful comment was made by ACP2, which I 
think it is something that we can all relate to:  
“All people bring their personalities to their jobs. I'm as bad or worse than 
anybody. All my personal defects come out every day when I show up here. It’s 
inescapable” (ACP2) 
This has a much larger bearing than perhaps we might initially think and our 
personalities govern how we communicate and work with others. 
A mantra that is commonly repeated by many people as a method for conduct at work 
is “check your baggage at the door”, referring to the expectation that people should not 
bring their personal issues into the workplace and/or let them cloud their judgement. 
But, is it even possible not to bring these influences into the work place?  
I have listed below some of the behaviours that were either exhibited by the 
interviewees or stemmed from my own observations during the interviews, along with 
the comments that were made: 
Competitiveness: 
“That had a direct impact on me. I surely did not want to be the Department that 
made us fail to meet the goal” (DIF) 
“I don't want to get the competitiveness to the point where people are pushing 
planes out of the hanger just to push them out of the hangar either, because our 
goal is to put the best product we can on the gate in the morning, and a safe 
product for our customers, and I'm afraid if you get too competitive like that, 
people turn their head to things just for the competitiveness and put a plane 
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that’s not right on the gate. So you go to be a little careful with competitiveness” 
(GMM) 
“I think the priority at the moment is that we are competing with half a dozen 
other airlines to be favourite by U.S. Airways in growth and survival” (ACP 2) 
Complacency: 
I’ve flown the line for years, I know what it's like. I was a fairly conscientious 
crewmember, but I was regarded as being probably more laid-back than most, 
and you would think those would be a contradiction, but they're not. As long as 
you get your butt out to the airplane and are ready to board 20 minutes before 
departure, it used to be 15 but now it’s 20, you’re golden, you’re done. As long 
as you sign the paperwork and make sure you’ve got enough fuel and just do 
those simple things you have to do then everything else is simply beyond your 
control, and then just don't worry about it. If you can help out you do” (ACP 2) 
Gossip: 
“I’ve never worked for a place like this. You have 350 pilots, one guy hears a 
rumour and within a day the whole pilot group knows. That's just unbelievable” 
(ACP1) 
Fear: 
“One of my goals coming into this office was to begin to try to change the 
culture of the flight department to make it more light-hearted and laid-back, to 
make it more fun, so people aren't intimidated when they come in the building, 
which they are now. People tip-toe through this hallway because they walk in 
fear” (ACP2) 
Stress: 
“I would say probably the stress they have been under a lot lately, because of a 
lack of resources, because of decisions that have been made by other 
departments to even limit those resources further, and...recognition is not there” 
(MCS) 
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Motivation: 
“The flight attendant gets paid the same amount of money whether she shows 
up late or shows up on time, or whether she does an above and beyond job on 
the airplane or she does a minimum” (DIF) 
“I think there are some who really enjoy their job and when they enjoy their job 
they’re just the type of person that’s within their personality to want to do the 
very best they can and yet there are some, who by personality, only do what it 
takes to get by” (MCS) 
 “I think there's a good core of people that truly work hard on this, to make this 
airline perform, and I think we do” (DO) 
Recognition: 
“In order to run a good airline you've got to be able to have good resources and 
good people behind the scenes too, which goes back to the whole thing that a 
person needs to be recognised for the good that they do” (MCS) 
Safety: 
“The first and foremost thing is that we are in the business of moving 
passengers and then make sure we build safety on that concept” (DT) 
“We have an active safety department, a good director of safety, who I think in 
my estimation is doing what is necessary to make the airline a safe place to 
work and operate” (DIF) 
The theme of attitudes and behaviours was illuminating. Everyone had an attitude. 
Their consequent behaviours seemed to emanate from these attitudes and play an 
important role in how each individual was coping with the ongoing crisis. This topic 
evoked the most emotional responses from the employees and was obviously close to 
their heart. Not only were the behaviours displayed but, the interviewees were also 
able to discuss the behaviours of their colleagues and ascribe some significance to 
them. This created a much more sharply focussed awareness for me of how important 
they might be in the success of a PMR system. Being human beings we all exhibit 
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behaviours that are influenced by our experiences, but, it was uncertain at this stage 
whether the interviewees would readily adopt the behaviours necessary to truly engage 
with the PMR system. 
 
4.6.10 Service Quality and Customer Service 
Even with the introduction of the performance management system in the Flight 
Department it was still unclear what the level of service quality actually was, or indeed 
how to measure it. Many of the respondents explained performance in terms of 
passenger satisfaction but there was no provision in our company to periodically survey 
our passengers, nor was there any other way to gauge this unless you used our 
completion factor and on-time performance as indicators.  
“A passenger’s image of our airline is directly on: did we leave the gate on time, 
did we get to our destination on time? Those are the two driving things. They 
bought a ticket to leave at a particular time and to arrive at a particular time, and 
you do anything short of that and you fail to fulfil their expectations. We can use 
that as a gauge to judge whether passengers are happy or not” (ACP 1) 
But, these do not provide true insight to the passengers’ experiences even if the flight 
is on-time. How courteous were the gate agents and flight attendants, what was the 
cleanliness of the aircraft interior or bathroom? A true measure of customer satisfaction 
must be taken from the passengers themselves. However, in discussing the concept of 
PMR and its purpose, all interviewees expressed a lot of thoughts about customer 
service and satisfaction: 
“That's one thing that I don't know if this company tracks, is customer 
satisfaction” (GMM) 
“What makes an airline truly function well? It's hard to say because...the 
friendliest people are at Southwest but they don't have the best performance 
numbers. The best customer service numbers were produced by, strangely 
enough, US fucking Airways last year, which was the laughing stock of the 
airlines, as far as customer service was concerned, a couple of years ago” 
(ACP2) 
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“I think travellers are certainly much more sophisticated than they used to be, 
so I think to a certain extent the expectations are lower than they used to be, 
which may be more realistic for what the airline is really able to provide” (MIF) 
“I think their expectations are that employees will handle themselves with a 
certain level of professionalism, that it will be a safe operation, and that there 
will be a reasonably high a level of reliability” (MIF) 
“I would say we are focused on customer service, as well as we can be with the 
resources that we have” (DIF) 
“I think it would be important for the employees to be more aware of how their 
decision affects the whole operation and how it affects the paying passenger on 
the other end” (MCS) 
“I think a lot of times they don't think about the passenger…mechanics don't 
really realise, don't think about, how this whole operation works together to 
make things happen” (GMM) 
“It comes down to: were you are able to take him from point A to point B on 
time, arrive at the destination on time, were your people able to interact with the 
customer, make him happy, or her, happy? I think those, truly that's what we 
sell. We sell delivering you from point A to point B, and obviously the goal is did 
we do it on-time, did we do it to the best of our ability, and were our people well 
represented I guess?” (DO) 
There were some issues that were identified as causing dysfunctional behaviour. A key 
example was highlighted by ACP1; 
“That image is shattered when you get a call from a supervisor saying, “why 
were you late?” So they would rather falsify the times outbound than have to 
deal with a phone call from me” (ACP1) 
One problem we endure during the summer months is that of aircraft cabins that do not 
get a chance to cool on very hot days.  
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“I was out flying last week and I got an airplane without an APU. The APU has 
been out for over 24 hours. My opinion is that in the middle of July if the APU 
fails it’s going into the maintenance hangar that night. It’s the most important 
thing on the fucking airplane in the middle of July and August. It’s absolutely 
inexcusable, inexcusable, that this airline could possibly subject it’s passengers 
to 105° temperatures. Unbelievable to me! Absolutely unbelievable! But they 
don't want to do that because it screws with their numbers. So this is a case 
where by chasing the numbers they’re actually hurting the airline” (ACP2) 
This highlights the problem that not all measures are necessarily in the best interests of 
the company. By striving to achieve a particular goal it must be understood that the 
primary concern is the customer. This message appears to be much more ingrained in 
the flight attendants and crew schedulers than it is in the pilots.   
“I think a lot of the decisions made about passengers are made by 
conscientious schedulers and not necessarily by corporate dictates” (DT).  
However many job functions are so far removed from the customer that it is easy to 
lose sight of the big picture. A mechanic working the night shift at a maintenance base 
never has an encounter with a passenger and, to a large extent, is out of touch with 
concepts of customer service and operations performance unless it is specifically 
communicated to him. 
From my own perspective, whenever I travel now, I take a critical look at the entire 
operation and make a judgement based on my knowledge and experience of how well 
the airline has accomplished its mission to provide safe, comfortable and timely 
transportation.  
4.6.11 Reaction to the Performance Measurement and Review System 
There was universal agreement that the weekly performance review had been 
beneficial, educational, and had assisted in putting into perspective what was actually 
within the control of the Flight Department. Each interviewee was able to articulate their 
experiences with the PMR system in a largely positive fashion: 
“I certainly think having an understanding of what other departments go through 
on a regular basis is helpful” (MIF) 
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“I would say it's been beneficial and an education for myself. I still think there's 
more that we could learn if others were willing to really participate” (MCS) 
“Our meetings once a week I think are very valuable, because we get to 
interact, and get to talk about our delays and what's happened over the last 
week” (ACP1) 
 “I took a look at your slides and they were easy to read…before this system I 
would not have known if we were having a good week or not” (DIF).  
I think the intent is good. I think the intent is to actually hold people 
accountable” (ACP2) 
The focus that the PMR system put on specific delay codes helped some of the 
managers to identify areas within their control that had deficiencies:  
“I think we've gained a lot of insight and I think the programme is working and I 
look at interesting things and identify crews late to the airplane, which is a 
major, major factor in our delays” (DO) 
This simple determination would not have been as easily recognisable without some 
kind of focus being placed upon it. 
“In looking back I was not empowered and I was more of an administrative 
person with somebody else calling the shots” (DIF) 
“I would hope that what other managers take away from that is similar to what I 
have taken away myself in that I feel like I get to see performance within my 
own department and how my department is managed side-by-side with how 
other departments are managed” (MIF) 
“I think the objective has been to help the crew members understand the effect 
of their actions on our statistics with the hope that they'll do better at their jobs” 
(DIF) 
“I think some probably resent the additional scrutiny, in that it does require, 
frankly, some extra work on their part” (MIF) 
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“We take our tally sheet and post it as you do in the hallway there, and those 
that are interested stop and read it” (DOM) 
“We spend so much time looking at the delays now, to try and pinpoint where 
our specific problems are within our specific departments” (ACP1) 
I know for certain that somebody is actually paying attention. It's not just a 
machine rolling along and nobody notices” (ACP1) 
Having had several months to engage with the PMR system it had given a sense of 
what might be achieved if they were committed to making it a success, and during this 
time the knowledge that had been gained was tremendous. Everyone who attended the 
weekly review had taken away a greater understanding of how the company operated 
and how other departments managed their resources. Even though there were 
sceptics, and communication remained a major problem, it still allowed a level of 
communication within the department that had not existed before. 
4.6.12 Desired Outcomes of the PMR System 
Having now positively engaged with the PMR system it became a logical step for the 
interviewees to express their desires for improvements and the eventual outcome of 
the PMR initiative: 
“Well I would like to know the results, positive or negative, at whatever point it is 
being measured. And I would like to know, whatever it is we are measuring, 
what portion of it I own” (DIF) 
“Ultimately I think we’re looking for knowledge. To find where we’re deficient, to 
find where we did really well, and see if we can't bring where we’re deficient up 
to where we’re doing really well” (DO) 
“I would like to see more motivation for others to strive to want to do better. By 
realising what it is we are being measured on and then seeing where we lack, 
that will obviously cause motivation for people to take initiative to do more than 
they're doing now” (MCS) 
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“I would like to find another way, or other ways, to make our flight attendants 
feel that they are an important part of this airline… Make them feel good about 
themselves, because they don't feel good about themselves” (DIF) 
There were also some good ideas put forward on how to accomplish these desires: 
“What I think I would do is publish expectations for each particular position with 
the understanding that everybody knows what they are ahead of time, so there 
can be no confusion” (MCS) 
“I think certainly having the performance measured in a little bit more public 
fashion maybe doesn't really allow certain problems to go unrecognised. It’s 
good. A little peer pressure goes a long way” (MIF) 
“I think the idea would be if that information was shared in a way, and compiled 
in a way, that was beneficial to everybody” (ACP1) 
 “If we’re going to do this we need to have some meaningful codes” (ACP2) 
“I would tend to think it would be very much like the Safety system. It would 
disseminate to the lowest levels of the company a certain amount of 
information. But, I think a performance system should give feedback all the way 
down in some form. I don't think any employee at the end of February in this 
company should have had any doubts how seriously the month impacted our 
company” (DT) 
 “I think if we were able to communicate the information and really disseminate 
it out to our pilots and flight attendants, but could maybe pluck out one 
particular instance,  going into some pretty extreme detail, so that they can 
understand how that particular problem affected the passenger, I think it would 
probably carry a lot more weight” (MIF) 
“I think the vast majority would ask themselves next time that they're swapping 
airplanes, or they're doing a quick turn, they’d say “if I leave five minutes late 
here I’m contributing towards that statistic that says we’re twice as bad as 
Piedmont. I think it would be a good education for them to see exactly what 
those statistics are, and how they’re justified” (ACP 1) 
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“I wish we could publish the numbers on a regular basis. The pilots have a far 
larger interest in it than you might have thought that they would. There is a pride 
in what they do and there is an air of competition” (ACP 2) 
“Like head-starts (first flight of the day) - we communicate to these people how 
important they are, and why they're important and what our goals are and 
where we’re at, and when we meet goals we let them know, and when we don't 
meet goals we put out numbers to them and say “this is unacceptable, what can 
we do?” We try to gain a partnership with our employees to say what can we do 
to make it better? What are we not doing here that we can't get these planes on 
the gate in the morning” (GMM) 
In concluding this section, perhaps the following quote sums up the core desire for 
what people needed: 
“I want the expectation to be clear as to what the company expects of me and 
what they are holding me accountable for” (DIF) 
This simple, but unanswered, cry was at the heart of why performance measurement at 
Allegheny had not previously been given the attention it deserved by the managers and 
directors. They did not have a clear understanding of what was expected of them and 
consequently did not place much importance on actively engaging with the PMR 
system and making the review of performance data an integral part of their daily 
routine. They needed leadership and support to provide some cohesion, but it was 
sadly not in evidence. 
4.7 Summary of Findings 
The preceding discussions directly focused on the nature of performance measurement 
at Allegheny as expressed from the perspective of, and by, the managers and directors 
who were responsible for flight operations performance. It became apparent to me 
once I began analysing the data that there was such richness and depth to it that it 
would not be possible to provide its full content. Instead, I had to condense it into what 
was hopefully an insightful summary of the situation at Allegheny for these people. It 
was a traumatic time and people wanted to talk, not just about the questions I had 
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asked, but also about the prevailing state of the company and their futures. There was 
a great deal of anxiety and concern. 
Hopefully, it will have provided the reader with unique insight to the problems and 
issues that existed at Allegheny during this period of time. Not all views were shared 
equally among the respondents of course, but there was an overwhelming sense of 
confusion with how they should operate within the pressing crisis and with the new 
PMR system. Many of the conclusions drawn from this cycle of research may now 
seem readily apparent to the reader, but it is important to note that these conclusions 
are also supported from my own intimate involvement in the events that took place 
around me. 
In reflecting back on the interviews, the most vocal about his frustrations was ACP2. 
He was very willing to share his attitudes, beliefs and thoughts on any topic and did so 
with fervour and in a colourful fashion. The most careful in his responses was MIF who 
took time to consider the subject and formulate a thought-out response, rather than an 
emotional response. DT was on the periphery on the day-to-day operation and did not 
seem to relate to the subject matter quite as well as others, and MCS was at a loss on 
how to articulate some things. However, they were all quite willing to be involved and 
there was a sense that everyone genuinely wanted to help the company succeed, but 
they were not really sure how to do it. 
Perhaps the best way to summarise the findings is to relate them back to the aims and 
objectives that were set forth at the commencement of this cycle of research. These 
were a sub-set of the overall objectives detailed in chapter three. 
4.7.1 Design and Introduction of the PMR System 
The first objective, with regard to the design and introduction of a performance 
measurement and review system, was achieved by the implementation of a PMR 
system within the Flight Department. This system was modelled loosely on the concept 
of a balanced scorecard, but was done so mainly as a means of using an already 
proven framework, rather than trying to adopt, or mimic, any particular BSC 
implementation. It allowed the measures to be grouped into definable categories that 
provided a balance within the system and helped us to look at operations performance 
from the perspectives of the customer, incurred cost, what we needed to excel at, and 
what we needed to improve.  It was clear that the heart of the system was the weekly 
171 
 
review meeting that took place prior to the conference call with US Airways. I ran this 
meeting, which took the form of a presentation of the prior week’s performance, with 
added insight and narrative on where performance fell short or exceeded goals. 
However, at this stage the review simply provided the variances from the goals rather 
corresponding reasons for why that was the case.  
The implementation was also restricted to the Flight Department, rather than as a 
company-wide deployment, which did not allow the opportunity to specifically evaluate 
these experiences in the context of how other departments operated. It also prevented 
it from gaining widespread support. Leaders of the other departments attended the 
weekly US Airways conference call but not the Flight Department weekly PMR 
meeting. 
When determining what to measure I initially settled on the most important metrics that 
provided an aggregate picture of operations performance plus a sub-set of measures 
for individual components within the internal processes that the managers needed to 
be aware of. The measures could not unfortunately be directly devised from the 
company’s strategy, which is held up in the literature as the core of a PMR system 
{Bourne, 2005 #173} because there was not a defined and communicated strategic 
plan. Instead, they were developed around the central theme of increasing the airlines 
operational reliability to meet US Airway’s expectations, which can be argued is a 
strategy in and of itself, but was not clearly defined or articulated.  
The consensus in the literature suggests that by creating an awareness of the key 
determinants of performance, linking them to the company’s strategy and vision, and 
assigning ownership and accountability for designated measures is expected to 
generate real and continual improvement (Kaplan and Norton 1992; Neely et al. 2000; 
Simons 2000). However, at Allegheny because there was not a clearly defined strategy 
that was being pursued by the management team it was unclear to everyone what the 
central thrust of the system was. This did not readily promote ownership and only a 
limited degree of actual accountability. However, the responses from the interviewees 
did suggest that they were getting some benefit from the PMR system, but it was 
lacking a clearly outlined central purpose that could guide and hone their efforts. 
A contributing factor to this was undoubtedly the absence of the Vice President of the 
Flight Department who had been on secondment to a sister airline for the previous 
three months and as such there was not a recognised authority in the department other 
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than the CEO. Consequently, there was nobody holding the management team 
accountable, and nobody to set specific direction. The managers did attend the weekly 
reviews regularly but did so without being able to give a clear understanding of why 
performance may have fluctuated in a particular area, and there was not a substantial 
effort made in providing the details behind the delays.  
Although the implementation was successful, perhaps a failure at the beginning of the 
programme was not to have allocated specific measures to individuals so that they 
would have some ownership of the process. The literature supports that the job of 
identifying accurate and applicable measures is enormously difficult and cannot be 
undertaken in isolation from those who operate within the system (Neely and Bourne 
2000). It requires the collective knowledge of all functional departments involved to 
identify the key components of good performance and to ensure that goals are realistic 
and achievable. This is a lesson to take forward to the next cycle. 
In establishing the PMR system my expectation was that it would encourage the 
stakeholders within the Flight Department to actively become involved with improving 
performance. Findings from the literature research also suggest that people will adopt 
behaviours and actions necessary to meet performance goals (Kaplan and Norton 
1992), but the analysis of the data failed to find significant evidence that the 
introduction of the PMR system encouraged or forced people to adopt the behaviours 
and actions necessary to arrive at the goals. In this regard, it did facilitate a better 
engagement with operations performance but there was still an insufficient 
understanding of what to do with the data. It added perspective to the roles of the Flight 
Department managers and there was evidence of some improvement behaviour taken 
by some of the respondents, but it was largely superficial, and did not involve drilling 
down to the determinants of performance. 
During the final stages of this first cycle when the PMR system was broadened by 
making a modified version of it available to all crewmembers online, it appeared to be 
mostly ignored. It was disappointing, and somewhat disconcerting for me to find, that 
over one month after the data had been made available, I had received just one item of 
feedback from a pilot who roundly criticised the validity of the data. His main concern 
was the inappropriate coding of delays by station agents that reflected poorly on the 
pilots. This problem was identified during the interviews and was acknowledged by all 
as a potential failure in the delay coding system and the cause of behaviour that sought 
to pass blame to others. By providing performance data online to the crewmembers it 
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was hoped that it would stimulate ownership by the crewmembers for the measures 
that they had influence over, but at the time of writing this was not the case. 
An explanation for this is that the data that was made available to the crewmembers 
represented the performance of the entire airline and included all delays and 
cancellations whether or not the crewmembers had any direct influence over them. A 
serious consideration for improvement is to limit this information to just the delays and 
cancellations that are controllable by the Flight Department. This may bring more 
perceived legitimacy to the process. 
In an ideal situation the design of a performance review process should try to harness 
the knowledge and expertise that exists within a company and in doing so try to break 
down functional barriers and allow the managers to act as a team of professionals, 
intent on pursuing performance excellence. Unfortunately, the evidence from this 
implementation showed that it was far from the case and that barriers were in existence 
that inhibited the effectiveness of the system 
4.7.2 Understanding Operations Performance Measurement 
Secondly, in understanding how my colleagues, the interviewees, understood how 
performance measurement was practised at Allegheny, the extensive results in the 
preceding sections indicated that overall there was a fundamental lack of knowledge 
regarding the measurement and interpretation of operations performance. It was 
actually quite alarming for me to learn how much my colleagues did not know, and how 
unstructured the company was with regard to guidelines and objectives with operations 
performance. There was an unspoken and fundamental notion for everyone to perform 
well everyday but not a common method by which to do it 
The intention was for the system to encourage people to think beyond just the results 
and to consider the causes (Fitzgerald et al. 1991). However, it became obvious quite 
early in the process that simply designing and implementing a system was insufficient 
without a significant investment of time in educating and nurturing the managers and 
directors in how to use it properly. It did not by itself, in this particular instance, promote 
the required behaviours necessary to meet goals. This was largely because there was 
not a corresponding strategy at the heart of the system that people could identify with, 
or commit to following. Indeed, there was no espoused strategy at all and this led to 
confusion. 
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It was also evident that we did not consider the measurement of operations 
performance as a critical success factor for the airline and therefore did not place 
sufficient importance upon it. Our day-to-day activities were not driven by performance 
nor was there a desire for continuous improvement. Indeed, it was a very short-term 
focus and our processes were not modified or altered based on the results of 
performance measures. 
The most frequently discussed topic was that of communication. It was evident that 
there was not a lot of good communication taking place and this tended to foster 
contempt. Communication was not only poor across departments but also within the 
Flight Department and by extension to the crewmembers. The CEO was singled out as 
the main culprit and certainly the one who had the responsibility for the company’s 
culture. It was not surprising to learn that many people had adopted the attitude that 
the company did not care about them. There was nothing to work towards and the CEO 
was not communicating with the workforce. These attitudes manifested themselves in a 
variety of different behaviours, including denial of performance results, resentment of 
other departments, resentment of other carriers, anxiety, stress, fear, frustration, a lack 
of ownership and a complete loss of inspiration. However, not everything was as 
negative as it outwardly appeared. Despite these conditions there was still an inherent 
and pervasive pride and professionalism that some people took in their work. 
Even though there was a fair understanding of what performance management meant 
to the interviewees there was not a collaborative effort that brought everyone together 
to collectively analyse the determinants of performance. All too often people rushed to 
apply a temporary ‘band-aid’ fix to a problem without truly taking the time and initiative 
to examine the deeper issues and thus comprehend how to make a lasting and 
permanent change. This was a fundamental problem and driven largely by a lack of 
resources. It was easier to talk about the theory than it was to put it into practice and 
many of the managers just flowed from day to day believing they were making a 
difference.  
4.7.3 Engaging with the New PMR Process 
The third objective was to evaluate how the managers and directors engaged with the 
new PMR process. The evidence suggests that there was universal agreement 
amongst the interviewees that the PMR system was beneficial and educational and it 
helped some managers to identify areas within their control that had deficiencies. Of 
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particular interest were the expressed desires for the outcome of the PMR system 
which included: clear results, clear expectations and consequences, make people feel 
important, and to communicate good results, when they happen, to all levels of the 
company. This obviously suggests that there was still a lot of work to do at Allegheny 
with the PMR system. 
Although the interviewees had a fair idea about the general purpose of performance 
measurement, they did not seem to practise it in their actions or daily routines. The 
weekly review meeting was successful in bringing everyone together but the action 
seemed to stop there. During the interviews, everyone agreed that performance should 
be measured, but how much of this was simply an attitude that they wanted to convey 
to me to sound good was unclear. Their consequent behaviours did not readily align 
with these expressed attitudes. Despite agreeing that performance should be 
measured they were uncertain on how to manage the performance results and what 
direction to take. This stemmed from a lack of leadership within the department and 
especially from the CEO, who was mostly absent during the weekly conference calls. 
This lack of direction and the very real lack of knowledge and understanding of PM 
resulted in an uncommitted response. Problems would be addressed if they became 
big enough, but nobody was anticipating them or taking ownership. 
One of the more important and undermining factors was that Allegheny was compared 
with the other US Airways Express carriers even though their geographical operating 
areas were significantly different. This led people to believe that they were being held 
to an unattainable standard. The goals were not considered to be realistic and 
achievable and there were no incentives or consequences for the individuals. 
Accountability led to blame and a deterioration in teamwork that was already tenuous. 
The focus of attention became the coding of delays and who to point the finger at, 
rather than investigating the entire process to see if fundamental improvements could 
be made to prevent problems from recurring. 
It was evident that great improvement needed to be made internally on how we 
communicated and disseminated information about performance. There was also an 
apparent lack of teamwork that was characterised by each department functioning 
separately without a cohesive bond, and with some animosity and unwillingness to 
address core issues. Our department was also hindered by a serious lack of leadership 
and virtually no accountability for the measures in place. All are fundamental to a 
successful PM programme. 
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An intrinsic objective of the PMR system was to identify and improve internal services 
in order to consequently improve service quality. In this instance the investigation of 
how performance was understood and practiced at Allegheny supports Vandermerwe 
and Gilberts (Vandermerwe and Gilbert 1991) findings that internal services fall short of 
user requirements and lead to a perceived gap between service users needs and the 
service providers performance. This was evident from discussions surrounding the 
needs of the passengers and the managers’ largely unilluminated understanding of 
what the customers need and how to provide that level of service. 
Curiously, considering that all of our efforts were to produce a service, there was not a 
good understanding of what the service quality was. There was no provision to 
measure it even though the interviewees were able to identify that the ultimate goal 
was passenger satisfaction. In this case, the crude measure of passenger satisfaction 
was whether or not we were able to operate the flight on-time, rather than a measure 
taken directly from the passenger. There were simply no resources, or motivation to 
want to conduct passenger surveys. Part of the reason for that was the passengers 
technically belonged to US Airways and Allegheny was simply providing a service for 
US Airways. It was also apparent in our organisation that knowledge gaps existed that 
prevented a superior service from being offered. These gaps were evident in the 
inability to know what to do with the performance results along with the lack of 
measures of customer service from the passenger’s standpoint. There was also 
evidence of dysfunctional behaviour where aircraft would be operated on hot days with 
inoperative cooling systems, thus inconveniencing the passenger, but achieving a 
performance goal of operating the flight. 
With the introduction of the performance measurement system and the presentation of 
new, less obvious measures, there was some awakening to the problems that were 
inherent in our operation, but unfortunately, there was still a largely uninformed view of 
performance measurement. 
4.7.4 The Culture at Allegheny 
The third objective was to evaluate the culture at Allegheny. The evidence from the 
content analysis shows that the overall culture was characterised by poor 
communication, lack of support, blame, and the dysfunctional behaviour of people 
chasing numbers to avoid being seen as the cause of flight delays, without really 
attempting to modify behaviour by identifying the true cause and effect of the problems. 
177 
 
There was a lack of instinctively knowing what to measure and why, and then what to 
do with that information once it was collected.  
The ongoing crisis had affected everyone to varying degrees and the overall impact on 
people seemed to be negative. The CEO was not providing any inspiration, comfort or 
support to his workforce and people were feeling isolated and abandoned. This was 
evident in the attitudes and behaviours adopted by the management team.  
It was unfortunate, but the culture could further be described as sad, depressing, and 
uninspiring. In order to have promoted a cultural shift to embrace performance 
initiatives a leadership change would have needed to occur, but this was almost 
certainly not going to happen. 
4.7.5 Further Work 
The fourth and final objective was to identify ideas for further work and improvement 
based on the research outcomes. This was achieved by identifying and uncovering the 
fundamental problems within Allegheny that the PMR system, and associated data-
gathering, had surfaced. In this regard it was plain that more time was needed to allow 
everyone to better understand the cause and effect linkages in the performance data 
and to grasp where they could make a discernable difference.  
The main areas to be addressed as enhancements to the PMR system include the 
need to be more customer orientated by better communicating performance shortfalls 
to the pilots and flight attendants so that they could see the full ramifications of delays 
and cancellations. Additionally, communication between departments and 
communication to the workforce needs to be substantially improved but it must carry 
with it a sense of support and encouragement rather than the intent to pass blame. 
This should be accomplished by providing more context to the performance issues and 
create a better awareness of the cascading nature of flight delays and be coupled with 
a concerted effort to promote teamwork and collaboration. This can only be 
accomplished if there is a greater degree of accountability being practised by senior 
level managers and an acceptance that controlling performance results are an intrinsic 
requirement of each managers and directors role. The focus should be on the 
controllable aspects of performance and there should be expectations established that 
are designed to promote ownership of measures. 
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These findings for areas of improvement will inform the changes to be made during the 
next cycle of research. 
4.7.6 Conclusion 
The introduction of the PMR system and the management team’s response and 
behaviours towards it enabled a better understanding of the airline’s operational 
performance. It had not, at this stage, provided full enlightenment of how to improve 
performance but it was the start of getting people to engage and ask questions. 
However, the primary goal of any PMR system should be to seek improvement and 
without realising such a goal it is just a reporting system that informs rather than 
influences behaviours and decisions. Indeed, it was the resultant attitudes and 
behaviours, that were heavily influenced by the ongoing crisis that limited the PMR 
system from being more effective.  
During the interviews, strategy, as a specific subject matter, was curiously not 
discussed at all, but lengthy discussions surrounding guidance, direction and support 
have shown that there was no real strategy in operation or a central mission that could 
be clearly articulated by anyone. This seems to be a fundamental flaw for a service 
company, and even more so given that the directors should be part of formulating and 
communicating a company’s strategy. 
A significant finding was that the attitudes and behaviours of the managers appeared to 
be deeply ingrained in their approach to the PMR system. A greater emphasis needs to 
be placed on the attitudes and behaviours of the people who are expected to work with 
the PMR system to produce the results that are desired. This will require a deeper 
understanding of how they need to be nurtured and moulded.  
This is where my research began to take sharper focus and I narrowed my view to that 
of the attitudes held by the managers and the respective behaviours that they 
demonstrated. All of the interviews were infused with attitudes, however, we know from 
Aronson (Aronson 2004) that expressed attitudes do not mean that these will be 
translated into corresponding behaviours and one of the fundamental expectations of a 
PMR system is that the users will adopt whatever behaviours are necessary to meet 
the goals (Kaplan and Norton 1992). Does this notion actually hold water? In the next 
cycle I will turn my attention to how my colleagues viewed the attitudes and behaviours 
of their peers as they continued to interact with the PMR system. 
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4.8 Personal Reflections on the First Cycle 
Looking back on the whole process it now seems simply insufficient and misguided to 
introduce a performance measurement programme and involve people in a review 
process without first considering, and providing, the structure and support necessary to 
hold them personally accountable for the measures that fell within their control. I had 
not even imagined that there was such a fundamental lack of understanding of the 
components that comprise overall operations performance. This was startling to me 
and made me realise that my efforts at introducing a PMR system would need to be 
much more concerned with educating the management team on cause and effect 
linkages and also to provide encouragement and inspiration. The fact that there was 
not a discernable strategy, or even individual strategies that the directors developed, 
was a further indication of the enormity of the problem at Allegheny. It would not be a 
simple undertaking to correct this.  
In a similar vein, it would have been better to have had discussions with the managers 
to gauge their overall level of knowledge and understanding of performance before 
introducing the system. This would have highlighted the need to provide training and 
education. I also learned quite quickly that it is of paramount importance that senior 
management buys into the system and provides strong leadership to ensure positive 
communication and to sustain commitment to the goals. This was obviously not the 
case at Allegheny and it was discouraging to feel that there was little demonstrable 
support from the CEO for all of the efforts that were being undertaken. 
For a PMR system to be truly effective probing questions should have been asked that 
challenged everyone to drill down to the determinants of performance and to stimulate 
a reaction to develop and design methods to increase the value proposition we made 
to our customer. This is not what we experienced at Allegheny. Without this, it was 
simply a review process, and it failed to get to the heart of the issues and ultimately fell 
short of providing any kind of transformational change. People would attend the 
meetings because they had to, but would look at the slides with no real insight to what 
was driving the performance results.  
Regrettably, a lack of any effective communication led to apathy and the inability to 
motivate oneself to fix the problems. Even in the climate we found ourselves in it 
should have been possible to motivate people provided there had been leadership, 
support and involvement of senior management, all of which were sadly lacking. It was 
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not through having mediocre personnel as there were some extremely capable people 
on the staff who had perhaps given up the willingness to go above and beyond and had 
settled for the path of least resistance. 
In order to successfully reach out to these sceptics a fundamental shift in culture may 
need to take place. Unfortunately, this would need to come from the top because much 
of the data thus far has indicated that is where the problem lay. While we continued to 
operate in a micro-managed environment, where individual mangers were unable to 
truly do their jobs with authority, it was unlikely that a shift in culture would ensue. 
Additionally, the level of frustration and lack of interest that was already present would 
eventually take its toll as the airline began to shrink during the next year and resulted in 
a further decline in morale. With an unknown future, the ability to effect change would 
undoubtedly be dampened. However, by chipping away at the foundations I believed it 
would be possible, at the very least, to educate people on performance measurement 
and perhaps enable a mechanism to address some of the performance issues that 
were identified as being deficient.  
A sad sense of loss and defeat, and perhaps resignation to the inevitable decline and 
potential demise of Allegheny, made it very difficult for some to engage with a PMR 
system that did not seem to provide much help to them:  
“[dejected] What does it mean after PSA was offered all them Jets. How can 
you sit here and say 90 anything, because with their numbers, they couldn't 
compete with us. So what does it mean, I don’t know...that’s US Air!” (DOM) 
When it came time to decipher the interview transcripts I initially coded the data to very 
specific themes which yielded an enormous number of codes. On reflection it might 
have been better to do this within broader categories rather than go through the 
laborious process of having to rationalise and combine them. 
The interviews were quite long and infused with each individual’s personality. Perhaps 
most notable for me during the interview process, because I was exposed to the raw 
responses from the interviewees, were the attitudes displayed and conveyed by the 
respondents. This aspect of the research triggered something in me that prompted a 
desire to learn more about how people reacted to an imposed PMR system and 
whether their attitudes and behaviours could significantly affect the outcome. I found 
myself empathising with their situations because I too was feeling the pressure from 
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US Airways and the feeling of being somewhat helpless to make a significant 
difference. 
4.8.1 Looking Forward to the Second Cycle 
The second cycle commenced in October 2003 and was this time aimed at improving 
the PMR system and more importantly further understanding the attitudes and 
behaviours of the Flight Operations management group to the measurement of 
operations performance. However, at this time I was becoming quite concerned about 
our outlook...  
“I enter into the second cycle with a little trepidation and anxiety because I fear 
that these results may only serve to further underline the lack of interest that I 
see being taken in truly making a difference at our airline, a lack of interest that 
is driven by the fear of the company being merged, or completely shut down. 
Everyone is very concerned, myself included” (my research journal) 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter has described the first cycle of the research project and explained the 
conditions of crisis surrounding Allegheny Airlines. It has also described the 
introduction of the PMR system and how it was designed and implemented, along with 
a comprehensive examination of how the measurement of operations performance was 
used and understood by the management of the Flight Department. It has drawn a 
picture of a distressing culture and mood that was prevalent in the airline and how this 
in turn impacted each individual by having an overall negative effect upon their ability 
and motivation to accomplish their jobs. 
It has uncovered that before the introduction of the weekly department performance 
review that the measurement of performance was not truly practised, nor understood 
and that there was little true appreciation of the determinants of the performance 
results. It has further shown in this particular case that education and knowledge are a 
prerequisite for a successful PMR system. 
This cycle became formative in developing the research focus and represented a very 
significant first step in shaping the full research project. 
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Chapter Five 
5. CYCLE 2: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS AT ALLEGHENY AIRLINES 
This chapter provides a detailed review of the investigative process during the second 
cycle of research. It describes the Repertory Grid method of gathering data and 
illustrates the various methods of analysis that were used. The findings from the first 
cycle have served to alter the frame of reference of the research to that of the attitudes 
and behaviours displayed by the managers towards the PMR system. 
5.1 Introduction 
The second cycle took place during 2004 as an extension of the work already 
undertaken and was designed to expand upon what had already been learned. During 
the first cycle, I had gained a better understanding of how operations performance was 
measured, understood and practised at Allegheny. In this cycle, I have turned my 
attention, and therefore the frame of reference, to the attitudes and behaviours of the 
managers and directors impacted by the PMR system and the state of crisis. This was 
done because a significant realisation from the analysis of the first cycle interviews was 
that the managers’ attitudes and behaviours appeared to be negatively influenced by 
the state of crisis occurring around them. This in turn had an impact on their 
engagement with the PMR system, which was not, as of yet, resulting in the actions 
necessary to produce improvement and meet goals. Changing the frame of reference 
is part of the initially fuzzy process of Action Research, which over time leads the 
researcher to more clearly define the problem under study (Dick 1993). 
A significant amount of time had passed (12 months) since the last formal round of 
data collection and this had provided an opportunity to not only further consider the 
results from the first cycle, but also to investigate how the managers viewed each other 
as participants in a collaborative process. It was during this time that I was introduced 
to the work of Andre de Waal and his examination of attitudes and behaviours to 
performance management in the Netherlands (De Waal 2002; De Waal 2003a). This 
was previously a little-researched area and DeWaal was able to determine that 
behavioural factors “seem to be important to the successful implementation and use of 
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a performance management system (p.694). This cycle therefore uses de Waal’s work 
to inform the research and as a source from which to compare the emergent attitudes 
and behaviours at Allegheny. 
5.2 Purpose and Objectives 
The second cycle followed the same sequential AR process that was used in cycle 
one, which was to: define the problem, plan action, take action, evaluate the action, 
and then reflect back on the action taken. In order to establish the purpose and 
objectives of this cycle of research it was important to complete the first two steps in 
the AR process, which were to define the problem, and then plan action.  
This cycle initially involved modifying the PMR system to account for the knowledge 
gained during the first cycle. One of the key findings from the implementation of the 
PMR system was that it was poorly communicated and that insufficient education had 
been given to the managers on how to use it and make sense of the results. Therefore, 
the first step would be to modify the PMR system and provide a greater level of 
guidance and training. This meant that the initial priority was to educate the managers 
and directors on how to interpret the performance data, how to identify the root cause 
of performance deficiencies, and how the key metrics were devised, measured, and 
presented. Of further interest was the declining morale and the associated attitudes 
and behaviours of the managers that emerged during the interviews, which seemed to 
have a profound effect on the success of the PMR system. It was hypothesised that the 
state of crisis had an impact on this, and that it warranted further investigation. For that 
reason, the primary purpose of the second cycle of research was to identify the 
attitudes and behaviours of the management team and then make an assessment on 
whether they were being displayed in a positive or negative way, and then to further 
examine whether the ongoing crisis was affecting them as they engaged with the 
modified PMR system. Once these problems had been defined, the next step was to 
plan the action to be taken, which involved some thought into how to adequately modify 
the PMR system, and then what method to use to examine what effect the crisis was 
having on the managers.  
The table below lays out the procedural steps in the same fashion as in the first cycle. 
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AR Procedural Steps  Action for Cycle Two 
1. Determine the problem: Morale suffering due to an implied threat to merge 
Allegheny Airlines with Piedmont Airlines and a 
desire to know what effect the crisis was having on 
the managers 
2. Plan action: Set objectives. Determine changes to make to the 
PMR system to account for knowledge gained in 
first cycle and change the frame of reference to 
examine attitudes and behaviours of Flight 
Department managers and directors 
3. Take action: Modify PMR system and conduct Repertory Grid 
interviews with the managers and directors 
4. Evaluate and analyse: Use descriptive analysis, relationship analysis and 
content analysis of the repertory grids to make 
sense of the findings and identify behaviours 
5. Reflect on action taken: Personal reflections on the second cycle 
In order to achieve this work plan and the aim of this cycle of research the following 
sub-set of objectives were devised: 
1) Modify and refine the previously introduced PMR system 
2) Identify the attitudes and behaviours of managers towards the measurement of 
operations performance by conducting repertory grid interviews 
3) Evaluate what effect the state of crisis had on the managers attitudes and 
behaviours towards the measurement of operations performance 
4) Compare the findings at Allegheny to de Waal’s research 
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This cycle of research and action is depicted visually below and shows re-engaging 
with the work situation, further defining the problem, planning action, taking action, and 
then reflecting upon the action taken. 
 
What attitudes and 
behaviours do the 
managers display and 
what influence does the 
state of crisis have on 
them?
Evaluation and 
analysis
Repertory grid interviews 
with Flight Ops 
department managers
Refining PM system 
and holding the 
managers accountable 
Reflection
Cycle 2: Allegheny Airlines – Deepening Crisis
Cycle 2 shifted the frame of reference to 
examine the attitudes and behaviours of 
managers as they tried to engage with an 
imposed PM system. This research occurred 
while the prevailing crisis deepened, 
threatening the very survival of the airline. 
 
Figure 5-1 Diagram of 2nd Cycle Events 
5.3 Modifying the PMR System 
The main findings from the first cycle suggested that in order to make the weekly PMR 
system more effective there needed to be a greater understanding of what is measured 
and how it is measured, and more importantly how to drill down to the causes of 
performance rather than just to identify that a variance exists. Additionally, the codes 
used to analyse delays needed to be meaningful, and performance information should 
be communicated to a larger audience by publishing weekly results so that other 
employees could view them. This should also provide the opportunity to highlight when 
performance is good so that some pride can be taken. The system should also have 
clear expectations. 
In order to address these I began to provide performance data to the managers during 
the course of the week and also prior to the weekly review meeting so that they had an 
opportunity to study it and decide whether they needed to research any particular 
performance shortfalls. This encouraged the managers to prepare for the weekly 
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department review and to ask themselves, ahead of time, what questions US Airways 
might have. 
Another important change was to require each performance metric owner to personally 
speak about the performance in their area and provide explanations. This was required 
even if the performance was above goal. The intention was to create an awareness of 
the performance drivers so that the manager could more fully engage with the charts 
and graphs. I also insisted that we discuss and explain any delay or cancellation that 
was considered to be ‘controllable’, or avoidable. This was designed as an attempt to 
create a sense of responsibility and ownership and to generate an overall discussion 
and summary of the previous week’s performance.  
As time went by I also encouraged other directors to compile and present the weekly 
performance review. This forced the managers to understand the data and make an 
assessment of what it was telling them because they would have to talk about it with 
degree of self-assurance. This was not easy to do for some and they struggled with 
trying to make sense of things. Some refused to do it, but it was not mandatory. Many 
performance shortfalls were dependent on other factors and it was hard for people to 
identify and understand the linkages and dependencies between them.  
Once the PMR system had been modified it was then logical once again to broaden the 
charts and graphs to a wider audience. This was accomplished by making the 
operations performance data available to the crewmembers online at a dedicated web 
page on the company’s web site. I then took this a step further by measuring and 
publishing on-time performance by each crewmember. A finding from the first cycle 
was that there were no incentives. I argued for and received approval to provide an 
incentive to our front line pilots and flight attendants to receive an award for being the 
most on-time performers each week and each month. The monthly winners all a 
received a day off work at their choosing.  
5.4 Adopting Repertory Grids 
During the first cycle of research, I was a little dissatisfied with the method of coding 
and analysing the data. Conducting interviews was a very informative, rewarding and 
rich experience but the subsequent coding and sense-making was a little arduous and 
left me wondering how to improve on this process and introduce a greater degree of 
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structure that would make sense to me. I was mindful of the fact that it is important for 
the researcher to use methods of analysis that suit the purpose to which they intend to 
put them (Denscombe 2007). This led me to examine the repertory grid technique and 
to assess whether it would be applicable to my situation. In desiring a method of 
gathering data that had more structure to it, I was able to come to a relatively quick 
conclusion that indeed the repertory grid method was not only suitable, but would also 
allow me to feel more at ease with the structure that it provided. It would allow sufficient 
latitude for delving into relevant issues and extracting the true meaning of someone’s 
personal constructs. I therefore made the decision to proceed with a second round of 
interviews but this time using the repertory grid technique.  
During this period, the airline had entered a very difficult stage in its history. US 
Airways had already implied that Allegheny Airlines might merge with another carrier 
and this had created a high degree of concern and discomfort among all employees. 
Consequently the repertory grid interviews were conducted in the full knowledge that 
those involved were caught in a work crisis, and almost certainly a personal crisis, as 
the future of the company, and of course every individual, was unknown and at stake. 
5.4.1 The Interviews 
The interview group essentially represented the same sample group that participated in 
the first cycle with a few changes: one of the Assistant Chief Pilots was not able to 
participate but he was still used as an element in the construct elicitation. The Director 
of Maintenance was not able to participate. His role in the research was replaced with 
the Manager of Dispatch. The Manager of In-Flight left the company in response to the 
ongoing crisis and was replaced by a colleague who participates here as the new 
Manager of In-Flight. The interviews were conducted with the list of people depicted in 
Table 5-1 below, and followed a standard repertory grid elicitation method as described 
in Chapter Three. I have used repertory grids in this context to examine the attitudes, 
behaviours and relationships between this diverse group of managers, and to learn 
how they construed their experiences with the PMR system. 
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Table 5-1 List of interviewees - Cycle 2 
Position   Abbreviation  Department 
Asst Chief Pilot 1   ACP1  Flight Operations 
Director of Operations  DO  Flight Operations 
Director of In-Flight   DIF  In-Flight 
Director of Training   DT  Crew Training 
Manager of Crew Scheduling  MCS  OCC 
Manager of In-Flight   MIF  OCC 
Manager of Dispatch   MD  OCC 
Following completion of the interviews the individual grids were reproduced in Rep IV 
and Excel spreadsheets to allow additional analysis. The following section describes 
the analysis techniques used and discusses the interim results that they yielded. 
5.4.2 Analysis Techniques 
Several analysis techniques were employed to make sense of the repertory grid data. 
These consisted of: 
A. Descriptive analysis techniques: 
Step 1 Process analysis 
Step 2 Eyeball analysis  
Step 3 Construct characterisation 
B. Relationship analysis techniques: 
Step 4 Cluster analysis – elements 
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C. Multiple grid content analysis: 
Step 5 Bootstrapping 
The mechanics behind these techniques are described and discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three, but some pertinent points have been repeated here to aid the 
illustration of the analyses that follows.  
5.5 Descriptive Analysis 
During the preliminary analysis of each grid three steps were taken to ensure familiarity 
with the grid content. These are qualitative in nature and descriptive of the grid process 
and elicitation methods, which in turn enables the interviewer to get to grips with the 
content of each grid. 
Initially all grids were analysed as individual grids in order to understand how each 
interviewee related to the subject. However, when there are multiple grids we need to 
analyse them together to gain an overall meaning. This was accomplished by a method 
of content analysis known as bootstrapping, which is described in section 5.8. 
Appendix B contains the individual grids of each manager and director who took part in 
this cycle of data gathering, and the results of the analysis techniques used. Below I 
have used the analysis for the Director of In-Flight to illustrate how these procedures 
work. I feel that it is important for the reader to see this method in action in order to 
better understand the results. 
5.5.1 Process Analysis Illustrated 
The first step is a “process” analysis, in which the interviewer thinks back to the 
interview itself and how it was conducted. The topic in question is considered and the 
interviewee’s reaction to it is noted. 
Below is the process analysis of the grid for the Director of In-Flight: The rating scale 
used was from 1 to 5. The emergent pole is on the left-hand side of the grid and the 
implicit pole is on the right. If the interviewee considered the element to be rated 
strongly on the emergent pole for a particular construct then they would indicate a 
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rating of ‘1’ or a ‘2’. If the element was rated on the implicit pole then a rating of ‘4’ or ‘5’ 
is given. Anything that was central would be rated as ‘3’. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 A Completed Repertory Grid: DIF 
Step 1: Process Analysis 
Topic (behavioural reactions to the measurement of operations performance) 
DIF was very interested in taking part in this process and was genuinely willing 
to learn about repertory grids and the topic under scrutiny, and consequently 
she approached the interview in a very positive manner. She was in agreement 
that the subject warranted investigation, intrigued by the approach of looking at 
attitudes and behaviours, and was curious to learn how I was intending to make 
sense of each manager’s role in performance management. 
Elements 
DIF considered the list of elements acceptable and appropriate because it 
included all of the managers and directors in the Flight Operations department 
who are involved with performance management. An interesting aspect of this 
is that the list of elements also included a “self”, which served to provide the 
interviewee with further opportunity for introspection when rating the elements 
on a construct, or when presented with a triad containing “self”. This was quite 
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enlightening for DIF who began very quickly to see everyone in relation to 
herself as she proceeded to develop and rate the constructs. 
Constructs 
The qualifying phrase, which was to consider the behavioural reactions of the 
other managers, was received well and served as a useful reminder during the 
elicitation process to ensure that the responses remained focused on the topic 
of the PMR system. There was a willingness from DIF to develop constructs 
and they flowed relatively easily once a level of comfort was reached.  
Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and sensible to DIF. She was able to 
readily place each element at a distinct point on the scale and she avoided a 
central tendency by trying to be as objective as she could. This process was 
thought provoking for her and she was careful with her designations. 
General 
Overall, this was a positive experience for both DIF and me. She was able to 
provide 13 constructs that relevantly dealt with the topic in question. 
5.5.1.1 Interim Findings of Process Analysis 
After conducting a process analysis on each repertory grid I was able to draw some 
preliminary findings. These showed that all interviewees with the exception of DO were 
able to engage positively with the repertory grid process. Additionally, all of the 
participants, again with the exception of DO, were willing to discuss the performance 
measurement process at Allegheny, and their observations of how their colleagues 
interacted with it. 
Interestingly, there was general agreement that the subject of attitudes and behaviours 
was poignant, and they recognised that the way they behaved had a lot to do with their 
inner level of contentment, or anxiety, with what was going on around them. 
Additionally, everyone considered that the list of elements was acceptable, appropriate 
and sufficiently comprehensive. There were no voiced concerns that anybody had been 
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omitted, or that someone was included who should not have been. The rating system 
was considered easy to understand and intuitive enough for all of the interviewees to 
easily rate the elements. 
However, developing bi-polar constructs was initially difficult for three of the 
respondents (MCS, DO and ACP 1) but they were able to get to grips with it after 
producing a few constructs and further understanding the opposing nature of them, 
after which the whole process made more sense to them. 
Only one interviewee, the DO, did not really engage with the process and gave very 
little thought to it, even though he was a willing participant. During elicitation, I 
constantly had to explain to him what to do and keep him focused on the topic. The 
concept of a repertory grid did not make much sense to him at all and he became 
reluctant to develop his constructs. His reaction was starkly different to everyone else 
and can perhaps be explained by the fact that he was suffering personally more than 
the others with significant concerns over his future and a innate feeling of helplessness. 
He had been with Allegheny for many years and was himself looking towards 
retirement within the next 5-10 years. The crisis was causing him a great deal of 
anxiety and may have led him to disengage and feel that he was powerless to do 
anything about it. 
Nobody had any difficulty with the topic of the interview, but I did have to repeat it 
several times for some of the interviewees in order to keep them focused on the 
attitudes and behaviours of their colleagues. There was a tendency amongst most of 
the interviewees to wander away from this specific topic. The overall responses of the 
interviewees are summarised below: 
• DIF – Very interested and willing to learn – a positive experience for both of us 
• MD – Willing to participate, but indifferent to the subject 
• DT – Enthusiastic, positive and very interested 
• MIF – Greeted the topic with some curiosity and a little scepticism 
• MCS – Initially had difficulty grasping the concept but soon caught on 
• ACP1 – Very willing, but initially had difficulty developing constructs  
• DO – Willing, but the process did not make sense to him. There were many 
moments of long thought and emotional responses 
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These observations provided an encouraging preliminary overview of how the 
interviewees engaged with the construct elicitation procedure, and gave insight to their 
disposition toward the topic of attitudes and behaviours as they related to operations 
performance. They all genuinely wanted the airline to survive this predicament and 
were willing to do what they could to help. Their willingness and enthusiasm to become 
involved in the repertory grid interviews and to develop useful constructs had validated 
its use as an effective data-gathering tool. It also provided an initial insight into the 
mood of the respondents, which could be characterised as anxious, powerless, and 
frustrated: wanting to help but not knowing how. 
5.5.2 Eyeball Analysis Illustrated 
Step Two in the analysis routine was an “eyeball” analysis, which involved reading 
each grid as a whole and gaining an insight into the meanings of what had actually 
been said and how the interviewee had represented the topic. Jankowicz (2004) 
suggests that the objective of this exercise is to consider what the interviewee was 
thinking about, how they represented the topic, what they think and how they think. The 
analysis below answers these questions. 
I continue here with the eyeball analysis of the grid for the Director of In-Flight: 
Step 2: Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents DIF’s view of the attitudes and behaviours of her colleagues, 
and their level of involvement, at that particular moment in time as Allegheny dealt 
with a major crisis. DIF has represented the topic well and remained focused on 
performance measurement relating it back to the weekly meetings that were held 
with the parent company and other subsidiaries. She saw herself in a very similar 
light to the other two females in the group, which is interesting and infers that there 
is perhaps a divide between genders, or that the females relate better to each 
other.  
What DIF’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
DO:  Demonstrates a poor attitude, is uninterested in his job, is lenient to 
crewmembers and likely to let the issues slip by and not hold 
crewmembers accountable for delays that they may have caused. 
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Wants to push problems off onto somebody else, believes that the union 
should have more influence, will likely see it out to the end even though 
he is obviously unhappy, and is unlikely to create or take an opportunity 
to move on. Does not show any creativity and tends to dwell on the 
negative and accept things the way they are rather than trying to see 
some positive in the gloom. Her ratings for DO seem to have him 
leaning toward the negative poles of each construct – perhaps some 
lack of respect for him here? 
ACP1:  Seems to lie mid-way between each construct and is largely 
unremarkable. There is a feeling that he also likes to push things off “as 
a Piedmont problem”, in other words the problem is not his concern but 
that of the acquiring company, which has allowed for some apathy to set 
in. He shows a lack of initiative and problems that would ordinarily be 
taken care of, are not addressed. However, ACP1 does have a very 
good technical background and appreciation of operational issues. 
ACP2:  Is seen as conscientious, interested in airline performance, and still 
tackles the issues when they arise. But he does exhibit some of the 
crewmember mentality of tending to look at things from an individual, or 
self-centred perspective, without grasping the bigger picture. He is seen 
as a good communicator but will likely leave at the first opportunity. He 
is creative and has a very good technical knowledge and tends to look 
at the positive side of things - tries to remain optimistic. 
DT:  Is seen as very conscientious, committed and motivated to improve 
performance. DIF feels that he strongly follows the rules and embraces 
the issues. He firmly believes that management, not the unions, should 
run the airline, and as such has a good global perspective. He is a good 
communicator, is creative and always remains positive and optimistic 
but will leave the company at the first opportunity. 
MD:   The majority of MD’s ratings fall with a central tendency. He still tries to 
embrace the issues and feels that management should run things. Is 
likely to see it out until the bitter end – has been with the company for 25 
years and is unlikely to leave without being asked to. Believes in 
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females as effective managers, but tends to be pessimistic in what he 
says and how he behaves. 
MCS:  Very conscientious, follows all rules, tackles problems, and does not 
pass off anything. She believes that management should be in control, 
has a good picture of the operation and communicates well. Although 
she believes that females can run the airline she views her position 
largely as just a job and will leave at the first good opportunity. Is 
creative but lacks flight operations experience. 
MIF:  Is seen as effectively fulfilling her role. She tackles the problems, follows 
the rules, holds flight attendants accountable and tackles the problems, 
refusing to pass them off to someone else. She believes that 
management should have firm control of the company, She is not seen 
as a particularly good communicator. She will stay until the end, even 
though she considers it just a job and not necessarily a career. Believes 
that females should have a greater role and are capable of running the 
airline, but lacks true operational flight experience.  
Self (DIF):  DIF sees herself as an ardent follower of the rules, and accountable for 
her area of operations. She tackles problems head-on and will not bow 
to union pressure. She is a good communicator and takes her career 
seriously. She is unlikely to leave the company until the bitter end 
because of 25 years of service already invested. She believes that 
females should be given a greater role and that they are more than 
capable of running the airline. She does not think that she is very 
creative in finding solutions but she does remain very positive and 
optimistic and has good technical flight knowledge and experience. 
5.5.2.1 Interim Findings of Eyeball Analysis 
Each of the individual repertory grids was subjected to an eyeball analysis in exactly 
the same manner as laid-out above. This enabled me to draw some preliminary 
conclusions, in concert with the results of the process analysis, about how each 
interviewee represented the topic and a perception of what each individual was 
thinking. This yielded the following summary of how each interviewee represented 
themselves in relation to the other interviewees: 
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DO 
DO showed a lot of concern over the merger and everyone’s apparent lack of 
knowledge about it. He pointed to the perceived dysfunction between trying to improve 
operations performance and the hopelessness of it all, considering that Allegheny was 
likely to merge with Piedmont Airlines. 
When considering how he himself was represented by the constructs he produced, he 
saw himself as very similar to DIF, which was completely opposite to how she saw him.  
He was involved with the workforce and had direct management oversight of the pilots 
and she oversaw the flight attendants. He saw himself as dedicated to his job and very 
much set direction for the department, although this was refuted by others. He said that 
he wanted improvements in performance and believed that he was held accountable 
for performance to some degree, but he was unable to be explicit about it. 
During the interview he mentioned the financial budgets several times and these were 
obviously something that he was responsible for, but he was unable to fully understand 
and get to grips with them. This subject caused him a lot of worry because he was 
charged with explaining pilot pay, which was a minefield and very complex, and he was 
lost with how to do this effectively.  
ACP1 
ACP 1 had built a clear view of the core behaviours that he observed in his colleagues, 
which painted a picture of concern and frustration about the future. Whereas he saw 
himself as fairly positive about the future, he is not very impressed with his boss’s 
capabilities (DO) but worked with him to accomplish things. 
When looking at himself, ACP1 believed that he held his employees accountable 
(contrary to what some others thought of him), and cared about performance 
measures. He was willing to delegate, and had a sympathetic view towards his 
employees (concurrent with what others thought). He felt that he was not 
communicated to by his boss or the CEO but also felt that he was held accountable by 
the DO. Despite that, he was generally easy going and wanted to improve 
performance. 
DT 
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He appeared to think that the DO had a good approach and demonstrated a good 
attitude. He also seemed to be very supportive of the roles played by DO, ACP1 and 
ACP2. This aligns itself with the fact that the DT was also a pilot for some of his career 
and seemed to have empathy with their position. 
He saw himself on the emergent pole more often than not and believed that he had a 
good attitude despite the troubles that the company faced. He also saw himself as 
having some authority and following the rules. He exhibited an individual view and was 
more technical and analytical. He could also be aggressive and looked for immediate 
action. He worked to improve performance but was definitely not held accountable for 
his actions. This was largely because there were no specific measures that pertained 
to his area of responsibility, which was Training. 
MD 
MD represented the topic well and tended to focus on the individual behaviours that 
were demonstrated by his colleagues. He was able to produce 11 constructs that 
summed up his view of how he saw his colleagues and their interaction with the 
performance management process. It was interesting that he viewed the pilot 
management group quite negatively, except for those that he worked with closely. 
When he considered his involvement he saw himself as accepting responsibility and 
holding people accountable. He viewed things from an administrative perspective and 
would have liked to do things differently if he could, by using his own methods rather 
than being told what to do. He took pride in his job and believed that he was held 
directly accountable for his actions, and therefore accepted the blame for errors. He 
also believed that the Flight Operations department was disorganised and that there 
was not a future for the airline. He saw himself as being quite similar to DO. This was 
interesting because they both had a tendency for being quite negative, according to 
their colleagues. 
MCS 
MCS represented the topic well and provided insightful constructs. However, she was 
quite unflattering about the DO and ACP’s and seemed to have very little respect for 
the entire pilot management group, seeing them as not engaged, reactionary and 
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unable or unwilling to solve problems. She seemed to like DT and DIF, and perhaps 
looked up to DIF. Both are female. 
When evaluating herself she viewed herself as a problem solver who shows initiative 
and is a very independent thinker. She was company-minded, recognised the situation 
for what it is, and wanted to fix it. She was willing to make a stand, was impartial and 
consistent, and professional and proactive. 
MIF 
MIF focused her constructs around the core behaviours that her colleagues 
demonstrated. She was able to readily place each element on the scale and used the 
ratings carefully. She seemed to identify herself with the other crewmember managers 
and obviously had respect for them.  
When rating herself she saw herself as concerned about performance and was very 
willing to go the extra mile, even operating a flight as a flight attendant if it avoided a 
cancellation. She shared information and had a good knowledge of crewmembers. She 
did not make excuses for her flight attendants and always followed through when 
researching a problem. She accepted responsibility, worked to improve performance, 
and was definitely held accountable. Naturally, she saw herself on the positive end of 
the scale for most of the constructs. 
5.5.2.2 Summary of Eyeball Analysis 
These findings and the reflections by the interviewees again produced very interesting 
awareness of their individual experiences. There was a universal tendency for the 
interviewee to see themselves as making a positive contribution and doing things 
correctly, however these statements were quite often contradicted by their peers, for 
example, DO thought he was similar to DIF but she was adamant that they were not at 
all alike. 
This has shown that relying simply on how an interviewee perceives themselves, and 
the contribution they made, was not a reliable way to predict their actual demonstrated 
attitudes and behaviours. It was far more important to consider these in conjunction 
with the observations and thoughts of their colleagues. There was also a perceived 
divide by gender, with the females in the group believing that they had a lesser role 
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than their male counterparts. The male-dominated pilot management group sometimes 
referred to their female counterparts in a less than positive manner by making snide 
comments about them inferring that the females had inferior capability. There was an 
observed lack of willingness to accept them as equals at Allegheny.  
The remainder of the analyses now turns its attention to the expressed behaviours and 
attitudes by identifying the types of constructs that were generated by each 
interviewee.  
5.5.3 Construct Characterisation Illustrated 
Step Three was a process known as construct characterisation, whereby the 
researcher identifies the types of constructs used by each interviewee and their 
significance. The objective of this was to discover what areas have greater meaning 
and substance to each person in the context of the subject of behaviours and attitudes. 
This was accomplished by looking at the proportion of constructs that were considered 
‘core’ and had a personal significance to the interviewee, versus those that were more 
peripheral in nature. This helped to further broaden the picture of how the interviewees 
had approached the topic and what was intrinsically important to them. 
I continue here with the construct characterisation of the grid for the Director of In-
Flight. 
Step Three: Construct Characterisation 
See chapter 3 for a description of each type of construct. 
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Table 5-2 Cycle 2 Construct Characterisation: DIF 
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
Concientious - wants the airline to look good - 
good work ethicI don't care attitude - poor work ethic Core
Will leave at first good opportunity
Just a job, not that concerned with future of 
company - less loyal
Believe females should be allowed to run airline
More creative - thinks outside the box
No flight experience - little appreciation of true 
operational issues
Perceive that men should run the airline, see 
females as less competent (e.g. suggestions not 
taken seriously)
Looks at the positive, makes light of things, sees 
the good - optimist
Less creative, more likely to limit thinking on 
improvements
Crewmember background - good appreciation of 
operational issues
Realist - looks at the negativity - accepts things 
as they are
More interested in airline performance - 
motivated
More lenient to crewmembers - willing to look 
the other way
It's a Piedmont problem - wants to push 
problems away
Union should have greater influence
Crewmember mentality - self-centred, individual 
view, does not have gobal picture
Poor communicator
Management should run airline not union
Management mentality - has global picture
Excellent communicator
Will see it out to the end
Career  - concerned about airline performance 
because of time invested, loyalty
Less interested but fulfils job requirements, not 
motivated
Still follows the rules - enforces policy as normal
Still embraces issues and problems as they 
arise
Behavioural
Behavioural
Behavioural
Core
Propostional
Core
Evaluative
Evaluative
Core
Core
Propostional
Core
 
In DIF’s grid there were 13 constructs. Of those 13, there were six that seemed to have 
a deep and personal significance to her. DIF is very particular about attitudes. She saw 
herself as making a big effort to be professional and was very loyal to the airline and 
feels that the seriousness with which one views their job is important, e.g. a career 
rather than just a job. She thought that an important distinction should be made 
between management and the union leadership. She also perceived an apparent 
difference between genders, and felt that one’s technical experience was very 
important and should not be downplayed because of gender. 
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5.5.3.1 Interim Findings from Construct Characterisation 
Each grid was similarly subjected to the same construct characterisation analysis. In 
assessing the number and content of the core constructs some preliminary conclusions 
were drawn. All interviewees had between six and eight core constructs, except DT 
who had just four. This suggested that each person was able to articulate concepts that 
were important to them and represent them with some prominence amongst the other 
more tangential constructs. However, some core constructs were repeated in slightly 
different ways, for example, both MCS and MD had two core constructs each that dealt 
with accountability. Further conclusions were drawn when these core constructs were 
grouped into themes. I have summarised the core constructs for each interviewee and 
categorised them into the following table: 
Table 5-3 Construct characterisation – Cycle 2 
Interviewee No. of CoreConstructs Categories
DO 7 Knowledge of Merger, Involvement with Workforce, Involvement with Regulations, Taking Action,Direction, Accountability
ACP 1 8 Flexibility, Accountability, Delegation, Specificity of Tasks, Sympathy, Communication, Work Ethic
DT 4 Authority, Demeanour, Work Ethic, Accountability
MD 7 Responsibility, Commitment, Involvement with Workforce, Accountability, Work Ethic, Organisation,Outlook
MCS 7 Detail Orientation, Approach to Problems, Initiative, Independence, Work Ethic
MIF 8 Work Ethic, Technical Knowledge, Integrity, Presence, Responsibility, Accountability
DIF 6 Work Ethic, Leadership, Career Orientation, Gender, Technical Experience, Outlook 
 
Two important themes emerged strongly from this simple categorisation: “Work Ethic” 
and “Accountability”. Work ethic was considered a core construct by all of the 
interviewees except DO, and Accountability was listed as a core construct by all except 
MCS and DIF. These findings suggest that there was a high emphasis placed on 
accountability, whether it was practised or not, and that work ethic was represented as 
a fundamental aspect of their work lives. Both seemed to be highly valued and they 
saw them as being particularly relevant at Allegheny during this period of intense focus 
on operations performance. This was borne out by their continued desire for the 
company to succeed, and the professional manner in which they conducted 
themselves, even though their actions were not producing the level of change that was 
required.  
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5.6 Relationship Analysis 
The primary method for assessing the relationships between the elements within an 
individual grid involved using cluster analysis. Doing so highlighted these relationships 
so that they became more visible. This process is illustrated below by again using the 
grid for DIF. 
5.6.1 Cluster Analysis Illustrated 
Steps Four in my analysis routine involved an examination of the relationships between 
the various elements. Rep IV conveniently presented these relationships 
diagrammatically in the form of dendrograms. For an explanation of dendrograms 
please see Chapter Three. These dendrograms represented the percentage similarities 
between the elements when all ratings for each element were compared side by side, 
and again the percentage similarities between all of the constructs when they were 
compared side by side.   
Here I continue with the cluster analysis of the grid for DIF: 
5.6.2 Step 4: Cluster Analysis of Elements 
 
Figure 5-3 Cycle 2 Cluster Analysis: DIF 
The objective of this analysis was to find out how DIF saw everyone else in the 
department, who she saw as being similar in their attitudes and behaviours, and in 
particular, where they clustered. This helped to further uncover the interpersonal 
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relationships within the Flight Department and added deeper colour to the emerging 
picture of the company’s culture and the behaviours being demonstrated. 
Table 5-4 Example of meanings drawn from the cluster analysed grid for DIF 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: DIF
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There are two main clusters: MD, ACP1 & ACP2, versus DT, DIF & MCS
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
MD, ACP1 & ACP2 are similarly rated on all constructs with no more than one 
rating point difference between them, with the exception of the second and 
13th constructs where the rating difference is 2 points. MD & ACP1 share the 
same ratings on 7 constructs. 
DT, DIF(self) & MCS are all rated the same on 5 constructs, sharing the same 
attitudes and behaviours
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
MD & ACP1 show the highest % similarity score at 86%. ACP1 & ACP2 are 
matched at 85%. Thus MD, ACP1 & ACP2 form a cluster whose lowest 
similarity score is 85%. The next closest is DT & DIF(self) with a match of 79%. 
The cluster of DT, DIF(self) & MCS has a % similarity score of 77%
Examine the 
remaining scores
MD, ACP1 & ACP2 form a distinct cluster being matched at 85%; their highest 
match with the other cluster is through MD's match with MIF at 79%. The most 
disparate match is between ACP2 & DO at 50%. This is interesting because 
ACP2 works for DO but DIF sees them as approaching performance 
measurement and review in distinctly different ways and with largely opposite 
attitudes and behaviours  
The cluster analysis for DIF”s grid shows that she saw two distinct clusters of people 
exhibiting similar behaviours: MD, ACP1 & ACP2 versus DT, DIF (self) & MCS. She 
has identified herself with MCS who is also female, and DT who was previously 
described as being very positive. 
Additionally her cluster analysis shows that the lowest similarity match is between 
ACP2 and DO (50%). She sees them as approaching the performance measurement 
and review process in distinctly different ways and with largely opposite attitudes and 
behaviours. This is an interesting assessment because ACP2 actually reports to DO, 
but appears to be quite at odds with his approach. Is this perhaps creating friction and 
a hindrance to their roles? This was confirmed when I posed this question to ACP2 and 
he explained that they did not always see eye-to-eye and he felt that DO was 
uncommunicative and secretive, and that this prevented him from being more effective 
in his role by not sharing information. 
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Each of the individual repertory grids was similarly analysed (see Appendix B) and the 
primary clusters were discussed through a feedback loop with the interviewees. This is 
also represented visually in Table 5-5 below: 
Table 5-5 Cluster analysis – Cycle 2 
Element
(Interviewee) Main Cluster % match Secondary Cluster % match Lowest match % match
DIF MD & ACP1 86% ACP1 & ACP2 85% ACP2 & DO 50%
DT DIF & DO 90% MD, MCS, ACP1 & MIF 88% ACP2 & Self 70%
MIF Self & MD 92% MCS & DIF 88% MD & DO 75%
ACP1 MCS & Self 89% MIF, DT & DIF 80% ACP2 & MCS 59%
DO DIF & Self 92% ACP1, ACP2 & MIF 88% ACP2 & MCS 67%
MCS DO & ACP2 92% DIF, DT, Self & MD 81% DO & MIF 58%
MD MCS & Self 95% DT, MIF & ACP1 91% DIF & ACP2 77%
 
This process was enlightening and intriguing for the interviewees who all expressed 
some measure of surprise at the comparisons. It became an exercise in personal 
discovery, which is one of the main benefits of repertory grids and why it is used 
effectively in clinical psychology.  
5.7 Findings from the individual Grids 
All of the preceding analyses were carried out on the grids as individual entities. This 
provided a lot of rich information about how each interviewee felt about the topic and 
their colleagues. The overall comparisons between the grids showed that there were 
not any universally agreed upon clusters, although there were some that had very 
strong matches between certain people, for example MD forming a cluster between 
MCS and himself at a 95% match. The interesting thing is that there were not any 
completely diverse attitudes displayed, except the lowest percentage similarity match 
of 50% between ACP2 and DO that was represented by the cluster analysis for DIF. In 
fact the best dissimilar match was represented by MD, who showed the lowest 
similarity cluster between DIF and ACP2 at 77%. Even though he felt that they were 
dissimilar, the difference between them was relatively marginal.  
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This suggests that overall there was a level of cohesion amongst the group and 
although differences of attitude and behaviour obviously existed, there was a uniform 
acceptance that the expressed attitudes were generally acceptable and each person 
was able to work with and relate to the others without any major clashes. 
The findings suggested that everyone benefited from taking an introspective look at 
how they had framed relationships with their colleagues. This provided the opportunity 
for each person to reflect on the results and for them to make changes if they so 
desired. 
The above analysis dealt with how each individual viewed their colleagues’ 
engagement with the PMR system and showed where they saw similarities in 
behaviour. What we have not yet been able to do is identify the attitudes and 
behaviours as a group. The analysis routines thus far were of great value but are 
significantly enhanced by the content analysis technique that follows. This technique 
known as bootstrapping actually combines the results of the grids into one set of 
categories that helps to paint a picture of the overall culture. 
5.8 Content Analysis – Bootstrapping 
This is the fifth step and the final analysis performed on the repertory grid data. This 
differs significantly from the previous steps because it now accounts for the grids 
grouped together. This had the advantage of aggregating the responses across 
categories and enabled me to draw some conclusions about how the group acted as a 
whole.  
5.8.1 Data Categorisation 
Here I show the results of the bootstrap analysis and then a method developed to 
provide significance to the initial results. 
After conducting a bootstrap analysis and testing for reliability as described in Chapter 
Three a set of eight distinct categories emerged that described an attitude or behaviour 
that was demonstrated by the research group: 
1. Conscientiousness 
2. Accountability and Responsibility 
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3. Teamwork 
4. Demeanour 
5. Flexibility and Creativity 
6. Big Picture View 
7. Delegation and Territory 
8. Motivation 
 
The constructs within each category were arranged so that those having a positive 
emphasis were on the left hand side of the grid and those having a negative emphasis 
were on the right hand side of the grid. The ratings for each element, on each of the 
constructs, in each of the eight categories, were averaged to arrive at an individual 
rating for each category. In order to separate the elements by whether they 
demonstrated behaviours and attitudes that were either positive, neutral or negative, I 
created a band for each of the three results as follows:  
Positive: any averaged rating that fell within the band: 1 to 2.3 
Neutral: any averaged rating that fell within the band: 2.4 to 3.6 
Negative: any averaged rating that fell within the band: 3.7 to 5 
This was achieved by using a close approximation of three equal divisions of the four 
possible rating outcomes. An averaged rating can fall between four possible outcomes: 
1-2, 2-3, 3-4 or 4-5. These four possible outcomes were divided by the number of 
rating bands sought, which was three. Therefore, 4 ÷ 3 = 1.3333…∞ 
Because the ratings of ‘1’ and ‘5’ are absolutes, e.g. a rating cannot be lower than ‘1’ or 
higher than ‘5’, I rounded 1.333…∞ to one decimal place, and added 1.3 to ‘1’, and 
subtracted 1.3 from ‘5’. This resulted in the bands listed above. The ‘neutral’ band is 
consequently marginally smaller than the other two bands by 0.1. This difference is 
small, but must still be explained. It could be argued that the ‘neutral’ band should 
include the rating 3.7, which is instead included within the ‘negative’ band. However, 
there were no ratings in any of the grids that fell at 3.7, and so the decision to represent 
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the ‘neutral band as marginally smaller than the other two bands did not materially 
affected the results at all. 
The desire would be for everyone to have behaviours that fall on the positive side of 
the equation. Table 5-6 summarises these results. 
Table 5-6 Summary of results from 1st cycle content analysis 
Average 
rating of 
category # 
co
ns
tru
ct
s
D
O
A
C
P 
1
A
C
P 
2
D
T
M
D
M
C
S
M
IF
D
IF
Category = Conscientiousness 2.4  15 3.1 2.6 3.3 1.5 2.5 1.8 2.5 1.9
       
Category = Accountability and Responsibility 2.5  14 2.8 2.9 3.9 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.4 1.7
       
Category = Teamwork 2.6  14 3.1 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.6 2.0
       
Category = Demeanour 2.7  12 3.3 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.9 1.9
       
Category = Flexibility and Creativity 2.6  10 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.9 2.4
       
Category = Big Picture View 2.6  9 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.2
       
Category = Delegation and Territory 2.7  4 3.8 2.3 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.8 3.5
       
Category = Motivation 2.9  4 4.3 3.3 4.0 1.5 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.0
       
Overall: 3.3 2.7 3.1 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.2
       
from to
 Positive 1 - 2.3
 Neutral 2.4 - 3.6
 Negative 3.7 - 5
Range
 
The nature of peoples construct systems reflect what they have previously experienced 
and what is important to them and because of this the number of constructs in each 
category is a measure of their relative importance. Each of these categories is 
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discussed below in order of relative importance. Negotiation over the definition of each 
category took place during the reliability testing phase outlined in Chapter Three. 
5.8.1.1 Conscientiousness 
This category was defined as: 
Demonstrating commitment to the company and working to improve 
performance versus adopting the attitude of "it's just a job", being ready to move 
on, or not willing to help or care, about performance 
There were 15 constructs in this category, of which seven were considered to be ‘core’. 
All interviewees had at least one construct in this category except for MD. Five of the 
constructs belonged to DIF alone indicating that she placed a lot of emphasis on this 
category. This suggested that being conscientious was a highly valued behaviour by 
the group. 
When all interviewees were rated using the analysis scale to show whether their 
behaviours were considered to be positive, neutral or negative only DT, MCS and DIF 
were considered to be demonstrating positive behaviours and thus showing an active 
commitment to the company and to improve performance. The remainder all fell within 
the neutral spread. 
5.8.1.2 Accountability and Responsibility 
This category was defined as:  
Demonstrating responsibility and holding people accountable, or is held 
accountable themselves: has good work ethic, versus not holding people 
accountable, not accepting accountability, or not showing responsibility: 
assigning blame 
There were 14 constructs in this category of which 13 were considered to be ‘core’. 
This is a very large number of core constructs and indicates that this category is by far 
and away the most important to the interviewee group. All interviewees had constructs 
in this category except DIF. 
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Four of the interviewees demonstrated positive behaviours, three neutral and one 
negative. It was not surprising to see that the negative rating was ACP2, because 
during the interviews in the first cycle, he was the most vocal in his dissatisfaction with 
the direction the company was going. This seemed to be borne out by his colleagues 
who saw him as not behaving in an accountable and responsible way, yet he believed 
that he was held accountable. 
5.8.1.3 Teamwork 
This category was defined as: 
Works cooperatively with others, is empathetic, compassionate and 
understanding, and relates well to other employees, versus an "Us against 
Them" approach, and being more isolated from the workforce 
There were 14 constructs in this category with only five being ‘core’. All interviewees 
had at least one construct in this category. MCS and DIF both had ratings that fell 
within the ‘positive’ band, while all the rest fell into the neutral rating. This was 
interesting because MCS and DIF, both females, were now exhibiting positive 
behaviours and attitudes in the first three categories, while the others were decidedly 
neutral. This was also borne out in the cluster analysis for both these interviewees with 
both MCS and DIF having rated themselves very closely with each other. This 
relationship was also recognised by MIF. DO rated himself similarly to DIF with a very 
high percentage similarity match of 92%, but this was not shared by the other 
interviewees who rated him neutral in most categories and negative in two. 
5.8.1.4 Demeanour 
This category was defined as: 
Remaining calm, organised and helpful versus being anxious, aggressive and 
unhelpful 
There were 12 constructs in this category of which five were ‘core’. MIF and DO did not 
have any constructs that fell within this category. 
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Only one person, DIF, was comparatively rated as positive. Indeed this was now the 
fourth category that DIF was rated as positive and clearly showed her as standing apart 
from the rest of the group. 
5.8.1.5 Flexibility and Creativity 
This category was defined as: 
Demonstrating a tendency to be flexible, creative and adaptive to change 
versus being rigid, obstructionist and inflexible 
There were 10 constructs in this category with four being ‘core’. Only one person, 
MCS, was rated as positive with everyone else being neutral.  
5.8.1.6 Big Picture View 
This category was defined as: 
Demonstrating a larger picture perspective, versus having a narrow or 
departmental view  
There were nine constructs of which five are core.  
Both MIF and DIF were rated as positive, both of whom run the In-Flight department. It 
seems that with the struggles going on with the pilot group and the ongoing crisis that 
the In-Flight department was able to remain more objective and keep a better 
perspective. This was represented in constructs that depicted the management versus 
crewmember view of how to run the airline and having all-round knowledge of the 
airline from the crew viewpoint and the manager viewpoint. 
5.8.1.7 Delegation and Territory 
This category was defined as: 
Delegates and shares information, versus remaining territorial and keeping a 
tight control over their own little corner 
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There are only four constructs in this category of which only one was ‘core’. However, 
there were three people exhibiting positive behaviours: ACP1, DT and MCS. DO was 
negative and the remainder neutral. It was encouraging to see that there was a 
concerted effort on the part of these people to share information and delegate work 
rather than being territorial. These are both positive behaviours, but in light of the crisis 
and the general level of concern, it could also be discerned that these behaviours might 
have been a reaction to the problems, and that shedding work in the form of 
delegation, was to avoid doing it themselves, and sharing information was merely 
voiced frustrations and concerns about the crisis at Allegheny. 
5.8.1.8 Motivation 
This category was defined as: 
Concerning themselves with making improvements and being determined to get 
work accomplished, versus making excuses, lacking drive and independent 
thought 
There were only four constructs in this category, of which two were ‘core’. DT, MD and 
DIF all exhibited positive behaviours. DO and ACP2 were negative, which was also 
borne out by their attitudes during the interviews. The remaining three were neutral.  
5.9 Findings from the Combined Grids 
In essence what has been captured here is a representation of the culture within the 
Flight Department and what qualities were currently required to be successful. The 
relative importance of these categories and what is missing says a lot about the 
company and provides many insights to the interactions of the team. It has shown that 
that only three people (DT, MCS, DIF) were considered to be consistently 
demonstrating positive behaviours when aggregated across all eight categories. This 
was less than half of the group and improvement by the others was obviously needed 
to enhance their engagement with the measurement and review of operations 
performance. When all ratings were aggregated across all categories the overall rating 
was neutral.  
ACP2 and DO both had two negative marks over the list of categories. They were the 
only people to have any negative marks. ACP2 was rated negatively in accountability 
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and responsibility, and motivation. This meant that the interviewees did not see 
corresponding behaviours from him that would suggest alignment with the desired 
behaviours for these categories. ACP2 also appeared on five of the seven cluster 
analysed grids as being in the lowest percentage similarity cluster with others, which 
showed that the interviewees regarded him as behaving in dissimilar ways to everyone 
else. DO was rated negatively in delegation and territory, which was also mentioned 
during the interviews in cycle one when he was described as being secretive. Like 
ACP2 he was not motivated and had a remarkably low rating of 4.3 in this category. 
This effectively showed that there was a division amongst the displayed behaviours of 
the interview group. With only three people overall being considered as positive, and 
not in all categories, it indicated that there was a lot more work to do to encourage 
people to adopt the positive attitudes and behaviours that were identified during this 
analysis as being needed for success. 
During this process and through the bipolar nature of constructs, a lot was uncovered 
about the negative behaviours requiring change and the positive behaviours that may 
need to be further strengthened to meet the strategic needs of the airline. This insight 
proved very valuable and provided the impetus and sharp focus to continue with 
improvements to the PMR process. 
5.10 Summary of Findings 
The findings from the analyses above have been summarised below by relating them 
back to the objectives established at the beginning of this cycle   
5.10.1 Modification of the PMR System 
The first objective of modifying and refining the previously introduced PMR system was 
accomplished by adopting the recommendations from the first cycle. This led to a more 
focused approach to the weekly reviews and allowed the Flight Department managers 
to gain a more in-depth understanding of how the various facets of the operation were 
measured. The addition of these modifications elevated the PMR system to something 
that could potentially become a very significant part of everyone’s daily routine. 
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Measuring each crewmembers on-time performance proved to be very useful and quite 
popular, but it also drew its critics who claimed that it was harder for some pilots to be 
in contention because of the bases from which they flew. However, it really did highlight 
the poor performers and we were able to see over a period of time that some were 
clearly not at all interested in performing well and indeed it did uncover that there was a 
significant amount of ‘slow flying’ taking place with the deliberate intent to pad the pilots 
flight hours and therefore pay hours. 
The weekly performance review meetings that were held prior to the US Airways 
conference call progressed well and attendance was, by and large, good. The 
managers and directors came to realise that they needed to provide explanations for 
any performance shortfalls and that they would be held accountable for results within 
their area of responsibility, which in turn provided a higher degree of ownership and 
responsibility. This weekly meeting served to prepare us for the US Airways conference 
call that followed and as time went by we became much more adept at answering US 
Airway’s questions and we were able to assert our own informed explanations about 
occurrences. This was enhanced by requiring each director to present the overall 
summary and discussion of the previous week’s performance results. Initially they 
found it hard to identify and understand the linkages and dependencies between the 
metrics, and especially how to clearly articulate them. However, this exercise was very 
beneficial in increasing their education on how aspects of the operation were measured 
and then used to build the picture of the overall level of performance. However, the 
evidence showed that identifying causes and remedying them had not yet become a 
prevalent practice. Without this fundamental ability to understand the linkages and 
dependencies between the various measures, and identify potential solutions to 
problems, it meant that the performance review meeting was less than effective and 
may have lacked a real objective. Uncovering the causes of performance shortfalls and 
developing action plans to correct them is a central requirement of a good PMR system 
(Fitzgerald et al. 1991; Neely and Bourne 2000; Simons 2000). This step is critically 
important, but was lacking at Allegheny. 
Although the PMR system had enabled a more comprehensive review of the data, the 
response had not provided the level of ownership that I had expected. However, we 
had become smarter in our understanding of our operation and how to intelligently 
relay problems to the Express Division. It did provide a greater degree of confidence 
and the weekly US Airways call became less daunting as the anxiety about being 
shown-up in front of the other carriers lessened. 
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5.10.2 Attitudes and Behaviours 
The second objective set out to identify the attitudes and behaviours of managers 
towards the measurement of operations performance during the ongoing crisis by 
conducting repertory grid interviews. These interviews were very useful and provided a 
great deal of rich data that was able to be interpreted both individually and as a group 
by using several analysis methods. This process gradually built a picture of how 
everyone related to each other and how they perceived their relative behaviours. We 
were able to put this to good use in an attempt to work better together. This was 
illuminating and enabled me to further uncover the culture within the Flight Department 
and apply this knowledge to how we approached the performance review meetings. 
The primary attitudes and behaviours that emerged were represented as eight 
categories that were ranked by their relative importance. This showed that the group 
most highly valued conscientiousness, accountability and teamwork, and placed less 
emphasis on delegation and motivation. They saw the primary categories as containing 
the most important behavioural traits that were necessary to seek improvement in 
operations performance.  
These categories converged with de Waal’s research (2002) in respect of the 
behavioural factors contained within his subparts of management level, management 
style, responsibility, supervision, alignment, organisational culture and external 
environment. These subparts fell within what he called the ‘controlled system, the 
‘controlling system’, the ‘internal environment’ and the external environment’, which 
relate primarily to the development and use stages of a PMR system (see Table 2-2 in 
Chapter Two). The behaviours that fall within these classifications were identified by de 
Waal as being important to the implementation and regular use of a PMR system. It 
was interesting to note that the behavioural categories that emerged through this 
research cycle had a strong correlation with de Waal’s results. This suggests that if 
these behaviours can be modified so that they are displayed positively by the 
managers, then it should promote a solid foundation from which to strengthen the 
engagement and use of the PMR system. 
The overall results indicated that, while there was a neutral behavioural response to the 
PMR system, there were some people who were demonstrating behaviours conducive 
to its success, but not consistently across all behavioural categories. There were three 
people overall who exhibited positive behaviours.  These were DT, MCS and DIF, two 
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of whom were female. There were only three females in the interview group of seven. 
This showed that there was potentially a divide between gender, which might need to 
be a subject for further research.  
The managers under study demonstrated a relatively good attitude towards operations 
performance but all seemed to be constrained from actually making a significant 
difference in how well the company performed. There was still a pervasive feeling of 
being powerless to affect US Airways’ perceptions, and this seemed to restrict people 
from making significant gains in performance. They were involved in the performance 
management process but it was largely in the capacity of just reviewing the data rather 
than actually being able to use it. All attended the weekly performance review meetings 
and seemed to understand the general objective, but remained handcuffed in their 
ability to take matters into their own hands. All had the ability to do a better job in this 
regard but there was an overwhelming lack of authority and support from senior 
management to do so. The CEO in this instance preferred that the majority of decision-
making be made at his level and/or with his consent. This served to frustrate those who 
were tasked with running the department or seeking improvements. The qualities about 
how the interviewees judged each other’s effectiveness, or lack thereof, could now 
guide further work. 
5.10.3 Crisis 
The third objective was to understand what effect the state of crisis had on the 
managers attitudes and behaviours towards the measurement of operations 
performance. It became clear that there was a direct link between the crisis and the 
behavioural reactions of the managers. This was evident in all of the interviews and 
was a subject of much discussion. Even though the behaviours that surfaced during 
this cycle covered a broad spectrum from positive to negative there were strong 
indications that the negative responses were being driven by the ongoing crisis. This 
was particularly apparent in the cases of ACP2 and DO, who both spoke in very 
frustrated tones and had already considered that there was nothing left to do to make 
things better. When considered in conjunction with the previously found knowledge gap 
and the lack of support and guidance from senior management it was easy to see how 
these behavioural reactions may not have been favourable. 
During the interviews there was an overwhelming concern with what the future held. It 
was obvious that many people believed that their future at Allegheny was bleak and it 
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created a large black cloud for them. This led to a sense of helplessness and 
consequently for some people to disengage, show complacency, a lack of direction and 
commitment and to simply get through the day without taking any kind of pre-emptive 
actions. 
However, in contrast to this there were some instances where the crisis influenced the 
attitudes and behaviours towards the positive. In the case of DIF, it prompted her to do 
more in terms of understanding the causes of performance deficiencies, how to 
improve performance, and to be a supporter of the PMR initiative. There was a 
demonstrated attitude of hanging on, not giving up, and intending to ‘go down with the 
ship’. This was a very strong character trait. In others, it caused them to disengage and 
give up. This would suggest that someone’s character and outlook on life is also very 
important when dealing with adversity. This can prompt the behaviour to tackle the 
problem head-on, or to run away. 
It is therefore important for the facilitator of a PMR system to gain a good 
understanding of human behaviours when seeking a drive towards better performance 
and be able to recognise when someone is being motivated or de-motivated and how 
to respond to it and encourage them to adopt alternative behaviours. It is especially 
important when the company is experiencing a crisis. This research has shown that 
positive behaviours can be displayed during a significant crisis. 
In this instance the prevailing crisis had a significantly negative impact on the 
personnel in the Flight Department. But there was still a lot of professional pride and a 
reluctance to give up that kept everyone going. Even though there was a keen desire 
for Allegheny to survive, there was also a lack of knowledge needed to make it happen. 
There was a sense of helplessness and a feeling of ‘what will be, will be’. They realised 
that the decisions were being made at the division level within US Airways regardless 
of whether Allegheny was able to improve performance or not 
5.11 Reflection 
Reflecting back on this experience and the methods used, provides an insightful story 
of how the research itself gave insights to my own personal values and construction 
system, and adds strength to Kelly’s view that the final conclusions drawn are done so 
in concert with the participant researcher’s own construct system. 
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I have found this repertory grid technique to be of great benefit for me personally and 
an improvement over conducting a standard interview. I believe I was able to elicit a 
higher level of introspection from the managers than I could have otherwise. It took a 
long time to learn the technique and to understand its psychological underpinnings but 
it was very useful. When I was first introduced to repertory grids I was a little concerned 
about its applicability to the business world. It raised a doubt in my mind as to whether 
it would have as much credibility as other methods, but after now having worked with 
grids I am convinced of their practical application in a business setting and indeed I 
have used them for other projects unrelated to this thesis. After all, in business, much 
like in any clinical setting, we are dealing with people and their problems. While 
arguments can be made that what people do at work is different to what they do at 
home, it is the very fact that as individual human beings we are imposing our own 
personal beliefs and understandings on the way that we do things that are based on 
our own personal construct system. An individual’s interpretation of the reality of their 
work environment, and the people with whom they interact, is based on their own 
conception of the world and the way in which they make sense of things based on their 
prior personal experiences. This existential quality lies at the heart of being able to use 
the repertory grid method.  
During some of the interviews, when the interviewee could see the constructs written 
down before them it helped them to narrow their field of thought to more specific 
perceptions of reality and provide useful constructs about a person or people rather 
than talking in generalities, which was the case during the unstructured interviews in 
the first cycle. If the interviewee wanders away from the topic they can be brought back 
to the task at hand relatively easily by repeating the qualifying phrase and/or laddering 
down the construct to seek deeper or more precise meaning. A learning experience for 
me was that the grids elicited during this second cycle might have benefited from being 
laddered down to arrive at more personal values. The constructs that were developed 
were informative but some could have been sharpened. This is a lesson to take into the 
third cycle. 
One drawback that I can see to this process is that an interviewee can inadvertently 
rate an element on the opposite end of the scale than they had intended, by getting 
confused about which end represents ‘1’ and which ‘5’. I have noticed that sometimes 
there is a tendency for the emergent pole to contain more positive constructs and so an 
interviewee becomes used to ‘1’ representing the positive end of the spectrum and ‘5’ 
representing the negative. When a construct takes on an opposite feel with the 
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emergent pole representing something that is perceived to be negative, the interviewee 
could mistakenly rate some of the elements incorrectly. Indeed, during the analysis I 
had to be very careful to ensure that I was recording the rating to the correct pole. It 
also becomes my responsibility as the interviewer, to clarify with the interviewee that 
they were using the rating scale correctly. There always exists the possibility in a 
human involved system that the ratings could be accidentally reversed on a construct 
and thus introduce error. While I have been very careful in my analysis it is inevitably a 
failing that can exist. 
This now provided a much more rounded picture of how my colleagues interpreted 
performance measurement and how they interrelated and worked together.  
This cycle of research was enormously beneficial to me personally. Having to learn the 
repertory grid technique and gain a better understanding of human behaviours was 
fascinating. Indeed, it made me take an entirely different perspective on how I viewed 
people, and especially how I managed them. In discussing attitudes and behaviours 
with my colleagues, and conducting this research and analysis, it became quite 
obvious to me that as human beings we simply cannot, and do not, react in a business 
environment without our own prejudices and experiences playing a very significant role.  
5.11.1 Looking Forward to the Third Cycle 
Having now identified the behavioural categories that were considered important to the 
interviewees and whether they were being demonstrated in a positive or negative 
manner it was important to try to change some of these for the better. Regrettably, 
before the results of this research could produce any long-term, useful and meaningful 
results, US Airways, as part of the second Chapter 11 reorganisation, decided to 
merge Allegheny Airlines with its sister company, Piedmont Airlines.  
It then became increasingly difficult for any of us to remain constructive because the 
aircraft fleet would be transferred slowly over a period of many months approaching a 
full year and no further efforts on our part to impact operations performance would 
change the outcome. The outlook for the third cycle was now looking rather gloomy.... 
“We appear to be headed for a slow and painful death!” (my research journal) 
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This left me in a position of either concluding my research and writing it up as a 
standalone project or putting it on indefinite hold until an opportunity arose that would 
allow me to continue with it. 
5.12 Summary 
This second cycle of research continued the theme of how the individual managers and 
directors at Allegheny responded to the PMR system, and further identified their 
attitudes and behaviours as seen through the eyes of their colleagues. This showed 
that the crisis was influencing everyone and caused many people to exhibit attitudes 
and behaviours that were not in alignment with the initiative to improve operations 
performance. However, there was evidence to show that for a few of the managers the 
crisis had the effect of making them take a more pronounced role in response to the 
PMR system. 
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Chapter Six 
6. CYCLE 3: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS AT PINNACLE AIRLINES 
The research study has now moved on to another airline and again explores 
behavioural reactions to a PMR system but this time when the airline is experiencing 
growth. It provides an overview of Pinnacle Airlines and an examination of the 
behaviours displayed by the managers in the System Operations Control (SOC) centre 
when they were required to be part of the design and use a new PMR system. 
6.1 Introduction 
The beginning of the third cycle occurred more than two years after the second cycle 
concluded. During those intervening years, I had moved to Pinnacle Airlines and spent 
a considerable amount of time becoming acquainted with the intricacies of how they 
ran a much larger and more complex flight operation and I spent a sustained period of 
time fixing existing problems. It became readily apparent to me that many of the issues 
identified at Allegheny were also evident at Pinnacle  
I was able to re-engage with the data gathering process between 2007 and 2010 to 
continue the research from where I had left off. This then resulted in two further cycles 
of research that were designed to examine the attitudes, behaviours and experiences 
of the managers in the SOC as they were integrally involved in the introduction of a 
PMR system. This took things a step further than at Allegheny, and thereby shifted the 
frame of reference to the displayed attitudes and behaviours during a growth phase. 
6.2 The Research Situation 
The pressure to address costs within the airline industry that followed 9/11 was also 
being felt by Northwest Airlines (NWA). These changes saw a shift away from NWA 
flying large aircraft to the smaller, short-haul, markets and a move towards the 
deployment of regional jets that could be operated much more economically by its 
regional carriers. Northwest Airlines, the parent company of Pinnacle at that time had 
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decided Pinnacle was to replace its aging fleet of Saab 340 turboprop aircraft with 50-
seat regional jets.  
When I arrived at Pinnacle in November 2004, the airline was still in the middle of this 
long and sustained period of growth having already put 98 jets into operation, with a 
further 40 to go over the forthcoming year or so. The Saab turboprop aircraft had 
already been retired. The growth was very significant for Pinnacle but the airline had 
failed to plan for it correctly and especially to strengthen its infrastructure to account for 
its massive growth in size, complexity and breadth of operation. During a particularly 
severe winter storm over Christmas 2004 the airline consequently suffered a major 
failure in its ability to run the daily operation because the quantity of staff and level of 
automation were already strained, and when further stressed, they fell apart. The 
onslaught of this disaster began on 20th December, and completely disintegrated in the 
week before Christmas, one of the heaviest travelled seasons of the year. The chaos 
led to massive cancellations leaving passengers stranded for days over the Christmas 
holidays. The SOC simply could not cope and the operation fell into an unrecoverable 
slide. Aircraft and pilots were out of position, people were not available to undertake 
the sheer enormity of work required to recover the operation, and morale was very low. 
Virtually all of these people were specialists and could not be replaced with temporary 
help without months of specific training. The management of the SOC ended up 
working 14-18 hour days for the next several weeks and in some cases when the 
pressure from NWA became too intense, 24 hour shifts. It was a catastrophe and a 
major failing on the part of the senior executive team. It can be argued that had a PMR 
system been in place there might have been indicators of a trend that was on a path for 
disaster. This was not the case and the signs went unnoticed.   
Northwest Airlines seized upon this with ferocity. It was a very serious failure on the 
part of Pinnacle and a potentially contract-breaking situation. The result was an 
extensive remediation plan that would last for a considerable amount of time while 
Pinnacle attempted to correct its short-sightedness in managing its rapid growth. This 
remediation plan was geared towards fixing the infrastructure, automation and 
processes that the growth had failed to plan for. Suddenly the purse strings were 
released and a major investment in the SOC staff and systems began. But, a problem 
like this simply could not be corrected overnight and it took two years to bring the SOC 
to a level where it was operating with a degree of reliability and confidence.  
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From my personal perspective, I was to be completely engulfed in rebuilding the 
infrastructure of the SOC, and developing formal policies, processes and procedures 
that the previous management team had failed to put in place as the airline grew. As 
we began the long road to operational stability it was apparent to me that I needed to 
introduce and measure operations performance in order to manage the growth in a 
much more considered and methodical fashion and to anticipate and identify the issues 
that could potentially cause problems. There were many telltale signs in evidence at 
Pinnacle that I had seen already at Allegheny, including the lack of any kind of 
performance measurement or review system within the SOC. Therefore, in 2005, I 
implemented a PMR system, but the process of formally continuing the research by 
data-gathering took place in 2007 and 2008 when the airline was in a much more 
stable growth phase. Additionally in late 2007 Pinnacle began service with a second 
customer Delta Airlines after successfully winning a bid to fly sixteen 76-seat aircraft 
from its hub in Atlanta. 
On a company-wide scale the formal review process for operational performance was a 
weekly meeting held by the COO. This had been ongoing for several years and up until 
early 2008, this meeting had also included select directors, but was mostly comprised 
of Vice Presidents. Weekly and month-to-date performance was reviewed and 
commented on by the COO, however, there was no mechanism for disseminating this 
information further afield, particularly to front line mangers. During 2008, a regrettable 
decision was made by the COO to restrict attendance at this meeting to just Vice 
Presidents and the downward flow of information and performance insight dried up very 
quickly. 
6.3 Purpose and Objectives 
This section outlines the purpose and objectives that are specific to this third cycle of 
research and accomplishes the first two formative steps in the AR process of defining 
the problem and planning action.  
The main problem that needed addressing was the understanding and communication 
of operations performance following the operational failures in the winter of 2004/2005 
and the continuing growth of the airline. This was also an opportunity to see if the 
attitudes and behaviours of flight operations managers at Pinnacle were influenced by 
a PMR system during a period of growth. In keeping with the defined AR process the 
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third cycle again follows the same steps that were used in the previous two cycles and 
is depicted below with the actions that I deemed to be appropriate to this cycle,  
AR Procedural Steps  Action for Cycle Two 
1. Determine the problem: No performance measurement system at Pinnacle 
and little understanding of how to measure 
operations performance and use results  
2. Plan action: Set objectives. Design PMR system using lessons 
learned from cycles 1 and 2 
3. Take action: Implement PMR system. Conduct Repertory Grid 
interviews with the SOC managers 
4. Evaluate and analyse: Use descriptive analysis, relationship analysis and 
content analysis of the repertory grids to make 
sense of the findings and identify behaviours 
5. Reflect on action taken: Personal reflections on the third cycle 
 
The following specific objectives were designed to aid the completion of the work plan 
depicted above: 
1. Design and implement a PMR system within the SOC 
2. Identify the attitudes and behaviours of the SOC managers towards the 
measurement of operations performance during an ongoing period of growth by 
conducting repertory grid interviews 
3. Understand what effect the growth had on the managers’ attitudes and 
behaviours towards the measurement of operations performance 
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The cycle of research is depicted visually below and is an excerpt from the overall 
depiction of the entire AR research plan which is contained in Chapter Three. 
Evaluation and 
analysis
Reflection
Repertory grid 
interviews with SOC 
managers
Introduction of Weekly 
SOC Operations 
Performance Review
Cycle 3: Pinnacle Airlines – Growth
This cycle examined what effect the state 
of growth had on the attitudes and 
behaviours of the managers who were 
expected to engage with a weekly 
performance review system. This research 
built upon the lessons learned in the first 
two cycles but shifted the frame of 
reference to consider the impact of 
business growth.
What attitudes and 
behaviours do the 
managers display and 
what effect does the 
state of growth have on 
them?
 
Figure 6-1 Diagram of 3rd Cycle Events 
6.4 Designing a PMR System for the SOC 
The first step was to design a PMR system that would allow the SOC managers to 
better understand and engage with operations performance results. At this time the 
SOC managers were not used to being held accountable for specific performance 
measures and did not have any kind of review process for the events that had led to 
performance shortfalls. This would be a significant change for them. 
The SOC comprised several departments and their respective staff who were charged 
with managing the day-to-day operation. The main departments were Crew 
Scheduling, Flight Dispatch, Operations Management, and Maintenance Control. My 
role was the Director of the SOC and as such I had the responsibility and accountability 
for running the daily flight operation. Figure 6-2 below shows the organisation chart of 
the SOC in 2005. Over the years this would be revised to accommodate the growing 
complexities of the operation.  
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Figure 6-2 System Operations Control (SOC) Organisation Chart  
The SOC makes all operational decisions for planning the safe execution of a flight 
including assigning crews, determining the route to fly, delays, cancellations, aircraft 
swaps, and crew swaps amongst others. These individuals have responsibility for 
ensuring that collectively as an operations centre we maintain an acceptable level of 
operating performance.  
At the time I joined Pinnacle they were operating a fleet of 98 aircraft and 
approximately 580 flights per day. This was a large operation and required constant 
vigilance to ensure that the operation ran as smoothly as possible.  In designing a PMR 
system for the SOC it would be important to capture measures that encompassed all of 
these functional areas and in particular to focus on measures of operational 
performance that were controllable by these areas. This would be important to ensure 
that when it was time to set the goals the mangers would feel some connection and 
responsibility toward them. This was a lesson learned from Allegheny where the 
measures were initially too broad, covered uncontrollable aspects of the operation and 
consequently goals were felt to be unrealistic or unachievable and did not therefore 
promote ownership. A further lesson learned was to directly involve the managers in its 
design. Fortunately I had on my staff a performance engineer who was an expert in 
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using statistics and Microsoft Excel and we met with the SOC managers as a group 
several times to specify how the PMR system should work and be used. 
In the meetings that we conducted as a management team we agreed that the best 
approach would be to measure each delay and cancellation code that was specific to 
the SOC in addition to composite measures of performance for the company as a 
whole. In other words the delays and cancellations that we had direct control over, and 
also to measure certain factors that were part of the jobs of the people who worked in 
the SOC, such as the quality of the work they were producing, the cost of actions 
taken, and the development of their abilities. 
I again loosely modelled the system on a BSC format as a means of providing a basic 
framework that could develop and evolve over time. None of the managers were 
familiar with performance measurement systems so I also provided some training and 
background on the BSC and the concept of balancing measures across a range of 
activities. 
The eventual system measured processes that covered the four facets of the BSC: 
1. Customer service: Operating performance that directly impacted the 
passenger such as on-time performance and completion factor, and customer 
service quality controls for internal customers such as the pilots and other 
operating departments. Plus measures of performance to avoid contractual 
penalties applied by NWA 
2. Internal perspective: Measures of internal SOC processes that ultimate effect 
operations performance such as planned fuel on arrival, quality control audits, 
and IT system reliability 
3. Financial perspective: Measures of activities that generate costs, such as 
staffing levels, overtime, accommodations, and ferrying aircraft 
4. Innovation and Learning: Reinforcement measures of corrective action taken 
to remedy problems, and the personal development and learning that the SOC 
managers would undertake during the review period 
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The individual measures were laid out in a purpose built spreadsheet that resided on a 
secure server and was accessible by all of the SOC managers. The data was collected 
from various sources and combined automated and manual methods. A big benefit at 
Pinnacle was that it used an operations management software application that was 
also used by its customer, Northwest Airlines. A central database was maintained by 
Northwest containing data from every single flight operation over several years. By 
using a data mining tool it was easy to extract data and then establish measurements 
for many different aspects of flight operations.  
At Allegheny, one of the major benefits of the PMR system was that the performance 
data was presented visually in graphs and colour-coded tables. This proved to be a 
more intuitive way for people to interpret the results, especially when it came to looking 
at trends over time. The same method was therefore applied at Pinnacle because the 
PMR system was devised as a vehicle for measuring and presenting the airline’s 
operating performance. I scheduled a weekly meeting with all of the managers together 
to review and discuss how the airline and each department within the SOC had 
performed over the previous week and to examine trends over time. These weekly 
meetings also had the benefit of enabling me to ‘teach’ aspects of the system to them 
and became the weekly SOC Managers Meeting that has subsequently endured for the 
last five years (as of 2010). 
I eventually expanded the performance review to the entire Flight Operations 
department as part of an initiative to communicate the importance of operations 
performance results to a much broader audience.  
6.5 Implementation of a PMR System in SOC 
The PMR system was introduced in late 2005 after the managers were trained in how 
to interpret the performance data and drive down to the determinants of operational 
problems. This was a big undertaking but began to show results almost right away 
because the managers were eager to be part of the initiative and learn how they could 
be more effective.  
The data was presented in a series of graphs that depicted the various measures and 
their performance over time. The following examples give an idea of the general format 
and presentation of the data. The graph in Figure 6-3 below is an example of how an 
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operating metric, ‘number of delays’, is further sub-divided into three specific delay 
codes that represented delays caused by Crew Scheduling (CSF), late flight releases 
(FRF), and weight and balance (WBF). The performance for each metric is shown over 
the previous 10 months allowing a trend to be discerned. Additionally, the relative 
performance over the prior 30 days is shown in the second graph and provides an 
indication of more recent performance. This method was applied to a multitude of 
different delays. Codes that ‘belonged’ to each department were grouped together to 
allow an assessment of how each operating department was performing. 
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Figure 6-3 Flight Delay Data From First PMR Meeting at Pinnacle 
Figure 6-4 below is an example of how measures were built around a core operating 
strategy. These graphs specifically depict two core measures of overall airline 
performance: completion factor and on-time departure performance. They are shown 
as depicting the level of performance required in order to avoid a financial penalty 
being applied by Northwest Airlines. This was a very easy way for the managers to 
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gauge how the airline was performing relative to its contractual obligations and proved 
to be a very popular and critical aspect of the entire review process. 
 
Figure 6-4 Measures Designed Around the Airline’s Operating Strategy  
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Figure 6-5 below depicts another aspect of performance that directly impacts financial 
performance and that is fuel. There are many different ‘buckets’ that fuel can be 
classified in. For example, some of these classifications are: the fuel burn required for 
an aircraft to reach its destination, the fuel required to taxi the aircraft to and from the 
runway, fuel for any kind of deviation from the flight plan, holding fuel in case of 
airborne ATC delays, contingency fuel for unanticipated delays, et cetera. The top 
graph in Figure 6-5 represents contingency fuel, which is presented over a 30 day 
period and shows that it was significantly and consistently higher (worse) than the 
established goal. The graph below represents planned fuel on arrival (PFOA) and is a 
measure of how much fuel each flight is planned to still have in the tanks upon its 
arrival at the destination. The idea here is to ensure that fuel was not being 
unnecessarily carried to the destination unless there is a need to do so. This ‘tankering’ 
of fuel can be very costly. The amount of fuel that an aircraft burns is directly related to 
the weight of the aircraft. If an aircraft is over-fuelled then it costs more in fuel to carry 
this extra and unnecessary fuel.    
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Figure 6-5 Measures of Fuel 
The PMR system grew and was refined over the next year and reached a settled state 
by 2007. By this time, the managers were fully conversant with the presentation of the 
data and had begun drilling down to the real cause of problems. There had also been a 
focus placed on performance shortfalls and many of the flight delay categories had 
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been targeted as areas for corrective action. This was yielding results and the PMR 
system was also becoming the means for the managers to brag about good 
performance in their area of responsibility. Each delay code was assigned to a 
manager and there was an air of ownership and friendly competition. 
 
Figure 6-6 Introductory Page of SOC Managers Meeting performance review 
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Figure 6-7 Refined and Improved Presentation of Flight Delay Data  
As the PMR system grew the managers began to take a more pronounced role in its 
presentation by carefully preparing for the meeting and ensuring that any performance 
shortfalls were adequately explained along with how they would be corrected. It also 
spawned several projects that the managers themselves initiated as off-shoots of the 
PMR system to help engage their staff in examining performance results. 
6.5.1 Repertory Grid Interviews 
Having implemented the PMR system the next step was to consider how to effectively 
gather data to assess the attitudes and behaviours of the managers to this new 
system. Being satisfied with the repertory grid interviews at Allegheny, I decided to use 
the same method again at Pinnacle. It was concise, practical, focused and encouraged 
the managers to be introspective and clearly consider the topic and the observed and 
perceived behaviours of their colleagues. 
The interview group consisted of the six people shown in Table 6-1 below. They were 
all managers within the SOC who ran various sub departments. 
Table 6-1 List of interviewees – Cycle 3 
Position   Abbreviation  Department 
Manager, Dispatch   MD  Dispatch 
SOC Operations Manager  SOM  SOC 
Manager of Crew Scheduling  MCS  Crew Scheduling 
Manager, SOC *   MSOC  Operations Management 
SOC Duty Manager   SOCDM1 Operations Management 
SOC Duty Manager   SOCDM2 Operations Management 
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These interviewees were also asked to consider three other people as ‘elements’ in the 
repertory grids when they were developing constructs. These three other people were 
either unavailable or had declined to be interviewed. They were: 
Manager, Performance Engineering MPE  Performance Engineering 
SOC Duty Manager   SOCDM3 Operations Management 
SOC Duty Manager   SOCDM4 Operations Management 
* MSOC only participated as an interviewee and declined to be considered as an 
element.  
The repertory grid interviews were conducted as detailed in Chapter Three and the 
individual grids were reproduced in Rep IV and Excel spreadsheets to enable analysis.  
6.6 Understanding Performance Measurement in the SOC 
The analysis and evaluation process followed the same steps and procedures that 
were used in cycle two and comprised descriptive and relationship analysis for the 
individual grids and content analysis for the combined grids. 
The following presentation of the analysis and discussion of the repertory grid data has 
been condensed from the format used in cycle two as there was no longer a need to 
provide an illustrated example. The fully worked analysis itself is contained in Appendix 
C. The individual grids were all subjected to a process and eyeball analysis in the same 
manner as they were in the previous cycle. This was a reinforcement exercise for me 
and showed that all of the interviewees positively engaged with the repertory grid 
process and all considered that the list of elements was appropriate. There was intrigue 
about why behaviours and attitudes were being examined, but they seemed keen to 
learn more. This was also an unusual occurrence for them because most of the time 
they were engulfed in running the operation and they did not dwell on the processes 
and procedures that might affect performance.  
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6.6.1 Process Analysis 
During the interviews I did have to repeat the qualifying phrase several times to keep 
some of the interviewees on the topic of how they saw the behaviours of their 
colleagues in relation to operations performance. The overall responses from the 
process analysis revealed that: 
MD – MD is not a natural conversationalist and so the interview remained on 
task without her deviating away from the main purpose. She took the whole 
process very seriously and was intent on doing a ‘good job’. She occasionally 
looked to me for approval of her constructs for which I countered with the 
statement that there were no right or wrong answers and that only she could 
represent her thoughts, opinions and observations. Overall, it was a pleasant 
and interesting interview, which provided an eye-opening experience for her. 
MD was the first person I interviewed at Pinnacle and it left an impression on 
me about how energised people were, when they have an influential impact on 
the outcome of each flight. 
SOM –SOM was eager to be a part of this research and tried hard to be as 
thoughtful, insightful and constructive as possible, remaining fully engaged 
throughout the interview. We were also able to have conversations related to 
each construct and the general operating environment. It was an enjoyable 
interview for both of us and provided some excellent insight into the operation 
from his perspective.  
MCS - MCS was involved in the daily operation and took her role seriously. She 
was flattered to be a part of this research and made a concerted effort to do her 
best. She remained attentive throughout the interview. Her constructs were well 
thought out and after providing 10 of them she declared that it fully represented 
her thoughts at that point in time 
MSOC - MSOC was very interested in the research and especially the 
academic process of gathering and analysing data, of which he asked several 
questions, although he declined to include himself as an element. He quickly 
picked-up on the grid process and developed some of the more distinct 
constructs of all the interviewees, which showed a good appreciation of the 
subject.  
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SOCDM1 – SOCDM1 was excited to be part of this process and she found the 
experience quite enlightening as she began to realise how she truly considered 
the behaviours of her colleagues. She had a little difficulty developing 
constructs to begin with, but after having produced a few that we dismissed she 
began to get the hang of it and developed constructs that were concise, 
focused and well thought out. She was not afraid to offer her opinions and 
several conversations ensued that delved deeper into certain aspects of her 
construction system.  
SOCDM2 – SOCDM2 approached the topic in a laid-back manner but soon 
took a much greater interest when he realised what his constructs and ratings 
would say. He admitted to not really paying attention to people’s behaviours 
before and this process became quite revealing for him. 
This process showed a universal willingness to participate and no one felt that they 
were being unfairly examined, or that the study was inappropriate or irrelevant. Similar 
to what I saw at Allegheny, it provided everyone with an insight into the behaviours of 
others that they had previously not considered. It also proved to be a valuable learning 
tool for me because I gained a glimpse into how each person made sense of things by 
the way they articulated their responses and their process of developing a construct. 
Not only did I learn about their abilities, but it gave me pause to think about how I could 
best work with them to elicit positive responses to the PMR system. I preferred to 
encourage and motivate rather than be perceived to be authoritarian and controlling. 
6.6.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The eyeball analysis again involved reading each grid as a whole and gaining an 
insight into the meanings of what the interviewee was thinking about, how they 
represented the topic, what they think and how they think. This is distilled below to 
paint a picture of how each interviewee represented their behavioural approach and 
those of their colleagues to the PMR system.  
MD 
MD saw several similarities in the behaviours of the SOCDM’s. All were seen as very 
focused on the daily operation and they all adopted a laid-back approach. The 
differences in approach were noted particularly with SOCDM4 who had a negative 
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outlook and a militaristic approach to getting things done. SOCDM1, 2 and 3 were seen 
as positive, and remained clam under stress. MCS was singled out as being markedly 
different to everyone else. She tried very hard to please people, was very lenient and 
disorganised, which resulted in her getting ‘frazzled’ very often. MD did not regard 
these qualities as being good.  
MD saw herself as being fairly intense and very focused. She was ambitious, took her 
job seriously and looked beyond the current day’s operation to consider impacts on 
future events. She worries after work and does not like criticism from others. She is 
strict about doing things by the book. 
SOM 
SOM viewed MCS as being reactive, uncreative and not knowing what the goals are, 
but he liked her personally. This was in contrast to how he saw MD, who was 
considered as serious, authoritative, confident, unapproachable and having a self-
serving agenda. MPE was represented as being serious, professional and confident, 
and remained aloof. The SOCDM’s were grouped into three, similar to MD’s outlook, 
separating SOCDM4 as being reactive and not taking his job seriously. He was seen 
as being uncreative and unable to effectively use his authority. The other SOCDMs 
were seen as being positive and confident. 
SOM saw himself as being very confident, professional, positive and approachable. He 
wants to succeed and be a role model for others. He tries to promote teamwork, but 
does not take the time to explain things, expecting people to intuitively know. He can 
be fickle. 
MCS 
MCS sees MPE as being very organised, professional, reserved and not emotional or 
sensitive.  MD was represented as very concerned about how things reflect on her and 
did not want to look bad. She is very organised but micro-manages her people, 
Defensive, private and not connected to her employees. In contrast SOM cares about 
people and is very approachable and not defensive. The SOCDMs were again 
separated in the same two groups with SOCDM 1, 2 and 3 being professional and 
knew how to respond to operational issues. SOCDM2 was regarded as the most 
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effective DM, while SOCDM4 was seen as not having any original thoughts and 
detached from the operation and performance results. 
MCS saw herself as a people person who was very approachable and gave a lot of her 
time to her employees. She did recognise that she was disorganised and spontaneous 
in voicing her thoughts without thinking them through. 
MSOC 
MSOC saw MCS as reactive and driven by her emotions. She would sacrifice 
performance for customer service and was not motivated to improve performance. 
MPE was proactive and practical, but aloof. He was analytical and would try to predict 
performance problems by analysing data. MD was seen as committed, focused and 
practical, but reactive. She would follow common practices and was not swayed by her 
emotions. SOM was focused on actions. He was proactive but disinterested in 
performance results. SOCDMA was reactive buy tried to improve performance. 
SOCDM2 was very aware of performance goals and tried to achieve them. He was 
motivated. SOCDM3 was reactive and emotional in his decision making. SOCDM4 was 
considered practical, focused and would follow standard practices, but her preferred to 
be told what to do. He was uninformed and not committed to improving performance. 
SOCDM1 
SOCDM1 saw MCS as having a very emotional and unpractical approach, but she 
would not cast blame on others, instead providing positive reinforcement to her 
employees.  However, she was easily distracted and disorganised and not respected 
by her peers. MPE was practical and clam and had great attention to detail, but he was 
distant. MD was regarded as very competent and took an active role in solving 
problems, but she could let her emotions get in the way. She stood up for what she 
thought was right but could offend people. She was not well respected by her peers. 
SOM was also regarded as very competent, practical and respected, but would 
concede to other people too quickly. He was good at motivating others. SOCDM2 was 
seen as highly competent and good at solving problems. He was respected and stood 
up for his beliefs but could provide negative reinforcement to others when he did so. 
SOCDM3 was also highly competent, well respected and defended his people. 
However, SOCDM4 was seen as trying to escape blame by pointing his finger at 
others. Consequently he was not respected. 
241 
 
SOCDM1 saw herself as competent and very centred on the current days’ operation. 
She was practical but also swayed by her emotions. She was positive and goal 
orientated and rated herself highly on all constructs. 
SOCDM2 
SOCDM2 saw MCS as being approachable and patient, having high expectations of 
others, but seeking approval before acting. MPE was represented as being out of touch 
with the daily operation and rather passive. MD gave prompt attention to operational 
issues, but was not very approachable and could be impatient, aggressive and very 
defensive. She seeks approval and recognition and needs to feel valued. SOM was 
willing to engage, be decisive and explain operational issues. Both SOCDM3 and 
SOCDM4 were seen as being knowledgeable, but the noticeable difference between 
them was that SOCDM3 seeks guidance before making decisions and SOCDM4 could 
be defensive and seeks recognition.  
SOCDM2 saw himself as giving very prompt attention to operational problems and 
easily able to speak about performance results. He considered himself as patient but 
with a tendency to be aggressive because of having high expectations of others. 
These findings and the reflections by the interviewees again produced very interesting 
awareness of their individual experiences, and I was able to use these insights to 
gauge how to manage these people and to better develop their leadership and 
management skills. In a similar fashion to the second cycle there was a tendency for 
the interviewee to see themselves as making a positive contribution and doing things 
correctly, however these statements did not always tally with how they were perceived 
by their peers. 
6.6.3 Construct Characterisation 
A construct characterisation exercise was conducted by evaluating the ‘core’ constructs 
from each interviewee and discovering what areas had greatest meaning and 
significance. Some preliminary conclusions were drawn. Once again, all of the 
interviewees had between six and eight core constructs. This was quite similar to what 
I saw at Allegheny and suggested that each person had developed constructs that had 
a personal significance to them. The core constructs for each interviewee are 
summarised in Table 6-1 below: 
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Table 6-2 Construct Characterisation – Cycle 3 
 
There was no significant theme that emerged from these in terms of the frequency with 
which any of them occurred. In fact the only theme that was repeated across four of the 
interviewees was ‘attitude’. This was conveyed as either describing a displayed 
attitude, or indicating that a construct was suggestive of an attitude. At this stage the 
only conclusion was that there was a healthy diversity to the constructs and that the 
interviewees displayed no indication that there were issues collectively identified as 
being prevalent. 
6.7 Content Analysis of Combined Grids 
It was first important to identify the attitudes and behaviours being displayed and then 
to analyse whether the state of growth was influencing them positively or negatively.  
6.7.1 Data Categorisation 
After conducting a bootstrap analysis and testing for reliability as described in Chapter 
Three a set of nine distinct categories emerged that described an attitude or behaviour 
that was being demonstrated by the members of the research group. These are listed 
below in order of their relative importance as ranked by the number of constructs in 
each category. 
1. Demeanour 
2. Conscientiousness 
3. Teamwork 
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4. Motivation 
5. Knowledge and Skill Level 
6. Responsibility and Accountability for Performance 
7. Creativity and Flexibility 
8. Delegation and Territory 
9. Big Picture versus Individual View 
Table 6-2 below, illustrates these and presents the data in a format from which to draw 
conclusions.  
Table 6-3 Summary of Results for 3rd Cycle Content Analysis 
Average 
rating of 
category # 
co
ns
tru
ct
s
M
C
S
M
PE
M
D
SO
M
SO
C
D
M
 1
SO
C
D
M
 2
SO
C
D
M
 3
SO
C
D
M
 4
Category = Demeanour 2.66  15 2.7 1.9 3.3 2.1 2.7 3.0 2.4 3.1
       
Category = Conscientiousness 2.43  14 3.4 2.4 1.8 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.3 3.1
       
Category = Teamwork 2.61  11 2.6 2.3 3.0 2.9 1.5 2.8 2.6 3.1
       
Category = Motivation 2.49  11 3.7 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.5 2.6 3.0 3.2
       
Category = Knowledge & Skill 2.66  10 4.0 3.3 2.2 3.2 2.2 1.7 2.2 2.5
       
Category = Accountability and Responsibility 2.73  6 3.7 3.5 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 3.2 3.2
       
Category = Delegation and Territory 2.54  3 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.3 2.7 1.3 1.0 2.0
       
Category = Flexibility and Creativity 2.56  2 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 5.0
       
Category = Big Picture View 2.75  2 3.5 5.0 3.5 4.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.0
       
Overall: 74 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0
         
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Each of these categories is now examined to reveal its applicability to the group. The 
definition for each category was the result of the negotiations about their meanings that 
took place when testing for reliability. 
6.7.1.1 Demeanour 
This category was defined as: 
Calm, organised and helpful versus anxious, aggressive and unhelpful 
There were 15 constructs in this category, of which four were considered to be ‘core’. 
All interviewees had at least one construct in this category, suggesting that it was an 
important value to all of them, and SOCDM1 alone had four, suggesting that she 
placed a greater emphasis on demeanour than any of the others. This was actually 
affirmed to a certain extent by my own observations, because she endeavoured to hold 
herself to a high standard of politeness and courtesy and she considered herself as 
always willing to assist others.  
When all interviewees were rated using the analysis scale to show whether their 
behaviours were considered to be positive, neutral or negative only MPE and SOM 
were considered by the group to be demonstrating positive behaviours and thus 
showing a consistently calm, organised and helpful approach. The remainder all fell 
within the neutral spread. Curiously, the collective ratings for SOCDM1 fell in the 
neutral band indicating that the group did not regard her behaviour in the same positive 
light that she herself did. This highlights the fact that although we may have a positive 
opinion of our own behaviours, they can often be perceived by others in a rather 
different light. 
6.7.1.2 Conscientiousness 
This category was defined as: 
Demonstrates commitment to company and works to improve performance 
versus "it's just a job", not willing to help or care about performance 
Of the 14 constructs in this category seven of them were core constructs. This 
represented the category with the highest number of core constructs suggesting that it 
had the most fundamental importance to the group. Everyone, except SOCDM2, had 
245 
 
constructs in this category with MD and SOM having four each. For them the behaviour 
of demonstrating commitment to the company and working to improve performance 
was very important. My observations confirmed that they both took their jobs seriously, 
regarded it as a career and genuinely wanted to make the company better. SOCDM2 
on the other hand was more lacklustre in his commitment and regarded his role as a 
job rather than a career. However, he was very competent at his job and would always 
strive to ensure that we ran a good operation.  
Four of the managers were considered by the collective group to be demonstrating 
attitudes and behaviours within the positive band of the ratings. They were MD, SOM, 
SOCDM1, and SOCDM3, with MD displaying the highest level of conscientiousness. 
6.7.1.3 Teamwork 
This category was defined as: 
Works cooperatively with others, is empathetic, compassionate and 
understanding, and relates to other employees, versus an "Us vs. Them" 
approach, or being more isolated from the workforce 
There were 11 constructs in this category with five of them being core. Three of these 
core constructs belonged to SOM who felt that this behaviour was centrally important, 
however, he was viewed as neutral, which again showed that how one regards oneself 
is not necessarily how others do. MCS did not have any constructs in this category. I 
found this curious because my observations suggested that she was a team player and 
that she valued being on a team. In fact, she was far more effective working on a team 
than she was working independently.  
Only two of the managers, MPE and SOCDM1, were considered by the group as 
consistently displaying behaviour representative of teamwork. This was now the 
second category that SOCDM1 was represented in the positive band of the ratings. All 
other aggregated ratings showed the rest of the team as being neutral. 
6.7.1.4 Motivation 
Concerned about making improvements and determined to get work 
accomplished versus makes excuses, lacking drive and independent thought 
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This category also had 11 constructs but six of them were core. Three of these six 
belonged to MSOC who placed a high value on being determined and thinking for 
himself. Neither, MCS, MD or SOM had core constructs in this category, which may 
show that that they did not consider motivation to be an important factor or that it was 
integral and obvious to them and they did not consider it when developing constructs.   
The overall results showed that four managers were considered by the group as 
positively demonstrating motivation. They were MPE, MD, MSOC and SOCDM1. This 
was very interesting because neither MD or SOM, as previously mentioned, had 
developed constructs about motivation but both were regarded by the group as 
displaying it in a very positive way. This suggests that it is central to their whole 
approach to the job. In stark contrast to this was MCS who was rated by the group as 
negative. This was the first negative rating in the categories and was the first indication 
that not all was well with everyone.  
6.7.1.5 Knowledge and Skill 
Knowledge, skill and capability to effectively manage operations versus 
inexperienced, untrained or incapable 
This category contained 10 constructs of which five were core. SOM and SOCDM2 had 
two each. MSOC had a total of seven constructs overall that were considered core and 
now over the last two categories he had five. This grouping of his core constructs 
suggested that his most deeply held values in terms of behaviours was the level of 
motivation, knowledge and skill that people displayed. Similarly SOCDM2 had four of 
his total of six core constructs clustered in the last two categories. For both of them this 
represented a significant indication of their core values. Everyone, except SOM, had 
constructs in this category suggesting that it was a fundamentally important category.  
There were four managers who displayed positive behaviours: MD, SOCDM1, 
SOCDM2 and SOCDM3. This was now the fourth category in which SOCDM1 was 
considered positive, and the third for MD. MCS once again was rated overall as 
negative, suggesting that she lacked the knowledge, skill or experience to  manage 
operations. From my own observations this was largely borne out. MCS had a positive 
outlook and a friendly approach but she seemed to take longer than others to grasp 
concepts and put words into action.  
6.7.1.6 Accountability and Responsibility 
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Good work ethic, demonstrates responsibility and holds people accountable, or 
is held accountable themselves, versus not holding people accountable, not 
accepting accountability, or not showing responsibility 
This category had just six constructs, however five of them were considered as being 
core, which meant that it was a behaviour that was highly valued. Everyone with the 
exception of MSOC had a construct in this category. My own observations showed that 
MSOC did not like being held accountable and he sometimes felt that it was unfair to 
be accountable for the actions of his direct reports, especially when he believed that he 
had done all he could. There was also a slight sense of him feeling powerless to make 
a difference within the larger scale of the operation as a whole. 
There were again four managers who were considered as practising accountability and 
responsibility. They were: MD, MSOC, SOCDM1 and SOCDM2. This was now the fifth 
straight category that SOCDM1 was represented as positive and the fourth for MD. 
Both were seen as having a good work ethic, displaying responsibility and holding 
others accountable. My observations confirmed this and also that they were both being 
held accountable themselves, which in turn made them take their job seriously.  This 
was done constructively and was not used as a method of placing blame or pointing 
fingers, but this higher level of accountability was sometimes seen by their direct 
reports as being heavy-handed. 
6.7.1.7 Delegation and Territory 
Delegates and shares information versus remains territorial and keeps a tight 
control over their little corner 
There were only three constructs in the category with two of them being core and 
represented by MCS and SOCDM2. This was an interesting category because the 
combined ratings showed managers behaviours across all three rating bands. Three 
managers were represented as positive: SOCDM2, SOCDM3 and SOCDM4. All of 
these individuals performed the same role but during different shifts. It was clear that 
they were managing and interacting with their people well by sharing information and 
delegating tasks. In contrast there were two managers, MPE and MD, who were 
viewed as behaving in a negative fashion by remaining territorial, not sharing 
information and keeping a tight control over their job. 
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However, now that the categories were being defined by just a few constructs from less 
than half of the group their universal applicability had to be questioned and these 
categories may not be accurately representative of the group. However, having said 
that my own observations did largely support this, especially with MPE and MD as 
having a tendency to keep things close to their chest.   
6.7.1.8 Flexibility and Creativity 
Tendency to be flexible and creative to adapt, versus, being rigid, obstructionist 
and inflexible 
This category had just two constructs, but both were core. Four of the managers were 
rated as displaying this behaviour positively: MPE, MD, SCODM2 and SOCDM3. There 
was one who was rated as negative: SOCDM4. 
6.7.1.9 Big Picture View 
Demonstrates larger picture perspective versus having a narrow view  
There were again just two constructs in this category with only one of them being core. 
Of the combined ratings four managers were seen as behaving in a positive manner 
and maintaining a larger picture perspective of operations performance, rather than 
getting caught up in minor aspects that did not influence the whole, and two were 
considered as negative, MPE and MSOC. 
6.7.2 Findings from the Combined Grids 
When the ratings on the individual behaviours are averaged for each individual across 
all behaviours there were three managers who were considered as displaying positive 
behaviours. The three managers were all SOCDM’s, which is rather intriguing. Each of 
them is charged with running the daily operation of the airline while they are on duty 
and consequently they are closely involved with operations performance. None of the 
managers displayed consistently negative behaviours and although the remainder were 
rated as neutral, each of them with the exception of MCS, had at least one behavioural 
category in which they were rated as positive. MCS is the lone exception. She did not 
receive any positive ratings and was rated negatively in motivation, and knowledge and 
skill. This perhaps exemplified what the group thought of her approach, and although 
not damning, it did point to some significant shortcomings that needed correction. 
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When analysed from the perspective of the overall ratings per category the best overall 
rating (2.43) was ‘conscientiousness’ and the worst rating was ‘big picture view’ (2.75) 
closely followed by ‘accountability and responsibility’ (2.73). This showed that the team 
placed the highest value on demonstrating commitment and working to improve 
performance, but that being accountable and holding others accountable and keeping a 
perspective on the overall picture was not yet at a level of being performance driven 
behaviour.  
A useful way to summarise this information is depicted in the table below. I compiled 
this to provide me with a good representation of who was generally on the right track 
and who needed additional work. It was sorted by ranking each interviewee on the 
number of categories in which they showed positive behaviours and then sorting from 
highest to lowest.   
Table 6-4 Summary of Repertory Grid Bootstrap Analysis – Cycle 3 
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So how does all of this help the practitioner researcher? In my case, this information 
and the light bulb moments during the grid elicitation procedure provided incredible 
insight. They were especially helpful in showing me how to progress and enhance the 
PMR system, how to ‘manage’ each individual to play to their strengths, and where I 
really needed to do some work to adjust their behaviours towards the positive. 
6.8 Summary of Findings 
The culmination of this cycle of research led to the very real need to expand the lessons 
learned to a much broader audience, which needs to capture all operations departments. 
These lessons showed that having a structure, providing education and support, and 
holding people accountable are fundamental to a successful interaction and engagement 
with a PMR system. These attributes were identified during the first two cycles at 
Allegheny, and were then directly used to shape and design the performance review 
process at Pinnacle, which further solidified their applicability. This supports the action 
research process of learning in action to produce iterative growth in the application of 
knowledge. 
The findings from this cycle of research are summarised below by relating them back to 
the aims and objectives that were set forth at the beginning of the cycle. 
6.8.1 PMR System in the SOC 
The first objective of designing and implementing a PMR system within the SOC was 
accomplished by the introduction of a weekly SOC Managers Meeting that was built 
around a review of the airline’s operations performance. Once again loosely modelled 
on a BSC approach, it contained measures of specific aspects of performance that 
were balanced across the four dimensions of the BSC.  
In contrast to the implementation at Allegheny this PMR system was built around the 
strategic objectives of ensuring that we met our contractual obligations with NWA and 
the objective of continuously working towards an increase in the overall effectiveness 
of the SOC. These objectives were refined over time as we began to hone in on the 
core facets of operational strategy. Additionally, involving the managers in its design 
and implementation meant that the measurements were relevant, realistic and 
acceptable. Goals were determined based on the previous year’s results and 
performance levels necessary to avoid contractual penalties imposed by NWA. Up until 
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this cycle of research there was not a performance measurement system in the SOC 
and the managers did not have access to performance results, much less know what to 
do with them. They were focused entirely on the day’s operation and not on trying to 
find root causes and thus fix systemic issues. 
The weekly meetings were initially led in a nurturing and educational fashion to 
encourage the managers to engage rather than shy away from the new process. It was 
already apparent to me from the first cycle that the biggest hurdle was a lack of 
education of the determinants of performance results, coupled with a lack of business 
experience and education. This meant that I had to hold them by the hand for a while 
until they learned how to be independent in their research and explanation of 
performance that fell within their areas of responsibility. These weekly meetings also 
led to the SOC managers having to give presentations on a regular basis. I had made it 
an important part of their management development to teach them how to develop a 
useful presentation and then how to deliver it with conviction. In the same manner we 
broadened this to developing formal reports and papers on the more important projects 
and assignments that they were working on. This enhancement to their overall 
management capability began to raise their capital in the SOC. They were slowly 
gaining a higher level of respect as professional managers, rather than being seen as 
simply administrators. It was also intriguing for me to see that their individual 
behaviours were modified over time so that they embraced the new PMR system and 
adopted a greater degree of motivation towards accomplishing their jobs more 
effectively. This was undoubtedly the result of my role in being not only the facilitator as 
the project manager, but also by providing the management support and guidance that 
everyone required in order to remain focused on the PMR system and especially the 
results. I was able to do this far more effectively at Pinnacle than at Allegheny because 
I was also the director for all of these managers and there was a certain obligation for 
them to comply. However, I approached my role in an encouraging and supportive way 
without being authoritarian or threatening.  
The performance review mechanism was also expanded to the entire Flight Operations 
department by way of a monthly review. This was a large undertaking and ran into the 
same problems as the initial implementations at Allegheny and Pinnacle, namely a lack 
of underlying knowledge and understanding about operations performance and the 
results presented. This caused the monthly meeting to remain simply a review, without 
taking an in-depth and critical look at the results. Most people just followed along rather 
than taking an active role, or questioning assumptions. This was unsatisfactory, but to 
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have truly engaged people would have taken an extensive project to train and educate 
them, which was simply beyond the resources that I had available at the time.  
6.8.2 Attitudes and Behaviours 
Secondly, the objective to identify the attitudes and behaviours that were adopted by 
the SOC managers towards the PMR system, was accomplished by extensive analysis 
of the repertory grid interviews. Following extensive reliability testing this resulted in 
nine behavioural categories. These behaviours are not an exhaustive list of all the 
behaviours necessary to successfully engage with a PMR system, but they do 
represent the behaviours deemed important by the group. De Waal identified 18 
behaviours as being important across the spectrum of a PMR system from its design to 
its continued use. The evidence from this cycle showed that there was again a strong 
convergence with de Waal’s derived behavioural categories (De Waal 2002). This 
further validates the results from the second cycle that suggested that the behavioural 
categories identified by the interviewees were important for them to feel alignment with 
the PMR system. 
While there was a good degree of positive behaviours there was still a lot of 
shortcomings that needed to be addressed. There is insufficient evidence at this stage 
to say that people will adopt the behaviours and actions necessary to arrive at the 
goals. My evidence showed that there was a significant lack of knowledge in how to 
measure and then interpret performance data and that training and education are still 
essential components to success.  
The individual grids provided me with very rich insight into everyone’s behaviours and 
attitudes, not only from their own personal perspective, but more importantly from their 
peers. This built a picture for me of how each person was seen and regarded by the 
others and allowed me to adapt my approach based on this new knowledge. I was able 
to identify individual shortcomings and work to improve them. This involved either a 
one-on-one session with an individual to address or correct the issue, or a more 
tailored approach to how I trained them on the PMR system. 
6.8.3 Growth 
The third objective was to understand what effect the state of growth had on the 
managers attitudes and behaviours towards the measurement of operations 
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performance. It was interesting to note that nobody specifically spoke in terms of 
growth during the repertory grid interviews, unlike at Allegheny where the crisis was 
ever present in their responses. There was however an underlying energy that the 
growth was instilling in people. It was exciting to be part of a progressive company and 
there was a pervasive determination to do well. This was evidenced quite strongly 
during the interviews by the way that the respondents related their experiences and 
thoughts. Nobody spoke in overly negative terms and there was a distinct willingness to 
be involved and learn. 
The growth was undoubtedly having a positive effect. 
6.9 Personal Reflections on the Third Cycle 
I again enjoyed using repertory grids because of the structure they provided and the 
immense detail that could be extracted. However, I had a lot of difficulty in trying to 
articulate in writing the insights that it provided. My understanding and appreciation of 
the capabilities of the SOC was enhanced significantly by this research and it played a 
pivotal role in how I progressed the PMR system. However, the knowledge was 
continuously being built which made it hard to say with clarity what the actual results 
were. 
Having now had experience of two extensive applications of repertory grids I truly 
appreciate the need for the interviewer to be an integral part of the exercise. An 
insightful repertory grid interview is not something that can really be carried out 
automatically without the interviewer having a very good knowledge of the subject 
matter. Had these constructs been elicited in an impersonal manner by computer then 
they may not have yielded the level of insight that I was able to derive from them. This 
made me much more aware of the thoughts of the managers in the SOC and gave me 
pause to consider their roles and the level of capability that each offered. Some 
responses were remarkably insightful. For others they were humdrum, but collectively it 
painted a very good picture of the culture. 
As time went by the SOC actually developed its own separate culture, different from 
the company’s overlying culture. The SOC functions in a largely autonomous way and 
is housed in a secure facility that requires authorised access. This meant that most 
people in the company did not have access to it and were mainly ignorant of what 
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activities took place in this facility. This separation and the attitudes and behaviours 
exhibited by its staff moulded the unique sub-culture that existed. It was very 
encouraging to see that this sub-culture began to show very strong signs of being 
representative of performance–driven behaviour. 
6.9.1 Looking Forward to the Fourth Cycle 
Having now established a robust PMR system within the SOC, and a monthly 
performance review for the Flight Operations department, it was important to bring 
these lessons and concepts to a larger audience. The fourth cycle explored the 
introduction of a daily PMR system that was designed to involve all operating 
departments. 
6.10 Summary 
This chapter has reported on the design and implementation of a weekly performance 
review system within the SOC at Pinnacle Airlines and then examined the attitudes and 
behaviours of the SOC managers as they engaged with it, and were held accountable for 
reporting on their areas of responsibility. This showed that even though structure, support, 
guidance and growth were prevalent, managers still did not automatically adopt the 
behaviours necessary to engage with a PMR system. It showed again that there was a 
significant knowledge gap that needed to be addressed. Without education and training it 
may result in just a review of performance results rather than critical understanding of the 
determinant of the results. However, when the knowledge gap is closed it facilitated a 
movement towards performance-driven behaviour.   
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Chapter Seven 
7. CYCLE 4: CROSS-DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
The fourth and final cycle of research focused on the managers’ behavioural reactions 
to a newly introduced cross-department daily operations briefing. This cycle again took 
place at Pinnacle Airlines and provides an account of the structural and behavioural 
factors of a newly implemented daily operations review system as the managers and 
directors engaged with it. 
7.1 Introduction 
Following the introduction of a performance measurement and review system within the 
SOC at Pinnacle during cycle three, which was then expanded to the entire Flight 
Operations department, I was given the opportunity to enlarge this to all operating 
departments by way of a formal and daily Operations Performance Briefing. 
The fourth cycle began in late 2007 and coincided with a knee jerk reaction by senior 
management to punish and threaten staff after a brief period of significantly declining 
performance. This declining performance was the result of prolonged bad weather, a 
shortage of crewmembers and reliability problems with our aircraft. It also coincided 
with the implementation of new business flying for Delta Airlines. Pinnacle had 
successfully won a contract to fly 16 new aircraft for Delta which entered service in 
December 2007. However, once again Pinnacle had failed to adequately plan for the 
addition of this new business and consequently resources were once again stretched 
thin and when combined with these operating problems there was insufficient flexibility 
over the entire airline to maintain our previously industry leading performance. 
This led to the senior executives imposing a mandatory seven day per week 
conference call at 06:00, which was designed to be inconvenient and punitive for the 
management staff. Their logic was that it would convince people to expeditiously 
improve performance so that they would not have to continue with the inconvenient 
conference calls. Inevitably, and not surprisingly, this led to discouragement, fear and 
anxiety. Fortunately, I was able to convince my boss at the time to allow some common 
sense to prevail and I launched a daily 09:30 Operations Briefing. This was deliberately 
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timed to be at an hour when everyone would be at work and not inconvenienced, and 
was designed to be constructive rather than destructive. The aim was to review 
performance from the previous day, identify major constraints on the operation and to 
look ahead to the current day of operation. 
7.2 Purpose and Objectives 
In a similar fashion to the previous three cycles this section outlines the purpose and 
objectives of the fourth cycle. The issue in question for this cycle was how to engage all 
operations departments collaboratively in a daily operations briefing that was designed 
to review performance and identify shortfalls that could be remedied to improve 
performance. 
AR Procedural Steps  Action for Cycle Four 
Determine the problem: No collaborative and cross-department performance 
measurement system and little understanding of 
how to measure operations performance and use 
results  
Plan action: Set objectives. Design a cross-department daily 
operations briefing 
Take action: Introduce the daily 0930 Operations Briefing and 
conduct interviews with the managers and directors 
who attended the briefing 
Evaluate and analyse: Descriptive analysis and content analysis of the 
interviews to make sense of the findings and identify 
behaviours 
Reflect on action taken: Personal reflections on the fourth cycle 
The following specific objectives were established to provide the necessary structure 
for this cycle of research: 
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1. Design and introduce a daily cross-department Operations Briefing 
2. Evaluate how the managers responded to this system by conducting semi-
structured interviews 
3. Examine whether the structural and behavioural aspects of the system were 
being met by content analysis of the interview transcripts 
How do managers 
react to a daily cross-
department 
operations 
performance review? 
Evaluation and 
analysis
Reflection
Interviews with 
managers of all 
operations-related 
departments
Introduction of 0930 
Daily Ops Briefing and 
Performance Review
Conclusion
Cycle 4: Pinnacle Airlines – Decline In Operations 
Performance Following Aggressive Growth
The final cycle examined the structure and behaviours 
underlying a newly introduced daily operations performance 
review that involved all operations-related departments.
The design, introduction, and conduct of the Daily Operations 
Briefing and Performance Review had its foundations in the 
knowledge gained during the first three cycles of research. 
These iterative stages of learning, change, and growth 
provided the insight to frame operations performance in a 
manner that should be understood, and responded to, by the 
managers who had responsibility for the airline’s output.
 
Figure 7-1 Diagram of 4th Cycle Events 
7.3 Design of Daily Operations Briefing 
My main goal in designing the 09:30 Operations Briefing was that it needed to be 
informative, concise and easy to understand and interpret. I intended to keep the 
meeting duration to approximately 15-20 minutes and so it was important to condense 
the operating data into a few pages that captured the essence of what we all needed to 
know. It was also of crucial importance that the each operating department had to 
participate and speak about performance within their domains. 
There were two distinct aspects to this. Firstly there was the collection of the data and 
its presentation in a format that could be viewed and understood by a large group of 
people and secondly the flow of information that would comprise the agenda of 
discussion topics for the actual review. 
The audience for this PMR system would be the department heads and key managers 
within all operating departments that were based at the headquarters. In addition to this 
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would be the base managers, hub coordinators, and assistant chief pilots in their 
respective bases throughout the country.  
Obtaining the data was a matter of culling statistics from several different sources and 
combining them into one document. I decided to do this using an Excel spreadsheet 
because Excel was available to everyone as a company deployed application and also 
offered a good way of importing and sorting the performance data into tables and 
graphs. When setup correctly it was just a matter of entering some information 
manually and then letting automation populate the rest of the fields. The spreadsheet 
was located on a secure server and accessible by all who needed to review it. 
Everyone located at the headquarters building would gather in a large conference room 
and those in the field would join via conference call. The spreadsheet was sized and 
formatted so that it could be displayed on a projector and would flow in a logical 
manner with each tab representing another page. 
I designed the format so that there were two parts to the review: firstly, a brief review of 
the key performance indicators from the previous day’s operation such as completion 
factor, on-time departures, on-time arrivals and controllable completion factor, and 
secondly an outlook for the current day’s operation. Each part of the review also 
presented a breakdown of the delays and cancellations by operating department. By 
the time that the review took place, which was 09:30 CST (10:30 EST) the day’s 
operation had already been in full swing for several hours and it was commonplace to 
discuss delays and cancellations that had occurred just hours or minutes before. 
My main intention was to focus on the current day rather than dwell in the past and so 
this part of the review received the most attention. It was designed to begin with a 
weather briefing from the operations management team in the SOC and was followed 
by a review of the launch performance. The meeting was then turned over to each 
operating base who in turn would have to discuss any operational problems that could 
affect their hub. This was followed by a review of the current delays and cancellations 
and was concluded with identifying any issues that required follow-up. They were 
recorded on an Action Item list with the expectation that answers would be provided at 
the meeting on the following day.   
Finally, it would be important to run the meeting in such a way that people felt 
encouraged and that their input was valuable. It was also important to present the data 
cleanly and clearly and with explanation of what the data was showing – colours for 
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above/ below goal, etc, and to elicit the input from our managers and directors in the 
field.  
7.4 Implementation of the 0930 Daily Operations Briefing 
The 0930 daily Operations Briefing was implemented in early 2008. I chaired this 
meeting for the first six months before handing it off to the Manager of Dispatch. In 
conducting the meeting I was conscious to include as many people as possible and to 
highlight the positive and negative performance results to address the findings from the 
first cycle. 
The first part of the meeting was a high level overview of the previous day’s operation 
starting with the most important aspect of running an airline, which is safety (Figure 7-
2). During the course of our daily business, operating in excess of 700 flights per day, it 
is inevitable that mistakes are made in handling aircraft. One such frequently occurring 
event is damage to an aircraft either in-flight or while it is on the ground. For example 
this can occur through bird strikes (very common), contact with a piece of ground 
equipment, scratches to the airframe from loading bags, or foreign object damage 
(FOD) while taxiing to or from the runway. These incidents of aircraft damage are 
carefully recorded, reported and tracked. Additionally, how an aircraft is loaded is very 
important in order to maintain the correct centre of gravity (CG). Occasionally load 
errors occur that can have serious safety ramifications. If an aircraft is loaded so that 
it’s CG is too far forward it may be difficult for the pilots to elevate the aircraft during 
takeoff. Similarly, with an aircraft that has been loaded too far aft it can lead to a high 
angle of attack when climbing and descending, which could potentially cause the 
aircraft to stall. This was a contributing factor to the crash of Air Midwest flight 5481 at 
Charlotte/Douglas International Airport in January 2003, which led to heightened 
awareness of aircraft loading practices. Most load errors occur due to an incorrect 
count of bags loaded onto the aircraft. Naturally, this is a serious issue so I decided to 
incorporate it into the review, so that it could be tracked and discussed daily.  
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Figure 7-2 0930 Ops Briefing Excerpt (Safety) 
The next section focused on the key operations metrics of completion factor, on-time 
departure performance (D:0) and on-time arrival performance (A:0). These are shown 
in Figures 7-3 and 7-4 below. They are the airline’s primary KPI’s. They were further 
broken down by our lines of business: NWA and DAL, and then by department. This 
provided all operating groups with a snapshot of how their area of responsibility had 
performed the previous day and their contribution to overall airline performance. 
 
Figure 7-3 0930 Ops Briefing Excerpt (NWA) 
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Figure 7-4 0930 Ops Briefing Excerpt (DAL) 
The second part of the meeting was devoted to an outlook of the current day’s 
operation (Figure 7-5). This commenced with a weather outlook for the main operating 
regions and continued with a review of the mechanical status of the fleet, the available 
crewmembers who were on reserve status and the performance of the first flight of the 
day for each aircraft, known as launch flights. 
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Figure 7-5 0930 Ops Briefing Excerpt (day of operation) 
The final aspect of the briefing was to identify any operational issues that had caused a 
performance discrepancy, assign an appropriate person to formulate corrective action 
and record this item on the Action Item Follow-up List. Any previously added items 
were reported on by the person to which they had been assigned. 
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Figure 7-6 0930 Ops Briefing Excerpt (action items) 
7.4.1 Interviews 
The interviews began in August 2008 and were designed around de Waal’s nine 
aspects of performance management (De Waal 2004; De Waal and Gerritsen-Medema 
2006).  These divided the use of a PMR system into two aspects: the structural side 
and behavioural side.  
The interview questions were designed to elicit predominantly ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers but 
left plenty of opportunity for elaboration by the interviewee (Appendix D). An interview 
was conducted with each of the nine managers or directors who attended the daily 
briefing, see table 7-1 below. These people represented all of the departments that had 
responsibility for operations performance. 
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Table 7-1 List of interviewees - Cycle 4 
Position   Abbreviation  Department 
Ground Ops Regional Manager GORM  Ground Operations 
Director of Maintenance  DOM  Maintenance 
Director of Flying   DOF  Flight Operations 
SOC Duty Manager   SOCDM Operations Management 
Manager, Dispatch   MD  SOC 
Director of Safety   DOS  Safety 
Manager, Crew Scheduling  MCS  SOC 
Director of Operations   DO  Flight Operations 
Director of In-Flight   DIF  In-Flight 
7.5 The Structural and Behavioural Aspects of the PMR System 
A significant factor of de Waal’s research was to assess the structural and behavioural 
aspects of a performance measurement system by applying a performance 
management analysis to 135 Dutch companies (De Waal 2004). 
There are two distinct parts to this: the first part examines the organisational ‘structure’ 
that is in place to allow engagement with, and consistent use of, the PMR system, and 
the second part examines whether the managers and directors displayed performance-
driven ‘behaviour’. In this cycle, I have used a similar approach but conducted the data-
gathering by way of one-on-one interview questions and analysing the data using 
content analysis. 
The interview transcripts were imported into NVIVO8 to facilitate content analysis and 
are presented here in subject order to follow de Waal’s (2004) nine aspects of 
performance management analysis (see Table 2-2 in chapter two). Each individual 
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aspect is presented in the order that the questions were asked and discussed from the 
interviewee’s perspective. The analysis is further informed by my own observations and 
the conversations that took place with those involved. 
7.5.1 Structure: Tasks and Responsibilities 
The first subject area involved questions concerning the tasks, responsibilities and 
roles of the managers and directors and whether they felt they were clearly defined. 
“Yes, definitely, they are clearly defined, not fully documented, but defined and 
understood” (SOCDM) 
“I do feel that they are defined, but I don’t have a sense of determining the limits 
of my responsibilities” (DOF) 
“It is ever-changing…and adapting to whatever is thrown your way. It is not like 
a manual or checklist. Clearly defined would be checking things off. So, you 
deal with what is thrown your way and try to predict what is going to happen in 
the future…and when it doesn’t you change again. In the hierarchy pyramid, the 
plans are put together by the people at the top but don’t include the people 
lower down. It is hush-hush until the last minute and then you are left 
scrambling” (MD) 
“Looking at it from my role as the manager of dispatch, I don’t think that any role 
is clearly defined” (MD) 
“Not particularly…There is insufficient infrastructure. I don’t have a clear 
definition of the role and responsibilities” (DO) 
“It was never really clearly defined when we went into the 0930” (DOM) 
“My tasks and responsibilities are clearly defined because I wrote them myself!” 
(DOS) 
“Yes, I think so….because I largely set them myself!” (DIF) 
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It appeared that some had worked proactively to ensure that the tasks and 
responsibilities for themselves and their departments were clearly established: 
“We have worked to further define roles and responsibilities so that we 
understand and can think outside the box” (GORM) 
“The position has evolved into what it has become now and we have really 
worked on what we need to do and why” (SOCDM) 
“Just the basic job description...so when it came down to the daily tasks and 
‘how to’...I was just feeling my way, but as time went on I figured out my 
responsibilities and how to meet goals” (MCS) 
This suggested that while some further clarification was required for the others they 
may also benefit by taking the initiative to clarify tasks and responsibilities, rather than 
expecting them to be defined for them. 
This was indicative of an ill-defined job description that saw him performing the role 
that normally typifies a Chief Pilot, but with a job title that suggests a far broader range 
of responsibilities. This caused a degree of role confusion for him and a sense of 
anxiety in not knowing whether an issue was really in his area of concern or not.  
“There are issues with determining the limits of my authorities. People have an 
unclear view of who I am and what my role is” (DOF) 
Having ascertained that there was not a consensus that their tasks and responsibilities 
were clearly defined, it was therefore important to understand from the perspective of 
the interviewees what could be done differently to improve the situation: 
“What I need to understand about the info I am giving on impact MEL’s is what 
use is it to other people? If nobody is getting anything out of it [0930 report] then 
I don’t understand what they want” (DOM) 
“Stop bending to political pressure…as long as I hold a position that is ill-
defined I will never be able to do that - I mean have a clear limit of my authority. 
I wish the organization was more steadfast and resolute” (DOF) 
267 
 
“I guess just a blanket list of specific expectations up front, for example, once a 
month do this, once a quarter have a meeting, etc. It would have been helpful...” 
(MCS) 
In distinction to the majority there were two responses that indicated that there was 
little that needed improvement: 
“We have really worked to take all the negative things out of it. Everything is 
aimed at meeting our goals and hitting performance measures” (GORM) 
“I don’t know. I think we have got it to the best it’s ever been without having to 
hire more people. It works, but has become very demanding time-wise” 
(SOCDM) 
The focus on understanding the distribution of tasks and responsibilities was further 
sharpened by enquiring whether they were applied consistently at all management 
levels and across all departments. In first examining their application at management 
levels: 
“Not sure. I say that because I am not sure how every department 
communicates goals and responsibilities and what the follow-through is” 
(GORM) 
“It seems like you guys (SOC) have more to do than the rest of us (re the 
0930)” (DOM) 
“…down to front-line manager levels? Yes. We do a good job of delineating and 
distributing the load” (DOF) 
“I don’t know enough about tasks required of the other departments. Within our 
department, I would say yes” (SOCDM) 
“No. There are very different departments, different positions, different 
responsibilities and different goals” (MD) 
“I would say that not everybody understands their duties and responsibilities 
and the authority they have to perform them. I see a lot of people who send 
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stuff up the chain instead of doing it themselves. At the recent Directors 
meeting the approach was: the VP’s would do the strategic thinking and let the 
directors run the airline. There is fear” (DOS) 
“We are all maxed-out. There are some who push back and refuse to take 
things on, but most people have to take on more tasks, especially in the SOC” 
(MCS) 
“The VP’s carry some of the load that directors should and directors carry some 
of the load that managers should, which is why we are so damned stressed at 
the end of the week. As a company we suffer from a lack of resources and 
infrastructure to support the type of operation we are trying to operate” (DOF) 
The majority of the interviewees thought that there was an uneven distribution of 
workload and that the burden fell on them. This subject caused some exasperation 
amongst the respondents who on the whole believed that the operations side of the 
business, and in particular Flight Operations, was more heavily tasked than others: 
“Flight Standards has a lighter load of responsibility and it does not fluctuate. 
Flight Ops Administration carries a heavier burden throughout the year. Flight 
Ops fluctuates constantly, and is under a constant state of having issues to 
handle. The CEC workload and responsibility varies with whether we are hiring 
and training or not and is dependent on the health of the airline” (DOF)  
“The absolute bulk of performance responsibility rests with Flight Ops and then 
Ground Ops. HR, Legal and Payroll are just there to support these 
departments. All of us individually carry more weight than we should. We do not 
delegate effectively, and do not have the resources to delegate to” (DOF) 
“There is so much more pressure in the SOC. Anyone in the SOC MUST be 
more flexible than other departments. Any plan you have could be completely 
wiped away by the demands of the operation” (MCS) 
Overall, there was evidence that tasks and responsibilities were being unevenly 
distributed, with Flight Operations carrying the heaviest load and burden, and that there 
was still work to do in clearly defining the roles, tasks and responsibilities for some of 
the attendees at the 0930 Operations Briefing.  
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This discussion on structure continued with a look at ‘content’, and the sources of 
performance information that people used. 
7.5.2 Structure: Content 
The subject of ‘content’ considered whether the managers used both financial and non-
financial information to assist them in achieving their operations performance 
objectives and to learn whether they used a balanced approach when making 
decisions. In regards to using financial information, there was an overwhelming 
agreement that it was considered: 
“Absolutely! Everything we do has that financial hit to it. If we don’t look at it 
financially we miss the big picture” (GORM) 
“Yes. I don’t look at financial measures daily…the average is 3-4 times per 
month. Items that come out of CASP (continuing analysis and surveillance 
programme) meetings that affect the operation and have a financial impact 
have to be looked at and evaluated carefully. I also look at the financials to see 
where we are year to date” (DOM) 
“There are financial decisions made…..calling in overtime for example. So, yes 
we use both” (SOCDM) 
“Yes. We use the financial part to determine staffing, and base the schedule on 
our financial position – training, etc” (MD) 
“Yes, I think so. When looking at crew utilisation….will it will cost the company 
more to use this pilot than that pilot? We must follow the contract when we 
junior-assign. If we make a mistake it may cost the company thousands in 
grievances. Mistakes can inconvenience passengers and cause costs: hotels, 
buses etc. Everything is tied to the bottom line” (MCS) 
“I do. The simplest example I can think of is the Preferential Bid solution 
meeting. The first thing I look for is the financial impact to our block hour cost” 
(DO) 
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“Yes. I have to take into account staffing and departmental G&A (general and 
administrative) and where to put assets. I only have X amount of heads and 
have to get the best bang for the buck” (DIF) 
A slight variation was the Director of Flying who stated that financial information was 
not critical to operations decisions: 
“But, the plane has to fly regardless. Financial constraints would be ignored in 
the everyday objective of accomplishing the mission. They have their uses in 
the planning stage but in the everyday operation they carry less weight” (DOF) 
There was only one who excluded financial information in his role and that was the 
Director of Safety (DOS), whose primary objective was to ensure that all operations 
were conducted with the highest regard for safety: 
“I exclude financial performance. It is not measured by my department, nor do 
we get involved. We are looking strictly at operational performance” (DOS) 
In enquiring whether the non-financial information has a strategic focus by using 
success factors and key performance indicators (KPI) there was universal agreement: 
“Absolutely! We look at our performance within the department as well as the 
company. In the 0930 we look at station D:0 versus company D:0 and what we 
are doing to hit these goals. We are looking for ways to hit targets and ensure 
we meet our piece of the goal” (GORM) 
“We always focus on on-time performance…getting an aircraft out of the hangar 
and meeting the D:0 goal for the kick-off (first flight of the day)” (DOM) 
“Yes. In operating with pilots I am interested in anything to do with behaviour 
e.g. long-term absences, sick calls, fatigue, staffing, extension refusals, etc. We 
use real-time indicators to make adjustments to policy and procedure and to 
meet any decline in performance. They (absences) are a large influence on how 
this department operates on a day-to-day basis and how it reacts…the bell-
weather for how we are doing” (DOF) 
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“Absolutely! Our performance for yesterday, month-to-date, year-to-date….all 
have a bearing on the decisions I make today” (SOCDM) 
“Our controllable delays like FRF, WBF etc, revolve around the weather 
primarily and staffing” (MD) 
“Oh, yeah. Whether I have control over damage or not it is part of my 
performance objectives” (DOS) 
“Yes, completion factor and ‘D:0’. I have put together a Powerpoint for the team, 
showing how what we do affects the key metrics” (MCS) 
“They are and have gotten much better. I have been accountable for metrics 
over the last 10-12 years as a manager at Pinnacle. I look at certain things – it 
is much better – I have found ways to mine information. The 0930 has shown 
that. The 0930 has turned out to be a good thing for us. Initially it did not fit for 
us but since we were given the responsibility for it and were able to adapt it, it 
has been good. There is no organisation on the servers - there are thousands 
of folders, no indexing, but the 0930 does that for us and at a face-to-face level. 
We know how to get much of what we need. Our group has done much better 
with this. All in all I am much happier on where and how to search out 
information” (DO) 
“Yes….very strategic for the operation. I can drill down to the station level. For 
example I can tell you if Norfolk has FA (flight attendant) issues” (DIF) 
This resounding expression of using CSFs and KPIs was very encouraging to hear. It 
added validity to the 0930 Operations Briefing and showed that the managers were 
actively involved with performance metrics and were keenly engaged in trying to obtain 
optimum performance. Having now established that the right inputs were being used 
the integrity of the information system was examined. 
7.5.3 Structure: Integrity 
This subject examined whether the interviewees considered that the performance 
information was reliable, timely and accurate. The majority of the interviewees thought 
so, of note were: 
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“If I didn’t have the 0930 meeting info I don’t think we have a good avenue for 
recovering that info, although we do get the SOC pages” (DOM) 
“Before the 0930 we only had access to the NWA report  - we are now stepping 
into what you use and have developed, for example the Flight Ops Monthly 
Performance Review” (DO) 
“Yes, I put it together! And, I do not rely on anyone else – just rely on Brio (data 
mining tool), but pull out the data myself: graphs, charts…everything is mine. I 
disseminate them daily amongst the (In-Flight) management group and they are 
posted at the bases for FA’s to see. It has really focused attention” (DIF) 
“We work to get our information out. We do a department conference call at 
0830, 7 days a week, where we talk about issues occurring now and in the past, 
and what we can do to fix them. They will occur again otherwise” (GORM) 
“The 0930 is a source of information and I look to the newsletter and SOC 
pages” (MCS) 
This suggested that the availability of performance information was adequate, but there 
were two responses that indicated some doubt: 
“Consistent? Yes.  Reliable? Not as much - delay reports have no real meaning 
to us until delays have been truly identified to their root cause. Timely? I get it 
fairly quickly, but unless the data is given to me quickly it is no use” (DOF) 
“It’s reliable, but never timely” (DOS) 
Overall, the integrity of the performance data in terms of its reliability, accuracy, and 
timeliness was considered to be sufficient. There was certainly room for improvement 
but everyone was satisfied with the data provided at the 0930. 
7.5.4 Structure: Manageability 
Manageability examined whether the interviewees were able to easily obtain 
performance reports and what they do when they need additional information. In terms 
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of obtaining performance reports all but one agreed that they received performance 
management reports: 
“Yes. We use much of what the company produces and other reports on the 
server” (GORM) 
“Yes. I can ask MOC to provide them. We have a pretty close-knit group. We 
talk about it and get what we need” (DOM) 
“We are now because we have developed some systems over the last year. We 
are just now getting the software programmes that allow us to do that, for 
example FOQA reports, Flight Safety reports, etc” (DOS) 
“Sure! Now that you have the 0930 spreadsheet on the server. I don’t know if I 
could physically crunch the numbers without that” (MCS) 
“Yeah, I can pull from the data warehouse. I used to be invited to the Monday 
1230 Ops Meeting, but, like all directors, I have been excluded from it for a long 
time, yet I run In-Flight! They ostensibly talk about the operation but there is 
absolutely no feedback from it” (DIF) 
The Director of Flying however had a conflicting view, which was at odds with everyone 
else: 
“No. I have to struggle to get them. I am computer literate but have to navigate 
to get reports. As an airline in this day and age we should not be doing this in 
spreadsheets. It is ludicrous that we track some crew qualifications in Excel. 
The company will not invest in the infrastructure that is needed” (DOF) 
In drilling down further the explanation can be found in his inability to readily 
understand the data that was available.  
“This is my first management position and when data is found it is a struggle for 
me to be able to look at the data, read it and interpret it and get something 
meaningful out of it. There is no guidance on how to interpret data. It is a sink or 
swim mentality” (DOF) 
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It seemed that he wanted it handed on a platter complete with interpretations and 
meanings rather than being the analyst and using his expertise and knowledge to 
interpret what the data was telling him. This highlights an important point. Should 
performance data be provided in raw form so that the managers could make their own 
interpretations or should the data be provided with the meaning already attached? 
If the available performance data was not sufficient where did they turn to when they 
needed more info? Everyone was able to state where they could go to obtain additional 
performance information. 
“Usually we go within our own department to [Name]. She can help or point us 
in the right direction” (GORM) 
“I would think that Performance Engineering should be able to get it for us” 
(DOM) 
“I can get it...but it requires relying on human involvement and human 
observation. We are saturated in data at times – no core KPI’s etc” (DOF) 
“I do not need more detailed info. If I did I would go to you!” (SOCDM) 
“I usually just research it, so yeah I can obtain it. If I need additional or in-depth 
data I pull it from FliteTrac reports” (MD) 
“I just have to find the SME (subject matter expert) in each department and dig 
it out” (DOS) 
“Well if its performance information as far as the team is concerned I would use 
transaction reports, Symposium reports, FliteTrac reports and also the NWA 
report” (MCS) 
“Well, I generally task it out to subordinates – we have some base managers 
that are very good at that sort of thing. I have become much more of a 
generalist than in the past…mainly through delegating effectively” (DO) 
“Yeah, but in terms of running the operation there is no more detailed info that I 
need” (DIF) 
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There was general agreement that the structure in place was adequate for the 0930 
Ops Briefing. Of the 72 possible responses to the seven questions concerning the 
subject of ‘structure’ there were 48 affirmative responses, 16 that did not agree and 
eight that were undecided. This 3:1 ratio suggests that although there was still 
improvement to be made the necessary structure was largely sufficient to allow 
everyone to function effectively. 
The next section now examines whether the interviewees themselves displayed 
performance-driven behaviour. This was assessed over twelve specific questions. 
7.5.5 Behaviour: Accountability 
This examined whether the interviewees felt responsible and accountable for the 
airline’s performance results. It was encouraging to learn that of the nine interviewees 
seven of them categorically felt that they were accountable for performance results.  
“Of course!” (DOM) 
“Absolutely! It comes from ensuring that standards are in place and procedures 
are in place and more importantly accountability is in place”(DOF) 
“Yes…it’s my department…my ass on the line…it keeps us all in a paycheque” 
(DIF) 
This indicated that the 0930 Operations Briefing was having a positive impact, whereas 
previously there was no visible accountability taking place.  
One response indicated uncertainty, but when questioned further it emerged that this 
emanated from the fact that her dispatchers had such a low rate of causing flight 
delays that the issue of being held accountable for a performance shortfall had never 
arisen. This actually indicated and was subsequently confirmed that this manager had 
already done a very good job in virtually eliminating delays caused by her employees 
that it was no longer even considered as a potential cause of poor performance. 
“It’s only a few (flights) that dispatchers now affect negatively - ours are so 
minimal that they do not have as big of an impact as others” (MD) 
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The Director of Safety responded that he was not held accountable for performance 
results. His logic was that his role was not in providing good performance results, just 
good safety results. This slight difference in interpretation of what is considered 
performance caused him to say no, but good safety results are part of good 
performance results. He had lost sight of the fact that all aspects of performance are 
combined into ensuring that the company is successful. This aspect of looking after just 
your area of responsibility was a theme that emerged quite strongly over the course of 
the analysis suggesting that people and departments were operating in silos and 
unconcerned about the big picture. 
“No. I am always the sniper, never the target. We live in a happy world of 
trailing indicators. Most of it is out of my hands. 9 times out of 10 we have a 
good process but we simply don’t follow them…especially on-line, where we 
probably have our less educated people…they have to have a process….how 
to capture the airplane properly or bad things can happen” (DOS) 
When asked specifically about whether they felt they were accountable for 
performance results in their own area of responsibility there was almost universal 
agreement that they did with only the DOS again in disagreement: 
“If I don’t take on that basic burden, oversee my group, then that reflects poorly 
on me” (GORM) 
“Yes, but I cannot prevent someone from calling in sick or refusing an aircraft 
etc, but I can hold them accountable” (DOF) 
“Yes, right now. I mean there is the dual reporting structure with the Duty 
Managers, and then they oversee the Sector Supervisors, and they make 
decisions on delays and cancellations, so yes” (MD) 
The director of safety was again deliberately separating his job obligations from the 
performance of the company, seeing his role as ‘policing’ what others do:  
“No. Like I said, the only thing we are responsible for is process improvement“ 
(DOS) 
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Having established that virtually everyone felt that they were accountable for 
performance results in their area of responsibility, it was further questioned whether 
they felt an obligation and commitment for the performance of the organisation as a 
whole. Now that the focus was on a larger scale there were some disagreements that 
began to emerge. Although five agreed that they felt their efforts were in alignment with 
helping the entire company the other four painted a picture that suggested segregation 
within the company: 
Of those in agreement that accountability encompassed the results for the company as 
a whole, of note were:  
“Absolutely! Again it comes down to, if I’m not doing my piece then we all fail. 
Each individual has to do what they can to help the company be successful” 
(GORM) 
“We all play a role in working with one another to meet company goals” (DOM) 
“Yes, but probably not any more than operational performance. I have no 
influence over our financial performance” (SOCDM) 
“Yeah, I think they are directly related and I think some of my senior people see 
that too. I feel directly connected to the organisation” (MCS) 
The responses that painted a different picture were: 
“We (SOC) are a huge driving force in it but not ultimately responsible” (MD) 
“I’m responsible just for achieving mine... I figure I’ll do my part and they’ll do 
theirs...If a department fails there is very little sympathy…thank God it’s them, 
not us….the heat is off us! Old adage…we don’t have to run faster than the 
bear, just faster than you!” (DIF) 
“Yes, but only as my piece relates to the whole. I feel no connection or influence 
to Ground Operations or In-flight. I feel as an airline, the way our organisation is 
setup, we own one segment of the pie chart but we do not cross those lines. 
We are segregated as departments” (DOF) 
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This apparent difference in attitude can also be explained as a difference in 
perspective: either not feeling departments were working together, or feeling that the 
individual was contributing to the larger cause simply by doing their part. This was an 
interesting distinction. The theme was developed further when talking about 
management style and support below. 
7.5.6 Behaviour: Management Style 
This subject examined the management style of the senior management group who 
ostensibly set the direction and strategy for the airline. It sought to ascertain whether 
they were visibly involved and interested in performance and whether they stimulated a 
culture of continuous improvement and proactive behaviour.  
The first question asked whether senior management was visibly interested and 
involved in the performance of their employees. This drew largely negative responses: 
“No. The VP’s and higher-ups are interested but only in how it relates to 
success of the operation” (DOF) 
“Some are, some aren’t. They should be more interested in strategic actions not 
how to run the day-to-day operation” (DOS) 
“Interested, Yes. Involved, No. They want to know what is going on but it 
doesn’t feel like they’re involved with employee performance. They are more 
interested in the operation than the employee” (MCS) 
“Not as much as I have seen elsewhere. Their heart is in the right place, but the 
mission of a very lean, low-cost regional airline, is an obstacle all too often. 
Evaluations, reviews, succession planning, training replacements…all fall down 
the priority list, whereas other companies make them a priority. Other 
companies start with training their people before they ever actually do the job. 
That is completely foreign here. We have never focused on the development of 
our people. We say we are going to, but never do” (DO) 
“They aren’t visibly involved in my performance. I think they are more interested 
in the things that are going poorly rather than well” (DIF) 
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In drilling down to examine why they showed a lack of interest and involvement drew 
the following responses: 
“They’re interested in the operation and the airplanes and how we look in other 
peoples’ eyes, not the employees…up until today’s conference call where they 
mentioned [DIF] leaving, there was no interest in him” (MD) 
“Micro-managing, interference” (DOS) 
“It’s not just evident by their absence, it can be evident in the newsletters and 
the reports they send to the employees. If you read between the lines…you 
know, the last line says….”don’t forget to take care of each other”…but the rest 
is about the operation, not the employee, and they don’t take care of us. They 
are always saying they want everyone to do a better job, which is evidenced by 
saying “look at our performance numbers”. It’s made very obvious to the 
employee that it’s always about performance numbers and much less about the 
employees’ contribution to performance” (MCS) 
“[Company President] has never asked me how it is that we continue to make 
goal each year despite the fact that our goal level has always increased – they 
have never asked that….but they will be quick to ask why haven’t you made 
goal?” (DIF) 
These comments very strongly suggested that the focus of senior management was 
just on the results and not the people who had to produce them. This was borne out by 
my own observations and conversations. There was a distrust of senior management. 
No matter how well you thought you were doing and which performance goals that you 
exceeded the focus was always on “why didn’t you do better”..! There was no thanks, 
support, or consideration for the human side of performance. 
The subject was further broadened to enquire whether senior management stimulated 
an improvement culture. Once again the consensus was that they did not. In fact they 
seemed to stimulate a blame culture. 
“No. they stimulate a “work harder until it gets better culture”. They do not buy-
in to the theory that improvements in the soft areas will help overall 
performance. They won’t spend money that does not provide an immediate 
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return versus investing in areas that provide intangible results that have been 
proven in other organisations to be of benefit to the success of the organisation. 
They “step over a dollar to save a nickel. There is no investment for the future” 
(DOF) 
“(laughs out loud..) NO, all the directors are quitting. No, they are focused on 
numbers and how the airline as a whole is doing, not the employees….the 
negative connotation of ”lessons learned”….It’s like [Name’s (company 
president)] message today… “ our performance is really good for now…I think” 
…… what was that all about?” (MD) 
“Lessons learned” refers to an infamous charter flight that we conducted in 2008. The 
charter actually went very well, but there was one minor problem concerning the 
weights of the passengers that had been overlooked during the planning stage but was 
addressed during the execution stage. To the passengers on the charter flight and the 
company that contracted for the charter the operation was smooth, on-time and 
successful. The problem was easily rectified by the operations staff in the SOC on the 
day of the charter, but this one problem was highlighted by senior management as a 
failure and an overbearing “lessons learned” meeting was ordered to identify who as at 
fault and to fix it. The result was to take a successful event and turn it into a negative 
experience for those involved. Naturally, it was a little demoralising. The sentiment 
expressed to me afterwards was that the individual would never go ‘above and beyond” 
again because they would get criticised no matter the outcome. 
“No. We are crisis driven…almost 100% crisis driven. We do not use the time 
well, when we are successful, to plan for the future. For example right now we 
should be implementing change and innovation to prepare for winter. We chase 
after crises when we don’t have a crisis” (DO) 
“Ummmm…they stimulate increases in performance by freaking people out. 
They have the carrot and the stick…..but there’s not a lot of carrot” (DIF) 
In agreement that an improvement culture was stimulated were the following: 
“I believe they are interested in improvement. I don’t know if that is working with 
all of the group…“ (GORM) 
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“Yeah, I do. It’s based on the communication they give us and they constantly 
ask what changes would help the organization and each department. They are 
looking at our needs…we may not get everything but they are interested” 
(DOM) 
“Yes, I think so overall. Pinnacle has proven itself to promote from within…that 
may be because we can’t get people from the outside. There are also training 
classes: LMS, PMU, and different classes, but you have to make time for it. If 
you don’t have time it’s tough luck. You have to get the tools and educate 
yourself” (MCS) 
“I would say I have a neutral answer…..maybe some but not a whole lot” 
(SOCDM) 
A further aspect of management style was assessing whether senior management 
encouraged proactive behaviour. This again drew some exasperated remarks: 
“No. they are reactive” (DOS) 
“No, they talk about it but there’s nothing in place to encourage proactive 
behaviour” (DIF) 
“Yes - by expecting everybody to take care of everything! [sarcasm]. We see 
that a lot. Take a look at the charter operation – it was successful but the 
expectation was for something perfect – then we had to endure a “lessons 
learned” exercise rather than accepting the success” (DO) 
“Yes, in a threatening sort of way they do. It’s always after the fact….”you 
should have done this or that”…..”you should have been proactive”. They have 
the benefit of hindsight, which is easy…they know the result already” (MD) 
“They ask for it and then inhibit the possibility of it…make it impossible to 
do…because you have to look at yesterday so often. So, typically the question 
is “I want to talk to you about yesterday”…like “why weren’t you proactive 
yesterday?” (MCS) 
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These remarks exemplified the all too often experienced criticisms that happened long 
after an event had taken place, and were always with the benefit of hindsight, but used 
as a tool to scorn the decision-maker. 
In contrast to this there were some positive comments: 
“I think so. In fact it is one of the things I enjoy. Again, they are approachable 
and can work with the entire workforce to ask for that behaviour” (GORM) 
“Yes. They never question decisions that I have made or am making” (SOCDM) 
“They do encourage you to find the problem and provide the solution – but not 
at a cross-department level” (DOF) 
In delving into whether management addressed employees whose area of 
responsibility produced sub-standard results drew largely negative responses: 
“No. They rely on us (directors) to do that” (DOM) 
“No. Pinnacle as an organisation is rife with pockets of inefficient employees, 
but they are kept on, past the level at which their performance would indicate a 
different path for them. It hampers our success. As a company we accept sub-
standard performance routinely” (DOF) 
“You know, they don’t do it early enough in the process. We don’t use the drop 
at a time method, we use the bucket method. For example, [Name] had no 
encouragement to fix things…he got blindsided…was only gone for 12 hours 
and still got fired…a scapegoat!” (DOS) 
This referred to the operational disaster at Christmas time in 2004 and how one 
unfortunate person was singled-out as at fault and fired.  
“We get the “set your hair on fire” speech, so I guess, No!” (MCS) 
This term “set your hair on fire” was deliberately used by the COO at a management 
meeting that was hastily called to bring all of the company’s managers, directors and 
VPs’ together in a large ballroom of a downtown hotel. At this meeting the COO, 
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President, and other VP’s spoke about the need for all of the managers to work harder, 
fix our operational performance problems, and to ‘motivate’ ourselves to do a better 
job. This phrase was used multiple times throughout the meeting as a ‘motivator’. The 
tone of the meeting was bordering on panic and it left many managers bewildered.  
In agreement was one comment, but it was offered tongue-in-cheek. The individual 
referred to here had a big reputation for firing anyone who made the slightest mistake. 
He was considered a bully and used threats to intimidate people. 
“Some have…Russ has no problem letting people go!” (DIF) 
Do they provide motivation and inspiration..... 
“[laughs out loud]….”light your hair on fire”! Not in a positive fashion, No. They 
provide threats and negative views – always focused on the negative – “could’a, 
should’a, would’a”” (MD) 
“No. We subscribe to a playbook – they say the right things at the right times 
but their heart is not in them” (DOF) 
“ [laughs] No, uh, Fear!” (DOS) 
“No, not really, What comes down from above might be to create some 
motivation to do better because it is your job….but not inspiration” (MCS) 
“They provide motivation but it only comes in certain flavours and one of them is 
fear. They try to put fear in you. I have never been inspired by senior 
management. Our senior staff have never really shown true leadership…where 
our leaders have said “we messed up here” and are going to make strategic 
changes to put us back on track. They tell others that the problem is theirs! 
Motivation by fear…!”  (DO) 
“No! Unfortunately they don’t. They don’t know how. There are folks who can 
lead and those who can manage. There are very few true leaders here, but 
plenty of managers. I can’t think of anyone above me that I see as an 
inspiration” (DIF) 
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There were only two positive responses. GORM again was in this category. His outlook 
and experience was positive. 
“I do. One of the things I have seen in my tenure is that they try to keep us on 
the path we need to be on and I have appreciated that motivation. Inspiration is 
there, but unfortunately some of it has gone in waves” (GORM) 
“Yeah. I feel you could go to any one of them and ask them for their input, or 
ask them what they would do and they would take time to do that. I think that is 
motivational” (DOM) 
7.5.7 Behaviour: Action Orientation 
This subject examined whether performance information was integrated into the daily 
activities of employees in such a way that problems are immediately addressed and 
corrective or preventative actions taken. It was encouraging to see that the majority of 
the responses were positive suggesting that there was an integral behaviour of 
correcting problems and taking proactive action at the mid-management level. 
“Currently yes. It is one of the things in Ground Ops I am sure of. I would hope it 
is the same across the company and that we push what is needed to the 
frontline employee” (GORM) 
“Yeah, that is the whole point of the 0930. It can be mundane from time to time 
when things are going well, but when it’s not going well then problems can be 
addressed instantaneously via email or at the 0930” (MD) 
“I think more so now than in the past” (DOS) 
“Yeah, I do. We have put some tools in place. Today we have the daily pilot 
delay reports. The Assistant Chief Pilot sits down and reviews delays from 
yesterday, analyses them and develops corrective action” (DO) 
Amongst the group was just one negative response, which was from the Director of 
Flying claiming that only a small portion of the organisation focuses on performance 
data. 
285 
 
“Only at the director level, for them to take action on. Others do not have a real-
time idea. In fact it seems that only 10% of the organisation focuses on 
performance data” (DOF) 
This was explained to me as meaning that departments who provide a support function 
such as Finance, Human Resources, and IT do not maintain any awareness of how the 
operation is doing. It seemed that there was an intensity for operations people to be 
very aware of overall performance results but when talking with employees from other 
departments they simply did not have any idea whether the operation was performing 
well or not. Their focus was just on their aspect of the company, despite the fact that 
we are an airline and that our entire future rests on whether we are able to provide 
reliable, timely and safe air service! 
I questioned everyone on why and how performance information was integrated into 
the daily activities. 
“Through the different meetings we have (0930) and communication of daily 
stats and when a problem arises” (DOM) 
“Only because I remember when it was not that way at all. The same problems 
would come up repeatedly but now the department managers are quick to 
correct problems, or address them” (SOCDM) 
“We have a good set of base managers in Flight Ops that track pilots down and 
tackle issues” (DOS) 
“The 0930 is the closest thing we have to an integrated performance review. 
The next step is to further develop the monthly Flight Ops review” (DO) 
“We really know how to run a good operation, but not a ‘bad’ operation. When 
we have difficulties we do not know what to do with them. The VP’s run around 
with their “hair on fire” – none of them are calm. It sends completely the wrong 
message. They should show “grace under fire”, not incite panic” (DIF) 
7.5.8 Behaviour: Communication 
This subject is divided into three distinct areas and examined whether: 
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Performance results were communicated at regular intervals and how that 
communication flowed from the bottom of the organisation up to the top, and 
from senior management down to the line workers 
Knowledge was shared between departments and between individuals  
Performance information was shared between departments and between 
individuals 
In general, there were more responses that showed agreement that communication 
was good rather than it needed improvement, but, this was a big and important subject 
and there were inevitably some divisions of opinion.  
The first area was whether communication about performance results took place at 
regular intervals. Seven of the nine interviewees emphatically believed that it did. Most 
notably were: 
“We look at it everyday, but the managers do not…at least not to the extent that 
we do. Items of performance are discussed at the 0930 e.g. why we took that 
delay or cancellation” (DOM) 
“Oh yeah….the Pinnacle Update, the Weekly Message, the 0930…..much 
better than we used to” (DOS) 
“Yes, I think so. We have the 0930, the newsletter, periodic letters, our SOC 
Managers Meeting” (MCS) 
“Yes, on a weekly basis through phone and face to face….among frontline flight 
ops management. We have an agenda that we cover, it’s fairly structured and 
involves performance” (DO) 
When asked whether it was driven from the top down seven agreed that it was and 
only two disagreed, believing that it was sporadic at best. But, when asked whether 
communication also flowed from the bottom up the consensus was that it did not. There 
was a fear that by providing information up through the ranks you would be criticised: 
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“We continue to ask for it and we need to continue reaching for it. Frontline 
employees can be shy or timid in providing that…fear of being chastised” 
(GORM) 
“No. the structure is such that data and communication is not provided up the 
chain. It is not encouraged” (DOF) 
“No. The shift workers are only there to work their shift and go home, unless 
they are held accountable for individual delays” (MD) 
“No. For example in MEM (Memphis) there are a large percentage of part-time 
people who just come in, do their time, load airplanes, and go back home. It’s 
just an extra paycheque to them. They are not interested in pushing information 
back up the chain. We have designed that into the system” (DOS) 
However, in contrast to this was the view from the Maintenance organisation and Crew 
Scheduling who seemed to agree that information did flow from the bottom up: 
“I think at least on the Maintenance side when there are issues in the field they 
are bringing them forward and it is getting to us so we can look at doing 
something different. They want to help the organisation. Everyone is concerned 
for their jobs and to make the organisation better” (DOM) 
“I think so. There is probably a pretty good flow. Pilots have to report things as 
they go. Schedulers have to report delays that are charged to Scheduling” 
(MCS) 
When evaluating whether knowledge was shared there was general agreement that it 
was, but it did not always appear to be open and transparent: 
“We get into department silos. We share what we need to share and keep close 
what we don’t need to share. Perhaps it’s a fear of being evaluated…..or others 
being able to do it better” (GORM) 
“From what I experience, yes. Could it be improved? Definitely, but it’s always 
been that way” (SOCDM) 
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“Yes and No. Sometimes people are so busy they neglect to, forget to, or don’t 
have time to. Some people view it as security if they hold it to themselves” (MD) 
“No, we are silo’d. There are a lot of secrets out there” (DOS) 
“I think so, yeah. There is certainly a lot of it, particularly in my department 
where you deal with people who come in with no knowledge, so it has to be 
shared” (MCS) 
It seemed that overall knowledge was being shared, but it also appeared that it might 
have been just within the department that the individual was working in. I further 
enquired whether knowledge was shared between departments. This brought a mixed 
response and no consensus. Of those in agreement were comments such as: 
“Recently probably…more than we have before over the last 6-8 months. Some 
of the ideas from last winter allowed us to tear down some of boundaries and 
barriers” GORM) 
“It’s improving. Oddly enough from my perspective, I go to the 0930 everyday 
and talk with others. It builds some camaraderie outside of the SOC. After the 
0930 we sometimes sit around and talk a little bit – it makes me more 
understanding of what they do and are responsible for. It helps me know what 
to include them on” (MD) 
“I think so, but there’s very little structure to that. The best is the 0930. Another 
one of my goals was to build bridges between departments. A by-product is that 
I can go and get help and information from them. One of the reasons why I am 
successful is that area” (DO) 
In contrast were those in disagreement: 
“No, departments do not really talk, only when a shortfall causes a problem with 
another department. They don’t really care otherwise” (DOF) 
I further sharpened this line of enquiry to learn whether knowledge was shared 
between employees. This showed that the majority did. The difference here when 
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compared to sharing with an entire department was that the individual could choose 
who to share knowledge with. 
“Again, yes and no. It is up to the individual. Some don’t see it as their job, 
some don’t want to be bothered” (MD) 
“I do, especially in similar jobs, but there is a lot of room for improvement so 
those not up to speed can catch up to those that are. We need to foster that 
growth more” (GORM) 
“Probably not, they are too busy doing what they need to do” (DO) 
“Yes, but between the same levels, i.e. manager to manager, and director to 
director, etc” (DIF) 
There was general agreement that knowledge and information were shared between 
departments and between individuals, but I now wanted to learn whether performance 
information in particular was shared. Again, this supported the previous findings. 
Seven of the nine adamantly agreed and the 0930 Operations Briefing was singled out 
as being the catalyst and mechanism to share performance information: 
“Yes, everyday at the 0930 ops meeting” (DIF) 
“I believe so. We get info from Aaron [Performance Engineering] and his group 
and internally within our department” (GORM) 
“Yeah, we are forced to – we have to share that. The 0930 does that – a great 
vehicle for that“ (DOM) 
“I do. Giving the folks the knowledge of what we need to do to be better” (DOM) 
“Yes, we have the 0930” (SOCDM) 
“Yes, but not prior to the 0930. It’s nice to see the maintenance and station side 
of things” MCS) 
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There were however two responses that indicated that performance information was 
not shared: 
“Not unless you ask. There’s only a couple of outlets for that:  the 0930 and the 
kick-off report, and it took a while to get Ground Ops to share that with us” (DO) 
“Not really, only at the VP level and then only to weigh ourselves against the 
metric. For example [DOM] does not come to me about how he is doing” (DOF) 
Similar to the questions on whether job knowledge was shared I also asked the 
interviewees about whether performance information was shared between departments 
and between individuals. This again showed that the there was a consensus that 
performance info was shared: 
In considering the communication at a department level 
“Predominantly we do it within our own departments. The senior officers share it 
at the VP level between departments” (GORM) 
“I would say yes, all departments get the same reports and have access to the 
same info. We are also telling everyone (SOC pages) 4 times a day” (SOCDM) 
“0930 – and now the monthly Flight Ops review. The individual department 
delays are in that box on the 0930. We also have the SOC Managers Meeting 
where we talk about performance” (MD) 
“Yes, the 0930 really brought that together” (MCS) 
These comments suggest that performance information was shared but it appeared to 
be within the same departments. There were two who thought otherwise: 
“No. There is hardly anything we get from Maintenance, at least not at our level” 
(DO) 
“No. No-one has ever asked me what I do” (DIF) 
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It was further questioned whether performance information was shared between 
employees.  
“I’m sorry to say some of our employees don’t know what the goals are” 
(GORM) 
“I think it is discussed…more now than I have ever heard it. I think when the 
Delta contract was almost lost everyone now seems to have a better idea about 
performance, and also when everyone was losing their City Team bonuses 
(quarterly bonus)” (SOCDM) 
“In the SOC I think so because we focus on it so much. In the pilot ranks I don’t 
know if it is quite as important. In Ground Ops it is relatively important. They are 
more in tune with getting things out on-time so they don’t have to explain a 
delay. It depends on whether the individual will be held responsible for their 
delay” (MD) 
“I know in my department it is” (DOS) 
“Yeah, I think they do on a management level and above” (MCS) 
“Perhaps at the senior staff level” (DO) 
This was a long, but very important section. It showed that performance results were 
communicated well and that information was largely shared amongst employees and 
across departments. It was encouraging to affirm that the 0930 Operations Briefing was 
being used as the primary vehicle from which to share information.  
7.5.9 Behaviour: Alignment 
This subject examined whether the interviewees thought that other departments such 
as Finance and HR were aligned with operations performance so that what is important 
to the organisation (operations performance) is regularly evaluated by others. The 
overwhelming opinion was that they were not. There was even some disdain and 
exasperation in their comments: 
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“They don’t have a frickin’ clue. They don’t understand at all how they are 
involved in getting a passenger on a plane” (DOS) 
“I don’t think so, No! HR is not concerned. Finance is more concerned with the 
budget – they don’t understand the intricacies of the operation. At the last 
budget meeting the CFO even suggested that we “fly slower” because our block 
(planned flight time) is too high.!!!” (DIF) 
“I don’t believe they are…but I absolutely believe that they should be. They 
don’t have a direct impact on making the planes fly but they have a direct 
impact in providing training and ensuring that finance is available” (GORM) 
“No. I don’t think they have any daily view of performance” (DOF) 
“I don’t believe it is evaluated by them. I think they know that performance is 
evaluated by us, but they just want a Pass/Fail assessment” (SOCDM) 
“They look at it from different perspectives and are not focused on performance 
metrics. HR focuses more on the individual employee, and Finance on getting 
the most for their money” (MD) 
“That’s hard to know. On the HR side I would say no. I’ve no idea about 
Finance” (MCS) 
“I don’t think so. The best way to look at that is that we have been tasked with 
the catch 22 situation of increasing performance and reducing costs at the 
same time. This past winter was a good example, we had to turn performance 
around and at the same time were asked to cut costs by 10%!” (DO) 
Only one interviewee seemed to believe that the other departments were aligned with 
operations performance: 
“Sure. Finance needs to be able to give us numbers we are spending to. HR 
needs to align us to the people. They play just as an important role as the rest 
of us” (DOM) 
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But, this really pointed at the dependency on these departments rather than them being 
involved in operations performance. 
7.5.10 General understanding of PMR process 
This final section represents a question that I posed to all of the interviewees about 
whether they could describe the performance measurement and review process at 
Pinnacle. It was designed to see if they could articulate the process now that all of 
them had been participating in the 0930 daily Operations Briefings. Many also 
participated in the weekly SOC Managers Meeting and the monthly Flight Operations 
Performance Review. Unfortunately, it was a little startling to learn that nobody could 
readily put the process into words and speak specifically about the PMR system. The 
question asked was: “Can you describe the performance measurement and review 
process at Pinnacle?” 
“Not really, but I recognise that our operations performance is our bread and 
butter” (DIF) 
“I don’t guess so. I do really like the 0930. I like the way you bring the 
supervisors into our SOC meetings and explain the delays and what we look at. 
You do a good job at helping their base-level understanding” (MCS) 
This was disappointing and disconcerting considering all of the effort and time taken to 
help people engage with the system. However, even though people were unable to 
clearly articulate the process, there was evidence that they understood the purpose of 
the 0930 Operations Briefing and their role in the performance of the airline: 
“Poor performance drove the establishment of the 0930 meeting. There is a lot 
of good info there…and it has enlightened everyone” (DOM) 
“It’s better than I have ever seen it. Knowledge of performance is now at higher 
levels” (SOCDM) 
“It’s better than it used to be…we are making progress. I’d like to see the 
people who actually affect the day to day success have more resources, rather 
than the people who do the ancillary stuff. You don’t get any kind of recognition 
unless you screw up!” (DOS) 
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“I appreciate the need for focusing on performance. It is how we are judged” 
(DO) 
However, this question also prompted two interviewees to again talk about the lack of 
respect for the employees. This was a significant topic for everyone but there was also 
some reluctance to talk too openly about it for fear of repercussions: 
“ ...but if the focus is solely performance, like some of the VP’s are right now, 
you end up with situations where people are quitting, or fed up and you get 
back into the same situation of unhappy people at their wits end. People are not 
appreciated” (MD) 
“If we think people should work around the clock and produce massive amounts 
of data and work because they are told to, then we are wrong. People have to 
be happy to produce more. That is what drives people to be hyper-productive. 
Senior management thinks that because we work at Pinnacle we should be 
hyper-productive regardless of our emotional state. If you lead and inspire 
people then they are more likely to be happy. You cannot just say this is the 
Pinnacle culture so work hard. There is very little inspiration and leadership. 
Leadership consists of soft and hard qualities like the ability to communicate, 
accountability, having the courage to make decisions, flexibility and adaptability, 
and humour. Our leadership does not really display these leadership qualities 
(DO)” 
7.5.11 Summary analysis 
The results of the content analysis discussed above were compiled into a table 
providing summary results. For each question the answer was assessed as either 
being in the affirmative (Y), negative (N) or uncertain (U). This allowed an aggregate 
picture to be obtained and the results to be quantified. These results are presented in 
table 7-2 below.  
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DOF DO DIF DOM MD DOS MCS GORM SOCDM Y N U
1 U N Y N N Y N Y Y 4 4 1
2 Y N Y U N N N U Y 3 4 2
a.) across all departments? N N Y U N U N U U 1 4 4
3 Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 8 1 0
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 9 0 0
S:I 5 U Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 7 1 1 S:I 77.8% 11.1% 11.1%
6 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 1 0
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 9 0 0
49 15 8 S 68.1% 20.8% 11.1%
8 Y Y Y Y U N Y Y Y 7 1 1
a.) in your own area of responsibility? Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 8 1 0
b.) what about the organisation as a whole? N Y N Y N N Y Y Y 5 4 0
9 N N N Y N N N Y Y 3 6 0
10 N N N Y N N N Y Y 3 6 0
11 Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y 6 3 0
12 N U U N U N N U N 0 5 4
13 N N N Y N N N Y N 2 7 0
B:AO 14 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 1 0 B:AO 88.9% 11.1% 0.0%
15 Y Y Y Y N Y Y U Y 7 1 1
a.) top down? Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 7 2 0
b.) bottom up? N Y N Y N N Y N N 3 6 0
16 Y Y Y Y U N Y N Y 6 2 1
a.) between departments? N Y N Y Y N N U Y 4 4 1
b.) between employees? N N Y Y U Y Y Y Y 6 2 1
17 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 2 0
a.) between departments? N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 6 3 0
b.) between employees? N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y 6 3 0
B:AL 18 N N N Y N N N N N 1 8 0 B:AL 11.1% 88.9% 0.0%
B:G 18 N N N Y Y Y N U Y 4 4 1 B:G 44.4% 44.4% 11.1%
99 71 10 B 55.0% 39.4% 5.6%
Y = Yes 10 15 17 24 14 11 16 18 23 148 86 18 < Overall > 58.7% 34.1% 7.1%
Abbreviations N = No 16 12 10 2 10 16 12 4 4 59% 34% 7%
U = Uncertain 2 1 1 2 4 1 0 6 1
S:R Structural: Responsibility
S:C Structural: Content DOF DO DIF DOM MD DOS MCS GORM SOCDM
S:I Structural: Integrity
S:M Structural: Manageability
B:A Behavioural: Accountability
B:MS Behavioural: Management Style Expressed as percentages: 
B:AO Behavioural: Action Orientation 35.7% 53.6% 60.7% 82.1% 50.0% 39.3% 57.1% 64.3% 82.1% Positive Attribution
B:C Behavioural: Communication 57.1% 42.9% 35.7% 10.7% 35.7% 57.1% 42.9% 14.3% 14.3% Negative Attribution
B:AL Behavioural: Alignment 7.1% 3.6% 3.6% 7.1% 14.3% 3.6% 0.0% 21.4% 3.6% Uncertainty
B:G Behavioural: General DOF DO DIF DOM MD DOS MCS GORM SOCDM
30.9%
U
25.9%
0.0%
0.0%
3.7%
8.9%
4.9%
N
44.4%
5.6%
5.6%
22.2%
60.0%
B:C
Y
29.6%
94.4%
94.4%
74.1%
31.1%
64.2%
A
sp
ec
t
S:R
S:C
S:M
B:A
B:MS
Count
A
sp
ec
t
S:R
S:C
S:M
B:A
Do you feel that your tasks and responsibilities are clearly 
defined?
Are tasks and responsibilities applied consistently at all 
management levels?
Do you use financial and non-financial performance 
information to assist you in achieving your performance 
objectives? 
Does this information have a strategic focus by using 
success factors and key performance indicators?
Ty
pe
Questions Interviewees
B:MS
B:C
Do they provide motivation and inspiration?
Do you feel that performance information is integrated into 
the daily activities of employees in such a way that 
problems are immediately addressed and corrective or 
preventative actions are taken?
Is senior management visibly interested and involved in the 
performance of their employees? 
Do they stimulate an improvement culture?
Do they encourage proactive behaviour?
Do they confront employees who have sub-standard 
results?
Can your describe the performance measurement and 
review process at Pinnacle?
S 
 T
  R
  U
  C
  T
  U
  R
  A
  L
B
  E
  H
  A
  V
  I
  O
  U
  R
  A
  L
Is the performance information reliable, timely and 
consistent?
Are you easily able to obtain performance management 
reports? 
Sub-total: Structural
Sub-total: Behavioural
Does communication about performance results take place 
at regular intervals?
Is knowledge shared?
Is performance information shared?
Are other departments in the company such as Finance, 
and HR, aligned with performance management, so that 
what is important to the organisation (ops performance) is 
regularly evaluated?
What if you need more detailed information?
Do you feel responsible for performance results?
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Table 7-2 Summary results of interview content analysis: Cycle 4 
From this summary, it can be seen that on the structural side of performance there 
were a total of 49 responses that were in agreement with de Waal’s assertions, 15 that 
were not and 8 that were uncertain. This strongly suggests that the structural side of 
the 09:30 Ops Briefing was sufficiently developed to allow people to use and engage 
with it. The responses in agreement outweighed those in disagreement by a ratio of 
over 3:1. This was encouraging and meant that the 0930 Ops Briefing was providing 
the structure and information that people needed. There were of course areas for 
improvement. 
Looking at each component in turn it can be seen that tasks and responsibilities (S:R) 
stood out from the others by receiving a significant number of negative replies. There 
was consternation that there was not an even distribution of workload and responsibility 
across the operating groups and some people felt that they were targeted unfairly when 
performance fell short of prescribed goals. However, the content of the PMR system 
(S:C) was considered to be very good, only receiving one negative comment from a 
possible 18. The integrity of the system (S:I) was also acceptable and manageability 
(S:M) was again considered to be very high just receiving one negative remark out of 
18. 
In order to increase the success of the structural side of the PMR system then the 
distribution of workload and responsibilities would need to be brought into line with 
what people were able to do, or expected to do. 
On the behavioural side there were 99 positive responses, 71 negative and 18 
uncertain. The category that showed the most acceptance amongst the group was 
action orientation (B:AO), which indicated that there was overwhelming agreement that 
performance information was being integrated in the daily activities of the employees. 
In contrast, there was a significant problem with alignment (B:AL). This represents the 
alignment that other non-operations departments such as Finance and HR have with 
the daily operation. The evidence showed that there was virtually no involvement by 
these departments and they did not consider operations performance when exercising 
their duties. In can be argued that they do not need to do so because their role did not 
directly influence the day-to-day running of the airline. Indeed it was clear that many 
people felt this way. However, their functions do play an important part in the planning 
and preparation that goes into making the operation a success. If the airline did not 
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maintain good financial relationships with its suppliers, then it would negatively impact 
the operation. Equally, if HR did not fulfil their obligations in efficiently providing 
benefits to employees, or in meeting their recruitment goals then this would also affect 
the operation. A pertinent example was when HR was unable to recruit sufficient pilots 
against the timeline that was planned by Crew Planning and Training. The airline went 
for several months with a shortage of crewmembers that resulted in numerous flight 
cancellations and a failure to provide reliable service. The other category that was poor 
was management style (B:MS). Of the 41 possible responses only 14 were positive 
and 27 negative. This indicated that senior management were still out of touch with 
how to effectively and supportively run a flight operation. It was remarked on several 
occasions that we were a finance company that happened to be an airline, rather than 
first and foremost an airline. It was demonstrated on several occasions that the 
revenue of the airline was held in higher regard than the employees and sometimes 
even safety.    
These results from the behavioural side showed that there was still much work to do to 
bring these categories into alignment with the others. . 
When comparing the structural and behavioural aspects together, of the 252 possible 
responses 147 in the affirmative, 87 negative and 18 uncertain. This equates to 59% of 
the responses indicating that the system was working according to the criteria set forth, 
but 34% in disagreement. These results were then transferred into a bar graph (Figure 
7-7) that more clearly shows the composition of each category:   
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Figure 7-7 Content analysis summary – Cycle 4 
When comparing the individual components of each aspect it can be readily seen that 
the problems lie in: management style, which scored only 31% positive, and alignment 
with a lowly 11%. The most highly rated was action orientation at 89%. 
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A graphical depiction of the interviewees’ content analysis also helps to provide a clear 
picture of where everyone stood in relation to one another. Figure 7-8 is a simple 
stacked bar graph showing the proportion of answers that were considered as either 
positive, negative or uncertain. 
 
Figure 7-8 Distribution of answers by interviewee – Cycle 4 
When the responses of each interviewee were aggregated across both aspects of the 
PMR system it can be seen that there is a cluster of two people who expressed very 
positive thoughts and remarks: DOM and SOCDM, and a sub cluster comprising DO, 
DIF, MCS and GORM whose responses were positive more than 50% of the time. This 
was interesting because it represented people from all four major operations 
departments: Flight Operations, Maintenance, Ground Operations and the SOC. On 
the opposite end of the spectrum was DOF and DOS who expressed more negative 
comments than positive. 
On the whole the attitudes and behaviours of the interviewees to the 0930 Operations 
Briefing  was healthy and encouraging with 59% of the remarks being positive, 34% 
negative, and 7% uncertain. This showed that at this stage the system was proving 
useful and informative. These results also indicated that while the managers might 
have adopted the necessary behaviours, senior management certainly had not.  
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7.6 Summary of Findings 
The findings for this cycle of research have been summarised in line with the objectives 
set forth at the beginning of the cycle. 
7.6.1 Introduction of Cross-Department Operations Briefing 
The first objective of designing and implementing a cross-department performance 
review system was accomplished with the introduction of the 0930 Operations Briefing. 
It was designed to take advantage of the lessons learned in the first three cycles and to 
follow the guidance in the literature (Bourne et al. 2000; De Waal 2002; De Waal 2004; 
Van Riel et al. 2009).   
This performance review is now simply referred to by all parties as “the nine-thirty”, no 
other explanation is needed. It has been in existence for two years and has proven to 
be a very valuable communication and collaboration tool for all operations 
departments. 
7.6.2 Behavioural Response 
The second objective was to evaluate how the managers responded to this system by 
conducting semi-structured interviews to identify their behaviours.  
The aggregated findings show that when compared to de Waal’s nine aspects of 
performance management there was significant agreement that the correct structure 
was in place to allow people to engage with the PMR system. Similarly, when 
examining behaviours there was also significant agreement that the interviewees were 
demonstrating behaviours conducive to effectively interacting with the PMR system. 
This evidence suggested that the introduction of the 0930 Operations Briefing was 
successful and facilitated a previously unattained level of insight to operations 
performance and provided a mechanism to illuminate and collaboratively discuss 
performance shortfalls. There are improvements to be made to this system but its 
success lies in its design and an implementation that was supported. 
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7.6.3 Structure and behaviour 
The third objective was to use the work of de Waal (De Waal 2004) to examine whether 
the structural and behavioural aspects of the system were being met. This was 
accomplished through content analysis of the interview transcripts. 
The evidence showed that the structural side of the PMR system was healthy and 
provided the necessary framework and organisation that the managers needed. 
However, there was still room for improvement, especially in the level of responsibility 
that the system should provide, but it could be considered a success.    
On the behavioural side of the system the picture was not as optimistic. Although the 
number of positive responses slightly outweighed the negative responses it was clear 
that the behavioural aspects of the PMR system still needed significant work before the 
system could be considered a success. Significant improvement was needed in 
alignment and management style. However, for this to happen there would need to be 
an intervention and change of tactics on behalf of senior management. The interview 
transcripts painted a disturbing picture of a culture that was rife with threats and blame. 
If that is not addressed then the behavioural side of the PMR system would not 
strengthen. This may eventually take its toll on those who have to engage with it. 
The overall cycle has again confirmed that behavioural reactions play an important role 
in the successful implementation and use of a PMR system. Positive behaviours are 
not automatically adopted by managers, unless there is a corresponding support 
structure in place and the necessary training and education on how to interpret 
performance results.  
7.7 Reflection 
The 0930 Operations Briefing was my attempt at bringing some normality back to how 
we interacted as a group and dealt with performance deficiencies. The meeting that it 
replaced, which was the 0600 mandatory conference call was simply punishment for 
everyone and served no productive purpose. It epitomised the bullying tactics that we 
began to see more frequently in 2008 and 2009 when senior management, through 
lack of any other intellectual ways of dealing with poor performance, resorted to blame, 
threats, bullying and deliberately causing inconvenience by over-reacting to operational 
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issues. This was indicative of panic on their part and was in response to pressure 
exerted by Northwest Airlines and Delta Airlines. 
It caused a great deal of resentment and discord. Morale declined further. The scars 
from this period are still in evidence today (2010) and people comment about those 
times with scorn. Perhaps representative of their inconsistent approach, there have 
been six different Vice Presidents of the Flight Operations department during my six 
year tenure with the airline. This is quite remarkable and indicative of the dictatorial 
approach that the senior executive team pursued. The VP was expected to ‘toe the 
line’ and simply enact their dictates. This only went so far before resistance was met.  
At one period in 2008 I tried taking these findings and this message to the COO and 
President. They listened, disagreed, and then quietly began restricting me from 
involvement in senior level meetings. They did not like my findings, did not want to hear 
what I had to say, and thought that problems could be controlled by maintaining the 
pressure on people. 
However, the 0930 Operations Briefing continues to this day (2011) and has evolved 
into a very useful and integral part of our daily activities. It has been further refined to 
account for changes in our business and particularly to reflect our operating strategy, 
which has finally become a central point of focus for everyone. Some of the 
performance data that was presented in tables is now presented in graphs to allow 
easy interpretation of the results and to show trends over time. In 2009, I passed off the 
responsibility for this meeting to one of my managers and it is encouraging and 
refreshing to see that she has revamped it to make it even more informative and 
accessible. This is of particular satisfaction to me because I spent several years during 
both the third and fourth cycle of research actively coaching and mentoring this 
individual, along with the other SOC managers, and she has risen to the challenge and 
become a much stronger and more capable manager. My role in her education was a 
conscious intervention because of what I had learned at Allegheny about how people 
did not really know what to do with performance results, how to interpret them and kept 
quiet so as not to show their ignorance. This individual stubbornly applied her own 
construction system to the newly redesigned review and it met with praise upon 
introduction. 
The benefits of combining quantitative analysis on top of the qualitative analysis helped 
to validate the results and gave richer and deeper insight. Nevertheless, the level of 
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detail gained from talking to everyone and being able to get very close to the data was 
unparalleled. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the fourth and final cycle of research. It has described how 
the introduction of a cross-department operations briefing was well-received and 
provided benefit to those involved.  
It has also provided evidence that strongly links behavioural reactions to the success of 
a PMR system and has shown that these behavioural reactions must be nurtured and 
encouraged, rather than be expected to occur unaided. 
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Chapter Eight 
8. DISCUSSION OF OVERALL FINDINGS (CYCLES 1- 4) 
The objective of this chapter is to amalgamate the findings from all four cycles of 
research and assess whether the aims and objectives of the research have been 
achieved. 
The findings from the four cycles of research have been summarised below by relating 
them back to the six overall objectives, listed in chapter one, that were established at 
the outset of the research project. 
1. Design and introduce a formal operations performance 
measurement and review (PMR) system 
There were actually three separate instances of the design and introduction of PMR 
systems throughout the four cycles: one at Allegheny Airlines and two at Pinnacle 
Airlines. At the outset, the lofty expectation was that by trying to create an awareness 
of the key determinants of performance, linking them to the company’s strategy and 
vision, and assigning accountability for individual measures it would generate a sense 
of ownership and a desire for real and continual improvement (Fitzgerald et al. 1991; 
Kaplan and Norton 1992; Neely et al. 1997; Simons 2000). This was not successfully 
accomplished at Allegheny, but at Pinnacle there was evidence to show that the PMR 
system promoted and encouraged a level of engagement in these behaviours. One of 
the major differences was the approach taken. 
The initial implementation at Allegheny suffered from some elementary problems by not 
directly assigning ownership for the measures and not providing an assertive level of 
accountability. Additionally the array of measures was at first too broad and included 
some that were uncontrollable by the managers and directors. There was not a true 
team spirit, or collaborative approach that linked all departments to seek solutions to 
problems together, and this resulted in blame and an uncommitted response. All too 
often people tended to avoid the true issues and therefore the ability to learn was not 
fostered. This was largely due to the culture that existed. The airline was very mature 
and had been in existence for over 40 years. Many of the employees were long-serving 
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and accustomed to the non-communicative, and at times micro-management style of 
the CEO. This led in some instances to complacency and an unhurried approach when 
dealing with problems. This is supported by findings from the literature suggesting that 
there is interplay between organisational culture, management styles and performance 
measurement and the need for a consultative management approach (Bititci et al. 
2006). 
There was also a significant lack of knowledge regarding the cause and effect linkages 
of the performance measures that should have been addressed prior to the systems’ 
implementation. However, as time progressed the system matured and developed into 
a more useful and informative review that was gaining momentum before the airline 
announced its pending merger. 
At Pinnacle, the PMR systems built upon the knowledge gained at Allegheny and were 
therefore more successful. This prior experience actually led to a burgeoning effort 
during cycle three that engrossed the SOC managers in more and varied attempts at 
measuring many other aspects of performance that were originally out of the scope of 
the research project, such as dispatch release audits and customer service telephone 
audits. Involving the managers in the design and implementation of the system also 
proved to be a significant contributing factor to its successful use. The PMR system 
evolved and matured and is still a cornerstone of the everyday activities of the 
operations mangers.  
The general framework contained within a balanced scorecard seemed like a good 
vehicle from which to launch a performance measurement drive at both airlines 
because it encouraged the use of a balanced presentation of performance measures. 
Without this foundational concept, it would have been all too easy to focus the 
measures simply on operating performance and neglect other equally important areas 
such as the ability to identify and learn from performance shortfalls. This concept alone 
was new for most of the interviewees because they had not previously considered that 
a broad sweep of measures across all facets of the operation was important. The need 
to use both financial and non-financial measures was pivotal in providing a more well-
rounded understanding of the company’s overall purpose. This also provided the 
lagging and leading indicators of performance. Additionally, by borrowing from the 
concept put forth by Fitzgerald, and placing a focus on the determining factors of good 
performance, realistic measures were devised that could guide future improvement 
(Fitzgerald et al. 1991). Indeed, the objective of identifying areas for developing the 
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skills of managers and their subordinates and then committing to providing them was 
not previously considered as an activity that should garner attention from senior 
management. 
It was evident at both airlines that the company culture and management style had a 
significant impact on the successful implementation of the PMR systems. This is 
supported by Bititci et al (2006) who found that PMR systems “through cultural change, 
lead to a more participative and consultative management style” (p.1344). They 
concluded that “external stimuli, including action researchers, play an important role in 
leading managers to change their management styles” (p.1344).  
At Allegheny, there was an attempt to engage with the PMR system but the underlying 
crisis made it difficult for the managers to feel that they were making a difference. At 
Pinnacle, there was a pervasive tendency for senior management to focus on 
performance shortfalls and make a big deal of them while neglecting to recognise what 
was really going well or why the shortfall had occurred. This led to a considerable 
deterioration in morale and a sense of apathy towards the measurement process…”no 
matter what you do, it is not good enough”. The underlying ‘blame’ culture and a 
tendency for each department to operate independently led to defensive behaviours 
that further served to isolate various aspects of the operation. This was aggravated 
when the senior officers interfered in the daily operation and created unnecessary 
panic. Far from encouraging better performance they actual contributed to an attitude 
of disengagement and an unwillingness to go above and beyond. Every shortfall 
therefore became a crisis and after a while the employees stopped taking their cries for 
“work harder”, “set your hair on fire”, and “get your head in the game”, seriously. 
Indeed, these well-worn ‘motivators’ became something of a joke amongst the 
managers, resulting in a decline in morale, a loss of focus and a general feeling of 
helplessness. Despite this, there was still perseverance with the formal PMR process 
and people remained engaged. This was because the ownership of the PMR system 
did not reside in the senior management ranks and there was some personal pride 
being taken by the managers in making the reviews effective. Had senior management 
been responsible for the PMR system then the result would undoubtedly have been a 
disengagement from the system. However, there was a lack of true motivation to seek 
solutions to problems at their root cause. The primary response from many managers 
was to explain a particular delay or cancellation, and then remove themselves from the 
spotlight without elaborating on the underlying causes. 
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Was the BSC the right PM framework to use for this implementation? I believe so. 
Despite the criticisms in the literature it did provide a good basis from which to tailor the 
PMR system at both Allegheny and Pinnacle. However, it did not provide any link to 
rewards or benefits for achieving performance goals. Professor Ken Merchant (De 
Waal 2005) is quoted as saying that the BSC “has been oversold” (p.31) and that “the 
advocates basically sell everybody a hammer and then state that everything is a nail, 
hitting it as much as possible will solve the problem” (p.31). I thought that this was a 
rather amusing remark, and whether this is actually the case or not in its wider 
application in other industries, it did not bear any similarity with how the PMR system 
was implemented and used during this research project. It does however, point to the 
fact that if managed without care then there is an inherent risk that the system could be 
overused. At both Allegheny and Pinnacle the systems were kept alive and carefully 
monitored by a facilitator (in this case, me) who continued to promote them and require 
attendance and participation. 
The BSC remains the most prevalent and influential performance measurement system 
to date, despite concerns over how to select and implement measures in practice, and 
especially with keeping them relevant to organisational changes (Paranjape et al. 
2006). During its use at Allegheny and Pinnacle the PMR system was in a continuous 
state of refinement, not only to ensure the measures were relevant but also to ensure 
that the presentation of the data remained meaningful. 
Of most satisfaction, and an enduring success, was the 0930 Operations Briefing that 
continues to this day and provides the meeting that all operations departments are 
required to attend and participate in. It is now attended by senior management and 
recognised as a very important facet of the daily operation. 
2. Examine how individual managers view and understand the 
measurement of operations performance and how it relates to their 
everyday job function 
This was accomplished over all four cycles by continually examining the responses 
displayed by managers to the PMR system implementations and their subsequent use 
of it after they had become familiar with it. At both airlines prior to the PMR systems it 
was enlightening, and rather disappointing, to discover that insufficient emphasis was 
placed on standard airline operating metrics and that only elementary discussions took 
place when performance fell short of the prescribed goals. This led me to further 
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assess each manager’s knowledge regarding operations performance. At both airlines 
the staff charged with making the strategic, tactical and operational decisions had a 
poor understanding of what the primary measures meant, and little or no knowledge of 
how they were measured. This was further compounded by the complexity of airline 
operations, which required a good deal of broad operating knowledge to properly 
comprehend. This led to missed opportunities to truly rectify problems and improve 
performance. 
At Allegheny, my research led to the conclusion that there was a real lack of 
understanding of the determinants of performance within the airline, and revealed a 
culture that was not conducive to fostering performance-driven behaviour. While most 
of the managers understood that performance measurement was necessary they could 
not readily articulate what the measures meant or how they were derived. There were 
big concerns about the alignment of measures and who should be held accountable. 
Communication and senior management support were seen as highly significant 
factors in the failure to properly establish a performance drive, leading to the 
conclusion that the prevailing culture, associated with the ongoing crisis, prevented a 
commitment to embrace change. These findings are supported by Cheng et al (Cheng 
et al. 2007) who established through research case studies that the barriers to 
implementing PMR systems “stem from a lack of senior management commitment and 
support, employee resistance to change, and a absence of appropriate learning 
interventions to facilitate their introduction” (p.72). In contrast Neely et al (1995) claim 
that “managers find it relatively easy to decide what they should be measuring” (p.93). 
In my experience, I found that it is a source of great frustration in deciding upon what to 
measure and how to measure it. It can be just as hard to establish realistic and 
achievable goals that motivate people to excel. Indeed in a later publication Neely et al 
agree that designing performance measures is a complex process that requires careful 
consideration (Neely Andy et al.  1997). 
At Pinnacle I was able to use this previously discovered knowledge to aid in educating 
the SOC managers about how a change in one variable could have a consequent 
affect on another, or several others. This education process was long and continues to 
this day as different people become involved in performance related projects. However, 
it has had an undeniable effect. Not only do the SOC managers now instinctively know 
what the cause of a problem is, they are able to competently address it with long-term 
solutions and not simply apply a quick fix and move on. 
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In both airlines the promotion of performance measurement was left to the operating 
managers and was not at all driven by the senior leadership. At Allegheny, the 
managers were left to defend for themselves with the only motivation being to have 
answers for the weekly US airways conference call. At Pinnacle, the leadership made 
noises towards the operating goals but there was no discussion or communication of 
corporate objectives, no structured PMR systems, and no balanced goals. It can be 
argued that both of these cases are wholly unacceptable, but it would not be surprising 
to learn that they exist in much the same form in other airlines and companies. 
However, it is a fundamental lack of true leadership that can result in employees being 
‘at risk’ and in danger of leaving the company, especially if they feel unsupported. 
At both airlines, there was considerable disquiet about the coding of delays. Managers 
were keen to avoid problems being incorrectly attributed to their area of responsibility 
and so a great deal of effort was invested in researching and changing delay codes so 
that they did not get blamed for poor performance. This resultant effort in correcting 
delay codes took a lot of time and resources. According to Edvardsson (1992) “in 
service companies it is estimated that as much as 35 percent of the staff are employed 
in correcting the mistakes made by the others” (p.17). It would therefore seem to be 
critical to ensure that these mistakes are rectified, However, there was not an initiative 
to actually try to fix the incorrect coding by training the gate agents who were 
responsible for coding delays to accomplish it with more accuracy. Performance 
measures and their objectives need to be more clearly communicated to all employees 
such that mistakes can be avoided. 
The findings from the initial research results during cycle one convinced me that the 
behavioural reactions of employees were of key importance to the success of a PMR 
system. 
3. Investigate how each manager regarded and assessed the 
behavioural reactions of their colleagues in response to, and while 
engaging with, a PMR system 
This was accomplished primarily through the use of repertory grids. The repertory grid 
process prompted introspection and a psychological slant to making sense of other 
peoples’ construction systems. This was an eye-opening and at times humbling 
experience. This method was invaluable in eliciting constructs that dealt with 
behaviours and then directly comparing those behaviours across all elements 
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(interviewees). The analysis routines used (Process, Eyeball, Construct 
Characterisation, and Cluster Analysis) all provided slightly different angles to the 
elicited constructs and served to effectively build an emergent picture of how each 
individual construed their role, their behaviours and the behaviours of others. These 
behavioural reactions were primarily assessed during the second and third cycles by 
examining and reflecting on the individual grids. This also provided me with a unique 
insight to whether the team was working together or not.  
At Allegheny, it showed that there was a small cluster of three people, out of seven, 
who were exhibiting similar behaviours and that nobody was very dissimilar. This 
suggested a level of cohesion and a uniform acceptance by the interviewees that the 
displayed attitudes and behaviours were acceptable. At Pinnacle, there was a greater 
diversity of constructs but again there was acceptance that the demonstrated 
behaviours of the group were acceptable. 
The use of repertory grids proved to be a useful tool in identifying the important 
attitudes and behaviours and understanding their impact. It allowed an assessment of 
the behavioural modifications that were required to successfully operate within the 
existing culture. It is acknowledged that a company’s culture will not change 
appreciably in the short-term and it is therefore better to harness the already existing 
positive behaviours and attempt to modify those that are not in alignment. In concert 
with this must be a carefully designed effort to provide the necessary education and 
support that are needed to fully understand the system and the implications of the 
results. Additionally, when a culture of blame persists people seek to achieve the 
numbers without really trying to improve overall performance. This was seen at its 
worst at Pinnacle where the finger pointing and a blame mentality forced people to be 
defensive, so that the spotlight did not fall upon them. There was not a unified effort to 
improve overall performance. This was exemplified during the winter of 2007/2008 
when the “light your hair on fire” speeches were farcical in nature. 
4. Identify the displayed attitudes and behaviours of managers in 
response to a PMR system 
Of most benefit to achieving this objective was the multi-grid content analysis 
(bootstrapping) which yielded the demonstrated behavioural categories that could then 
be assessed as being exhibited positively or negatively. This directly provided insight to 
how each member of the interview team was rated in terms of the displayed behaviours 
311 
 
that were considered important by the interview group. As a consequence, it allowed 
the facilitator to see who needed to modify their behaviours and also which behaviours 
were being displayed in a weaker manner than others. 
These behavioural categories, while not exhaustive, were considered by the 
interviewee group as being important to the use of the PMR system. The categories 
from both airlines are listed in Table 8-1 and show that there was significant 
commonality between the two. The category titles were taken from the themes of the 
core constructs in each common group.  
 
ALLEGHENY 
# 
co
ns
tru
ct
s 
  PINNACLE 
# 
co
ns
tru
ct
s 
          
Conscientiousness 15   Demeanour 15 
Accountability and Responsibility 14   Conscientiousness 14 
Teamwork 14   Teamwork 11 
Demeanour 12   Motivation 11 
 Flexibility and Creativity 10   Knowledge & Skill 10 
Big Picture View 9   Accountability and Responsibility 6 
Delegation and Territory 4   Delegation and Territory 3 
Motivation 4   Flexibility and Creativity 2 
      Big Picture View 2 
         
Overall: 82   Overall: 74 
 
Table 8-1 Behavioural Categories 
These behavioural factors played a very important role in the implementation and use 
of the PMR systems at both airlines.  
The second cycle at Allegheny surfaced eight behavioural categories that were 
displayed and observed by the management team. The three considered by the group 
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to be the most important were: conscientiousness, accountability and teamwork. The 
results at Allegheny showed that there was reasonably good cohesion among the 
Flight Department managers and directors and that the observed and described 
behaviours were not markedly dissimilar. Three of the eight interviewees were actually 
marked as demonstrating positive behaviours when considered across the eight 
identified behavioural categories, but not in each category. Improvement was needed. 
The evidence showed that the neutral and negative behaviours were the result of the 
stress that everyone was under during the ongoing crisis, the inability to take 
ownership of business processes, and the lack of education, training and senior 
management leadership and support.  
At Pinnacle, there were nine behavioural categories, of which the top three were 
demeanour, conscientiousness and teamwork. It is very interesting to note that two of 
these coincided with the observed behaviours at Allegheny. This suggests that there is 
an intrinsic and personal value to these two categories and that a PMR system 
implementation should be mindful to ensure that these behaviours are actively 
supported and encouraged. Similar to Allegheny, three of the eight interviewees were 
demonstrating positive behaviours when considered across all nine behavioural 
categories. The evidence showed that the neutral and negative behaviours were the 
result of a lack of education and training and an underlying culture of imparting blame. 
Both examples showed a strong convergence with de Waal’s (De Waal 2004) findings, 
which supports the assertion that individual attitudes and behaviours are important to 
the successful implementation and use of a PMR system. This is also reflected in de 
Waal’s later work reinforcing the importance of the behavioural dimensions of 
performance measurement (De Waal 2010).  
In order for a system to be effective and embraced by those using it, it must adequately 
address these behaviours, but the larger more significant contributor is the underlying 
culture and management style. During a period of crisis, morale can suffer greatly, as 
was seen at Allegheny, and if this is not held together by a strong positive culture it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to attain the objectives of a change initiative unless there 
is an inherent ownership promoted at all levels. 
As a result of this research it is possible to state that there are behavioural reactions, 
specific to each airline context, that lend themselves to a successful PMR system. 
However, it is far more than just the attitudes and reactions of managers. Cycle four 
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showed that despite a very good effort from the managers the system will not be 
successful without a corresponding level of support from senior management.  
5. Discover what effect the underlying business state of crisis or 
growth has on the managers’ attitudes and behaviours to the PMR 
system 
The ongoing crisis and eventual demise of Allegheny had a big impact on the 
behaviour of managers and played a significant role in the implementation and use of 
the PMR system. There was initially a move to embrace it and an attempt to improve 
performance in the belief that there was still time to save Allegheny but this was 
overshadowed by the additional problems that arose surrounding the inability to truly 
understand the performance results and the sense of helplessness. However, for three 
of the managers, the crisis did influence them to engage with the PMR system more 
than their peers. They sought to learn the really important performance indicators and 
to measure what was controllable. For them there was an energy that had not existed 
previously. In contrast were the other five managers for whom the crisis had more of a 
negative impact. They displayed this in their unwillingness to participate and an attitude 
of ‘why bother’. 
At Pinnacle, the state of growth itself was a motivator. There was an inherent 
willingness to embrace the PMR system and to try to make use of it. This was also 
because the PMR system implementation had involved the managers from the outset 
and they had developed a feeling of ownership.  
It was interesting to conclude that the although the business climate had an impact at 
both airlines it was not the sole driving factor behind behaviours. At Pinnacle, there was 
an eagerness to get involved and do better simply because the airline was growing and 
it was a new and exciting endeavour. The complacency that existed at Allegheny can 
be attributed to the crisis but also to the lack of direction support and guidance 
provided by the CEO. 
The findings from both airlines have shown that there were many similarities between 
the two, despite the different states of crisis and growth. The objective must therefore 
be to identify and understand behavioural reactions in order to provide insight and 
guidance for the use of a PMR system when the business climate is changing. 
Understanding the major influences and anticipating behavioural reactions will lead to a 
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more informed approach when engaging employees in a PMR initiative and can 
provide greater motivation. 
6. Draw conclusions on the value of the employee as a stakeholder 
having responsibility for operations performance, to the success of 
a PMR system 
The literature to a large extent takes a detached view of performance measurement 
and does not pay sufficient attention to the value of the employee as a significant 
stakeholder in a PMR system. After all, what we are trying to encourage is 
performance-driven behaviour. If it is expected to happen in response to the PMR 
system then it requires involvement and training. 
What has been determined from these studies is that for a PMR system to be 
successful not only must a supportive organisational structure exist, but significant 
attention must be paid to the existing behavioural factors and the prevailing culture of 
the organisation. Also, of paramount importance is education for the individual to 
effectively engage with the system and ensure that they are able to understand what 
each metric means and their control over the outcome. In the case of Allegheny, the 
introduction of the PMR system was largely unsuccessful. This was attributed to 
insufficient involvement of the managers during the design phase, lack of any real 
senior management support and an ongoing crisis that had thrown the airline into a 
state of chaos where managers had no direction, no authority, an uncertain future, and 
a lack of initiative to do anything outside of protecting their own territory. The result was 
an uncommitted reaction to an imposed system that did not sufficiently align itself with 
the roles and responsibilities of the managers. There was not much enthusiasm to 
embrace the concept and no incentive to be accountable for the measures. This 
highlighted some of the structural and behavioural factors that contributed to an 
unsuccessful implementation. The introduction of a performance review system at 
Pinnacle was much more successful, and gradually led to a deeper and more informed 
performance culture among the managers, but it still suffered form the same issues 
identified at Allegheny, namely education and a lack of senior management support. 
It can be concluded that a great deal of value must be placed on the employee as a 
stakeholder in a successful PMR system implementation. It is the employee who must 
strive to achieve the performance goals and to do this they must feel valued and 
supported. The evidence of this research has shown that managers will not 
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automatically adopt the behaviours necessary to achieve performance goals. These 
behaviours must be developed over time by ensuring that the implementation 
addresses the structure and behavioural side of the PMR system to allow people to 
engage with it and produce the desired results. This is supported by Bititci et al (Bititci 
et al. 2006), who assert that managers will not readily change their management style 
without external stimuli. 
8.1 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the collective findings from all four cycles of research and 
related them back to the original objectives. 
An overall conclusion can be drawn that shows that the successful implementation and 
use of a PMR initiative is dependent on the right behavioural reactions of the managers 
who engage with it, but this must be coupled with education, training and support. 
316 
 
Chapter Nine 
9. CONTRIBUTION 
This chapter seeks to identify the contribution to knowledge and in particular, because 
it was practitioner research, the contribution to professional practice and the 
corresponding contribution to learning. 
9.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
The central theme of this research, which was to understand behavioural reactions and 
provide insight on how a regional airline can better engage employees in a productive 
effort to improve operations performance, has been addressed through four cycles of 
research across two different airlines. These four cycles represent clear examples of 
the implementation, use of and refinement of PMR systems that were designed to 
provide a balanced view of each airline’s operations performance. This was necessary 
because the literature generally lacked examples of research undertaken from the 
perspective of those who are required to engage with a PMR system and especially 
because there was no literature examining the behavioural reactions within an airline. 
The study has reached beyond the detached view of performance and delved very 
deeply into the personal aspects of how managers’ attitudes and behaviours are 
affected by, and can impact, their ability to successfully work within a highly measured 
environment. The research has looked at the behavioural reactions to imposed 
measurement systems, collaboratively designed measurement systems, and the 
impact on these behaviours by the business climate. The overall success or failure of a 
PMR initiative is ultimately influenced by all of these factors, but of special importance 
is the need to gain acceptance from managers and to ensure that sufficient training and 
awareness of the measures and results is achieved before holding managers 
accountable. Being able to address these before implementation will lead to a more 
committed approach to the PMR system and can result in performance-driven 
behaviour. 
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Even though these studies were restricted to two airlines, the results should be 
meaningful to other airlines that are considering a more robust approach to measuring 
and reviewing operations performance. The results themselves may not be applicable, 
but the realisation that human attitudes and behaviours are centrally important can 
guide managers in their formulation and deployment of PMR systems.  
It can be difficult to encourage the positive behavioural reactions that lead to a greater 
level of involvement and ownership. To do so successfully requires an understanding 
of the influences and actions that shape individual behaviour and define the culture of 
the company. In addition, it is important to understand the effect that the business 
environment can have on motivation and commitment. The research addressed this by 
examining in-situ, and in-depth, the reactions, behaviours and attitudes of managers 
when they had to use a PMR system and sought to understand whether the system 
motivated them to adopt positive behaviours as suggested in the literature. The results 
have shown that the transition from not having and using a formal PMR system to 
collectively agreeing upon using a PMR system, and how to make it work in two 
separate airlines can take a tremendous amount of time and effort and requires 
commitment and support. 
The original framework, derived from the literature, showed that the desired 
behavioural reactions during a BSC implementation were expected to be displayed 
after following a logical sequence of designing a PMR system around a company’s 
operating strategy, implementing it, and then relying on those who engage with it to 
adopt the necessary behaviours and attitudes to meet performance goals (Kaplan and 
Norton 1992). This implied that the goals themselves would provide inspiration, and the 
initiative to spur people on to achieve them (Figure 9-1).  
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System Design 
System 
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PMR System 
Outcomes
 
Figure 9-1 Original PMR System Implementation Model Adapted From the Literature 
However, the research has demonstrated that in these two particular cases the 
attitudes and behaviours of the managers and directors were not directly affected by 
the introduction of a PMR system, but they did have a profound effect upon the 
effectiveness of the system and that positive behaviours are not automatically 
displayed by those who engage with it. This was also supported by de Waal (De Waal 
2002; De Waal 2003a; De Waal 2003b,  2004) who found that behavioural reactions 
were very significant to the successful implementation and use of a PMR system. 
At both Allegheny and Pinnacle there was a significant lack of education in terms of 
interpreting performance data, and the ability to drive down to the determining factors 
of poor performance was not readily apparent. Consideration and planning for attitudes 
and behaviours should take place at the strategy formulation stage and at each 
319 
 
subsequent step in the design and implementation of a PMR system. Measuring and 
subsequently interpreting airline operations performance is complex. Each outcome 
measure is the result of actions taking place across the breadth of the company’s 
operation and requires extensive knowledge of the inner workings of all aspects of the 
production line. 
Within these two airlines there was evidence to suggest that a more appropriate 
approach to implementing a PMR system was to consider the approach in reverse 
order by first deciding what behavioural reactions you want to achieve and then 
determine how the company’s strategy can best be communicated to everyone so that 
the eventual response is positive. To do so requires a detailed understanding of the 
company’s culture and the prevalent attitudes and behaviours of those who will be 
influential in working with the system. This is not to say that the system must be 
moulded around the attitudes in existence because they may be negative but to first 
understand the human and social side of the group and then provide in-depth 
education on the system, measures, results and in particular how to analyse and 
interpret them. 
Based on my findings, Figure 9-2 modifies the model derived from the literature by 
acknowledging that the PMR initiative must also take account of the prevailing 
business climate, attitudes and behaviours and management style that will eventually 
lead to performance driven behaviour. 
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Figure 9-2 Revised Model for PMR System Implementation 
The changes in this model are based on the evidence contained within the thesis. Not 
all people will naturally relate to this. At Pinnacle in particular, where the culture was 
one of blame and threats, there was little, if any, emphasis placed on what mattered to 
people and how to successfully harness their positive behavioural reactions. 
Nevertheless, it remains a thorough reflection of the situations as related to me during 
the various interview stages and represents a more intuitively systematic and 
encompassing approach than simply forcing people to accept something that they do 
not instinctively understand or know how to engage with. 
This research has therefore shown the evolvement from the fairly strong approach of 
expecting behaviours to the softer, more encouraging approach of cultivating 
behaviours through systematic training and education and recognising that humans will 
321 
 
react in personal ways. For example, the response of managers to Pinnacle’s ‘set your 
hair on fire’ speech was displayed across the whole spectrum, from being inspired to 
being totally divorced and despondent with this misconceived approach. 
The contribution from this research must then be a continuing growth in appreciation of 
human behaviours and the social needs and reactions of the influential people who will 
ultimately determine the success of a PMR system. 
9.2 Contribution to Professional Practice 
I have been working on this research and working within this subject matter for over 
seven years now at the time of concluding this thesis, and it is a little difficult to 
accurately articulate what has been achieved from the perspective of professional 
practice because it has simply been so extensive. My personal learning has been 
turned to good use within the day-to-day practice of running the operations of both of 
these airlines and also in my ability to motivate, nurture and train managers. In a very 
real sense, it has had a dramatic impact on how I set direction and strategy for the 
future. The sheer amount of knowledge gained has been tremendous. Indeed, the 
lessons learned at Allegheny played a very important role in the introduction and use of 
a PMR system at Pinnacle and will inevitably factor into any organisation that I work for 
in the future. 
This study has effectively demonstrated how a researcher, who is also a practitioner 
intimately involved in the research situation, can make a big impact on the research 
when he himself is actively pursuing a change initiative through the methodology of 
Action Research. My recommendation to practitioners, citing the experience from this 
research, is that one needs to establish the underlying culture and behaviours before 
embarking on a change process that will require active involvement of managers. 
The ultimate goal in conducting a study such as this using an action research approach 
is to seek and implement improvements in practice and to contribute to overall 
organisational learning. This has been the undeniable benefit of this research and 
below I have briefly described the contributions to professional practice during each 
cycle. Collectively they amount to a unique body of work that enabled the managers in 
both companies to learn and grow from their experiences.  
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9.2.1 Cycle One Contribution  
During this formulation phase of the research the managers and directors in the Fight 
Department at Allegheny began to learn about the key performance metrics that were 
important to our parent airline and why they were significant. Consequently, they 
started to tentatively assume responsibility and accountability for trying to achieve 
them. This led to a fledgling start at engaging with an imposed PMR programme and 
trying to make sense of what was before, simply data. Having a structured PMR review 
meeting each week and exerting a little pressure in the form of increased accountability 
actually made the managers and directors prepare for the meeting, not wanting to look 
bad in front of their peers. This was aided by the fact that the PMR system presented 
data in a more easily understood format. It could be argued that this may inevitably 
have occurred anyway, as a result of the increasing pressure by US Airways, but 
equally argued that without the structure of a PMR system to more clearly see and 
understand the performance linkages and shortfalls and identify critical performance, it 
would not have been as effective. Without the introduction of the PMR system the 
managers and directors would have continued to struggle with the demands placed by 
US Airways and would have continued to avoid attending the conference call. It was a 
dreaded part of everyone’s week because we knew that criticism would be levelled at 
Allegheny, yet nobody was adequately prepared to refute it. Even though there was 
little support from the CEO, the PMR system did provide a robust foundation from 
which the managers and directors could learn, and allowed them to feel more 
comfortable when questioned by US Airways. 
The primary contribution during this cycle was introducing a system that required the 
management team to extend themselves and become more aware of how they could 
influence the performance of the airline. The findings from this cycle allowed me to 
think more deeply about how to continue with the PMR system and how to broaden its 
reach to the crewmembers. A further outcome of this first cycle was to sharpen my 
focus on the real topic that needed investigating, which were the behavioural reactions 
of the managers and directors.  
9.2.2 Cycle Two Contribution 
By the time I commenced cycle two, the PMR system was already well established and 
the management team knew what was expected of them. They had already benefited 
from the contribution of the first cycle and had begun to learn about the attitudes and 
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behaviours of their colleagues, and how to better collaborate and cooperate with them. 
It also provided each interviewee with an opportunity to introspectively consider their 
colleagues and their behaviours in the specific context of a professional setting. This 
encouraged the managers to try to make a difference, even if they felt that their efforts 
would not sway US Airways.  
This was still far from perfect, but it ensured that we kept momentum in the continued 
use of the PMR system, and the weekly reviews became more productive and useful. 
By intrinsically involving them in the presentation of the performance reviews it further 
solidified their knowledge and made them take a critical view of their area of 
responsibility and examine what could be improved. 
The results from cycle two also contributed to professional practice by identifying the 
behaviours that the management group were demonstrating, and also recognising 
other behaviours that de Waal had identified, which provided opportunities for personal 
improvement. 
9.2.3 Cycle Three Contribution 
The impact and contribution of cycle three continues to this day. Even though the 
research moved beyond the SOC to encompass all operating departments by the 
fourth cycle, the managers in the SOC are still continuously exposed to a philosophy of 
seeking permanent improvement, not only in the performance results, but also in the 
manner in which we measure, interpret and review the data. I use the word ‘permanent’ 
specifically to denote that improvement efforts need to have a long-term benefit, rather 
than being a reflexive reaction to solve a problem that in its solution may have 
unintended consequences. Airline performance is a complex and interwoven set of 
measures that are dependent on many variables. Adjusting one to solve a problem can 
cause a bigger problem unless thoroughly investigated and tested. Beforehand, the 
experience at Pinnacle was to rush to apply ‘band-aid’ fixes, but, inevitably, these 
turned out to be very short-term because of a lack of underlying knowledge in the 
linkages between performance components. 
The initial PMR system has been refined and modified numerous times to account for 
the continual lessons that were learned as it grew, and to adjust for changes in 
operating strategy. Not only has this led to a far greater level of knowledge but it has 
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also defined how we now run the daily operation with a vast array of more productive 
policies, procedures and methods that were not in existence before.  
I hold my managers to high standards and it is not easy for them to simply ‘get by’. 
They must continually demonstrate that they understand the data by making weekly 
presentations of performance in their area, with a detailed discussion of why the 
performance is what it is. Any variances that are worse than the established goals must 
be backed up with solid and verifiable reasons. This result of this is that the SOC 
managers have an intricate knowledge of the operation to a degree that maybe higher 
than the senior management of the airline. A downside is that when they provide an 
explanation for a performance variance the senior management group can have 
difficulty grasping it and are invariably sceptical because they assume they know 
better. It takes some effort on the manager’s part to eventually persuade them that they 
now instinctively know what happens in the operation. The SOC managers in some 
regards have become a threat to those higher up in the organisation who falsely 
believe they know things and this has led, on several occasions, to the insight provided 
by an SOC manager being dismissed, with the naive assumption that the senior 
manager knows best. This has fuelled a good deal of frustration. Unfortunately, it leads 
me to believe that there is little future for this kind of initiative and learning at an 
organisation that simply does not value it, and will not recognise that the experts do 
indeed know the right course of action, even if that action is in the face of what senior 
management believes. 
The most significant contribution to professional practice during cycle three was the 
introduction and perseverance with the weekly SOC Managers Meeting. The managers 
had to prepare for the meeting and more importantly interpret the data so that when 
called upon for explanations they could provide a rudimentary explanation of any 
performance variations. It was not easy for them to embrace this level of formal review. 
It was new to them, somewhat daunting, and they were uncomfortable and out of their 
element. It also required a higher degree of research and analysis on their part to trace 
the origins of particular delays or cancellations. Once they realised that it was not 
punitive, but rather a means to understand, learn and grow, they eventually began to 
prioritise this meeting as a central part of their week and the vehicle from which to raise 
operational concerns without fear, and to take pride in performance improvements in 
their area. Initially, this was a steep and long learning curve for everyone. They not only 
accepted this formal review, but actually began to see, perhaps for the first time, that 
their efforts could make a marked difference to the company’s overall performance. 
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The success of this effort also led to the monthly Flight Operations performance review. 
It also became a significant part of the Quarterly Managers Meeting, which required the 
SOC managers to make various presentations to the entire management group about 
operations performance. 
A further contribution was the introduction of periodic operations performance updates 
during the course of the operating day that were disseminated to a large audience 
throughout the company and contained pertinent and real-time information on 
operations performance. This not only broadened the reach of operations data to other 
departments that were on the periphery of the operation but it also served to bring 
closer meaning to those in the field who are divorced from the central operations 
centre. 
Pinnacle’s SOC is a much better run and managed organisation now that the 
managers’ daily activities include a critical look at operations performance and whether 
our operating strategy is still in line with the company’s mission. The managers have a 
clear purpose, well-defined goals and an appreciation of the strategic objectives that 
are relevant to their area of the operation. Each manager in the SOC has actually taken 
the lessons learned from their involvement in the PMR systems and this research and 
applied this knowledge to measuring various aspects of their departments that we 
would not have dreamed of doing before. This has included customer service 
telephone audits, and in particular dispatch release quality audits, which have been 
confirmed as the most rigorous in regional industry in North America. 
9.2.4 Cycle Four Contribution 
During the fourth cycle we had really begun to professionalise the daily performance 
review and put accountability and participation at the forefront. It was no longer 
acceptable to just read the numbers and then go about your day without paying further 
attention to them. 
The introduction of the 0930 Daily Operations Briefing was the first real attempt at 
bringing together disparate work groups and forcing them to discuss performance data 
and cooperate on finding solutions. The meeting has evolved since its first introduction 
and has grown in status. It is now recognised as the most important daily meeting to 
review and discuss the operations of the airline. It is even held on weekends via 
conference call. 
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Additionally, I developed a weekly operations performance dashboard that I present 
weekly at the senior staff meeting (Appendix E). This proved so popular that it has now 
been copied and used in two other airlines that are owned by our parent company. 
During this cycle I was also called upon to make a presentation to the Board of 
Directors on operations performance. This was a very unusual event and was a little 
intimidating. However, the presentation was very well received and I was offered praise 
from all who attended. In fact, it went so well that I was invited to present a modified 
version of it to other functional departments that were not normally involved in 
operations performance. This led to presentations to the Finance, Accounting, Human 
Resources and IT departments. For these presentations I also involved the SOC 
managers so that they could gain experience and also participate in a unique event. 
For all of us this was a contribution to our own professional practice because we now 
had to disseminate complex performance information to other departments in a manner 
that could be readily understood and digested. 
9.3 Contribution to Learning 
It is a little difficult to single out specific contributions to learning. Indeed, the forgoing 
discussions regarding contributions to professional practice also contain the main 
contributions to learning. The whole premise of action research is that it is research in 
action and requires active participation. By default, this results in learning. The 
knowledge gained during the first two cycles at Allegheny helped the airline further its 
ability to meet customer expectations and served to provide the foundation for the 
interventions that took place at Pinnacle during the third and fourth cycles.  
The contribution to learning can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, from the 
perspective of all of those involved in this research and secondly from my own personal 
perspective. When considered in the context of the people involved, it can be stated 
assuredly that there was a contribution to the individual learning at each stage of the 
research by the insights that it provided and the advances that we made in furthering 
the understanding and appreciation of operations performance results.    
At both airlines, people learned about themselves, their construct system and by 
extension how their colleagues behaved. This was noticeably evident during the 
repertory grid process when there was an awakening and realisation for many of the 
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interviewees that their construction system was based on prior experiences and 
perceptions, and that it was used to anticipate their response to events. It was also 
discovered that even though people had a positive outlook to the PMR system it did not 
automatically translate to positive behaviours with corresponding education on the 
facets of operations performance. The education that took place at both airlines about 
how to use a PMR system contributed to the growth and effectiveness of everyone 
involved. In the case of Pinnacle this resulted in the SOC managers reviewing 
performance data in a critical light and delving into the root causes without being 
prompted to do so. There is a natural inclination to be able to understand the 
phenomena and to explain it. This has been invaluable in identifying dysfunctional 
behaviour and correcting processes that under the surface are counter productive to 
the goals of the airline. 
From my own personal perspective, the increase in my knowledge and capability has 
been enormous. It has led to better judgement, a more attuned understanding of 
human nature and has had a tremendous influence on the way I manage and tackle 
problems. I do so in a much more methodical, thought-out, well-structured and indeed 
academic fashion. The whole process has been extremely beneficial to me personally 
and to the way in which my colleagues have engaged with and understood the 
measurement of operations performance. It has substantially elevated my ability to 
examine, critically appraise and analyse a problem and then go about solving it. 
Additionally I have unintentionally taken on the role of being a mentor and coach for 
people who are doing similar activities in the company. I find that I want to share my 
knowledge and experience with people and in particular to educate them on how to 
look beyond the performance numbers and to truly read the charts, and question the 
assumptions and initial conclusions. 
The lessons learned from the various implementations of PMR systems and the deeper 
knowledge gained of how people react to these systems has allowed me to be far more 
effective and take greater leadership, initiative and innovation in how we approach the 
measurement of critically important aspects of our organisation and in particular how 
we interpret the results. These lessons have, to a certain degree, been transferred to 
my direct reports and peers who worked with me during these ventures. The process 
became organic and spurned many other analyses and reviews that arguably would 
not otherwise have occurred.  
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In visits to other departments, it now becomes apparent to me that they are only in the 
elementary stages of truly understanding how to use a PMR system. The review is 
simply that, a review of the data with no informed or intelligent explanations of the true 
causes. The managers can fool themselves into believing that they are part of a 
productive process without actually making any informed insight.  Much of this is still 
unfortunately driven by senior management threats at Pinnacle. Whenever there is a 
performance deficiency the inevitable response by senior management is to find out 
who is at fault so that there is someone to blame.  
This research and practical experience has taught me an immense amount about how 
people think, react and behave. It has presented unique opportunities for me to provide 
motivation and support to others by recognising where a shortcoming might exist, 
making me a much stronger manager. This has led me to become very much a people-
centric manager who believes that performance-driven behaviour can be nurtured and 
developed by providing people with the necessary education, support and 
encouragement. 
9.4 Summary 
This chapter has identified where and how the research has made a contribution to 
knowledge, practice, and learning. It has explained that undertaking this research 
provided me with an unexpected, yet very rewarding experience that has deepened 
and broadened my entire academic and practitioner education and knowledge, and by 
association, this has had a positive effect on those who worked with me. 
The next and final chapter synthesises the various strands of this thesis and makes 
recommendations for further research. In so doing, it presents the final contribution to 
the research project. 
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Chapter Ten 
10. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter provides a closing summary and conclusion to the research project 
by asking what has been achieved. It is a little difficult to place an exact end-point on 
the process because the nature of this research means that learning and experience 
continue consciously and subconsciously without the requirement of a formal research 
objective. Here I attempt to conclude the project, make recommendations for further 
research and reflect on the overall experience. 
10.1 Summary of the Four Cycles 
The research from Cycle One, showed that the reaction to the imposed PMR system 
did not automatically generate the required responses because of a lack of company 
support, a lack of education, and a prevailing crisis that was having a personal effect 
on everyone. Cycle Two took this further by identifying the existing behaviours and 
assessing those that were positive and how to use them to gain a better commitment to 
the PMR system during an ongoing crisis. This provided insight into how better to 
implement and use a PMR system but was lost when the airline was merged. Cycle 
Three showed that in a time of business growth there was a much healthier attitude in 
the desire to engage with a PMR system, but again, there was a very significant lack of 
knowledge and understanding of the complexities of airline operations. Cycle Four 
identified that a cross-department operations briefing had a positive effect on people 
and provided a means of interacting and modifying behaviours to accept the PMR 
system.  
10.2 Discovering a More Informed Way to Implement PMR Systems 
This research endeavoured to learn how to better engage employees in a productive 
effort to understand and improve operations performance by identifying and 
encouraging positive behavioural reactions that lead to a greater level of involvement 
and ownership. It has shown that to do so requires an appreciation of the influences 
and actions that shape individual behaviour. This includes the culture of the company, 
330 
 
the external environment and the support network. Whoever is responsible for the PMR 
system must therefore have a good knowledge of the differences in displayed attitudes 
and behaviours in different business climates, so that they can specify the level of 
human involvement and coordination that is required to improve operational 
performance. 
Expecting a PMR system to promote the desired behaviours without intervention from 
the project leader and senior management is an altogether ineffectual way of 
approaching a performance initiative. It is simply insufficient to design and implement a 
performance measurement system without serious consideration given to the key 
factors of manager involvement, senior management support, an understanding of the 
behaviours and attitudes of those involved, an acute awareness of the prevailing 
culture, and the environment within which the business is operating. It is of paramount 
importance that senior management ‘buys-in’ to the system and provides strong 
leadership to ensure positive communication and to sustain commitment to the goals. 
Probing questions must be asked that challenge everyone to drill down to the 
determinants of performance and stimulate a reaction to develop and design methods 
to increase the value proposition being made to the customer. Without this it can simply 
become a review process that fails to get to the heart of the issues, and ultimately falls 
short of providing any kind of transformational change. This is especially the case when 
the PMR system does not have strategic objectives at its core. A lack of 
understandable communication can lead to apathy and the inability to motivate oneself 
to fix the problems. Even in the climate that Allegheny found itself in, it should still have 
been possible to motivate and thrive, if only there had been leadership and involvement 
of senior management, all of which were sadly lacking at this airline. It was not through 
having mediocre personnel, because there were some extremely capable people on 
the staff who had perhaps given-up on the willingness to go above and beyond and 
had settled for the path of least resistance. Ownership had been lost if indeed it ever 
existed.  
However, the PMR system alone cannot introduce the magnitude of change or 
improvement that might be sought without a corresponding effort on behalf of the 
employees themselves. These efforts by employees are displayed as positive or 
negative influences and lie within the individual attitudes and behaviours that they 
regularly demonstrate. They are inevitably the result of not only the company culture 
but individual psychology as well. Establishing and communicating company goals is 
not sufficient to change many people’s behaviour, but the expectation of a PMR system 
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is that establishing goals for individuals will lead to behaviour that is conducive to 
achieving the desired result. To be truly effective these individual goals should be 
established in collaboration with the individuals concerned and not as an isolated 
activity. Otherwise they can be little more than threats or demands for better 
performance, without providing any inspiration, motivation or encouragement. 
A successful PMR system also needs a “champion”, perhaps a dedicated Performance 
Manager, to ensure that everyone is being held to task. As deWaal points out “the 
behavioural factors that are important to the ‘use’ stage have to be monitored 
continuously to ensure regular use of the performance management system” (De Waal 
2003b). 
It is also vital when implementing a performance measurement system to guard against 
the phenomenon where “people modify their behaviours in an attempt to ensure a 
positive performance outcome even if this means pursuing inappropriate courses of 
action” (Neely Andy et al.  1997, p.1132). This was further illustrated by Neely and 
Bourne when discussing implementation failure that if there is a culture of blame, 
people will begin to seek ways to deliver the measure rather than pursue real 
performance (Neely and Bourne, 2000). Unfortunately, this was and still is in evidence 
at Pinnacle. It is a major failing within the system and one that we have been unable, 
as yet, to correct. 
The combined threads from this research suggest that if there is an understanding of 
the business climate, a binding interaction between performance strategy, system 
design, system implementation and people management, that is also coupled with 
education, support and guidance then it is possible to achieve a successful PMR 
system implementation and pursue performance-driven behaviour. 
After conducting this research project, I now firmly believe that understanding human 
behaviour is key to a successful PMR system implementation.  
10.3 Implications 
These implications of this research will only have situational relevance to the 
companies within this research project, but by listing them concisely below it may 
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provide some thought-provoking ideas for anyone considering implementing a PMR 
system, or trying to modify an existing system to make it more effective. 
• The business state of crisis or growth can have a profound effect on the 
attitudes and behaviours of managers. Crisis caused a sense of helplessness. 
Growth caused an undercurrent of willingness and eagerness to be involved 
and to learn  
• Expressed attitudes do not always result in corresponding behaviours 
• How an individual views their own behavioural reactions may not tally with how 
others see them 
• A PMR system needs to be designed around, and with, the people using it 
• Expecting a PMR system to promote desired behaviours is misleading. It 
requires significant investment of time and understanding on the part of the 
facilitator to ensure that there is an environment that can foster the desired 
behaviours  
• Education and training are essential, not only on how to read, understand and 
interpret performance data, but also how to examine processes to determine 
the causes and reasons for performance shortfalls 
• Reflection by managers through repertory grid elicitation is particularly 
beneficial to encourage introspection about their role and that of their 
colleagues 
• Performance data needs to be presented in a manner that is easy to read and 
interpret, especially when shared with a wide audience 
10.4 Limitations 
The study was limited by the fact that it was an in-depth examination of only two 
regional airlines and the results will not be representative of other airlines. Additionally, 
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it is embedded in the regional airline industry and does not consider the major airlines 
who may have more sophisticated PMR systems.  
This study used a subjective and inductive approach that drew findings from 
examination of actual events that took place over a seven year period. While there was 
real insight that might be useful to others, there is no expectation that these results can 
be duplicated elsewhere. The entire thrust of the project has been to understand the 
behaviours and attitudes exhibited by specific individuals and these are by their nature 
unique. 
However, it is hoped that insights from this study may provide guidance to others on 
the importance of understanding and cultivating behavioural reactions if they are 
contemplating introducing any kind of performance initiative.   
The research was also restricted to just the managers having responsibility for flight 
operations performance and did not consider the much larger population of all the 
personnel who reported to these managers. 
10.5 Recommendations for Further Research 
Further research is required into what effect the external business environment has on 
the behaviours and attitudes of the managers working within a PMR system. Although 
this research was able to show that the business state did have an influence it was not 
conclusive and requires additional in-depth analysis. 
Research is also required into how to provide the necessary education and training on 
understanding and interpreting airline operations performance. This is a complex area 
and more understanding is needed on the level of knowledge required by managers so 
that they can recognise the linkages between performance metrics and to avoid 
unintended consequences. 
It would also be useful to expand this research to several more airlines, or similar 
companies, to see if the findings have relevance elsewhere. 
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10.6 Reflections on the Repertory Grid Method 
A very significant and largely unexpected outcome of this research project was the 
value and insight that the repertory grid method provided. When I initially decided to 
use repertory grids, it was to add more structure to an interview and to allow a more 
intuitive way to analyse the data. However, this method turned out to be truly eye-
opening and a very valuable contribution to the overall research findings. It not only 
sharpened the focus for the interviewee but also, added a deeper psychological insight 
than would have been possible with a standard interview. 
The findings from cycles two and three, during which the technique was used, were 
therefore much richer in colour. This was due to the ability to logically compare the 
interviews side by side and discern differences in perception and meaning about the 
topic and the interviewee’s awareness and observation of their colleagues. This was 
particularly appropriate because it provided the means to identify and explain the 
attitudes and behaviours that were being demonstrated, and to do so in an informed 
and personal manner. I found that I was able to elicit a higher level of introspection 
from the managers than I might have otherwise. It further allowed the findings to build 
incrementally by first examining and analysing the individual grids, and then combining 
them through a bootstrap analysis technique to add deeper meaning as to how the 
group collectively worked together and saw the contribution of their colleagues. The 
findings therefore became interwoven in the various stages of analysis.  
The method itself is able to identify the way that a person interprets and gives meaning 
to their experiences. This in turn allows the interviewer to make inferences about the 
interviewee’s personality, which is a very powerful facet of the method. 
It can take quite a long time to learn the technique and to understand its psychological 
underpinnings but once mastered it is very useful. When I was first introduced to 
repertory grids I was a little concerned about its applicability to the business world. It 
raised a doubt in my mind as to whether it would have as much credibility as other 
methods, but now, after having worked with grids for several years I am convinced of 
their practical application in a business setting and indeed I have used them for other 
projects unrelated to this thesis. After all, in business, much like in any clinical setting, 
we are dealing with people and their problems. As individual human beings, we are 
imposing our own personal beliefs and understandings on the way that we do things, 
which are formed from our prior personal experiences and become our own personal 
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construct system. Therefore, an individual’s interpretation of the reality of their work 
environment, and the people with whom they interact, is derived from their conception 
of the world and the way in which they interpret actions and events. This existential 
quality lies at the heart of the repertory grid method.  
On reflection, it is fair to say that using repertory grids provided greater insight and 
understanding of human nature. Because the repertory grid is carried out in a personal 
and collaborative fashion, and with the analysis often conducted while the grid is being 
elicited, it can provide immediate and useful insight for both the interviewer, and in 
particular the interviewee. At times, this was enlightening for the interviewee and 
caused them to pause and consider their own construction system, and how and why, 
they regarded their colleagues in a certain way. It was a light-bulb moment for some 
that led to further introspection, greater awareness and incremental learning. This is 
not the case with other methods that typically require remote analysis of the data, 
which may never be discussed with the interviewee. Of particular note here, was when 
DIF in cycle two, and MD in cycle three, had sudden realisations of how they had 
subconsciously classified some of their colleagues. This awareness then allowed them 
to talk further, and more acutely, about how and why they had drawn certain 
distinctions. 
The results of this research study generated knowledge of the very real differences 
between the various personalities and how they interacted with the PMR system. 
These insights and findings then allowed me to tailor my approach to the PMR systems 
and provided me with a level of knowledge and realisation that I would not otherwise 
have had. I was then able to augment, refine and improve the PMR system. The whole 
process further added to the findings because the conclusions drawn were done so in 
concert with my own construct system. 
10.7 Personal Reflections on the Research Study 
Reflecting back at this final stage the first two cycles of research at Allegheny could 
have constituted a thesis on their own. There was so much data and so many 
conclusions to be drawn on how to improve the performance review process that it 
could have been even more lengthy that it actually was. It was truly an eye-opening 
experience for me and I felt like I was drinking from a hose. There was simply so much 
to absorb. It was a great shame that the company was eventually forced to merge and 
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disappear from the American regional aviation scene, but this did present the ability to 
compare those findings against another regional airline to verify whether the same 
conclusions could be drawn. This juncture was also a very difficult and challenging time 
for me because I was left with a real sense of loss, not only with the demise of 
Allegheny but also with how, or indeed if, to continue my research. There were many 
times over the years when I shelved the project, not being able to see a clear path to 
an end. This led to some procrastination and frustration in trying to further the research 
project. 
As time went by it became apparent to me that what I was doing in the course of my 
job was indicative of the lessons I had learned at Allegheny. I began to formalise a 
cycle of research that provided insight to a different organisation and how a separate 
group of people engaged with the PMR process. This was enlightening and made the 
overall research project and hence this thesis more interesting and useful.  
It would be an untruth to say that I have enjoyed this process. It has certainly had its 
moments of pleasure and sudden illumination, but there have been many grey times 
when it was hard and sometimes impossible to provide myself with the inspiration I 
needed to make headway. During the course of writing this thesis I have written and 
rewritten much of it many times, and I am sure by this stage the reader will realise that 
it is rather lengthy and perhaps a little cumbersome. The data and information that I 
had was overwhelming. Trying to break it down and make sense of it was tiresome, 
complicated and more than a little time consuming. When I initially began the research, 
I think I was expecting a more serious approach to PMR but this proved to be 
somewhat naive. There was simply not the level of comprehension with operations 
performance and I had to rethink my approach, many times. 
As discussed in the previous chapter the benefit of conducting this study has been 
immense to me personally and this learning has been shared with those around me. 
Not only did it highlight the need to pay particular attention to the behavioural reactions 
of those who must use a PMR system, but it also underlined that the PMR system 
needs to be structured and that sufficient guidance and support are required in order to 
ensure success. My own education in this endeavour has focused my priorities on the 
people reporting to me and not just to those above me. I believe very strongly that I 
have become a much better and more effective manager but also an empathetic and 
very tolerant boss. I allow people to make mistakes without berating them, and I 
encourage them to grow and prosper through support, insight and guidance. In fact 
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when people make mistakes it is a unique instance of learning in practice. For those 
who make a mistake but also recognise it as a learning opportunity it is rewarding. 
There are others who will continue to make the same mistakes. They are much harder 
to help.  I now consciously try to put myself in their shoes before issuing any directives, 
or when providing advice and guidance. As this study has progressed I have also been 
able to impart to others some of the knowledge that I have gained. This has been 
rewarding and has allowed me to assemble my collective experiences into an order 
that I can discuss with others so that they may either learn from them, or gain some 
insight to help themselves or others. What has become an infallible truth for me is that 
in order for any performance initiative to succeed it must have complete acceptance 
and ‘buy-in’ from those who must engage with it. 
One overwhelming aspect of conducting a lengthy and in-depth study like this is the 
reward when you discover things that at first were not apparent. In particular the views 
and personal constructs of my colleagues were eye-opening, and became more so 
when I conducted the analysis. This  reminded me of a phrase that has stuck with me 
since hearing it in a song many years ago: “once in a while you get shown the light, in 
the strangest of places if you look at it right” (Hunter 1993,p.197). I think this 
exemplifies for me in an esoteric way the value of the AR process and the repertory 
grid construct elicitation method. There were long periods of boredom, and then 
incredible frustration when I could not make sense of things, or I lost direction in what I 
was endeavouring to do. But, with some forced perseverance and persistence there 
was that occasional and unexpected light bulb moment that appeared from out of 
nowhere, when I was looking in odd places, that allowed me to make some small 
headway, or on a few occasions that magical enlightenment that all of a sudden 
illuminated the way and provided the essential encouragement to continue. There were 
many times when I felt like packing the whole thing in but my stubbornness (learned 
through my own introspection while experimenting with repertory grids) refused to let 
go, even though there were long periods of inactivity and lack of motivation to 
reengage. 
In my approach to a practical application of a performance measurement system, I 
have experienced a confusion of approaches and a plethora of methods that have 
made the research study at times confusing and far from illuminating. Indeed, it is fair 
to say that during this extended study I have felt more aggravation and frustration than 
I have actually found a clear pathway to a solution that would be robust and easy to 
implement. I have every empathy with anyone who must implement a PMR system. 
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However, my conclusions from this research study have led me to firmly accept that 
individual attitudes and behaviours have a very profound impact on the successful 
implementation and use of a PMR system. 
Not withstanding the difficulties that I encountered, this entire experience has been of 
exceptional value to me. One other satisfying aspect of such a lengthy research 
process and accompanying thesis is when you can finally lay your pen down, for good 
or bad, and say...”it’s finally, finally done!”  Perhaps the reader will share the same 
sentiment. 
10.8 Summary 
This final concluding chapter provided a summary conclusion to the research project 
and identified areas for additional research that arose from this study.    
I have also provided my personal reflections on the research process and hopefully 
provided an insight to my thought processes, motivations, and frustrations, which may 
be worth consideration for future researchers as they embark upon what has been for 
me, a very large, challenging but ultimately immensely rewarding and immersive 
experience. 
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Glossary 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
9/11  The infamous acts of terrorism committed in NY on 11th September 2001 
9E  IATA designation for Pinnacle Airlines 
A:0  On-time flight arrival performance measured to the minute against the 
published scheduled arrival time 
A:14  On-time flight arrival performance measured within 15 minutes of the 
published scheduled arrival time 
ALO  ICAO designation for Allegheny Airlines 
AR  Action Research 
ASA  Airline Service Agreement 
ATC  Air Traffic Control 
ATL IATA Airport Code for Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in 
Atlanta, Georgia 
BSC Balanced Scorecard 
CBA  Collective Bargaining Agreement 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CF  Completion Factor: a measure of the number of flights actually operated 
as a percentage of the total flights that were scheduled to be operated 
CFR  Certified Flight Rules 
COO  Chief Operating Officer 
CSF  Critical Success Factor 
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D:0  On-time flight departure performance measured to the minute against 
the published scheduled departure time 
DAL Delta Airlines 
DOT  United States Department of Transport 
DTW  IATA Airport Code for Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport in 
Detroit, Michigan 
FAR  Federal Aviation Regulation 
FLG  ICAO designation for Pinnacle Airlines 
FOD  Foreign Object Damage 
IATA  International Air Transport Association 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IND  IATA Airport Code for Indianapolis International Airport in Indianapolis, 
Indiana 
KPI  Key Performance Indicator 
LGA  IATA Airport Code for La Guardia Airport in New York 
MBO  Management by Objectives 
MEM  IATA Airport Code for Memphis International Airport in Memphis, 
Tennessee 
MSP IATA Airport Code for Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
NWA Northwest Airlines 
OCC  Operations Control Centre 
PM  Performance measurement 
PMR  Performance Measurement and Review System 
RAA  Regional Airline Association 
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SOC  System Operations Control Centre (aka OCC) 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure 
U.S.  United States 
UQ  IATA designation for Allegheny Airlines 
342 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Controllable delay or cancellation  
A delay or cancellation to a flight caused by actions that are within the control of the 
aircraft operator. For example a mechanical problem rendering the aircraft not 
airworthy, boarding the passengers late, the flight crew not being at the aircraft in 
sufficient time to allow for an on-time departure, or not having a full flight crew to 
operate the aircraft 
Uncontrollable delay or cancellation  
A delay or cancellation to a flight that is not within the control of the aircraft operator. 
For example: weather at the departure airport, destination airport, or en-route that 
would prevent a safe operation, or lengthy ATC delays into congested airports that 
cause a carrier to cancel a flight in order to protect the operating schedule later in the 
day 
Express Division 
A division of US Airways known more formally as US Airways Express. This comprised 
a number of airlines all providing regional passenger feed to the major hubs. Three of 
the eleven (at the time) US Airways Express carriers were wholly-owned by US 
Airways. 
Deadheading 
When a flight crewmember is carried on a flight but is not working. This occurs when a 
crew needs to travel from once place to another to take up their duties. Also known as 
‘positioning’. 
Station 
A term used to represent the operations of the airline at an airport. For example, each 
airport that an airline flies to is referred to as a station. If it opens or closes a station it 
means that the airline is beginning service to, or removing service from, an airport. The 
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airport itself continues to operate whether it is considered as a ‘station’ for the airline. It 
is similar to a railway station in that it is a stopping off point to allow passengers to 
board and disembark. 
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Appendix A INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AT ALLEGHENY – CYCLE 1 
Interview questions 
 
1. How would you describe operations performance management at this airline 
and what does performance mean to you? 
2. Do you think performance should be measured?  
o At what level: company, department, individual? 
3. How is operations performance measured here? 
o What is the objective? 
4. Does the company value performance measurement? 
5. Are you supported in your endeavours to measure performance? 
6. Are you held accountable? 
7. How do you measure performance in your department? 
8. How does the way we manage performance relate to customer satisfaction? 
9. If you had free reign to measure only what you thought was important what 
would that be? 
10. What would you like to see as the outcome of a PM system? 
11. Who should set the goals? 
12. Does the company communicate effectively? 
13. Are you provided with sufficient and necessary information and resources to do 
your job? 
14. Should performance data be made available to other employees?  
o in particular crewmembers? 
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Appendix B REPERTORY GRIDS - ALLEGHENY AIRLINES - CYCLE 2 
B.1 DIF (Director of In-Flight) 
 
 
Figure C-1 Repertory Grid: DIF - Allegheny 
B.1.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
DIF was very interested in taking part in this process and was genuinely willing 
to learn about repertory grids and the topic under scrutiny, and consequently 
she approached the interview in a very positive manner. DIF was in agreement 
that the subject warranted investigation and was curious to learn how I was 
intending to make some sense of each manager’s role in performance 
management. 
Elements 
DIF considered the list of elements appropriate and acceptable because it 
included all of the managers and directors in the Flight Operations department 
who are involved with performance management. An interesting aspect of this 
is that the list of elements also included a “self”, which served to provide the 
interviewee with further opportunity for introspection when rating the elements 
on a construct, or when presented with a triad containing “self”. This was quite 
enlightening for DIF who began very quickly to see everyone in relation to 
herself as she proceeded to develop and rate constructs. 
Constructs 
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The qualifying phrase was received well and served as a useful reminder during 
the elicitation process to ensure that the responses remained focused on the 
topic of the performance management system. There was a willingness from 
DIF to develop constructs and they flowed fairly easily once a level of comfort 
was reached.  
Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and sensible to the DIF. She was able 
to readily place each element at a distinct point on the scale and she avoided a 
central tendency by trying to be as objective as she could. This process was 
thought provoking for her and she was careful with her designations.  
General 
Overall, this was a positive experience for both DIF and I. She was able to 
provide 13 constructs that relevantly dealt with the topic in question. 
 
B.1.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents DIF’s view of the level of involvement and the attitudes of 
her colleagues at that particular moment in time as Allegheny dealt with a major 
crisis. DIF has represented the topic well and remained focused on 
performance management relating it back to the weekly meetings that were 
held with the parent company and all subsidiaries. She sees herself in a very 
similar light to the other two females in the group which is interesting and infers 
that there is perhaps a divide between male and female when it comes to this 
topic, or that the females share similar values and relate better to each other. 
Her responses fall into a group of distinguishable categories: interest, 
commitment, control, vision, communication, gender, creativity, technical 
knowledge, and outlook.  
What DIF’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
DO:  Demonstrates a poor attitude, is uninterested in his job, is lenient to 
crewmembers and likely to let issues slip and not hold crewmembers 
accountable for delays that they may have caused. Wants to push 
problems off onto somebody else, believes that the union should have 
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more influence, will likely see it out to the end even though he is 
obviously unhappy, unlikely to create or take an opportunity to move on. 
Does not show any creativity and tends to dwell on the negative and 
accept things the way they are rather than trying to see some positive in 
the gloom. The ratings for DO seem to have him leaning toward the 
negative poles of each construct – perhaps some lack of respect for him 
here? 
ACP 1  Seems to lie centrally between each construct and is largely 
unremarkable. There is a feeling that he also likes to push things off “as 
a Piedmont problem”, in other words the problem is not his concern but 
that of the acquiring company, which allows for some apathy to set in. 
Problems that would ordinarily be taken care of, are not addressed and 
he shows a lack of initiative. However, ACP1 does have a very good 
technical background and appreciation of operational issues. 
ACP 2  Is seen as conscientious, interested in airline performance, and still 
tackles the issues when they arise. But he does exhibit some of the 
crewmember mentality of tending to look at things from an individual, or 
self-centred perspective, without grasping the bigger picture. He is seen 
as a good communicator but will likely leave at the first opportunity. Is 
creative and has a very good technical knowledge and tends to look at 
the positive side of things - tries to remain optimistic 
DT  Is seen as very conscientious, committed and motivated to improve 
performance. DT feels that he strongly follows the rules and embraces 
the issue and believes firmly that management should run the airline, 
and as such has a good global perspective. He is a good communicator 
but will leave at first opportunity. Is creative and always remains positive 
and optimistic. 
MD   The majority of MD’s ratings fall with a central tendency. He still tries to 
embrace the issues and feels that management should run things, is 
likely to see it out until the bitter end – has been with the company for 25 
years and is unlikely to leave without being asked to. Believes in 
females as effective managers, but tends to be negative in what he says 
and how he behaves. 
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MCS  Very conscientious, follows all rules, and tackles problems, does not 
pass anything off as not hers, believes that management should be in 
control and has a good picture of the operation, communicates well but 
will leave at first good opportunity. She views her position as largely just 
a job, but fully believes that females can, and should, run the airline. Is 
creative but lacks flight operations experience. 
MIF  Is seen as effectively fulfilling her role. She follows the rules and holds 
flight attendants accountable and tackles the problems, refusing to see 
them as somebody else’s problem. She believes that management 
should have firm control of the company, She is not seen as a 
particularly good communicator. She will stay until the end, even though 
she considers it just a job and not necessarily a career. Believes that 
females should have a greater role and are capable of running the 
airline, but lacks true operational flight experience.  
Self:  DIF sees herself as an ardent follower of the rules, and accountable for 
her area of operations. She tackles problems head on and will not bow 
to union pressure. She is a good communicator and takes her career 
seriously. She is unlikely to leave the company until the bitter end 
because of 25 years of service already invested. She believes that 
females should be given a greater role and that they are more than 
capable of running the airline. She does not think that she is very 
creative in finding solutions but she does remain very positive and 
optimistic and has good technical flight knowledge and experience. 
B.1.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table C-1 Construct Characterisation: DIF - Allegheny 
Con#
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
CoreI don't care attitude - poor work ethic1.1 Concientious - wants the airline to look good - good work ethic
Core
Evaluative
Evaluative
Core
Core
Propostional
Core
Behavioural
Behavioural
Behavioural
Core
Propostional
Less interested but fulfils job requirements, not 
motivated
Still follows the rules - enforces policy as normal
Still embraces issues and problems as they 
arise
1.2
Poor communicator
Management should run airline not union
Management mentality - has global picture
Excellent communicator
Will see it out to the end
Career  - concerned about airline performance 
because of time invested, loyalty
Looks at the positive, makes light of things, sees 
the good - optimist
Less creative, more likely to limit thinking on 
improvements
Crewmember background - good appreciation of 
operational issues
Realist - looks at the negativity - accepts things 
as they are
More interested in airline performance - 
motivated
More lenient to crewmembers - willing to look 
the other way
It's a Piedmont problem - wants to push 
problems away
Union should have greater influence
Crewmember mentality - self-centred, individual 
view, does not have gobal picture
1.8 Will leave at first good opportunity
Just a job, not that concerned with future of 
company - less loyal
Believe females should be allowed to run airline
More creative - thinks outside the box
No flight experience - little appreciation of true 
operational issues
Perceive that men should run the airline, see 
females as less competent (e.g. suggestions not 
taken seriously)
1.13
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
 
In DIF’s grid there are 13 constructs. Of those 13, there were six that seemed to have a 
deep and personal significance to her. DIF is very particular about attitudes. She saw  
herself as making a big effort to be professional and was very loyal to the airline. She feels 
that an important distinction should be made between management and the union 
leadership. She feels that the seriousness with which one views their job is important, for 
example a career rather than just a job. She also sees that there is an apparent difference 
between genders, and feels that one’s technical experience is very important.   
B.1.4 Cluster Analysis 
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 Figure C-2 Cluster Analysed Grid: DIF - Allegheny 
Table C-2 Cluster Analysis: DIF - Allegheny 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: DIF
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There are two main clusters: MD, ACP1 & ACP2, versus DT, DIF & MCS
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
MD, ACP1 & ACP2 are similarly rated on all constructs with no more than one 
rating point difference between them, with the exception of the second and 
13th constructs where the rating difference is 2 points. MD & ACP1 share the 
same ratings on 7 constructs. 
DT, DIF(self) & MCS are all rated the same on 5 constructs, sharing the same 
attitudes and behaviours
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
MD & ACP1 show the highest % similarity score at 86%. ACP1 & ACP2 are 
matched at 85%. Thus MD, ACP1 & ACP2 form a cluster whose lowest 
similarity score is 85%. The next closest is DT & DIF(self) with a match of 79%. 
The cluster of DT, DIF(self) & MCS has a % similarity score of 77%
Examine the 
remaining scores
MD, ACP1 & ACP2 form a distinct cluster being matched at 85%; their highest 
match with the other cluster is through MD's match with MIF at 79%. The most 
disparate match is between ACP2 & DO at 50%. This is interesting because 
ACP2 works for DO but DIF sees them as approaching performance 
measurement and review in distinctly different ways and with largely opposite 
attitudes and behaviours  
The cluster analysis for DIF”s grid shows that she sees two distinct clusters of people 
exhibiting similar behaviours: MD, ACP1 & ACP2 versus DT, DIF (self) & MCS. She has 
identified herself with MCS who is also female, and DT who was previously described as 
being very positive. 
Additionally her cluster analysis shows that the lowest similarity match is between ACP2 
and DO (50%). She sees them as approaching the performance measurement and review 
process in distinctly different ways and with largely opposite attitudes and behaviours. This 
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is an interesting assessment because ACP2 actually reports to DO, but appears to be quite 
at odds with his approach. Is this perhaps creating friction and a hindrance to their roles? I 
posed this question to ACP2 and he explained that they do not always see eye to eye and 
he feels that DO is uncommunicative and secretive, not sharing information. 
12 
 
B.2 DT (Director of Training) 
 
Figure C-3 Repertory Grid: DT - Allegheny 
B.2.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
The interview was greeted with a positive reaction. DT agreed that performance 
management was an area that warranted further understanding. He readily 
accepted the topic as being a useful means of examining the behaviours of his 
peers and its purpose in seeking a better understanding of their attitudes during 
a very difficult time in the company’s history. There was a willingness to develop 
constructs and they flowed fairly easily with little prodding. 
Elements 
The list of elements was acceptable because it incorporated all the managers in 
the Flight Operations department who are involved with performance 
management. 
Constructs 
The qualifying phrase was received well, but it was repeated several times to 
keep the interviewee focused. DT likes to talk and would develop the discussion 
in a number of different directions. He would use a construct to validate why or 
how things are done and also offered general views on how ineffective and 
uncommunicative senior management were (CEO). The constructs flowed 
slowly but steadily and are fairly straightforward in that they drew differences 
between the attitudes displayed by the managers. There was a focus on the 
lack of authority and helplessness for the interviewee in his involvement in the 
13 
 
performance management process and he was anxious to do more to improve 
the current level of performance. DT portrayed himself more on the emergent 
rather than the implicit side of the scale. 
Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and sensible to the interviewee. At 
times it was eye-opening for DT as he considered some of the inferences he 
was making. The ratings spanned the whole scale and did not follow a central 
tendency. DT did not need to think deeply when rating each element because 
he seemed to have a ready opinion on where each manager fell on the scale. 
General 
DT is a natural talker and would take the conversation off on tangents very 
quickly. I would let these wander for awhile and then try to bring him back to the 
core topic by repeating the qualifying phrase.  Overall, it was an interesting and 
pleasurable experience that included a lot of conversation.  
B.2.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents DT’s views on the level of involvement and attitudes of his 
colleagues as Allegheny dealt with a major crisis. He appears to think that the 
Director of Operations has a good approach and demonstrates a good attitude. 
DT sees himself on the emergent pole more often than not and considers that 
he has a good attitude. He addresses a number of different and distinct 
categories in the grid including, Role, Authority, Conformity to rules, Teamwork, 
Manner and behaviour, Commitment, Accountability and Attitude.  
What DT’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
DO Tends to collect data, or has it available to him, but does not act upon it. He 
has the authority to change actions but conforms to the rules and works as 
a team member and not as a leader. He plays a supportive role, has a big 
picture view and remains calm and organised. He wants to improve 
performance and has a relatively good attitude. 
ACP 1 Takes action, wants to fix problems, has some authority and works as a 
team player to support others. He has a good grasp of the bigger picture 
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and remains calm. Wants to improve performance, is held accountable, and 
has a good attitude. 
ACP 2 Most definitely wants to take action but has no real authority to do so. He is 
creative, works mostly as a team player and is supportive of others. 
However, he does not possess a larger view of things and can be 
aggressive, or looks for immediate action. He cares about performance and 
is held accountable. He has a relatively good attitude. 
MIF Does not seem to be that involved and neither has, or lacks, authority. She 
tends to follow the rules and is definitely team oriented and supportive. She 
is neither anxious nor calm, but works to improve performance. She is held 
accountable and displays a relatively good attitude. 
DIF Is perceived to be not that involved, but does have authority to act. She 
always follows the rules and is creative when trying to get things 
accomplished. She is team oriented and very supportive, has a big picture 
view and is mostly calm and organised. She demonstrates a relatively good 
attitude. 
MCS  Tends to be a data collector rather than having any influence on overall 
performance. She has some authority and tends to follow the rules. She is 
not seen as being a team member. She has a technical/procedural 
approach and a fairly good big-picture view of how the company is 
operating. She tends to be calm, sits in the middle of the road regarding 
improvement but is definitely held accountable. She has a relatively good 
attitude. 
MD Also tends to be just a data collector but has some authority to change the 
actions of others and implement change. He follows the rules, works 
independently, rather than being a team player, is more technical and 
procedures oriented. He has a big picture view of the operation, can be 
aggressive, but sits on the fence regarding the need to make improvements. 
He is definitely held accountable and has a relatively good attitude. 
Self: Neither collects data or takes any action. DT sees himself as having some 
authority and following the rules. He exhibits an individual view and can be 
more technical and analytical. He can also be aggressive and looks for 
immediate action. DT works to improve performance but is definitely not 
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held accountable for his actions. This is largely because there are no 
specific measures that pertain to DT’s area of responsibility, which is 
Training. He sees himself as having a pretty good attitude despite the 
troubles that the company faces. 
B.2.3 Construct Characterisation 
Table C-3 Construct Characterisation: DT - Allegheny 
Con#
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
Behavioural2.1 Data collectors Takes action
Core
Core
Core
Behavioural
Core
Behavioural
Behavioural
Behavioural
Propositional
2.8
2.9
2.10
Does not care about performance
Not held accountable
Bad attitude
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
Authority to change actions of employees, 
develop procedures, implement change
Works diligently to improve performance
Is held accountable
Good attitude
Follows rules/within protocol - diplomatic, 
disciplined, methodical
Plays a supportive role - more direct 
contact/inflence on flight personnel
Team oriented view of dealing with performance 
issues
Big picture perspective
Calm, organised, planned approach Anxious, "aggressive", immediate action profile
Creative - manouvering to accomplish things
Individual view of how to deal with performance 
issues
More technical/procedural
Analytical perspective
Lacks authority to change actions of others
 
 
B.2.4 Cluster Analysis 
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 Figure C-4 Cluster Analysed Grid: DT - Allegheny 
Table C-4 Cluster Analysis: DT - Allegheny 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: DT
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There are three main clusters: DIF & DO versus MD & MCS versus ACP1 & 
MIF
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
DIF & DO are similarly rated on all constructs with no more than one rating 
point difference between them. MD & ACP1 share the same ratings on 6 
constructs. ACP1 & MIF share the same ratings on 5 constructs.
MD & MCS are rated the same on 7 constructs, sharing the same attitudes and 
behaviours
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
DIF & DO show the highest % similarity score at 90%. MD & MCS are matched 
at 88%. ACP1 & MIF are also matched at 88%. DIF, DO, ACP1, MIF & ACP2 
form a cluster whose lowest  similarity score is 83%. The next closest is Self, 
MD & MCS with a match of 75%. 
Examine the 
remaining scores
The most disparate match is between ACP2 & Self at 70%. This is interesting 
because DT sees them as approaching performance measurement and review 
in quite different ways and with largely unrelated attitudes and behaviours
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B.3 MIF (Manager of In-Flight) 
 
Figure C-5 Repertory Grid: MIF - Allegheny 
B.3.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
The interview was greeted with some curiosity and scepticism. MIF agreed that 
performance management was important, but was not certain why we should 
dig any deeper into it. However, she was willing to develop constructs and they 
came quite easily to her. 
Elements 
The list of elements was considered appropriate and acceptable because it 
included all of the managers in the Flight Operations department who are 
involved with performance management.  
Constructs 
The qualifying phrase was received well and served as a useful reminder during 
elicitation.  
Ratings 
The rating system was seen as straightforward and intuitive to the interviewee 
and she was able to easily place each element on the scale. 
General 
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The interviewee related to the topic quite well but had to be prompted on 
occasion to remain focused on the topic. 
B.3.2 Eyeball Analysis 
MIF focused her constructs around the core behaviours that her colleagues 
demonstrated. She was able to readily place each element on the scale and 
used the ratings carefully. The categories that her constructs fall into are: the 
PM system, Concern, Commitment, Communication, Technical knowledge, 
Demeanour, Creativity, Responsibility, Accountability. She seemed to identify 
herself with the other crewmember managers and obviously has respect for 
them.  
What MIF’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
DO Is viewed as very willing to go the extra mile to ensure a flight happens, 
including flying it himself if nobody else is available. However, he does not 
share information with the In-Flight department. He has a very good 
knowledge of crewmember capability and attitudes, but makes excuses for 
them all the time. He takes time to accomplish tasks and tends to follow 
through, but he is not creative. He tends to work behind the scenes to 
improve performance, and his work is not easily seen. He works to improve 
things and is held directly accountable – (contrasts wildly with other views of 
DO) 
ACP 1 Very willing to go the extra mile. He does not always share information but 
has an excellent knowledge of crewmembers and their attitudes and 
capabilities, but makes excuses for them and passes the blame to others. 
However, he does work to improve performance. 
ACP 2 Is concerned about improvement and is very willing to go the extra mile. He 
shares information that can lead to improvement, much more so than his co-
workers. He has an excellent knowledge of crewmembers but makes 
excuses for them and passes the blame elsewhere. He generates very good 
ideas and is a creative thinker. Tends to work in the forefront and likes to be 
noticed. 
DT Believes that the performance measurement and review process is 
beneficial and is genuinely concerned about making improvements and 
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correcting mistakes. He is proactive and very willing to go the extra mile. He 
tends to share information that can lead to performance improvement and 
has a very good knowledge of crewmembers. He is a pilot himself but does 
not make excuses for them, which is the opposite of how [Name] sees the 
other management pilots (ACP 1, ACP 2 & DO). DT takes the time needed 
to accomplish tasks, follows through and is very good at generating ideas. 
He is a creative thinker and tends to work behind the scenes, making 
contributions to enhance performance, without being terribly noticeable. He 
is willing to accept responsibility for a mistake, and works diligently to 
improve performance. MIF seems to have a very firm view of DT and has 
only rated him as a 3 (central tendency) on one of the constructs, which is 
the one dealing with accountability. 
DIF  DIF is MIF’s direct superior. DIF is concerned about performance and very 
willing to go the extra mile. She shares information that can lead to 
improvement, does not make excuses, and takes the time needed to 
accomplish tasks. She always follows through, generates good ideas and 
works out of the limelight. She is very willing to accept responsibility for 
mistakes, and works diligently to improve performance. She is held directly 
accountable. 
MCS Believes that the performance measurement and review tool we use is 
beneficial. She is very concerned about improvement and the need to 
correct mistakes. She is always willing to go the extra mile to ensure that a 
flight departs as scheduled and shares all information that can lead to 
improvement. She does not make excuses and takes the time to accomplish 
tasks properly. She does not rush, always follows through and is thorough. 
She tends to be creative and generates good ideas, while working behind 
the scenes. She is willing to accept responsibility, works diligently to 
improve performance, and is held accountable. 
MD Is concerned about performance and is very willing to go the extra mile. He 
has a good knowledge of crewmembers and what they are capable of. He 
does not make excuses and always follows through. He also works behind 
the scenes, is willing to accept responsibility, works diligently to improve 
performance, and is held accountable. 
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Self: MIF sees herself as concerned about performance and very willing to go the 
extra mile, including taking a flight as a flight attendant if it avoids a 
cancellation. She shares information and has a good knowledge of 
crewmembers. She does not make excuses for her flight attendants and 
always follows through when researching a problem. She accepts 
responsibility, works to improve performance, and is definitely held 
accountable. Naturally, she sees herself on the positive end of the scale for 
most of the constructs. 
B.3.3 Construct Characterisation 
Table C-5 Construct Characterisation: MIF - Allegheny 
Con#
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
Evaluative3.1 PM tool not beneficialPM tool is beneficial
Core
Behavioural
Behavioural
Propositional
Core
Core
Core
Core
Core
Evaluative
Core
Core
3.13
3.11
3.12
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.2
3.3
3.4
Up front work, obvious, does not enhance 
performance
Passes the blame
Fails to follow through
Is not creativeGenerates good ideas - creative thinking
Behind the scenes work, not readily seen, but 
enhances performance
Does not care about performance
Not held accountableIs Held accountable for performance measures
Not concerned - not proactive
Unwilling to go the extra mile
Does not share information
Lacks knowledge of crewmembers
Does not make excuses
Will finish at another time
Concerned about improvement, need to correct 
mistakes, proactive
Willingness to go the extra mile can go out to 
work the flight)
Shares information that leads to improvement
Willingness to accept responsibility for mistake
Works diligently to improve performance
Has knowledge of what crewmembers are 
capable of and attitudes
Makes excuses
Takes time needed to accompish tasks
Follows through - is thorough
 
B.3.4 Cluster Analysis 
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 Figure C-6 Cluster Analysed Grid: MIF - Allegheny 
Table C-6 Cluster Analysis: MIF - Allegheny 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: MIF
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There are two main clusters: Self & MD versus  MCS & DIF
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
Self & MD are similarly rated on 10 constructs with no more than one rating 
point difference between them. MCS & DIF share the same ratings on 7 
constructs.
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
Self & MD show the highest % similarity score at 92%. MCS & DIF are 
matched at 88%. MCS, DIF, Self & MD form a cluster whose lowest similaritry 
score is 86%. The next closest is DO, ACP1 & ACP2 at 85%
Examine the 
remaining scores
The lowest match amongst the whole group is 75% (MD & DO) indicating that 
MIF thought that all of the interviewees reacted in a not too different manner
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B.4 ACP 1 (Assistant Chief Pilot) 
 
Figure C-7 Repertory Grid: ACP1 - Allegheny 
B.4.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
The topic was readily accepted. ACP1 is an easily approachable and amiable 
person and was very willing to participate, seeing it as an interesting 
development of the performance measurement process and the interview we 
conducted during the first cycle. 
Elements 
The list of elements was considered quite appropriate and acceptable because 
it incorporated all of the managers in the Flight Operations department who are 
involved with performance management.  
Constructs 
The qualifying phrase was received well and served as a useful reminder during 
elicitation to ensure responses remained focused on the performance process.  
Ratings 
There was nothing remarkable here. The rating system was seen as 
straightforward and easy to understand. 
General 
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ACP1 works for DO and is closely associated with ACP 2 – both are pilots and 
assistants to the Director of Operations. ACP1 had some difficulty trying to 
develop constructs and towards the end repeated the central theme of others: 
i.e. not a lot of creativity and some negativity. 
B.4.2 Eyeball Analysis 
ACP1 has built a view of the core behaviours that he observes in his 
colleagues. He has represented the topic fairly well and his constructs fell into 
the categories of: Role, Flexibility, Accountability, Ownership, Delegation, 
Communication and Accountability. 
What ACP1’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
DO Sees DO as fitting into the established system, inflexible and follows the 
rules, holds employees accountable and does not tolerate slackness. He 
accepts the operating practices, cares about performance measures that 
are assigned to him, but is not willing to delegate anything. He is territorial 
and has tight management of his area of responsibility. He has very defined 
tasks and knows exactly what jobs need to be done. He holds staff 
meetings and communicates with his direct reports, but can be uptight. He 
is held accountable for performance measures. 
MD Very much fits into the established system, is very inflexible and follows the 
rules. He holds employees accountable, accepts current operating practices 
but does not care about performance measures. He is very concerned 
about the future. He is willing to delegate, is territorial, has defined tasks 
and is sympathetic to employees. He is not communicated to (not in the 
loop), but is very easy going, does not care about performance, and is not 
held accountable. 
ACP 2  Tends to buck the system, is flexible and willing to bend but is very 
frustrated with the way we operate. He has some optimism about the future, 
is very willing to delegate. His tasks tend to be loosely defined and he is not 
communicated to. He is very easy going, but does not care about 
performance, and is not held accountable. 
DT Fits into the established system, very inflexible, holds employees 
accountable, and does not tolerate slackness. He is frustrated with the way 
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we operate, cares about performance, is willing to delegate and is very 
territorial. He has very defined tasks, and knows exactly what needs to be 
done each day. He is unsympathetic to employees, very uptight, wants to 
improve performance, and is held accountable. 
DIF  Very much fits into the established system (this seems to be the case for 
anyone who has been with the airline for some time). She is very inflexible, 
follows the rules and very much holds employees accountable. She accepts 
current operating practices, has some optimism about the future, is very 
territorial and has tight management of her area of responsibility. Her tasks 
are clearly defined. She is unsympathetic to employees. [Name] sees her as 
being rigid with the flight attendants whereas he tends to be sympathetic to 
the pilots plight. She is communicated to. She is seen as uptight. 
MCS Tends to fit into the established system, holds employees accountable, 
accepts operating practices and very much cares about performance 
measures assigned to her. She is also concerned about the future, is willing 
to delegate, more sympathetic to employees, is not communicated with, 
tends to be easy going and wants to improve performance. She is held 
accountable. 
MIF Very inflexible, holds employees accountable, does not tolerate slackness 
and accepts how we currently operate. She cares about the performance 
measures assigned to her, tends to be unsympathetic to employees, is not 
communicated to, is very uptight, does not really care about performance, 
but is held accountable. 
Self: Holds employees accountable, cares about the performance measures and 
is optimistic about the future. He is willing to delegate, and has a 
sympathetic view towards his employees. He feels that he is not 
communicated to, but is easy going and wants to improve performance. He 
is held accountable. 
B.4.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table C-7 Construct Characterisation: ACP1 - Allegheny 
Con#
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
Behavioural4.1 Bucks the systemFits into the established system
Core
Core
Core
Attributional
Core
Core
Core
Evaluative
Core
Core
Behavioural
Evaluative
Evaluative
4.13
4.14
4.9
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.2
4.3
4.4
Does not care about performance
Not held accountable for performance measures
Tasks are loosely defined - not easy to know 
when job is finished
Unsympathetic to employees
Communicated with e.g. staff meetings
Easy going
Works to improve performance
Is held accountable for performance measures
Flexible - willing to bend the rules
Does not hold employees accountable
Frustrated with the way we operate
Does not care - "this is just what we did this 
week"
Optimistic about the future - post merger airline
Not willing to delegate
Open to outside influence
Not communicate to (not in the loop)
Uptight
Cares about the performance measures 
assigned to them
Concerned that there is no future at the 
company post merger
Willing to delegate
Territorial - tight management of your area of 
responsibility
Inflexible - follows rules
Holds employees accountable - does not tolerate 
slackness
Accepts operating practices
Has very defined tasks - knows exactly what 
jobs need to be done each day
More sympathetic to employees
 
 
B.4.4 Cluster Analysis 
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 Figure C-8 Cluster Analysed Grid: ACP1 - Allegheny 
Table C-8 Cluster Analysis: ACP1 - Allegheny 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: ACP1
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There is one main cluster: MCS & Self. The next nearest match is a cluster 
between MIF, DT & DIF
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
MCS & Self are similarly rated on 9 constructs with no more than one rating 
point difference between them. 
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
MCS & Self show the highest % similarity score at 89%. MIF, DT & DIF are 
matched at 80%. 
Examine the 
remaining scores
The lowest match amongst the whole group is 59% which is ACP2 & MCS
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B.5 DO (Director of Operations) 
 
Figure C-9 Repertory Grid: DO - Allegheny 
B.5.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
The interviewee was willing to participate but could not understand the reason 
why. During elicitation I constantly had to explain what to do and keep him 
focused on the topic. He gave very little thought to this and did not engage with 
the process. The concept of a repertory grid did not make any sense to him and 
he became reluctant to develop his constructs. He did not seem to understand 
the purpose of the research. This was rather significant because he was acting 
“dumb” and simply could not, or would not, engage.  
Elements 
The elements were supplied by myself and there was agreement on why they 
were selected. 
Constructs 
DO could not remain focused on the qualifying phrase and it had to be repeated 
multiple times to provoke answers. He was distant and became reluctant to 
share any of his true feelings. This interview appeared to be of little use. The 
topic seemed to be avoided as if it was a source of pain or frustration for him. 
All constructs required a lot of thought. He focused on the subject of “it’s not in 
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our control or worth it” attitude. We eventually managed 14 constructs but it was 
a long, arduous and very trying process. He was disinterested and very 
distracted by what the future held and had a sense of helplessness and 
hopelessness. DO was a senior captain at the airline and was not looking 
forward to the prospect of having to fly the line again. He was also very 
concerned about his future employment prospects. He was considering leaving 
the industry and this seemed to trouble him a great deal. 
Ratings 
I had to prompt DO to rate each of the elements for virtually every construct that 
was developed. The scale made sense to him but quantifying each individual 
was a chore. It was emotionally involving in that DO demonstrated a sense of “I 
don’t care” and detachment from what is going on and the serious concern over 
the future. 
General 
There were many moments of thought and emotion. DO was resentful and 
resigned to a slow death. He also made comments about the CEO and the lack 
of information he has. He did not make any comments about the repertory grid 
procedure although he clearly did not understand it, but probably participated 
because I was a colleague and had asked him to. 
B.5.2 Eyeball Analysis 
There was a lot of concern over the merger and the relative position of the 
elements in the scheme of things as it relates to performance management. DO 
drew distinctions between our role in trying to improve performance and the 
hopelessness of it all considering our future was poor and that Allegheny was 
likely to merge with Piedmont Airlines. The constructs covered such categories 
as; Information, Management, Legality, Manuals, Dedication, Interaction, 
Authority, Responsibility, Leadership, Commitment and Accountability. 
What DO’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
MD Is directly involved, must consider crew legality in his decisions making. He 
has some interaction and makes final decisions. He determines direction, 
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but is not responsible for budgets. He does some work to improve 
performance and is held accountable to some degree.  
 
ACP 1 Lacks knowledge of the merger, is directly involved with the workforce, but 
also has management oversight of them. Deals with legality but does not 
write manuals or policies. He does not demonstrate a noticeable level of 
dedication and is not interactive. He makes the final determination on delay 
codes, but is not responsible for budgets. He does some work to improve 
performance and is accountable to some degree. 
ACP 2 Lacks knowledge of merger. Is directly involved and has some management 
oversight. He is not involved with writing manuals and not dedicated to his 
job. Tends to act in a supporting role, but makes final determination of delay 
codes. He is not responsible for budgets but does work to improve 
performance, but is not held accountable.  
 (both ACP 1 and ACP 2 work directly for DO) 
DT I seen as lacking knowledge on the merger, has no management oversight, 
deals with legality and is responsible for manuals. He is very dedicated to 
his job with medium interaction with others. He tends to act in a supporting 
role and makes some final determinations for delay coding. He is 
responsible for dealing with budgets and is accountable for expenditure. 
Wants to improve performance and is held accountable to some degree. 
DIF DO sees DIF as very similar to himself, probably because she shares a 
similar role being responsible for flight attendants as opposed to pilots. She 
lacks knowledge on the merger, is involved with the workforce and has 
management oversight. She does not seem to deal with legality issues. She 
tends to be dedicated to her job and has a lot of interaction with others. She 
makes the final determination on delay coding and sets direction. She is s 
highly responsible for budgets and expenditure and is held accountable to 
some degree. 
MCS Has no knowledge on the merger. She is involved with the workforce, has 
management oversight and deals directly with crew legalities. She is 
responsible for manuals, very dedicated to her job and has a lot of 
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interaction with others. She does not act in a supporting role, and neither 
gives nor receives direction. She is not involved much with budgets. She 
tends to care about performance and is definitely held accountable. 
MIF Has no knowledge on the merger. She has management oversight, is 
responsible for manuals, tends to be dedicated, interacts with people, and 
acts in a supporting role by just presenting the issues for resolution. She 
does not make the final determination or seek solutions. She is not involved 
much with budgets but does tend to want to improve performance, however 
she is not really held accountable. 
Self: DO sees himself as very similar to DIF. He has no real knowledge on the 
merger, is involved with the workforce and has direct management 
oversight. He does not tend to deal with legality issues (possibly wrong 
rating?). He tends to be dedicated to his job and makes the final 
determination and very much sets direction (Flight Operations is under DO). 
He is very responsible for budgets, tends to want improvement in 
performance and believes he is held accountable to some degree. 
During the interview DO mentioned ‘budgets’ a lot and it was obviously something that 
he was responsible for but could not get to grips with. DO was charged with explaining 
pilot pay, which was a minefield and very complex, and he was lost with how to do this 
effectively. 
B.5.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table C-9 Construct Characterisation: DO - Allegheny 
Con#
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
Core5.1 Lack of knowledge on merger A lot of knowledge on merger
Core
Affective
Propositional
Core
Core
Core
Behavioural
Core
Propositional
Core
Unremakable
Propositional
5.13
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.2
5.3
5.4
Determines direction
Responsible for budgets - accountable for 
expenditure
Works to improve performance
Directly involved with large number of workforce
Management oversight of crewmembers
Deals with FAR's, legality issues
Responsible for wirting manuals
Dedicated to job Not dedicated to job
More interaction with numbers/facts
Does not act in a supporting role
Just presents the issues for resolution
More interaction with people
Acts in a supporting role
Makes final determinations =- ODM decisions
Receives direction
Not responsible, accountable for budgets
Does not care about performance
Not accountable for performance measuresAccountable for performance measures
Isolated from workforce
No management oversight
Removed from dealing with FAR's, legality 
issues
Not responsible for writing manuals
 
 
B.5.4 Cluster Analysis 
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 Figure C-10 Cluster Analysed Grid: DO - Allegheny 
Table C-10 Cluster Analysis: DO - Allegheny 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: DO
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There are two main clusters: DIF & Self versus ACP2, ACP1 & MIF. 
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
DIF & Self are similarly rated on 10 constructs with no more than one rating 
point difference between them. 
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
DIF & Self show the highest % similarity score at 92%. ACP2, ACP1 & MIF are 
matched at 88%. 
Examine the 
remaining scores
The lowest match amongst the whole group is 67% which is ACP2 & MCS
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B.6 MCS (Manager of Crew Scheduling) 
 
Figure C-11 Repertory Grid: MCS - Allegheny 
B.6.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
[Name] understood the topic and was pleased that some intense scrutiny of the 
performance management process would take place. 
Elements 
The list of elements was considered appropriate and acceptable because it 
incorporated all of the managers in the Flight Operations department who are 
involved with performance management.  
Constructs 
The qualifying phrase was received well and served as a useful reminder during 
elicitation to ensure responses remained focused on performance 
management.  
Ratings 
The rating scale was straightforward for MCS and she was able to rate 
everyone quite easily. 
General 
[Name] initially had difficulty grasping the concept of the grid and how to 
produce constructs after being offered the triad of elements. After some trial 
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and error she was able to get into a rhythm and begin relating to the topic. MCS 
has represented her view of performance management in light of the difficulties 
she faces as the manager of Crew Scheduling and has focused on the 
crewmembers as the primary source of poor performance. Consequently, she 
looks at the pilot managers rather negatively and does not see them as doing 
anything constructive to ensure that their pilots are being held to task and 
required to perform to an acceptable standard. 
B.6.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The MCS represented the topic well and provided insightful constructs. She 
However she was quite unflattering about the DO and ACP’s and seems to 
have very little respect for pilot management, seeing them as no engaged, 
reactionary and not able or willing to solve problems. 
She seems to like DT and DIF and perhaps looks up to DIF. Both are female. 
What MCS’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
DO Is seen as laid back and perhaps disinterested. He tends to gloss over the 
details and looks at the larger picture, acts aloof and does not take action to 
solve problems. He does not show any initiative and pushes problems off as 
“a Piedmont problem”. He is not self motivated, but is very influenced by 
what others think and has to be told what to do! Even when the solution is 
obvious he is not willing to help out, does not take a stand and does not 
hold people accountable. He does not absorb the good influences 
emanating from others, shows favouritism and lacks consistency. He also 
lacks the drive to accomplish things and is easily distracted. He seems very 
unprofessional, always reactionary rather than proactive, and does not want 
to be bothered, even though the airline is performing “at the bottom of the 
list”. MCS did not give him a single central rating. She was very emphatic in 
the way she portrayed DO and seems to consider him as somewhat 
worthless when it comes to the topic in question. He seems to be an 
obstacle that must be overcome and perhaps a contributor to the problem 
rather than taking steps to find solutions. He has the authority and position 
to direct others to focus on improvement initiatives, but decides not to. Has 
become very complacent and is just trying to get by with minimum 
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commitment or involvement. The crisis within the company has affected him 
greatly. 
ACP 1 Tends to gloss over the details and is influenced by what others think. Even 
if the solution is obvious he is not willing to help out, does not hold people 
accountable, and shows favouritism. He lacks drive, and is reactionary. 
ACP 2 Very much like DO and ACP 1 who are all pilot managers.  He is viewed as 
also glossing over the details, is laid back, acts aloof, and does not take 
action to solve problems – “it’s a Piedmont problem”. He is very much 
influenced by others, has to be told what to do and will not use his own 
initiative for fear of working against his peers. He is not willing to help out, 
does not hold his pilots accountable, does not adopt any of the good 
influences that others may, and he lacks consistency. He shows favouritism 
to some crewmembers, lacks drive, is very unprofessional, reactionary and 
does not want to be bothered.  
DT In contrast DT is seen as energised and detail oriented, with a very high 
tendency to be a problem solver. He shows initiative, thinks independently 
and is not encumbered by what others think. He has ideas of how to do 
things, is company-minded, works well if coupled with the right people, is 
impartial and consistent. He acts professionally and has a proactive 
approach. He is prepared to, and wants to, make a difference. 
DIF:  Similar to DT she is highly energised, and detail oriented. She is seen as a 
problem solver, shows initiative, thinks independently and has ideas on how 
to make improvements. She is willing to take a stand and hold others 
accountable. She works effectively if coupled with the right people, is 
impartial and consistent. She is determined to get work completed and 
make modifications as needed. She is very professional, proactive, and 
wants to make a difference. 
MD Is very detail oriented and a problem solver. He is an independent thinker, 
but tends to show favouritism and lacks consistency. He is determined to 
get work done, and acts professionally, but can be reactionary rather than 
trying to anticipate problems before they arise. 
MIF Is detail oriented, has an aloofness, rather than seeking to solve problems 
and is a firm believer that “it is a Piedmont problem”. She has to be told 
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what to do, and is not willing to help even when the solution is obvious. She 
tends to be impartial and consistent, is professional, reactionary, but wants 
to make a difference. Some contradictions here perhaps? 
Self: MCS views herself as a problem solver who shows initiative and is a very 
independent thinker. She is company-minded, recognises the situation for 
what it is, and wants to fix it. She is willing to make a stand, is impartial and 
consistent, and professional and proactive 
B.6.3 Construct Characterisation 
Table C-11 Construct Characterisation: MCS - Allegheny 
Con#
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
BehaviouralLaid back Energised6.1
Propositional
Core
Core
Evaluative
Attributional
Propositional
Behavioural
Propositional
Core
Core
Core
Core
Core
Detail oriented
Alloofness, rather than taking action to solve 
problems
Shows initiative
Influenced by what others think and who they are 
around
Has ideas of how they want to do things if given 
free reign
Even when solution is obvious - not willing to 
help out (e.g. fly)
Willing to take a stand and hold others 
accountable
Works more effectively if coupled with the right 
people
Shows favouritism - lack of consistency
Determined to get work accomplished - e.g. 
modify a procedure so that it works
Professional
Proactive - prepared
Prepared - wants to make a difference
Glosses over details - looks at larger picture
Problem solver - inquisitive
It's a Piedmont problem not self-motivated, 
needs to be assigned tasks
Independent thought - actions not hindered by 
what others might think
Has to be told what to do
Company minded and recognises the situation 
for what it is and attempts to fix it
Does not hold people accountable - influenced 
by peers - makes exceptions
Reactionary
Does not want to be bothered, even though 
performing at bottom of list - unprepared
Does not absorb the good influences emanating 
from others
Very impartial - consistent
Lack of drive to accomplish things - easily 
distracted
Unprofessional
6.6
6.5
6.7
6.8
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.13
6.14
6.9
6.10
6.11
6.12
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B.6.4 Cluster Analysis 
 
Figure C-12 Cluster Analysed Grid: MCS - Allegheny 
Table C-12 Cluster Analysis: MCS - Allegheny 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: MCS
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There are two main clusters: DO & ACP2 versus DIF, DT, Self & MD. 
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
DO & ACP2 are similarly rated on 13 constructs with no more than one rating 
point difference between them. 
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
DO & ACP2 show the highest % similarity score at 92%. ACP2, ACP1 & MIF 
are matched at 81%. 
Examine the 
remaining scores
The lowest match amongst the whole group is 58% which is DO & MIF
  
38 
 
B.7 MD (Manager of Dispatch) 
 
Figure C-13 Repertory Grid: MD - Allegheny 
B.7.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
Elements 
The list of elements was considered appropriate and acceptable because it 
included all of the managers in the Flight Operations department who are 
involved with performance management.  
Constructs 
The qualifying phrase was received well and accepted as a useful way to view 
his colleagues. It helped in the formation of the constructs and was repeated 
each time that a triad was offered. The constructs focused largely on the 
behaviours exhibited by his colleagues in their approach to performance 
management.  
Ratings 
The rating system was sensible to the interviewee and he was able to easily 
rate everyone for each construct. There was a tendency not to stray too far from 
the central rating with only a few of the elements receiving a ‘1’ or a ‘5’ and then 
on only three constructs. 
General 
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MD was at ease with the process and began to develop some interesting 
insights as the interview progressed which allowed him to think more deeply 
about how the team works together and how they each view their role in the 
weekly performance review meetings. 
B.7.2 Eyeball Analysis 
MD has represented the topic well and has tended to focus on the individual 
behaviours that he are demonstrated by his colleagues. He was able to produce 
11 constructs that sum up his view, at this point in time, of how he sees his 
colleagues and their interaction with the performance management process. It 
is interesting that he views the pilot management group quite negatively but 
those that he works closely with in a more positive light. His responses fell into 
a group of distinguishable categories: responsibility, outlook for the future, 
perception, commitment, professionalism, accountability, and organisation. It is 
interesting that MD did not include communication in any of his constructs. 
(Why? The others have).  
What [Name]’s grid says about the elements and constructs: 
DO Has a strong tendency to view things through a pilot’s eyes, but if given the 
opportunity would not change the way he handles performance 
management. He believes that an “us and them” divide exists between the 
pilots that he supervises and management. DO does not accept that he is 
accountable and looks for someone else to blame. 
ACP 1 Tends to accept responsibility, and would like to stay at the company, he 
takes pride in his job and accepts the blame for delays that are incurred by 
pilots. Other than that, he is seen as being fairly middle of the road. 
ACP 2 Appears to want to stay with the company. He does not believe that an “us 
and them” divide exists, which is starkly at odds with how his boss is seen 
(DO). ACP 2 tends not to accept that he is accountable for delays taken by 
his pilots and will readily look for someone else to blame. This is more in 
keeping with how MD views DO and is perhaps because he is seen as 
following his lead. He believes that the department is disorganised, but is 
hopeful for a future at the airline. 
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DT Accepts responsibility, but is ready to move on. He would do things 
differently if given the opportunity but just goes through the motions right 
now. He does accept responsibility for operational issues but does not really 
accept any blame. This is probably because his direct involvement in the 
daily operation is limited.  
DIF  Fully accepts responsibility and holds crewmembers accountable. She 
wants to remain and is looking for a future at the company. She would like 
to be given the opportunity to do things differently. She does not think there 
is an “us and them” divide and takes pride in her role and how she handles 
herself. She is seen as being held accountable and accepts blame, She 
thinks that department is disorganised, but believes there is a future. DIF 
was only rated a ‘3’ once on all 11 constructs and stands out along with 
MCS for having that distinction. MD seems to have a very well defined 
opinion of DIF and clearly thinks highly of her. He knows her well and has a 
lot of respect for her. 
MCS Accepts responsibility and likes to see people held accountable, but is ready 
to move on. She views the issues from an administrative perspective and 
not from the same perspective that a pilot would, however she takes pride in 
her job and handles herself well. She is seen as most definitely accepting 
that she is accountable and will accept the blame for delays that are 
attributable to her area of responsibility. She also believes that the 
department is disorganised. She does not believe that there is much of a 
future for the airline. 
MIF Tends to accept responsibility and holds crewmembers accountable. She 
wants to stay on and has hopes for a place in the new company. She would 
like to do things differently. She does not think there is an “us and them” 
divide between crews and management and she takes pride in doing a good 
job. 
Self: MD sees himself as accepting responsibility and holding people 
accountable. He views things from an administrative perspective and would 
like to do things differently if he could. He takes pride in his job and believes 
that he is held directly accountable for his actions, and therefore accepts the 
blame for errors. He also believes that the department is disorganised and 
that there is not a future for the airline. MD sees himself as being very 
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similar to DO. This is interesting because they both work very closely 
together and report to the same director.  
B.7.3 Construct Characterisation 
Table C-13 Construct Characterisation: MD - Allegheny 
Con#
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
CoreFails to accept responsibilty for pilots' actions - does not hold crews accountable7.1
Accepts responsibility - holds crewmembers 
accountable
Core
Core
Core
Core
Core
Propositional
Affective
7.8
Behavioural
Wants to stay and hopes for a place in new 
company
Deals with crewmembers - views things from the 
"line" side
If given opportunity would do things differently
Handles themselves poorly Attributional
Core
Believes that Flight Dept. is organised
Does not accept accountability - not reqired to 
provide answers
Believes in "Us and Them" division between 
Flight Dept and SysCon
Takes pride in doing job as best as they can
7.10
7.11
7.5
Does not believe there is a future for them at the 
airline
7.6
7.7
Would do things the same
Does not believe in "Us and Them" division
Just goes through the motions
Handles themselves very well when dealing with 
people
Accepts direct accountability - has to provide 
answers
Looking for someone else to blame Accepts blame
Believes there is a future
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.9
Ready to move on
Views from administrative, ops management 
side
Believes that Flight Dept is disorganised
 
B.7.4 Cluster Analysis 
 
Figure C-14 Cluster Analysed Grid: MD – Allegheny 
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Table C-14 Cluster Analysis: MD - Allegheny 
Cluster analysis procedure for elements: MD
Examine the 
shape of the 
element 
dendrogram
There are two main clusters: MCS & Self versus DT, MIF & ACP1  
Identify construct 
similarities and 
differences
MCS & Self are similarly rated on 9 constructs with no more than one rating 
point difference between them. 
What does this 
mean?
Each of these clusters of elements adopts similar attitudes and behaviours in 
how they view and engage with the performance measurement and review 
system, i.e. each element within each cluster tends to act in a similar way
Find the highest 
% similarity score
MCS & Self show the highest % similarity score at 95%. DT, MIF & ACP1 are 
matched at 91%. 
Examine the 
remaining scores
The lowest match amongst the whole group is 77% which is DIF & ACP2
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Appendix C REPERTORY GRIDS AT PINNACLE AIRLINES - CYCLE 3 
C.1 MD ( Manager, Dispatch) 
 
Figure D-1 Repertory Grid: MD - Pinnacle 
C.1.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
MD approached the interview positively and was pleased to be involved in my 
research. She was relatively inexperienced in her management role and she 
took this as a learning opportunity. She was already quite well-versed on how 
Pinnacle measured flight operations performance and was keen to offer her 
thoughts on the matter. She was interested in the topic and curious to know 
what the repertory grid process was all about, and why I was interested in 
everyone’s behaviours and attitudes. She had not previously considered the 
question of how people react to imposed measures. MD had been with Pinnacle 
before the growth into regional jets occurred and so she had a good perspective 
on the effects of change. It took her a few minutes to settle into the elicitation 
process and she was quite thoughtful when considering each triad, but once 
comfortable she was willing to develop constructs more freely and they began 
to flow with little prodding. She would sometimes show a lack of self-confidence 
and look to me for approval when offering up a construct. I countered with the 
statement that there were no right or wrong answers and that only she could 
represent her thoughts and observations. 
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Elements 
MD considered the list of elements appropriate and acceptable because they 
were all managers in the SOC and colleagues that she works with, all of whom 
have direct involvement in how well the daily flight schedule operates. 
Constructs 
Once MD settled into the elicitation process it became eye-opening for her to 
compare her colleagues and then rate where they fell on each construct. It 
actually provided her with some enlightenment on how she construed their 
actions and behaviour and perhaps brought into sharper focus her thoughts on 
each of them. The qualifying phrase was received well, but I did have to remind 
her a few times to consider the triads in the context of how people behaved 
towards operations performance. Her constructs focused on the stress and 
intensity of the job and the side conversations showed that she took her role 
very seriously and understood the ramifications to the passengers when 
mistakes are made. Her discussions also reflected an energy that seemed to be 
evident in the SOC. MD seemed to know herself quite well and did not have any 
hesitation on rating herself on the far end of a construct if she thought it was 
closely related to her attitude and behaviour. 
Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and easy for MD to discern. She tried 
to avoid a central tendency unless appropriate and gave each rating careful 
consideration. She was able to quickly, and assuredly, establish a position on 
each construct for everyone. 
General 
MD is not a natural conversationalist and so the interview remained on task 
without her deviating away from the main purpose. She took the whole process 
very seriously and was intent on doing a ‘good job’. Overall, it was a pleasant 
and interesting interview, which provided me with some excellent insight. MD 
was the first person I interviewed at Pinnacle and it left an impression on me 
about how energised people were when they have an influential impact on the 
outcome of each flight. 
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C.1.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents MD’s views on the observed attitudes and behaviours of 
her colleagues at Pinnacle during a time when the airline was enjoying a 
sustained period of growth in its fleet size and scale of operation. It is clear that 
she differentiated the SOC Duty Managers (SOCDM2, SOCDM3 and 
SOCDM4) from herself, seeing them as having a different role, and approach. 
She rated the elements carefully and was able to avoid simply settling for a 
central tendency. She knew her own mind and was not afraid to rate people on 
the far ends of constructs.   
What the grid says about the elements: 
MCS: Takes her job very seriously and adopts a 24/7 approach, but focuses on 
today’s operation rather than anticipating the future. She is conscientious 
and works hard to get things done. She welcomes feedback and critique 
from others so that she can try to improve. She tries to please everybody 
and be their friend and is consequently very lenient with people, especially 
her employees, which can lead to her not being taken seriously. She is very 
content in her current position. She will invariably have to take work home 
with her because she is disorganised, arrives late for meetings, starts many 
tasks without finishing prior tasks, and is unable to effectively multi-task, 
resulting in a lot of time spent on one item at a time. She displays a very 
positive approach to work and life but can become overwhelmed and 
‘frazzled’ quite quickly. MCS has the distinction of being very different from 
her colleagues not sharing the same rating on any construct, except P2.15. 
This is significant because in MD’s view she stands apart from everyone 
else. 
MPE: Is seen as very ambitious, positive, forward thinking, and has high 
aspirations for himself and his work. He is very focused, handles tasks 
diligently and tries to relate them to improving operations performance. He 
is very calm and organised in his approach and it is clear that he is highly 
respected by MD. 
SOCDM1: Takes her job very seriously, welcomes feedback, and is very focused on 
the daily operation seeing it as her responsibility to ensure that the airline 
performs well. She has been able to relate performance metrics to how she 
approaches her job. She has high aspirations for herself and adopts a very 
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positive and confident approach. She conducts her job by the book and puts 
aside friendships with colleagues in order to be as effective as possible. 
SOCDM2: Is seen as relatively laid back but with the ability to use his initiative and 
effectively run the daily operation. He multi-tasks very well and remains 
calm and collected when under stressed. He is very content in his current 
position with no aspiration to rise any higher in the organisation or take on a 
different role. He is very focused while at work but is happy to leave the job 
behind when his shift is over, not dwelling on any operations issues after 
work. 
SOCDM3:  Is very laid back, has a positive demeanour and does not let the job get 
under his skin. Like SOCDM2 he is very content in his position, has no 
particular aspirations and leaves the job at the door when his shift is over. 
When he is under pressure he can remain calm and collected. He is 
focused on the daily operation, but does not readily see the impact and 
effect on performance metrics that his actions and those he is managing will 
have.  He will manage multiple tasks, but has a somewhat disorganised 
approach. He goes out of his way to be approachable and he genuinely 
wants to please everyone. 
SOCDM4: Is very laid back, not particularly focused and has to be told what to do 
rather than recognising it himself or using his own initiative. He adopts a 
more negative approach and does not try to relate his actions to 
performance metrics. Similar to SOCDM2 and SOCDM3 he is also very 
content in his position and is happy to leave any worries about the job at the 
door when he leaves for the day. He is task oriented and focused when he 
is told what to do and approaches it in a militaristic manner, largely resulting 
from his experiences in the Army. It is not important to him to be well-liked 
or popular, but he does expect people to do as he says. 
SOM: Is seen as very laid back and focused on today’s operation only, rather than 
anticipating the future. He is receptive to feedback and criticism, shows 
ambition and strong initiative, but can be too lenient with people. He will 
worry about his job after work and is very concerned about finishing any job 
that belongs to him. He prefers to handle only one or two tasks at a time but 
he knows how his actions effect performance and he has a good 
understanding of the performance measurement and review system. He has 
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a positive outlook, tries to please everyone and be their friend and always 
remains calm and collected 
Self: MD sees herself as fairly intense as it relates to the job, and very focued on 
her responsibilities. She has high aspirations for herself and is ambitious. 
She takes the job seriously and is able to look beyond today’s operation and 
consider the impact on future events. She will worry a great deal about the 
job after work. Shes does not like criticism from others and is strict about 
doing things by the book, seeing this as the only acceptable approach. She 
does not like to be sociable at work and it is unimportant to her whether she 
is liked or not. MD’s ratings for herself were positioned toward one side or 
another on each construct, some of them being ‘1’s’ or ‘5’s’. Only one was a 
‘3’. This suggests that she represented her construction system well and 
was able to articulate constructs that meant a lot to her personally. 
C.1.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table D-1 Construct Characterisation: MD - Pinnacle 
Construct Characterisation: Jeannine Matthews
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
P2.1 Intense - thinks about job 24/7 - wakes up at night Does not let it bother you Core
P2.2 Reporting: looking at past to forecast future Not forecasting the future, living in today
P2.3 Receptive to people's comments and critiques Does not like criticsim
P2.4 Ambitious - initiative - striving to get things done Has to be told what to do, but will get it done
P2.5
Direct result: put airline to bed. Very focused on 
daily ops. Doing whatever it takes to start the 
airline off as well as possible
Not being focused on "tomorrow" with the 
operation
P2.6 Lenient towards people By the book, people and policies
P2.7 Higher aspirations Content in their position
P2.8 Takes job home with them Forgets job when leaving door
P2.9 Focused - starts and finishes Scattered - starts many things but does not finish. Somewhat disorganised
P2.10 Handles things one at a time Multi-tasks
P2.11 Tries to understand what performance metrics mean to us and how to apply them
Does not go out of their way to understand 
performance metrics
P2.12 Positive. Tries to approach things that way. Glass half-full, not half-empty Negative - negative approach, nut not destructive
P2.13 Can get frazzled Calm and collected
P2.14 Always arrives in plenty of time Shows up just in time (meetings)
P2.15
More focused on operation and job, not the social 
part of it and being someone's friend. Not 
important for people to like us
Wanting to please people and be their buddy
Unremarkable
Core
Core
Propositional
Affective
Attributional
Behavioural
Core
Evaluative
Behavioural
Behavioural
Core
Behavioural
Behavioural
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 Figure D-2 Cluster Analysed Grid: MD - Pinnacle 
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C.2 SOM (SOC Operations Manager) 
 
Figure D-3 Repertory Grid: SOM - Pinnacle 
C.2.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
SOM was pleased to be part of the research and he consequently approached 
the interview in a positive manner. SOM was on secondment to the SOC for 
several months having previously worked here as a dispatcher and then 
Manager of Dispatch for several years. He was experienced in his role and had 
a good knowledge of how to run the daily flight operation. The repertory grid 
process was intriguing to him and was interested to learn more. SOM was able 
to understand the construct elicitation process quickly and was thoughtful when 
considering each triad, which yielded a good overall presentation of his 
thoughts and construction system. During the interview we also engaged in 
conversations related to each construct and the general operating environment. 
Elements 
SOM considered the list of elements appropriate and acceptable because they 
were all managers in the SOC and colleagues that he has worked with for a 
long time. All have a direct involvement in how well the daily flight schedule 
operates, and also the performance and review process. 
Constructs 
The elicitation process of providing a triad of elements was received very well 
and SOM enjoyed sharing his thoughts. As with others it provided him with an 
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insight that he had previously not fully considered when comparing the attitudes 
and behaviours of his colleagues.  His constructs were focused on the 
importance of the job that people do in the SOC and remained on the topic of 
attitudes and behaviours.   
Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and easy for SOM to discern. He was 
able to rate everyone carefully on each construct and was not lost for where to 
position anyone.  
General 
SOM was very involved in the daily operation and took his role seriously. He 
was therefore eager to be a part of this research and tried hard to be as 
thoughtful, insightful and constructive as possible, remaining fully engaged 
throughout the interview. It was an enjoyable interview for both of us and 
provided some excellent insight.  
C.2.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents SOM’s views on the observed attitudes and behaviours of 
his colleagues at Pinnacle during a time when the airline was enjoying a 
sustained period of growth in its fleet size and scale of operation. It was clear 
that he was excited to be a part of this growth. He rated the elements carefully 
and was able to avoid simply settling for a central tendency.   
What the grid says about the elements: 
MCS: Has a reactive approach to achieving operational goals, and does not seem 
to knows what the goals are or how to achieve them. She is very respectful 
of senior management demands and will conform to what she is asked to 
do. She is viewed as professional, a team player with a very positive 
attitude, and very approachable. She will listen to her employees, try to do 
well by them and foster a fun environment. But she is not creative and not 
able to convey her authority to others very well. SOM has a high regard for 
MCS as a person but seems quite a few shortcomings in her ability and 
approach to work. 
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MPE: Is seen as having a serious, professional and confident approach and fully 
understands the performance goals that need to be achieved. This 
approach may have lead to him being considered aloof by some. However, 
SOM also believes that he is a team player, with a positive outlook and very 
approachable to his colleagues. He will listen for understanding from 
employees when tasking them with a assignment. He likes to laugh and 
have fun sometimes but is very respectful of senior management. 
MD: Has a serious and authoritative approach to operational goals. Is perceived 
as confident, but will not take the time to explain things to her employees. 
She is unapproachable, has a self-serving agenda and does not care how 
she is perceived by others. She can be unprofessional and gives a poor first 
impression. She will think outside of the box on operation problems but will 
not work collaboratively with others. She is hurried and does not make time 
for her employees. She will stay with the company. SOM does not seem to 
have much respect for MD, seeing her as an impediment at times. 
SOCDM1 Is seen as having a serious approach to achieving operational goals. She is 
very much a team player who has a positive attitude and will not hesitate to 
exert her authority when needed. However, she will also take the time to 
work closely with her people and ensure that they understand what is 
needed. Consequently, people do not hesitate to approach her. She aspires 
to succeed, will remain with the company and demonstrates a great deal of 
respect for senior management. 
SOCDM2:  Also has a serious and professional approach to achieving operational goals 
and is confident in his work, himself, and in exerting authority. However, he 
can have a self-serving agenda and does not care about how he is 
perceived by others. People consider him unapproachable and he tends to 
work independently without taking time for other people. However, he does 
like to lighten the mood and have fun from time to time.  
SOCDM3: Has a very serious but confident approach to work and is seen as very 
knowledgeable and promotes a team environment. He demonstrates 
authority, and is willing to share this with employees to ensure that they 
understand. He is creative with operational problems and goal oriented. Will 
stay with the company for a long time. 
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SOCDM4: Is seen as reactive to operational problems, rather than being able to 
anticipate them as others would, and does not take his role very seriously at 
times. Prefers to have laugh and have fun when he really should be setting 
a better example. He is not creative and is not able to effectively use his 
authority – people tend to ignore him (bark worse than bite). Tends to have 
a self-serving agenda and does not care how others see him, but is 
approachable and will listen to his co-workers to ensure they understand 
what is needed.  He is stuck in his job and gives off the impression that he 
does not want to work here.  
Self: SOM sees himself as taking his job seriously, being very confident and 
professional in what he needs to do, and understands how it relates to 
operations performance. He has a positive attitude and is very 
approachable to his colleagues. He truly wants to succeed and be a role 
model for others. He promotes team work but sometimes does not take the 
time needed to fully explain things to his employees or colleagues, perhaps 
thinking that they should intuitively know what he means or wants. He is 
very respectful of senior management, and knows how and when to use his 
authority. He can be fickle or uncertain at times, while he decides on a 
course of action regarding his career. 
C.2.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table D-2 Construct Characterisation: SOM - Pinnacle 
Construct Characterisation: Ashley Gates
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
P1.1 More serious approach to achieving operational goals Reactive Behavioural
P1.15
P1.11
P1.12
P1.13
P1.14
P1.7
P1.8
P1.9
P1.10
P1.5
P1.6
P1.2
P1.3
P1.4
Perceived as confident: understands what the 
goals are. Confidence in understanding what we 
need to do today
Yearning for knowledge. Willingness to fully teach 
someone and look for understanding
Self-serving agenda
Positive attitude / the desire to have a positive 
attitude
Unapproachable
Aspiring to succeed and being a role model for 
wanting to aspire
Professional (demeanout) upon first impression
Do not care how they are perceived
Approachable
Stuck in job but "don't want to work here"
Unprofessional - poor first impression
Does not demonstrate that operational goals are 
part of their directive on a daily basis
Shut-up, do your job
Team player
operationally not creative (has to be told)
Perceived as aloof in regards to authority
Promotes a team environment
Listening for understanding from employees
Works in silos
Hurried. Does not take time for people
operationally thinking outside the box
Demonstrating authority
Likes to laugh and have fun and sometimes 
affects work - meant to lighten the atmosphere
Respect for senior management demands
Staying the course with the job. Longevity with the 
company
Very serious and constantly goal oriented
Resistant to management demands
Uncertainty, fickle
Behavioural
Propositional
Core
Core
Core
Evaluative
Behavioural
Core
Attributional
Core
Core
Evaluative
Core
Core
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Figure D-4 Cluster Analysed Grid: SOM - Pinnacle 
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C.3 MCS (Manager, Crew Scheduling) 
 
Figure D-5 Repertory Grid: MCS - Pinnacle 
C.3.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
MCS was pleased to be part of the research and she approached the interview 
in a positive manner. The repertory grid process was interesting to her and she 
picked-up the process quite quickly. During the interview we also engaged in 
conversations related to each construct and the general work environment. 
Elements 
MCS considered the list of elements appropriate and acceptable because they 
were all managers in the SOC and colleagues that she has worked with for a 
long time. All have direct involvement in how the daily flight schedule operates, 
and also the performance and review process. 
Constructs 
The elicitation process of providing a triad of elements was received very well 
and MCS did not have much difficulty in sharing her thoughts. As with the 
others it provided her with an insight that she had previously not fully 
considered when comparing the attitudes and behaviours of her colleagues.  
Her constructs were well thought out and after providing 10 of them she 
declared that it fully represented her thoughts at this point in time.    
Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and easy for MCS to discern. She did 
not have difficulty in rating everyone.  
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General 
MCS is very involved in the daily operation and takes her role seriously. She 
was flattered to be a part of this research and made a concerted effort to do her 
best. She remained fully engaged throughout the interview. It was an enjoyable 
for both of us, and provided good insight.  
C.3.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents MCS’s views on the observed attitudes and behaviours of 
her colleagues at Pinnacle during a time when the airline was enjoying a 
sustained period of growth in its fleet size and scale of operation.  
What the grid says about the elements: 
Self: MCS sees herself as people person who is prepared to provide plenty of 
leeway to her employees. She recognises that she is not very organised 
and accepts that it is one of her shortcomings. She also has a propensity to 
be spontaneous with voicing her thoughts before thinking them through, 
which can lead to some unusual conversations. However, she is personally 
vested in her job and takes it seriously. She does feel that she has her 
finger on the pulse but equally she is not too distant from it. She is 
considered to be very approachable by her employees and genuinely tries 
to give them her time and consideration.  
MPE: MCS sees MPE as a data gatherer who does not really have an impact on 
the daily operation. He takes his job very seriously, is very organised and 
maintains professionalism. He is reserved and careful about speaking his 
thoughts. In fact you more often than not have to pry them out of him. He 
does not have his finger on the pulse because of his detached connection to 
the operation, but he does know how we perform. His detachment from the 
day to day operation also gives the impression of being unapproachable. 
Likewise he is seen as thick-skinned and not emotional or sensitive to 
operations performance. He simply reports it and gives insight to trends. 
MD: Is seen as being very concerned about how performance results reflect on 
her and her department. She does not want to look bad. She is very 
connected to the operation and tends to micro-manage people to ensure 
that things are done her way. She takes her job very seriously and is 
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organised in her approach and method of conducting work. She focuses on 
facts and figures and is defensive if they show any shortcomings in her 
department. She is very reserved about speaking her thoughts, especially 
anything on a personal level. She will express thoughts on operational 
issues but they tend to be defensive of her department or accusatory of 
others. She has her finger on the pulse and knows how to run the operation 
well. Her aloofness makes her unapproachable and unfriendly, and she is 
therefore, perceived to be thick-skinned and not at all sensitive to others.  
SOM: SOM is closely connected to the operation and likes to allow his employees 
a high degree of freedom in doing their jobs. He is organised and is able to 
speak in specifics when discussing operations performance. He also 
responds quickly with his thoughts on questions about performance. He 
cares a great deal about his job and will do his best to ensure that the 
operation runs well. He has a very good understanding of how the daily 
operation works and what we need to do to perform. Consequently, he is 
able to identify problems quickly and easily. He is very approachable and 
not defensive about his actions. 
SOCDM1 Is concerned about how performance results reflect on her and will strive to 
do the best she can. She is very closely connected to the operation and will 
micro-manager her colleagues and employees to achieve the right results. 
She takes her job very seriously and is personally vested in the company 
with a high degree of loyalty. She instinctively knows what is happening in 
the operation and how to respond to problems when they arise. She can be 
defensive when criticisms are levelled her way regarding operational 
decisions. 
SOCDM2:  In contrast to SOCDM1, SOCDM2 (also a Duty Manager) is not concerned 
about how operations performance reflects on him. He adopts a laid back 
approach and likes to have fun and joke around. He is closely connected to 
the operation but likes to give his employees free reign to make their own 
decisions. He is very organised and will respond quickly with his thoughts 
on how things should be done. Although he is personally detached he 
accomplishes his duties very well because he has a very good 
understanding of what is happening in the operation and how to deal with 
problems. This has been learned through years of experience. He is 
regarded as one of the most effective duty managers. He is approachable 
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but has a thick skin when it comes to criticism and is not always sensitive to 
the needs of other employees. 
SOCDM3: Is very closely connected to the operation and actively encourages his 
employees to make their own decisions. He takes his job very seriously and 
is professional. He is very organised and deals in facts, however he has a 
tendency to respond quickly with his thoughts without thinking through why 
performance is the way it is. He is personally detached from the operation, 
and sees problems as operational issues not caused by him. He has a very 
good understanding of what needs to happen with the operation on a daily 
basis but is unable to explain trends or spikes in performance. His focus is 
one day at a time. SOCDM3 is very approachable and respected by his 
colleagues.   
SOCDM4: Is seen as not worried about how operations performance reflects on him 
and he adopts a laid back, relaxed and unconcerned approach. He does not 
offer much original thought and remains detached from the operation and 
performance results.    
C.3.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table D-3 Construct Characterisation: MCS - Pinnacle 
Construct Characterisation: Lucy Hathcote
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
Just data gatherers - not concerned  about how 
ops performance reflects on them
Concerned about how performance results 
reflects on themP3.1 Core
Detached from the operation
Gives people more rope, or leeway
Mainly "its just a job" laid back apporach. More 
relaxed, jokes around
More organised - speaks in specifics (facts and 
figures)
Responds quickly with their thoughts (gut 
reaction)
Less organised - speaks in generalisations
Reserved and careful about speaking their 
thoughts (original thought is held back until they 
have thoroughly considered it)
Personally vested - cares about job
Really good understanding of what is happening 
or needs to happen. Finger on the pulse
Unapproachable
Thick-skinned. Less emotional/sensitive
Approachable
Projects defensiveness into job. Overly sensitive
Connected to the operation
Micro-manages - displaying that they want to be 
hands-on in control
Takes the job very seriously - maintains 
professionalism all the time
P3.5
P3.6
P3.2
P3.3
P3.4
Core
Core
Evaluative
Evaluative
Core
Core
Evaluative
Behavioural
Behavioural
P3.7
P3.8
P3.9
P3.10
Personally detached, but accomplishes duties
Does not have finger on the pulse
 
 
 
Figure D-6 Cluster Analysed Grid: MCS - Pinnacle 
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C.4 MSOC (Manager, SOC) 
 
Figure D-7 Repertory Grid: MSOC - Pinnacle 
C.4.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
Jorge was very willing to be a part of the research and he approached the 
interview in a positive and inquisitive manner. He was also interested in the 
academic process of gathering data and analysing it and asked several 
questions as the interview proceeded. Jorge was able to make sense of the 
repertory grid process quickly and he provided some of the more distinct 
constructs that showed an appreciation of the subject and the intent of the 
interview. He was in agreement that the subject of attitudes and behaviours was 
appropriate and topical. 
Elements 
Jorge considered the list of elements appropriate and acceptable. He worked 
closely with all of them over the last three years. 
Constructs 
The elicitation process of providing a triad of elements was received very well 
and Jorge had no difficulty in sharing his thoughts and providing insightful 
constructs. He was inquisitive about the process and genuinely seemed to take 
it very seriously. He produced 12 constructs.    
Ratings 
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The rating procedure was straightforward and easy for Jorge to discern. He did 
not have difficulty in rating everyone.  
General 
Jorge was very interested in the research and especially the academic process 
of gathering and analysing data, of which he asked several questions during the 
interview. He quickly picked-up on the grid process and developed some of the 
more distinct constructs of all the interviewees, which showed a good 
appreciation of the subject.  
C.4.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents Jorge’s views on the observed attitudes and behaviours of 
his colleagues at Pinnacle during a time when the airline was enjoying a 
sustained period of growth in its fleet size and scale of operation.  
What the grid says about the elements: 
MCS: Is seen as being aware of performance numbers but is likely to sacrifice 
performance for customer service reasons. She is reactive rather than 
proactive and uses her emotions to make decisions. She is not at all 
interested in reviewing performance numbers and her motivation to improve 
performance was low.  
MPE: Proactive and practical, but remained aloof from the others. He was seen as 
being concerned about improving performance and very aware of the goals. 
He was excited to see the numbers even though he may not know what 
actions were behind them. He was analytical by nature and would try to 
predict performance problems by analysing the data. 
MD:  Committed, focused and practical, but tended to be reactive. She would 
always adhere to practices to improve performance and not be swayed by 
emotions. She was very aware of the goals and tried to be creative to 
improve performance. 
SOM: Focused on actions rather than results. Proactive, but might sacrifice 
performance numbers to ensure better customer service. Not fully aware of 
the goals, and a little disinterested in reviewing performance results, but 
was motivated to improve them if told to do so. 
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SOCDM1 Committed to good performance, but reactive in her approach. Is aware of 
the goals and objectives and adheres to practices to improve performance 
and concerned about performance but disinterested in reviewing 
performance results.  
SOCDM2:  Pays close attention to performance, is very aware of the goals and strives 
to achieve them. He is proactive, practical, and creative and will put 
performance results above customer service. Poor results motivates him to 
do better. 
SOCDM3:  Focussed, knows the goals and strives to attain them, but can be reactive 
and emotional in his decision-making. He does not show creativity, instead 
preferring black and white rules. 
SOCDM4: Practical, focussed, always follows standard practices, but is not at all 
creative and prefers to be told what to do. He enjoys reviewing performance 
results but is uninformed on how they are measured and is not committed to 
improving results unless told to do so. 
C.4.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table D-4 Construct Characterisation: MSOC - Pinnacle 
Construct Characterisation: Jorge Quezada
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
P4.1 Focused on numbers - pays close attention to performance against metrics
Focused on actions - not paying attention to 
metrics, just striving to do well Core
P4.11
P4.12
P4.7
P4.8
P4.9
P4.10
P4.5
P4.6
P4.2
P4.3
P4.4
Proactive
Practical - will look at several options before 
commiting to achieve performance goals
Focused - aware that we have goals and 
objectives and strives to achieve them
Always adheres to practices to improve 
operational performance
Aware - knows what goals are, knows what needs 
to be done
Reactive - does not foresee problems that may be 
coming, but does respond when they arrive
Concerned about operations performance - 
striving for better
Sacrifces operations performance for other 
reasons, e.g. crew rest delays for customer 
service reasons
Unaware - may not know goals but still tries to 
achieve good performance
Analytical - relies heavily on data to predict 
problems
Not concerned about operations performance. 
Has to be made aware and will then worry
Reactive
Emotional - goes with gut instinct
Aloof - not focused on operational goals
Black and white methods (learned through 
experience)
Disinterested in reviewing perofrmance numbers
Motivated by poor performance
Committed to good performance
Not motivated to improve performance if it is low
Not committed to imporving performance
Has creative ways to improve perofrmance
Interested in operations performance - excited to 
see numbers even if they don't know what to do 
with them 
Propositional
Affective
Core
Behavioural
Core
Core
Behavioural
Core
Evaluative
Core
Core
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 Figure D-8 Cluster Analysed Grid: MSOC - Pinnacle 
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C.5 SOCDM 1 ( SOC Duty Manager) 
 
Figure D-9 Repertory Grid: SOCDM 1 - Pinnacle 
C.5.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
SOCDM1 was excited to be part of the process and agreed that the subject was 
relevant and very useful. She commented that the behaviours of her colleagues 
were not always as she would like. 
Elements 
SOCDM1 considered the list of elements appropriate, especially the other 
SOCDM’s because she works hand in hand with them and shares the 
responsibility for running the daily flight operation when she is on duty.   
Constructs 
SOCDM1 initially had some difficulty in developing constructs and was a little 
unsure how to select from the triad of elements presented to her. Once she had 
produced a couple of constructs that we dismissed she began to get the hang 
of it and it flowed. She was not afraid to share her thoughts and opinions and 
was quite vocal about the subject. As we progressed she began to see a 
pattern developing with the elements and how she rated them. She thought this 
was fascinating and wanted to learn more. This was insight that she had 
previously not fully considered when comparing the attitudes and behaviours of 
her colleagues.  She produced 12 constructs that were concise, focussed and 
well thought out.    
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Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and easy for SOCDM1 to discern and 
consequently she did not have difficulty in rating everyone. She was also 
cognisant of avoiding a central tendency in her ratings and only selected ‘3’ 
when she truly could not make up her mind. 
General 
SOCDM1 was excited to be part of this process and she found the experience 
quite enlightening as she began to realise how she truly considered the 
behaviours of her colleagues. She had a little difficulty developing constructs to 
begin with but once she had produced a few constructs that we dismissed she 
began to get the hang of it and it flowed. She was not afraid to offer her 
opinions and several conversations ensued that delved deeper into certain 
aspects of her construction system.  
C.5.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents MCS’s views on the observed attitudes and behaviours of 
her colleagues at Pinnacle during a time when the airline was enjoying a 
sustained period of growth in its fleet size and scale of operation.  
What the grid says about the elements: 
MCS: Has a longer-term view of operation, rather than focussing just on today. 
She is concerned with solving problems, and is careful not to cast blame on 
others. She has a very emotional approach and is not seen as practical. 
She can become very distracted and finds it hard to remain on task. Her 
approach to work is generally not respected very well by her peers or staff. 
She is likable and she does adopt a positive approach and tries to provide 
positive reinforcement to her people. She has a lack of direction and does 
not seem committed, but is good at getting cooperation from others and 
remaining calm in stressful situations.  
MPE: Great attention to detail, looks at the operation as a whole, but is distant and 
not active. He is practical, calm, good at motivating employees and very well 
respected. 
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MD:  Very competent, takes an active role, finds solutions and solves problems, 
but can let her emotions get in the way. She is focussed, stands up for what 
she thinks is right and is driven and goal orientated. She can offend people 
and is consequently not as respected by her peer group as she could be. 
She remains clam in stressful situations. 
SOM: Very competent, is personally concerned, finds solutions, is practical, 
focussed, and respected by his peers. He is unlikely to stick by his guns, 
and will concede to others. Provides positive reinforcement, is driven to do 
well, excellent at motivating others, and will remain very calm in stressful 
situations. 
Self SOCDM1 sees herself as competent, very centred on today’s operation, 
and very capable in solving problems as they occur. She does concede that 
she has an emotional response, but she is focussed on the operation. She 
believes she is very well-respected by her peers and will always stand by 
her people. She considers that she has a very positive approach, and is 
driven and goal orientated. She rated herself highly on all of the constructs 
that had a strong positive slant to them. 
SOCDM2:  Is seen as highly competent, focussed on today’s operation and very good 
at finding solutions and solving problems. He has a practical approach, is 
not swayed by emotions and is respected by his peer group. He stands up 
for what he thinks is right, but he can provide negative reinforcement to 
others when he does so. SOCDM1 regards him highly. 
SOCDM3:  Is also considered as highly competent, takes and active role and is very 
good at solving problems. He is highly focussed, very well respected, 
defends his people, provides positive reinforcement, is excellent at 
motivating others and remains very calm is stressful situations. 
SOCDM4:  Is centred on today’s operation, is personally concerned, has a practical 
approach, but likes to escape blame and point the finger at others. He is 
also willing to sacrifice others for himself and provides negative 
reinforcement, which in turn leads to him not being respected by others.    
C.5.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table D-5 Construct Characterisation: SOCDM 1 - Pinnacle 
Construct Characterisation: Sally Russell
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
Forgetful and regarded as incompetentGreat attention to detail - highly competentP5.1 Core
Provides negative reinforecement
Has a lack of direction and is not committed
Good at motivating employees to perform. Good 
at getting cooperation outside of the SOC
Remains calm in stressful situations
Offends people. Makes people not want to help 
you
Does not remain calm. Can create stress
Positive approach - solution oriented. Provides 
positive reinforcement
Driven - knows direction and is goal oriented
Looking at the operation as a whole - longer-term 
approach
Distant. Not active. Detached
Escaping blame, pointing the finger
Emotional approach
Focused
Not respected
Goes along. Willing to sacrifice others for self
Practical approach
Distracted
Respected by their peer group
Sticks to their guns - stands up for what they think 
is right. Defends their people.
Centred on today's operation and solving 
problems that are occurring now and tomorrow - 
short-term approach
More personally concerned - takes an active role
Concerned with solving problems - finds solutions
P5.5
P5.6
P5.2
P5.3
P5.4
P5.7
P5.8
P5.9
P5.10
P5.11
P5.12
Core
Behavioural
Core
Evaluative
Evaluative
Propositional
Core
Core
Core
Evaluative
Evaluative
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 Figure D-10 Cluster Analysed Grid: SOCDM 1 - Pinnacle 
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C.6 SOCDM 2 (SOC Duty Manager) 
 
Figure D-11 Repertory Grid: SOCDM 2 - Pinnacle 
C.6.1 Process Analysis 
Topic 
SOCDM2 approached the topic in a nonchalant sort of way but soon developed 
an interest in what it might reveal.  
Elements 
SOCDM2 considered the list of elements appropriate and acceptable because 
they were all managers in the SOC and several of them were SOCDM’s that he 
had worked with for several years. 
Constructs 
The elicitation process of providing a triad of elements was received very well 
and he found it quite easy to develop constructs and did not have to hesitate 
when selecting from the triad of elements. He produce 14 constructs that all 
focussed on the behaviours of his colleagues.  
Ratings 
The rating procedure was straightforward and easy for SOCDM1 to discern. He 
did not have difficulty in rating everyone.  
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General 
SOCDM2 is very involved in the daily operation and takes his role seriously. He 
approached the topic in a laid-back manner but soon took a much greater 
interest when he realised what his constructs and ratings would say. He 
admitted to not really paying attention to people’s behaviours before and this 
process became quite revealing for him. 
C.6.2 Eyeball Analysis 
The grid represents SOCDM2’ views on the observed attitudes and behaviours 
of his colleagues at Pinnacle during a time when the airline was enjoying a 
sustained period of growth in its fleet size and scale of operation.  
What the grid says about the elements: 
MCS: Lags behind on operational issues and shows only indirect control over the 
operation. She is approachable and patient but seeks approval and 
recognition. She is out of touch, not knowledgeable about the operation and 
is unable to explain operational results. She has low expectations of others 
and is passive. 
MPE: Has indirect control over the operation, is easily approachable, but is out of 
touch with his knowledge of the operation and is unable to explain 
performance results. He is passive, patient, driven and ambitious, and does 
not feel a need for approval.  
MD:  Displays very prompt attention to operational issues, has indirect control 
over the operation, but is very knowledgeable about ops detail and 
statistics. She is not very approachable, but can be impatient and 
aggressive. Makes independent decisions, is driven and ambitious, but very 
defensive. She seeks approval and recognition and needs to be valued. She 
has high expectations of others especially subordinates.  
SOM: Gives prompt attention to ops issues, but indirect control of the operation. 
He is passive and very approachable. Capable of speaking to ops 
performance, and is very willing to engage and explain issues. Makes 
independent decisions, and is very ambitious. Open minded and not easily 
offended. Has high expectation of others. 
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Self SOCDM2 sees himself as giving very prompt attention to operational issues, 
and having a very direct control over the operation. He is up to date on his 
understanding of the operation and is easily able to speak to ops 
performance issues. He is patient, but can be a little aggressive and has 
high expectations of others. He is and happy and comfortable in his role. 
SOCDM3: Displays a very prompt attention to ops issues and has direct control over 
the operation. He is knowledgeable and up to date on understanding of the 
operation and he is able to speak to performance results, but he requires 
guidance before making decisions. He is very patient, easily approachable, 
and happy in his role. He is open minded, does not feel a need for approval, 
and has less expectations of others. 
SOCDM4: Has direct control over the operation and responds to operational issues 
promptly. He is approachable, up to date in his knowledge and capable of 
speaking to ops performance issues. He is happy and comfortable in his 
role, but can be defensive and seeks approval and recognition. He has high 
expectations of subordinates,   
C.6.3 Construct Characterisation 
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Table D-6 Construct Characterisation: SOCDM 2 - Pinnacle 
Construct Characterisation: James Gazlay
Emergent Implicit Type of Construct
P6.1 Displays prompt attention to operational issues Lags behind Core
P6.11
P6.12
P6.13
P6.14
P6.7
P6.8
P6.9
P6.10
P6.5
P6.6
P6.2
P6.3
P6.4
Believes and demonstrates they have direct 
control over the operation
Has an easily apporachable attitude
Is current and up to date on their understanding 
and knowledge of the operation
Most knowledgeable about ops details and 
statistics
Capable of speaking to ops performance results
Willing to engage and explain issues
Able to make independent decisions
Not knowledgable on all aspects of operation
Unable to speak to ops performance
Unforthcoming with information and explanations
Requires guidance before making decisions
Open-minded. Not easily offended
Does not feel a need for approval
Patient
Driven (self-driven). Ambitious
Shows indirect control over the operation
Is unapproachable
Out of touch
Impatient
Happy and comfortable in current role
Behavioural
Core
Behavioural
Behavioural
Has high expectations for others, especially 
subordinates
Aggressive
Less expectations of others. More accepting
Passive
Defensive
Seeks approval and recognition - needs to be 
valued
Core
Propositional
Core
Behavioural
Core
Attributional
Core
Evaluative
Core
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 Figure D-12 Cluster Analysed Grid: SOCDM 2 - Pinnacle 
 
 
 
76 
 
Appendix D INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AT PINNACLE – CYCLE 4  
 
Concept A: Structure 
Q.1 Responsibility 
Do you feel that your tasks and responsibilities are clearly defined? 
Q.1a 
Why do you think that is? 
Q.1b 
What could be different? 
Q.2 Responsibility 
Are tasks and responsibilities applied consistently at all management levels? 
Q.2a 
Are they applied across all departments? 
Q.2b 
Can you give me any examples? 
Q.3 Content 
Do you use financial and non-financial performance information to assist you in 
achieving your performance objectives?  
 
Q.4 Content 
Does this information have a strategic focus by using success factors and key 
performance indicators? 
Q.5 integrity 
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Is the performance information reliable, timely and consistent? 
Q.5a 
Why do you think that is?  
Concept B: Behaviour 
Q.6 Manageability 
Are you easily able to obtain performance management reports?  
Q.7 Manageability 
What if you need more detailed information? 
Q.8 Accountability 
Do you feel responsible for performance results? 
Q.8a 
What about in your own area of responsibility?  
Q.8b 
What about the organisation as a whole? 
Q.9 Management Style 
Is senior management visibly interested and involved in the performance of their 
employees?  
Q.9a 
How do they exhibit this? 
Q.10 Management Style 
Does senior management stimulate an improvement culture? 
Q.11 Management Style 
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Do they encourage proactive behaviour? 
Q.12 Management Style 
Do they confront employees who have sub-standard results? 
Q.13 Management Style 
Do they provide motivation and inspiration? 
Q.14 Action Orientation 
Do you feel that performance information is integrated into the daily activities of 
employees in such a way that problems are immediately addressed and 
corrective or preventative actions are taken? 
Q.14a 
Why do you think this is? 
Q.15 Communication 
Does communication about performance results take place at regular intervals? 
Q.15a 
Is it driven from the top down?  
Q.15b 
Does communication flow from the bottom up? 
Q.16 Communication 
Is knowledge shared in general? 
Q.16a 
Is knowledge shared between departments? 
Q.16b 
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What about between employees? 
Q.17 Communication 
Is performance information shared? 
Q.17a 
Is it shared between departments? 
Q.17b 
What about between employees? 
Q.18 Alignment 
Do you think other departments in the company such as Finance, and HR, 
aligned with performance management, so that what is important to the 
organisation (ops performance), is regularly evaluated? 
Q.19 General 
Can you describe the performance measurement and review process at 
Pinnacle? 
Q.20 Conclusion 
Is there anything further you would like to comment on? 
Q.21 Interviewee questions 
Do you have any questions? 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
Appendix E          WEEKLY OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE DASHBOARD 
CRJ200
Ave a/c Stn/
CF D:0 A:14 OTS MEL's Cxls WX MX Pilot FA Dmg Other Comments Pilot FA TTL
Su 2‐May 97.7% 61.8% 67.5% 1.2 43 16 2 1 8 2 0 3 1 sub in flight, 2 sub mx 53 22 75
Mo 3‐May 99.0% 68.0% 79.7% 5.4 37 7 0 3 0 2 0 2 2 sub mx 47 23 70
Tu 4‐May 98.3% 78.7% 88.1% 7.4 45 12 0 11 0 0 0 1 1 sub mx 39 15 54
We 5‐May 99.4% 71.0% 78.2% 4.0 45 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 ATC/1 FC/ 1 EQP SUB MX  45 15 60
Th 6‐May 99.5% 77.4% 86.7% 4.4 44 4 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 atc 43 12 55
Fr 7‐May 98.6% 61.9% 70.4% 4.5 55 10 1 2 2 0 0 2 EQP SUB MX  42 19 61
Sa 8‐May 97.2% 70.3% 53.9% 3.5 50 14 2 4 1 0 0 7 5 ATC, 2 eqp sub (mx) 37 18 55
98.5% 69.9% 74.9% 4.3 46 68 5 23 11 4 0 22 <‐ Totals Ave: 43.7 17.7 61.4
CRJ900
Ave a/c
CF D:0 A:14 OTS MEL's Cxls WX MX Pilot FA Stn/Dmg Other Comments Pilot FA TTL
Su 2‐May 100.0% 44.9% 51.3% 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% completion 5 6 11
Mo 3‐May 100.0% 27.4% 38.1% 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% completion 7 8 15
Tu 4‐May 98.8% 61.7% 84.0% 1 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 cx mem atl 8 6 14
We 5‐May 100.0% 61.0% 77.1% 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% completion  9 6 15
Th 6‐May 100.0% 72.1% 82.6% 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% completion 11 9 20
Fr 7‐May 100.0% 57.0% 74.4% 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% Completion 6 6 12
Sa 8‐May 100.0% 78.7% 85.2% 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% completion  7 7 14
99.8% 57.5% 70.4% 0 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 <‐ Totals Ave: 8 7 14.4
Pilot FA TTL
58 28 86
54 31 85
Outlook 47 21 68
ATL: 54 21 75
DTW: 54 21 75
MEM: 48 25 73
MSP: 44 25 69
Ave 51.3 24.6 75.9
Weekly Operations Peformance (7 days: Sun ‐ Sat inclusive)
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No Sig WX expected for majority of week
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